Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title nothing else is to be noted, except that what the name means of "idea" is explained in the body.

In the body there are three parts: first, he proposes the responsive conclusion to the question; second, he assigns the meaning of the name of idea¹; third, he proves the responsive conclusion².

II. As to the first, the responsive conclusion to the question is affirmative: It is necessary to posit ideas in the divine mind, – Where note that esse in the mind is taken formally, that is, insofar as the mind is. This, however, is an objective esse, as understood in the one understanding; and not as a form in that of which it is the form. The sense of the conclusion, therefore, is that it is necessary to posit ideas objectively in the divine intellect.

III. As regards according to³: idea signifies the form of some thing existing apart from the thing itself. And this is made clear from the Greek idiom. — If you wish to see a fuller definition of idea, read question III of De Veritate, article 1.

IV. As to the third point ⁴, the proposed conclusion is proved as follows. The world was not made by chance, but was made by God acting through intellect: therefore the form of the world is the end of its generation: therefore there is an idea in the divine mind. The antecedent, in both its parts, is supposed, as will be shown below in its proper place. — The first consequence is proved from that maxim: in all things that are generated not by chance, the form is the end of the generation. — The second consequence, however, infers two things: namely, both that the form, according to whose likeness etc., is in God; and that it is in such a manner, namely in the divine mind, that is, objectively. And both are proved in the text. As to the first: because it is common to every agent to prepossess the likeness of the intended form. As to the second, there is a difference between a natural agent and one acting with purpose, in the mode of possessing that likeness: because the former possesses it according to natural being (esse naturale), as is clear in fire; the latter according to intelligible being (esse intelligibile), as is clear in the craftsman. Therefore, if God is an agent acting through intellect, therefore etc. — The third consequence is then proved: because in this consists the ratio of an idea. It is proved: the ratio of an idea is that it be a form outside the thing, an exemplar of the thing, and a principle of knowledge, etc.

V. Note here carefully that in the text it is cautiously said that the idea is posited as exemplar, and it is not said as principle of being. For "principle of being" would signify the form by which an agent acts; but "idea" does not signify such a form, rather the form which the agent conceives, according to whose likeness he works, and not by which he works. And this is properly an exemplar. And therefore in the example of the housebuilder it is expressly added that the idea of the house is the form conceived in the mind, and not the art of building. Similarly, when the text had said that the idea is a principle of knowledge, it immediately added the qualification, insofar as the forms of knowable things are said to be in the knower. As if to say: I do not say that the idea is a principle of knowledge (for this would signify that it is itself the ratio of knowing as an intelligible species); but that it is a principle of knowledge in the way in which the forms of knowable things existing objectively in the knower are said to be principles of the knowledge of those knowable things themselves. And since in the penultimate consequent all of this was contained—namely, the form of the world existing apart from the world, and exemplary causality, and the mode of being intelligibly or objectively—therefore rightly was the last consequent proved from those things pertaining to the ratio of idea which had already been laid down, with pregnant words, namely, and herein consists the ratio of idea.

VI. In response to the third, a doubt arises: because it seems false and incongruous that the idea should be the divine essence. False indeed, says Scotus, in I, dist. XXXV, because the whole rationale of an idea is satisfied in a stone having objective esse in the divine intellect: therefore an idea in God is not the divine essence. — The antecedent is clear by applying the whole rationale of an idea. And it could be confirmed by assuming the definition given in Qu. de Ver., qu. III, art. I, and the one derived from that article: namely, that it is the form of some thing other than the thing itself, an exemplar, and the principle of cognition of that same thing. — The consequence, moreover, is proved as follows: objective esse is not real esse, but diminished esse; therefore it is not the divine essence.

Incongruous, however, because an idea is either the divine essence as it is, or the divine essence as it is set before the divine intellect as an object. If in the first way (as is intimated in the following article, where it is said that the idea is the divine essence insofar as it is imitable: for this belongs to the divine essence insofar as it is a being), then the answer given to the principal question of the article is wrong. And the consequence is proved as follows. To the question whether it is concerning a thing that has being both in the nature of things and in the intellect, it is wrongly answered in the affirmative by the being it has in the intellect, the being in the nature of things being passed over: just as, to one asking whether the sphere of fire exists, it would be wrongly answered that it exists in the intellect. And the reason is that being in the intellect is being in a certain respect, while being in the nature of things is being simply: but the question whether it is asks about being simply; and therefore, if it is answered with respect to being in the mind, it is insinuated that that thing has no other being, but that being in the mind is its being simply. If, therefore, the idea is the essence according to real being, the answer given to the question is wrong: it is necessary to posit ideas in the divine mind. — But if the idea is the essence as it is set before the divine intellect as an object, then it was wrongly said that it is the divine essence itself. For the divine essence as set before the intellect as an object does not have real being, but objective being. And if, per impossibile, the divine essence were not in the nature of things, and were set before the intellect as an object, the account of the idea would be preserved. Therefore, that the idea is the same as the essence is accidental, indeed superfluous: for the nature of any thing is set before the divine intellect as an object, though secondarily, even if it were never identified with the divine essence as it is set before the divine intellect as an object; for it is known by God not only as it is in the prior object, but in itself. — These arguments are not formally from Scotus: but partly from him, partly from the text, I believed they should be formed, so that the truth may shine forth.

VII. To make these things evident, two points must be considered, on which the solution of everything depends: first, how the idea is related to esse; second, what esse obiectum is ⁵.

As to the first point, know that, as is clear from the passages cited ⁶, it belongs to the notion of an idea that it be the exemplar of a thing. And it belongs to the notion of an exemplar that it be formative of the thing, through an agent acting by way of intellect. Hence in the same place ⁷ it is said that if all things acted by necessity of nature, ideas would not be posited. Now it belongs to the notion of what is formative in this way that it exist in a mind: for no exemplar is ever formative in this way unless remotely, unless it exists in a mind. And if it exists only in a mind, its formative character is thus preserved. Therefore the mode of being of the exemplar that is necessary is existence in a mind; the other modes of being are accidental, speaking absolutely. And for this reason, in the text, to the question whether they exist concerning ideas, the answer given was that they exist in the divine mind. For existence in a mind is simply necessary for the being of ideas, and belongs formally to an idea precisely as idea. Nor did the Author concern himself with the existence of ideas in the nature of things, as is attributed to Plato: since he was teaching theology, and treating of the divine intellect; whereas that discussion is metaphysical, belonging to the treatise on Separate Substances. Hence it is clear that the idea in God is, formally speaking, the divine essence as it exists in the divine mind. Nor does the opposite follow from those words of the following article: for "imitable" is understood to contain within itself the character of an exemplar. And accordingly, as is clear from what has been said ⁸, the divine essence is called an idea insofar as it is an exemplar, that is, insofar as it is formative of a thing through the medium of intellect. But this is clearly not fitting to the essence insofar as it exists merely naturally, but insofar as it is set before the divine mind as its object.

VIII. But what is being in this way, namely objective, which was to be examined in the second place ⁹? — Scotus, in book I, distinction XXXVI, determines that known being is not real being, absolute or respective; nor is it relative being according to reason; but it is the diminished being of a thing, whether absolute or relative, which is called being secundum quid; so that a thing having such a mode of being founds a relation of reason to the intellect. And he holds that the stone, etc., are entities produced from eternity by God, through the act of the divine intellect, in such being; and that entities of this kind are beings secundum quid; and that they are called ideas, because all the conditions of ideas belong to them, as was shown by argument ¹⁰.

But I, nurtured on Peripatetic milk and, as they say, unable to speak in the open air, know only real being and being of reason, apart from the breadth of real being (V ¹¹ and VI Metaphys. [**5]). Now I learned from St. Thomas, in Qu. de Ver., q. XXI, art. 1, that being of reason is a relation or a negation. Hence, since objective esse is not a mode of being according to the thing, nor is it a negation, it remains that it is a relative esse according to reason, speaking in general terms. But since the divine esse is of such excellence that it eminently precontains all modes of being, whether outside the soul or in the soul, it must be that the natural esse of the divine essence itself is not only of the intelligible order and in its purest act, but is also (and not accidentally) the objective esse of that same essence with respect to its own intellect: otherwise it would not contain all modes of being in one most eminent way. And by this, neither does the divine essence, as an object presented to an intellect, have diminished esse; nor does any thing, as an object of the divine intellect, have diminished esse. Of the divine essence indeed this follows manifestly: because its objective esse is the natural esse of God himself, on account of his excellence. Of other things it follows from this, that others can be presented to God in no other way than as objects within the divine essence: for God understands nothing outside himself, but all things only in himself. So that he knows both in himself, namely both the stone as an object in the essence, and the stone absolutely; and this stone, and the stone in my soul, etc.: for he knows all these things, but the mode in which these things are presented is one, namely in the divine essence. And consequently the objective esse of things with respect to the divine intellect is not a relative esse, but an absolutely most real one, namely the esse of God. And because the idea in God, of which we are speaking, signifies things according to such an esse, therefore it was rightly said that it is the divine essence itself, etc.

IX. To the first objection, therefore, the inference is denied. To its proof, however, it is said that, although objective being in common is not real, objective being nevertheless is real in the divine intellect. ¹²

To the second, it is already clear that the idea in God is the divine essence as an object presented to the divine intellect, etc. And when it is argued, therefore it was wrongly said that the essence is, the inference is denied. First, because it was not said that it is essence insofar as it has natural being. Second, because if this had been said without duplication, it would be true, on account of the unity of both in God. For the divine essence possesses both modes of being eminently, in its single most excellent mode of being: and therefore, in affirming the identity of the idea with the essence, it does not formally follow, speaking in a human manner, therefore identity is affirmed with the essence insofar as it exists in the nature of things. In the text, however, the latter is not affirmed but the former. And therefore those two consequences, which were subjoined as objections, namely, therefore for the idea in God to be identical with the divine essence is accidental, and, therefore it is superfluous, are of no force: because identity with the essence is essential and necessary, from the fact that nothing can be presented to the divine intellect except in the divine essence. So that the mode in which things are presented as objects is necessarily being in the object-essence: otherwise God would understand something outside himself, and his intellect would be diminished, as is clear from Book XII Metaphysics ¹³. Hence it is false and impossible that the stone should be presented to God objectively in itself as stone. Yet this argument assumes and presupposes such a thing, out of ignorance of metaphysics.

But as for that hypothetical deduction, if the divine essence were not in the nature of things, and were set before its own intellect, the account of an idea would be preserved: therefore the identity of the idea with the essence is accidental, once the conditional is granted, the further inference is denied. Indeed, the opposite follows: because, that conditional standing, the idea would be the very essence as set before the intellect. — And if it be said, therefore that the idea is the divine essence according to real esse is accidental, the inference is denied. For the objective esse of the divine essence, in the intellect of God, is not accidental in a real sense, but essential, from the proper eminence of the essence itself. Yet many happen to be deceived in this matter, from the fact that objective esse is considered absolutely, and real esse absolutely, which, as is agreed, are not the same; since the discussion here concerns objective esse of a certain kind, and a real esse of that kind, from which the identity arises—though with the license of stammering, so to speak.