Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

A clear title. - In the body he does three things: first, he answers the question affirmatively; second, he shows that this plurality is not repugnant to divine simplicity ¹; third, he shows how this plurality is ².

II. As to the first point, the responsive conclusion is: It is necessary to posit many ideas. — Proof. The ultimate end in any effect is properly intended by the principal agent: therefore the order of the universe is properly intended, and made for its own sake (per se), by God: therefore there is in the divine mind an idea of the order of the universe: therefore there are in it proper rationes of all things: therefore there are in it many ideas.

The antecedent is made manifest by the order of an army and its commander. The first consequence is proved: because the best thing existing in things is order, which is confirmed from Metaphysics XII. And the truth of the consequent is confirmed by the refutation of Avicenna's opinion, etc. The second, however, is self-evident. The third is proved: because the ratio of the whole cannot be had unless the rationes of all those things from which the whole is constituted are had, as is clear in the case of a house and its parts. And the truth of the consequent is confirmed by the authority of Augustine. Finally, the last consequence has no need of proof.

III. Note that in the first antecedent it is not said to be the ultimate end, but it is said to be the ultimate end in each effect: for here we are speaking of the intrinsic end of the effect, and not of an end that is outside the effect. For as is clear from Metaphysics XII ³, text 52, the good of the universe is twofold: namely, that which remains within the universe itself, and another outside it. The first is order; the second is God, on account of whom even the order itself exists. Therefore the order of the universe, because it is the best in the whole universe, must be ultimate in this effect which is the universe, and consequently must correspond to the principal agent—which we suppose to be God. And thus God is the agent per se and the end of the very order itself, just as a general is with respect to the order of an army.

Note, secondly, that the text, in order to show the force of this middle term for inferring a plurality of ideas in God, inserted the opinion of Avicenna concerning the manner in which the plurality of creatures emanated—of which there will be discussion below ⁴. For if the distinction of creatures were not intended by God per se, but were accidental on the part of God—that is, on account of the succession of agents, or in any other way whatever—we would have no way of concluding that there are exemplars of many things in God, but only of one thing. For no craftsman requires an idea of those things that are accidental.

IV. As to the second point ⁵, it is shown that the plurality of ideas is not repugnant to the divine simplicity, on account of the difference between what someone understands and that by which he understands. And he uses such an argument. To multiply what is understood does not conflict with simplicity, but to multiply that by which one understands does; but an idea is what is understood, and not that by which one understands; therefore, a multitude of ideas is not repugnant to the divine simplicity. — The major premise is proved: because understanding many things does not posit composition or imperfection, etc., but understanding by means of many species does indeed posit this. The minor premise is proved inductively from the idea of a house in the mind of the craftsman, etc.

V. Concerning the difference assigned in the text between that and whereby, a doubt arises. First, either the discourse concerns a real plurality or one of reason. If real, the plurality of both prejudices divine simplicity. If of reason, each can with equal reason be made plural. For the divine essence, as species, comprehends all intelligible species, just as it itself comprehends all objects as objects: and thus plurality according to reason is equal in both.

Secondly, the intellect from God cannot be anything but one in number, as is clear in XII Metaphys. ⁶ Therefore it is repugnant to multiply that by which what is understood by God is understood. Therefore it is false that a plurality of that which is understood is not prejudicial. Thirdly, in God there is wisdom and art and knowledge: therefore that by which He understands is multiplied in God. The consequence is proved, because these are related as that by which God understands; as the text also expressly says in the reply to the second.

VI. For the clarification of these points, know that, as regards the terms by which and that which, the discussion here concerns the by which and the that which in exercised act; namely, those formal reasons, or things, which exercise the act of the that which itself, or the act of the by which itself. Thus, in the case at hand, the idea is what is understood in exercised act, since it signifies what stands to intellection as object or term: art, however, is the by which in exercised act, because it imports what stands as the formal principle of intellection. And so with the others. As for multitude or plurality, know that here there is no question of real plurality; nor of plurality of reason, speaking formally; but of plurality simply of the that which or of the by which. So that the intention of the text is to establish a difference in this: that the formal reason exercising the act of the that which can be multiplied simply, and can be said absolutely to be many; whereas the reason exercising the act of the by which cannot be multiplied in such a way that it could be said absolutely to be many. VII. To the first objection raised on the opposite side ⁷, the reply is clear. For we say that, since the idea is what is understood, and every distinction of reason suffices for the plurality of what is known (for one thing known is the point as principle, and another as end); therefore for the plurality of ideas that relative distinction suffices, by which the essence, as imitable in this way, is one thing known, and as imitable in that way, is another thing known, etc. But for the plurality of the principle of understanding, not just any distinction of reason suffices: rather a distinction according to the proper and per se reason of the principle of understanding is required. Therefore the reason of the multitude of the by which is not the same as that of the that which. When, then, it is said, the divine essence contains just as many objects as does the reason, it is granted. But it is denied that, just as that plurality which is understood in it as objects suffices for the plurality simply of its that which, so the same plurality which is understood in it as reason or species of understanding suffices for the plurality of its by which; for the reason already given. To the second objection, however, the answer is given in two ways. First, that what is understood by God is one only as distinguished against many disparate things: and not as distinguished simply against many things. The ideas are not many disparate things known, neither among themselves nor from the divine essence: since each of them is the very essence. For it would be against the simplicity of the understanding if it had many disparate things known, as such, that is, in cognitional being (for we speak formally): as happens in us when we understand a triangle and an ox. But to have many things known that are not disparate—indeed, communicating in one number—does not prejudice simplicity. – Second, that what is understood per se first by God must be one. But the idea is what is understood per se second, and therefore it admits of multitude. For it was not said in the text that everything of the sort of the that which can be multiplied; but that multiplying the that which does not prejudice simplicity. And this is sufficiently verified if the that which per se second can be plurified. To the third it is said that it labors under equivocation. For the text does not intend that several diverse formal reasons of the by which sort cannot be posited in God: but that none of them can be multiplied. For there are not in God many wisdoms, nor many arts, etc. But there are in God many ideas. VIII. As for the third point ⁸, the manner is shown in which the aforementioned objective plurality is in the divine intellect. God perfectly understands the essence: therefore he knows it in every way in which it is knowable: therefore he knows it not only in itself, but also insofar as it is participable in any way by a creature; therefore he knows it as imitable in this way by such a creature: therefore as the proper reason of this creature: therefore he knows the plural reasons of things, which we call ideas. The antecedent is clear, along with the first consequence. The second, however, is proved: because God is knowable in both ways. The fourth is proved: because the species of creatures are according to the modes of participating the likeness of the divine essence. The fifth is clear from this: because the judgment about this creature and about others is the same. IX. In reply to the first, note diligently that here there is no question of just any likeness, but only of the exemplar. Now nothing is imitable exemplarily unless it be the object of the intellect. And therefore, although the divine essence absolutely is priorly imitable than it is an object, nevertheless it is not priorly imitable exemplarily than it is an object: because of the reason of the exemplar, as was said ⁹, objective being belongs. Hence, if God were not an intellectual agent, his essence would indeed be imitable, but not exemplarily: and thereby it would not have the reason of an idea. And this the text intimates, saying that it names not the essence, but the reason understood from it. X. In reply to the second and third objections, for clearer understanding, note three things together. First, that the idea signifies the divine essence imitable exemplarily. And because imitability can be taken in two ways, namely fundamentally, that is, for the absolute, and formally, that is, for the respect, the signification of idea can be imagined in three ways: first, as signifying only the absolute; second, only the respective; third, both. And indeed that it signifies not only the foundation of imitability is proved from this: since that is entirely one in all the ideas (because it is the divine essence itself, most simple, in which the absolute imitable by a stone cannot be distinguished from the absolute imitable by a lion), the plurality of ideas in God could not be sustained: for it is impossible to understand several ideas unless the thing signified by the idea is understood as pluralified. That it also signifies not only the respect is clear from this: it is said to signify the divine essence. Hence it remains that it signifies both; not in the way in which the word garment would signify a white man if imposed on each (since thus the idea would not have one reason); but in the way in which names signify the absolute relatively, as Savior and Creator, etc. And thereby, of the reason of the idea in God are both essence and relation; not as parts composing one common reason, but as thing and mode, as determinable and determination, as common and proper. Second, note that the ideas, both in craftsmen and in God, happen to be understood in two ways: first, as they are the ideas of other things; second, as they are in themselves. An example of both members is found in the text, in the reply to the second objection: when the craftsman contemplates the house to be made, the intellection terminates at the idea of the house inasmuch as the idea is the idea of the house; but when the craftsman, in a reflex act, considers the very thing he conceives in his mind as an idea, the intellection terminates at it as it is in itself. In the same way also in God. From this distinction you can easily perceive that the ideas are constituted not by being understood as they are in themselves, but by being understood as the ideas of other things. Nor does it matter for our purpose whether that understanding is actual or habitual. And therefore it is granted that in God there are several ideas before they are ideas understood in themselves. And for this reason in the text, at the end of the reply to the second objection, concerning the second mode in which they are understood, it says, and this is for there to be several ideas in his intellect as understood. Because it is one thing for there to be several ideas in his intellect, and another for there to be several ideas in his intellect as understood: for the first says them to be objectively in the intellect as the reasons of other things; the second truly says them to be objectively there as understood in themselves. Therefore he added as understood. Third, note that these respects distinguishing the ideas, since they are also constitutive of them, do not follow upon the act of the divine intellect understanding the ideas; but they come about through the act of the divine intellect understanding its own essence comparatively. So that one must not imagine that first the essence is understood as imitable, and then the ideal respect follows: but that the very intellection of the essence as imitable is the constitution of the ideal respect. – From this, moreover, you have that the ideal respects are not posited as necessary in order that God may distinctly understand creatures, as some seem to interpret: for it is evident that the perfection of the divine intellection does not beg from respects of reason. But they are posited as necessary, necessarily constituted from the perfection of the divine intellection. Hence in the body of the article the Author said that, because God understands his essence most perfectly, therefore he understands it as imitable in so many ways: for this is to constitute several ideal respects, and to understand several ideas as they are the reasons of other things, and to understand creatures distinctly in the divine essence set before him. And if you have contemplated these things well, you will laugh at the objections of others: which I did not bring forward, because they do not fight against the sense of the exposition of the doctrine of St. Thomas.