Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

A clear title. - In the body, a single conclusion answering the question: The Truth by which all things are true is in one way one, and in another way not. - This conclusion is proved with respect to both parts at once in this way. Truth is first in the intellect and secondarily in things, in relation to the divine intellect. Therefore truth existing in the intellect, according to its proper notion, is multiplied both in diverse created intellects and in one and the same intellect according to diverse things known; but the truth by which all things are said to be true is one and primary.

The antecedent is clear from what has been said. The consequence, however, as regards the inference of each part, is proved from the difference between the univocal and the analogical in this respect: that in the former, the proper ratio is preserved in each of its univocates according to its own proper ratio; whereas the latter posits the proper ratio only in the first, while in the others it is an order founded upon the first. Examples are given in the text. – As for what is implicitly contained in the second part of the consequent, namely that all things are referred to the truth of the divine intellect, it is proved thus: because each thing is assimilated to it according to its own entity. And the first part of the consequent is confirmed by the authority of the Gloss, as is clear in the text.

II. Concerning the first part of the consequent, a doubt arises. Either that part, namely the truth of the intellect is multiplied, is not proved in the text except by the authority of the Gloss; or truth is found univocally in all intellects, at least created ones. But each of these is inconvenient. Therefore. – The assumption is proved. In the text there is no proof except from the difference between the univocal and the analogous. And on the side of the analogous, as is clear in the text, multiplication is not inferred, but on the side of the univocal. Therefore either it is not proved; or it is proved from the condition of the univocal, that it is multiplied according to the multiplication of its univocates: and thus it is supposed that truth is found univocally in all created intellects. – That both of these are inconvenient is made manifest. First indeed, because in the text, after the difference between the univocal and the analogous, and its application to the matter under discussion, the conclusion is immediately drawn with a mark of inference, saying, if therefore we speak etc. Second, because truth in our intellect is composition and division: but in the angelic and divine intellect it is simple understanding, eminently prepossessing whatever both our simple understanding, and composition and division, have. III. Concerning the same part also a doubt arises, because the text seems to imply a contradiction. For if the analogous is preserved according to its proper account in one only; and it is established from qu. XIII¹ that all names common to God and others are analogous, and consequently that truth is found analogically in the divine intellect and other intellects; it follows that in many intellects there are not many truths, but all intellects are true by one single truth, namely that of the divine intellect. And conversely, if truth is multiplied according to the multiplication of true intellects, then it is not said of them per prius et posterius: because what is said per prius et posterius is found formally in one only, as the text sounds. IV. Concerning the second part of the consequent also, a doubt arises. For when it is said that all things are true by the divine truth, speaking of the truth of a thing, this is understood either by extrinsic or by intrinsic denomination. Not intrinsic, as is clear: therefore extrinsic. And if so, then things either are not true formally: which is inconvenient, because each thing has in itself its own truth of a thing, by which it is called true, as is clear of sense with respect to its proper sensible object. Or they are true in both ways; just as in Qu. de Bono² it was said that all things are good by the divine goodness exemplarily, finally and effectively, and yet, along with this, they are formally good by their own goodnesses. And if so, then they are not true solely by the divine truth. V. To the first doubt³ it is said, denying that disjunctive proposition: for a third way of expounding the text is granted. For the clarification of which, know that two things are contained in univocal predication: namely, to be predicated formally of its univocates; and to be predicated of them according to entirely the same formal account, as is clear in animal with respect to ox and lion. Its multiplication, however, according to the multiplication of subjects, does not belong to it from the second (for it would belong to it alone, which is known to be false): but it belongs to it from the first, in which it communicates with some non-univocals. Hence, since the discussion here concerns the univocal insofar as it is multiplied according to the multiplication of subjects, it follows that the proposition by whose force the inference holds with respect to the first part is not this one, the univocal is multiplied according to the multiplication of its univocates: but this more common one, contained in the former, a formal predicate is multiplied according to the multiplication of subjects. And then I concede that it is understood to be subsumed that truth is a formal predicate with respect to the intellect. And thus it is inferred: therefore truth is multiplied according to the multiplication of intellects; indeed of intellects, whether in one or in diverse intellects. But the text mentions rather the univocal than a formal predicate, so that the teaching might be handed down from what is better known. VI. But to the second doubt⁴ it is said that that rule concerning the analogous handed down in the text is not universal over every mode of analogy: rather, properly speaking, as is clear I Ethic.⁵, it belongs to no analogous name, but belongs to names toward one or in one or from one, which we abusively call analogous. Truth, however, if compared to things and intellects, is a name from one: since truth is in the intellect alone, from which things are called true. If, however, it were compared to intellects among themselves, then it is an analogous name: for it is preserved proportionally, though formally, in every intellect knowing the true. To be, therefore, a name according to its proper account in one only, is a condition of names that are toward one or from one, etc.: and not of names said proportionally. Truth, however, with respect to the divine intellect and the others, is a proportional name. And therefore it does not follow that it is in God alone. For it has already been said in the solution of the first doubt⁶ that every formal predicate written down you will find treated in the treatise On the Analogy of Names⁷. VII. But to the doubt against the second part of the conclusion⁸, the answer is had from the text, where it is said that although there are many essences or forms of things, nevertheless there is one truth etc. For these words were added after the proved conclusion, to declare the difference between goodness and truth in this regard. Since all things are called good in two ways, intrinsically and extrinsically, as was said in qu. VI⁹: but they are called true only by extrinsic denomination, such that no truth is in things formally; but imitatively or fulfillingly with respect to the divine intellect, and causally with respect to our speculative intellect. For if there were no intellect, no thing would be true, nor could any sense be called "of" its object, except equivocally, as is said in Qu. de Ver., qu. I, art. 4.: just as, if there were no health of the animal, no medicine and no diet could be called healthy. And the reason is one for all: namely, that in the account of the true in things falls the truth of the intellect; and in the account of the healthy in medicine and diet falls the health of the animal; and so with the others. For when the definition is removed, the same name does not remain except equivocally.