Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

A clear title. – In the body there are two parts: first, he answers the question; second, he assigns the reason for the several definitions of truth, there: And according to this, truth ¹.

II. As to the first, the responsive conclusion to the question is: Truth is principally in the intellect, secondarily in things, in relation to the intellect on which they depend.

This conclusion has three parts. And as to the first, it is proved as follows: The true is the term of the intellect; therefore it is in the intellect. – The antecedent is explained by the proportional agreement between the true and the good: for just as the good signifies that toward which appetite tends, so the true signifies that toward which the intellect tends. The consequence, however, is proved from the difference between appetite and cognition, from Book VI of the Metaphysics ²: because the former is completed outside, the latter within.

As for the second part, namely that truth is in things secondarily, it is proved there: But as the good. Truth is in the intellect insofar as it is conformed to the thing understood; therefore the ratio of truth is derived from the intellect to the thing understood; therefore the thing understood is called true insofar as it has an order to the intellect. – The antecedent is made clear from the proportional agreement between good and truth: for just as the good is in a thing as suitable to appetite, so truth is in the intellect, etc. Both consequences are likewise proved from the same root: the first, because from the good in a thing goodness is derived to appetite; the second also, because on this account appetite for the good is called good.

As to the third part, namely that from which it depends, it is proved there, The thing understood, however, in two ways: first, by reason; second, from the effects. The reason is this. A judgment about any thing is not made according to those features that belong to it accidentally, but essentially: therefore each thing is said to be true absolutely, in relation to the intellect on which it depends. The antecedent is evident. The consequence is proved from the difference between a thing's order to an intellect that is causative and one that is merely cognitive: namely, that to the latter it has an accidental order, but to the former an essential one; which is illustrated by the example of a house with respect to the craftsman and to one who is not a craftsman. – The effects, moreover, that bear witness to these truths are artificial things and natural things. For artificial things, both mechanical ones, such as a house, and liberal ones, such as speech, are true absolutely if they conform to their arts. Natural things too are true absolutely if they accord with the maker, whom we take to be the first intellect.

III. Concerning the foregoing, two propositions are to be noted. The first is, truth is that toward which the intellect tends, as the good, etc.: for this will be discussed below, art. 3, ad tertium ³. The second is, cognition is according as the thing known is in the knower, but appetite according to an inclination toward the thing: and this will be defended in qu. LXXXII, art. 3 ⁴, where the will is compared with the intellect.

IV. As regards according to ⁵, the reason for the six definitions of truth is given: three pertain to truth in things, two to truth in the intellect, and one to truth in both. All is clear.

A clear title, among those who hold that the intellect composing and dividing does not signify a substance or any power; but it names an operation of the intellect called composition and division in Book III On the Soul ¹

II. In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: Truth, properly speaking, is only in the intellect composing and dividing. - This conclusion has two exponents, namely: truth, properly speaking, is in the intellect composing and dividing; and, that it is in nothing else. And both are proved together in the text, thus. Every thing is true according as it has its own form of its nature: therefore the intellect, as knowing, is true, according as it is assimilated to the thing known: therefore truth is the conformity of intellect and thing: therefore to know truth is to know the conformity of cognition to the thing cognized: therefore neither sense, nor the intellect with respect to what a thing is, but the intellect judging it to be so as it is apprehended, knows truth first and says what is true: therefore the intellect composing and dividing knows truth: therefore in it alone is truth according to the proper mode of the name true as imported: therefore in it alone is truth, properly speaking.

The first consequence is proved: because the likeness of the thing known is the proper form of the intellect as knowing. - The second indeed holds manifestly from its antecedent, already proved, together with that proposition placed at the beginning of the body of the article, namely, truth, according to its first ratio, is in the intellect. For if it is thus, and the truth of the intellect is considered according to its likeness to the thing, it follows that truth is to be defined by the conformity of intellect and thing. - The third, however, is left as known. And truly it is known: since, if the truth of cognition consists in the likeness or conformity of intellect and thing, it must be that to know truth is to know this conformity, namely of intellect and thing; and conversely, to know this conformity is to know truth. - The fourth, however, as regards its negative parts, is declared in sight and simple intellection. As regards the affirmative part, however, it needs neither proof nor manifestation. - The fifth, however, is proved: because in every proposition one applies some form signified by the predicate to the thing signified by the subject, or removes it from it. - The sixth, however, is proved: because the true is the perfection of the intellect as known. And it is made manifest from the difference, following from what was said above, between the knower's being true and the knower's knowing the true. For the former is for the knower to be true as a certain thing: and therefore it belongs to sense, to the intellect grasping what a thing is, and to uncomplex utterances. The latter, however, is to have the true as known in the knower: and therefore it belongs to the intellect composing and dividing, and to complex utterances as signs, etc. - Finally, the last consequence is self-evidently known, as is clear.

III. For the evidence of these things, note that the plain sense which the surface of this text shows at first glance: it seems that, because the cognition of a sense, say sight, or even of simple intellect, is conformed to the thing, it can therefore be called true: but because it cannot know that conformity which exists between the simple cognition itself and the thing, therefore ² it does not know truth: and because the composing intellect knows that conformity, it therefore knows truth. - But such a sense is foreign to this text, in truth. First because it is false that simple intellect does not know that conformity: since that conformity is something definable, and consequently is known by simple intellect. Second because that conformity is not known except reflexively by intellect: but truth is known directly, and not merely reflexively. Third because the middle term adduced in the text to prove that the conformity in which truth consists is known by intellect composing or dividing would not be to the point, as is clear to one who applies it.

IV. Therefore, so that the present text may be clear, along with any similar to it, four points are noted. First, that it is one thing to speak of intellect even in act second, and another to speak of intellect insofar as it is knowing; and likewise, it is one thing to speak of the truth of the former, and another of the truth of the latter. For no more is required for the truth of intellect in act second than for the truth of sense in act second: hence both intellect and sense in act are said to be true as a certain true thing, when their cognition is informed by assimilation to the known. But for the truth of intellect insofar as it is knowing, it is required that truth be in it insofar as it is knowing; and this is only if it be in it insofar as it has cognized. And therefore the text, investigating where the true properly resides, proceeds from the proper form of intellect not in first or second act, but insofar as it is knowing; and it holds that its proper form and perfection is the likeness of the thing known—not that which is the principle of cognition, but that which is the term or as it were the term, or the perfection toward which, upon being attained, cognition is perfected.

V. Wherefore note second, that the likeness of the thing known is taken in two ways, as far as the matter at hand is concerned. First, for the intelligible or sensible species simple, that is, representing in the manner of an incomplex, whatever that species may be. Second, for the species representing the thing known as such, whether incomplex or complex, whatever it may be, whether impressed species, expressed species, or the very cognition itself: for these do not vary the matter at hand. In the present passage the likeness of the thing known is not taken in the first way, as the superficial exposition understands³, but in the second. So that the sense of the text is that the likeness attained or acquired by cognition is the proper form and perfection of the intellect insofar as it is knowing; and ⁴ that cognition which knows its own conformity with the thing known—that cognition knows the true, and no other; in whatever way that conformity may be, namely, whether in the manner of a complex or of an incomplex.

VI. Third, note that knowing the conformity of oneself to the thing known occurs in two ways: namely, in signified act and in exercised act. To know conformity in signified act is for the cognition to terminate in the relation of conformity. To know conformity in exercised act, however, is to know something in itself as conforming to what is known. That this may be perceived more clearly, it is made manifest in the act of speaking, since the point in question appears more clearly in it. Someone states the conformity of intellect and thing in signified act when he utters these words, or their meanings, either in general or with respect to the particular matter he understands, mentally or vocally; but he states it in exercised act when he says something as conforming to things. Now one never says anything as conforming to or discordant from a thing so long as he says something incomplex: for in saying man, or centaur, or void, I say nothing as conforming to or discordant from any thing. But when he first says a man is, he says something as conforming to or discordant from a thing, since he says something signifying a man to be, as is evident of itself. And it is similar with believing and knowing. Therefore, to know one's own conformity to a thing is nothing other than to know something in itself as conforming to the thing. And this is nothing other than to apprehend some complex: for in apprehending the word a man is, one apprehends something as conforming.

In the matter at hand, conformity is not taken in the first way, as that superficial exposition accepted⁵, but in the second. And therefore in the text it is proved that to know one's conformity to a thing belongs properly to the intellect composing and dividing, on the ground that every enunciation posits or removes something from a subject. For if to know one's own conformity to a thing is to know something in oneself as conformed to the thing; and something is never known in oneself as conformed except when an enunciation is known, which is admittedly present in the one enunciating, and imports conformity or non-conformity to the thing ⁶; it follows that only the enunciating intellect knows and says what is conformed or non-conformed as such. And because this alone is to say and know truth in exercised act, therefore only the intellect composing and dividing knows and says truth; and truth in exercised act is in the intellect alone that composes and divides, as known and said in the knower and sayer. For the knowledge of truth in exercised act and in signified act must be distinguished just as the things said above. If you do not grasp this distinction, even any novice will perceive it from this distinction, as regards its meaning. For "to signify truth," as is found in the instructions of logic, occurs in two ways: namely in exercised act and in signified act. For the word true signifies truth, but does not exercise it: but the words man is a biped signify truth, because they exercise truth itself. And the words man is winged signify falsehood in exercised act, etc. And therefore in I Perihermeneias ⁷ it is said that an enunciation is speech signifying truth or falsehood, namely in exercised act; which is to signify what is conformed to the thing or non-conformed as such.

VII. From these considerations, however, the fourth point is evident, which introduces great obscurity into this matter, namely that truth is a conformity of intellect and thing. For this can be understood of the truth of a thing, or of truth absolutely. And in the first way it is very well said: since the truth by which every thing is said to be true in its own degree of being (esse), whether or not anything knows it, consists in the conformity of these two, as is clear from this passage and the preceding one. In the second way, however, as appears at first sight, it is well said, but must be understood particularly: because not the conformity of any intellect whatever, but only of a complex intellect, is truth, as is clear from what was said ⁸. But if we have examined this definition more deeply, we shall find that, speaking universally and properly, this definition belongs to truth alone in the absolute sense; and not to the truth of a thing, except extensively. For the conformity of an intellect to a thing can be found in the intellect in two ways: in one way per accidens, in another way per se. For no simple (incomplex) intellect, as such, has conformity to a thing per se: because the simple, as such, exercises no relation of equality or inequality to another ⁹, even though perhaps it is in fact adequate to another, as is clear by induction. But every complex mental proposition exercises ¹⁰, in its proper character, being equal or unequal to the thing enunciated: since essentially it is a likeness consisting in this, that something is or is not in that thing; and if indeed what it represents as present is present, it is called conformate; but if not, difform. Therefore, since some intellect is conformate or difform from its own proper character; and since the conformity of intellect is of the character of truth absolutely; it is consistent that the discussion concerns the intellect to which conformity belongs per se. So that the sense is: truth is a conformity of intellect and thing, that is: truth is an intellect conformate to a thing per se; or, the conformity of an intellect that is per se the subject of conformity: so that in the definition of truth the intellect is posited as subject not per accidens, but per se. Such is the composing intellect, as was said ¹¹. Hence Aristotle, in Book IV of the Metaphysics, text 27 ¹², defined true and false by means of the enunciable, saying that the true is for being (ens) to be (esse) and non-being not to be, while the false is for being not to be and non-being to be. So that he defines the enunciable by the true, and the true by the enunciation: so that it may be shown that the true is found properly only in this composition, as truth exercised.

In the title, "ly" true is taken in the community of its analogy, as is evident from the response to the first question.

In the body, one conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: Truth and being are convertible. — It is proved by a reason that includes at once the force of the middle term and a manifestation drawn from the proportional likeness of truth and goodness. The force of the middle term is: each thing, insofar as it has esse, to that extent is knowable; therefore ens and truth are convertible. — The antecedent is made manifest from the authority of Book III On the Soul, in which it is said that the soul is all things, because it is all things knowable; for this would not be true unless knowability matched esse, as is evident. But the consequence is proved: because truth imports an order to cognition, that is, the knowable.

Proportional similarity, however, consists in three things. First, in this: as the good signifies the appetible, so the true signifies the intelligible. Second, that as the good is convertible with being (ens), so is the true. Third, as the good adds over and above being (ens) an ordination to appetite, so the true adds an ordination to intellect.

II. On this point there is one doubt. For the force of the medium consists in this, that the true signifies the knowable in general, as is clear both from the words of the text and from the authority cited from Book III of the Soul. But the text itself declares this to be false at the end, since it says that the true signifies an ordination to the intellect; and thereby it signifies the knowable in this way, namely through the intellect, and not the knowable in general. And truly it is so: for, as was said in the first article, the true signifies that toward which the intellect tends.

III. To this it is briefly answered by denying that the force of the medium requires that "true" signify "knowable in common." For it is sufficient either that it signify knowable in common, or that it signify in such a way that the mode of signifying be so ample as to extend to all things to which knowable in common extends. For it makes no difference to the force of the argument whether "true" imports knowable in common, or something equivalent to it: in either case there follows the convertibility of the true with being. And so it is in the case at hand: since intelligibility extends to all things to which knowability extends—for everything knowable is intelligible, and each thing has as much intelligibility as it has of esse—he began from the knowable in the letter and arrived at the intelligible, so as to hand on the teaching from the easier matters, leaving what we have said to be understood implicitly. So too, when he says each thing insofar as it has of esse, to that extent is knowable, he leaves out and conversely, which nevertheless must be understood implicitly, so that ens and the true follow upon one another convertibly.

IV. In reply to the third point, a difficulty arises: because this reply seems to conflict with things said above and elsewhere by St. Thomas. For it was said in the first article that the true is that toward which the intellect tends, just as the good is that toward which the appetite tends; and elsewhere ¹ it is said that the true is the object of the intellect. But now it is said that the notion of the true attains upon the apprehension of ens. For the object of the intellect does not follow intellection, but rather precedes it. — It also seems contrary to the truth. For ens is not true because it is apprehended; rather, conversely, because it is true, therefore it is apprehended, whether actually or potentially. V. To this it is said that the true is taken in two ways, as is clear from what has been said ²: namely, for the truth of the thing, and properly. And that which is properly true is the intrinsic terminus of intellection, and its intrinsic object, indeed the proper objective perfection of the one understanding. And thus the true neither follows nor precedes intellection, but is simultaneously that which perfects it. And of this the present text is not speaking, but rather the text of the first article, which infers that the true is in the intellect. — The true of the thing, however, is indeed posterior to ens, but prior to cognition; and it is the object of the intellect not formally, since that is ens, but it is the proper condition of the formal object. For ens, although according to all conditions and modes and notions it terminates the intellect, since all things are understood actually or potentially, nevertheless requires a certain general condition by which it exercises this function of objectively perfecting the intellect: and this the true adds over and above ens. For it does not perfect the intellect in just any way; just as neither does it perfect the appetite in just any way, nor act in just any way. Hence between the true and the good, although they agree in this, that each is an object and terminates, etc., there is this difference: that the good seems to signify the formal object of the will, whereas the true seems to signify a condition of the formal object. And therefore every appetition is an appetition of the good formally; but not every intellection is an intellection of the true formally, as is said in the text, but of a true thing; so that the word thing denotes the thing understood, and the word true the condition by which the thing is understood. On this account, the arguments of Scotus in I, dist. III, qu. III or V, by which he attacks the claim that the true is the proper object of the intellect, need not be solved: because they speak of the formal object, which in this text is taught not to be so. VI. To the opposing arguments ³, therefore, it must be said that the statements of St. Thomas are contrary neither to one another nor to the truth. For this text does not mean, speaking of the truth of the thing, that the notion of the true follows apprehension; but that the notion of the true stands by or assists apprehension. For this is what he intends by the word attains upon: for to attain upon, properly speaking, is not to follow, but rather to reach. For the text clearly shows that it intends nothing else than that there is something true when ens is understood and yet the true is not understood; as also the example of intelligibility shows; for it is established that the object is intelligible before it is apprehended. Nor for that reason do we posit the true in the thing without an order to the intellect; rather, we posit first ens, then ens as perfective of the intellect, and third the intelligible; because it is intelligible because it is true, and not conversely. But in this, namely in being perfective of the intellect, an order to the intellect is manifestly evident.

In the title, "ly" secundum rationem properly falls upon the good and the true, and not upon the prior: although both senses come to the same thing, if priority of reason is taken in itself, as can be gathered from the response to the first, not merely with respect to us. The sense is therefore: Whether the ratio of good is prior by reason to the ratio of true. II. In the body there are two parts: first, a tacit objection against the question itself is excluded; second, the question proposed is answered ¹. As to the first, it is said that, although each of these converts with being suppositionally, they are nevertheless distinguished by reason. He said this because, since order presupposes distinction, and this question concerns the order of good and true, their distinction must be had beforehand. But from what has been said so far ² it is held that good and true are the same as being, and consequently the same as each other. How then is order now being asked about? This objection is excluded by those few words at the beginning of the text: for in them it is declared that identity is in the subject, not in the formal ratio of these; but in this they are distinguished. III. As to the second ³, the question is answered with a single conclusion: The ratio of true is absolutely prior to the ratio of good. It is proved in two ways. First, the true follows esse simply and immediately, while good follows esse according as it is in some way perfect, that is, according as it bears in some way the ratio of perfection: therefore the true is closer to being than good: therefore it is prior. – The antecedent, as to its second part, is proved: because being is desirable in this way; that is, being does not have the ratio of the desirable except as it takes on the ratio of perfection. This is evident both because being does not accompany the ratio of good under every consideration whatever, as is clear in mathematics; and because every appetent thing desires some perfection. – The second consequence is also proved: because being is known to be prior to good, indeed first simply. Second, the conclusion is proved. The true pertains to cognition, but good to appetite: therefore the true is prior to good. – The inference is proved: because cognition naturally precedes appetition.

A clear title. – In the body, a single conclusion answering the question: In God there is not only truth, but He Himself is the first and highest truth. – This conclusion contains within itself four parts: first, that in God there is truth as in a thing; second, that in God there is truth objectively; third, that God is truth; fourth, that He is first and highest. And with respect to all of these it is proved in the text. With respect to the first indeed: The esse of God is not only conformable to His intellect, but is itself His very act of understanding: therefore it is true in the highest degree by the truth of a thing. – The inference is proved: because truth in a thing exists according as that thing has an esse conformable to an intellect. With respect to the second, however: The understanding of God is the measure of every other esse and intellect: therefore He knows the true. – The inference is proved: because truth in an intellect exists according as it apprehends the thing as it is. For it is evident that an intellection which measures every esse must apprehend things to be as they are. And likewise one which measures every intellect, even one composing and dividing, must apprehend whatever is apprehended by any intellect whatsoever. With respect to the third, however: God is His own esse and His own understanding: therefore He is truth itself. – And the inference is evident. For from the fact that He is His own esse, it follows: therefore He is truth itself as regards the thing. But from the fact that He is His own understanding, it follows: therefore He is truth itself in the intellect. With respect to the fourth part, however, no special proof is brought forward, but it is gathered from what has been inserted in the preceding passages. For since His own esse and understanding have the character of the first measure and cause of every esse and intellect, it manifestly follows that the truth which is there is highest and first.

A clear title. - In the body, a single conclusion answering the question: The Truth by which all things are true is in one way one, and in another way not. - This conclusion is proved with respect to both parts at once in this way. Truth is first in the intellect and secondarily in things, in relation to the divine intellect. Therefore truth existing in the intellect, according to its proper notion, is multiplied both in diverse created intellects and in one and the same intellect according to diverse things known; but the truth by which all things are said to be true is one and primary.

The antecedent is clear from what has been said. The consequence, however, as regards the inference of each part, is proved from the difference between the univocal and the analogical in this respect: that in the former, the proper ratio is preserved in each of its univocates according to its own proper ratio; whereas the latter posits the proper ratio only in the first, while in the others it is an order founded upon the first. Examples are given in the text. – As for what is implicitly contained in the second part of the consequent, namely that all things are referred to the truth of the divine intellect, it is proved thus: because each thing is assimilated to it according to its own entity. And the first part of the consequent is confirmed by the authority of the Gloss, as is clear in the text.

II. Concerning the first part of the consequent, a doubt arises. Either that part, namely the truth of the intellect is multiplied, is not proved in the text except by the authority of the Gloss; or truth is found univocally in all intellects, at least created ones. But each of these is inconvenient. Therefore. – The assumption is proved. In the text there is no proof except from the difference between the univocal and the analogous. And on the side of the analogous, as is clear in the text, multiplication is not inferred, but on the side of the univocal. Therefore either it is not proved; or it is proved from the condition of the univocal, that it is multiplied according to the multiplication of its univocates: and thus it is supposed that truth is found univocally in all created intellects. – That both of these are inconvenient is made manifest. First indeed, because in the text, after the difference between the univocal and the analogous, and its application to the matter under discussion, the conclusion is immediately drawn with a mark of inference, saying, if therefore we speak etc. Second, because truth in our intellect is composition and division: but in the angelic and divine intellect it is simple understanding, eminently prepossessing whatever both our simple understanding, and composition and division, have. III. Concerning the same part also a doubt arises, because the text seems to imply a contradiction. For if the analogous is preserved according to its proper account in one only; and it is established from qu. XIII¹ that all names common to God and others are analogous, and consequently that truth is found analogically in the divine intellect and other intellects; it follows that in many intellects there are not many truths, but all intellects are true by one single truth, namely that of the divine intellect. And conversely, if truth is multiplied according to the multiplication of true intellects, then it is not said of them per prius et posterius: because what is said per prius et posterius is found formally in one only, as the text sounds. IV. Concerning the second part of the consequent also, a doubt arises. For when it is said that all things are true by the divine truth, speaking of the truth of a thing, this is understood either by extrinsic or by intrinsic denomination. Not intrinsic, as is clear: therefore extrinsic. And if so, then things either are not true formally: which is inconvenient, because each thing has in itself its own truth of a thing, by which it is called true, as is clear of sense with respect to its proper sensible object. Or they are true in both ways; just as in Qu. de Bono² it was said that all things are good by the divine goodness exemplarily, finally and effectively, and yet, along with this, they are formally good by their own goodnesses. And if so, then they are not true solely by the divine truth. V. To the first doubt³ it is said, denying that disjunctive proposition: for a third way of expounding the text is granted. For the clarification of which, know that two things are contained in univocal predication: namely, to be predicated formally of its univocates; and to be predicated of them according to entirely the same formal account, as is clear in animal with respect to ox and lion. Its multiplication, however, according to the multiplication of subjects, does not belong to it from the second (for it would belong to it alone, which is known to be false): but it belongs to it from the first, in which it communicates with some non-univocals. Hence, since the discussion here concerns the univocal insofar as it is multiplied according to the multiplication of subjects, it follows that the proposition by whose force the inference holds with respect to the first part is not this one, the univocal is multiplied according to the multiplication of its univocates: but this more common one, contained in the former, a formal predicate is multiplied according to the multiplication of subjects. And then I concede that it is understood to be subsumed that truth is a formal predicate with respect to the intellect. And thus it is inferred: therefore truth is multiplied according to the multiplication of intellects; indeed of intellects, whether in one or in diverse intellects. But the text mentions rather the univocal than a formal predicate, so that the teaching might be handed down from what is better known. VI. But to the second doubt⁴ it is said that that rule concerning the analogous handed down in the text is not universal over every mode of analogy: rather, properly speaking, as is clear I Ethic.⁵, it belongs to no analogous name, but belongs to names toward one or in one or from one, which we abusively call analogous. Truth, however, if compared to things and intellects, is a name from one: since truth is in the intellect alone, from which things are called true. If, however, it were compared to intellects among themselves, then it is an analogous name: for it is preserved proportionally, though formally, in every intellect knowing the true. To be, therefore, a name according to its proper account in one only, is a condition of names that are toward one or from one, etc.: and not of names said proportionally. Truth, however, with respect to the divine intellect and the others, is a proportional name. And therefore it does not follow that it is in God alone. For it has already been said in the solution of the first doubt⁶ that every formal predicate written down you will find treated in the treatise On the Analogy of Names⁷. VII. But to the doubt against the second part of the conclusion⁸, the answer is had from the text, where it is said that although there are many essences or forms of things, nevertheless there is one truth etc. For these words were added after the proved conclusion, to declare the difference between goodness and truth in this regard. Since all things are called good in two ways, intrinsically and extrinsically, as was said in qu. VI⁹: but they are called true only by extrinsic denomination, such that no truth is in things formally; but imitatively or fulfillingly with respect to the divine intellect, and causally with respect to our speculative intellect. For if there were no intellect, no thing would be true, nor could any sense be called "of" its object, except equivocally, as is said in Qu. de Ver., qu. I, art. 4.: just as, if there were no health of the animal, no medicine and no diet could be called healthy. And the reason is one for all: namely, that in the account of the true in things falls the truth of the intellect; and in the account of the healthy in medicine and diet falls the health of the animal; and so with the others. For when the definition is removed, the same name does not remain except equivocally.

A clear title. – In the body, a single conclusion, answering the question in the negative: No created truth is eternal. – It is proved. The truth of enunciables and of things is nothing other than the truth of an intellect: therefore, if no intellect were eternal, no created truth would be eternal: therefore, only in the divine intellect does truth have eternity: therefore, no created truth is eternal.

The antecedent, as regards its first part, is proved. An enunciable in speech is true significatively only, just as urine is said to be healthy; but in the mind it is true through itself, that is, formally true: therefore. As regards the second part, it is assumed from what has been said. The first consequence is left evident in itself, because no other truth is given besides these three, namely truth in the thing, truth in the sign, and truth in the intellect. The second is proved: because only the divine intellect is eternal. The third, however: because truth in the divine intellect is God Himself, as was said in article five; but created truth is other than God.

II. Note here two things. First, that the principal conclusion is not placed formally in the text, but virtually in that more universal proposition: nothing other than God is eternal, because truth is God. – Second, that from this passage you have most clearly that no secondary object of the divine intellect is to be posited which would be other than God: since if propositions known, or their truth—which is the same thing—are in the divine intellect God himself, how much more so the stone, and whatever else is signified incomplexly. And this must be well noted, for confirming the doctrine concerning the divine understanding delivered ¹.

A clear title. – In the body, one responsive conclusion to the question, with one corollary. The conclusion is: The truth of the divine intellect is immutable; but that of our intellect is mutable. – Concerning this conclusion, three things are said. First, a reason is given why an answer is rendered concerning the truth of the intellect, when the question was asked about truth in general. And it is said at the beginning of the body that this is done because truth exists formally in the intellect alone; therefore also its mutability and immutability; for the other conditions follow upon being (esse). – Second, the conclusion is proved. – Third, the term mutable, posited in the conclusion, is explained. For it can be taken in two ways: namely, subjectively and terminatively. In the matter at hand it is said to be taken terminatively, and not subjectively; and the reason is that forms are called mutable in this way, that is, terminatively, not subjectively. Therefore the conclusion is proved as follows. The truth of an intellect is the conformity of the intellect to things; therefore it can vary on the side of the intellect and of the thing; therefore, if there be some intellect without any alternation of opinions, and whose apprehension no thing escapes, its truth is immutable; therefore the truth of the divine intellect is immutable, but ours mutable. - The antecedent is clear. The first consequence is proved: because every likeness can vary on the side of its extremes. But the second: because this variation on the side of the intellect consists in a change of apprehensions; but on the side of the thing, in a hidden change of the thing. But the third is left evident. The corollary, however, is: The truth according to which natural things are said to be true is altogether immutable. - It is proved: because it is the truth of the divine intellect.