Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title nothing else is to be noted, except that what the name means of "idea" is explained in the body.

In the body there are three parts: first, he proposes the responsive conclusion to the question; second, he assigns the meaning of the name of idea¹; third, he proves the responsive conclusion².

II. As to the first, the responsive conclusion to the question is affirmative: It is necessary to posit ideas in the divine mind, – Where note that esse in the mind is taken formally, that is, insofar as the mind is. This, however, is an objective esse, as understood in the one understanding; and not as a form in that of which it is the form. The sense of the conclusion, therefore, is that it is necessary to posit ideas objectively in the divine intellect.

III. As regards according to³: idea signifies the form of some thing existing apart from the thing itself. And this is made clear from the Greek idiom. — If you wish to see a fuller definition of idea, read question III of De Veritate, article 1.

IV. As to the third point ⁴, the proposed conclusion is proved as follows. The world was not made by chance, but was made by God acting through intellect: therefore the form of the world is the end of its generation: therefore there is an idea in the divine mind. The antecedent, in both its parts, is supposed, as will be shown below in its proper place. — The first consequence is proved from that maxim: in all things that are generated not by chance, the form is the end of the generation. — The second consequence, however, infers two things: namely, both that the form, according to whose likeness etc., is in God; and that it is in such a manner, namely in the divine mind, that is, objectively. And both are proved in the text. As to the first: because it is common to every agent to prepossess the likeness of the intended form. As to the second, there is a difference between a natural agent and one acting with purpose, in the mode of possessing that likeness: because the former possesses it according to natural being (esse naturale), as is clear in fire; the latter according to intelligible being (esse intelligibile), as is clear in the craftsman. Therefore, if God is an agent acting through intellect, therefore etc. — The third consequence is then proved: because in this consists the ratio of an idea. It is proved: the ratio of an idea is that it be a form outside the thing, an exemplar of the thing, and a principle of knowledge, etc.

V. Note here carefully that in the text it is cautiously said that the idea is posited as exemplar, and it is not said as principle of being. For "principle of being" would signify the form by which an agent acts; but "idea" does not signify such a form, rather the form which the agent conceives, according to whose likeness he works, and not by which he works. And this is properly an exemplar. And therefore in the example of the housebuilder it is expressly added that the idea of the house is the form conceived in the mind, and not the art of building. Similarly, when the text had said that the idea is a principle of knowledge, it immediately added the qualification, insofar as the forms of knowable things are said to be in the knower. As if to say: I do not say that the idea is a principle of knowledge (for this would signify that it is itself the ratio of knowing as an intelligible species); but that it is a principle of knowledge in the way in which the forms of knowable things existing objectively in the knower are said to be principles of the knowledge of those knowable things themselves. And since in the penultimate consequent all of this was contained—namely, the form of the world existing apart from the world, and exemplary causality, and the mode of being intelligibly or objectively—therefore rightly was the last consequent proved from those things pertaining to the ratio of idea which had already been laid down, with pregnant words, namely, and herein consists the ratio of idea.

VI. In response to the third, a doubt arises: because it seems false and incongruous that the idea should be the divine essence. False indeed, says Scotus, in I, dist. XXXV, because the whole rationale of an idea is satisfied in a stone having objective esse in the divine intellect: therefore an idea in God is not the divine essence. — The antecedent is clear by applying the whole rationale of an idea. And it could be confirmed by assuming the definition given in Qu. de Ver., qu. III, art. I, and the one derived from that article: namely, that it is the form of some thing other than the thing itself, an exemplar, and the principle of cognition of that same thing. — The consequence, moreover, is proved as follows: objective esse is not real esse, but diminished esse; therefore it is not the divine essence.

Incongruous, however, because an idea is either the divine essence as it is, or the divine essence as it is set before the divine intellect as an object. If in the first way (as is intimated in the following article, where it is said that the idea is the divine essence insofar as it is imitable: for this belongs to the divine essence insofar as it is a being), then the answer given to the principal question of the article is wrong. And the consequence is proved as follows. To the question whether it is concerning a thing that has being both in the nature of things and in the intellect, it is wrongly answered in the affirmative by the being it has in the intellect, the being in the nature of things being passed over: just as, to one asking whether the sphere of fire exists, it would be wrongly answered that it exists in the intellect. And the reason is that being in the intellect is being in a certain respect, while being in the nature of things is being simply: but the question whether it is asks about being simply; and therefore, if it is answered with respect to being in the mind, it is insinuated that that thing has no other being, but that being in the mind is its being simply. If, therefore, the idea is the essence according to real being, the answer given to the question is wrong: it is necessary to posit ideas in the divine mind. — But if the idea is the essence as it is set before the divine intellect as an object, then it was wrongly said that it is the divine essence itself. For the divine essence as set before the intellect as an object does not have real being, but objective being. And if, per impossibile, the divine essence were not in the nature of things, and were set before the intellect as an object, the account of the idea would be preserved. Therefore, that the idea is the same as the essence is accidental, indeed superfluous: for the nature of any thing is set before the divine intellect as an object, though secondarily, even if it were never identified with the divine essence as it is set before the divine intellect as an object; for it is known by God not only as it is in the prior object, but in itself. — These arguments are not formally from Scotus: but partly from him, partly from the text, I believed they should be formed, so that the truth may shine forth.

VII. To make these things evident, two points must be considered, on which the solution of everything depends: first, how the idea is related to esse; second, what esse obiectum is ⁵.

As to the first point, know that, as is clear from the passages cited ⁶, it belongs to the notion of an idea that it be the exemplar of a thing. And it belongs to the notion of an exemplar that it be formative of the thing, through an agent acting by way of intellect. Hence in the same place ⁷ it is said that if all things acted by necessity of nature, ideas would not be posited. Now it belongs to the notion of what is formative in this way that it exist in a mind: for no exemplar is ever formative in this way unless remotely, unless it exists in a mind. And if it exists only in a mind, its formative character is thus preserved. Therefore the mode of being of the exemplar that is necessary is existence in a mind; the other modes of being are accidental, speaking absolutely. And for this reason, in the text, to the question whether they exist concerning ideas, the answer given was that they exist in the divine mind. For existence in a mind is simply necessary for the being of ideas, and belongs formally to an idea precisely as idea. Nor did the Author concern himself with the existence of ideas in the nature of things, as is attributed to Plato: since he was teaching theology, and treating of the divine intellect; whereas that discussion is metaphysical, belonging to the treatise on Separate Substances. Hence it is clear that the idea in God is, formally speaking, the divine essence as it exists in the divine mind. Nor does the opposite follow from those words of the following article: for "imitable" is understood to contain within itself the character of an exemplar. And accordingly, as is clear from what has been said ⁸, the divine essence is called an idea insofar as it is an exemplar, that is, insofar as it is formative of a thing through the medium of intellect. But this is clearly not fitting to the essence insofar as it exists merely naturally, but insofar as it is set before the divine mind as its object.

VIII. But what is being in this way, namely objective, which was to be examined in the second place ⁹? — Scotus, in book I, distinction XXXVI, determines that known being is not real being, absolute or respective; nor is it relative being according to reason; but it is the diminished being of a thing, whether absolute or relative, which is called being secundum quid; so that a thing having such a mode of being founds a relation of reason to the intellect. And he holds that the stone, etc., are entities produced from eternity by God, through the act of the divine intellect, in such being; and that entities of this kind are beings secundum quid; and that they are called ideas, because all the conditions of ideas belong to them, as was shown by argument ¹⁰.

But I, nurtured on Peripatetic milk and, as they say, unable to speak in the open air, know only real being and being of reason, apart from the breadth of real being (V ¹¹ and VI Metaphys. [**5]). Now I learned from St. Thomas, in Qu. de Ver., q. XXI, art. 1, that being of reason is a relation or a negation. Hence, since objective esse is not a mode of being according to the thing, nor is it a negation, it remains that it is a relative esse according to reason, speaking in general terms. But since the divine esse is of such excellence that it eminently precontains all modes of being, whether outside the soul or in the soul, it must be that the natural esse of the divine essence itself is not only of the intelligible order and in its purest act, but is also (and not accidentally) the objective esse of that same essence with respect to its own intellect: otherwise it would not contain all modes of being in one most eminent way. And by this, neither does the divine essence, as an object presented to an intellect, have diminished esse; nor does any thing, as an object of the divine intellect, have diminished esse. Of the divine essence indeed this follows manifestly: because its objective esse is the natural esse of God himself, on account of his excellence. Of other things it follows from this, that others can be presented to God in no other way than as objects within the divine essence: for God understands nothing outside himself, but all things only in himself. So that he knows both in himself, namely both the stone as an object in the essence, and the stone absolutely; and this stone, and the stone in my soul, etc.: for he knows all these things, but the mode in which these things are presented is one, namely in the divine essence. And consequently the objective esse of things with respect to the divine intellect is not a relative esse, but an absolutely most real one, namely the esse of God. And because the idea in God, of which we are speaking, signifies things according to such an esse, therefore it was rightly said that it is the divine essence itself, etc.

IX. To the first objection, therefore, the inference is denied. To its proof, however, it is said that, although objective being in common is not real, objective being nevertheless is real in the divine intellect. ¹²

To the second, it is already clear that the idea in God is the divine essence as an object presented to the divine intellect, etc. And when it is argued, therefore it was wrongly said that the essence is, the inference is denied. First, because it was not said that it is essence insofar as it has natural being. Second, because if this had been said without duplication, it would be true, on account of the unity of both in God. For the divine essence possesses both modes of being eminently, in its single most excellent mode of being: and therefore, in affirming the identity of the idea with the essence, it does not formally follow, speaking in a human manner, therefore identity is affirmed with the essence insofar as it exists in the nature of things. In the text, however, the latter is not affirmed but the former. And therefore those two consequences, which were subjoined as objections, namely, therefore for the idea in God to be identical with the divine essence is accidental, and, therefore it is superfluous, are of no force: because identity with the essence is essential and necessary, from the fact that nothing can be presented to the divine intellect except in the divine essence. So that the mode in which things are presented as objects is necessarily being in the object-essence: otherwise God would understand something outside himself, and his intellect would be diminished, as is clear from Book XII Metaphysics ¹³. Hence it is false and impossible that the stone should be presented to God objectively in itself as stone. Yet this argument assumes and presupposes such a thing, out of ignorance of metaphysics.

But as for that hypothetical deduction, if the divine essence were not in the nature of things, and were set before its own intellect, the account of an idea would be preserved: therefore the identity of the idea with the essence is accidental, once the conditional is granted, the further inference is denied. Indeed, the opposite follows: because, that conditional standing, the idea would be the very essence as set before the intellect. — And if it be said, therefore that the idea is the divine essence according to real esse is accidental, the inference is denied. For the objective esse of the divine essence, in the intellect of God, is not accidental in a real sense, but essential, from the proper eminence of the essence itself. Yet many happen to be deceived in this matter, from the fact that objective esse is considered absolutely, and real esse absolutely, which, as is agreed, are not the same; since the discussion here concerns objective esse of a certain kind, and a real esse of that kind, from which the identity arises—though with the license of stammering, so to speak.

A clear title. - In the body he does three things: first, he answers the question affirmatively; second, he shows that this plurality is not repugnant to divine simplicity ¹; third, he shows how this plurality is ².

II. As to the first point, the responsive conclusion is: It is necessary to posit many ideas. — Proof. The ultimate end in any effect is properly intended by the principal agent: therefore the order of the universe is properly intended, and made for its own sake (per se), by God: therefore there is in the divine mind an idea of the order of the universe: therefore there are in it proper rationes of all things: therefore there are in it many ideas.

The antecedent is made manifest by the order of an army and its commander. The first consequence is proved: because the best thing existing in things is order, which is confirmed from Metaphysics XII. And the truth of the consequent is confirmed by the refutation of Avicenna's opinion, etc. The second, however, is self-evident. The third is proved: because the ratio of the whole cannot be had unless the rationes of all those things from which the whole is constituted are had, as is clear in the case of a house and its parts. And the truth of the consequent is confirmed by the authority of Augustine. Finally, the last consequence has no need of proof.

III. Note that in the first antecedent it is not said to be the ultimate end, but it is said to be the ultimate end in each effect: for here we are speaking of the intrinsic end of the effect, and not of an end that is outside the effect. For as is clear from Metaphysics XII ³, text 52, the good of the universe is twofold: namely, that which remains within the universe itself, and another outside it. The first is order; the second is God, on account of whom even the order itself exists. Therefore the order of the universe, because it is the best in the whole universe, must be ultimate in this effect which is the universe, and consequently must correspond to the principal agent—which we suppose to be God. And thus God is the agent per se and the end of the very order itself, just as a general is with respect to the order of an army.

Note, secondly, that the text, in order to show the force of this middle term for inferring a plurality of ideas in God, inserted the opinion of Avicenna concerning the manner in which the plurality of creatures emanated—of which there will be discussion below ⁴. For if the distinction of creatures were not intended by God per se, but were accidental on the part of God—that is, on account of the succession of agents, or in any other way whatever—we would have no way of concluding that there are exemplars of many things in God, but only of one thing. For no craftsman requires an idea of those things that are accidental.

IV. As to the second point ⁵, it is shown that the plurality of ideas is not repugnant to the divine simplicity, on account of the difference between what someone understands and that by which he understands. And he uses such an argument. To multiply what is understood does not conflict with simplicity, but to multiply that by which one understands does; but an idea is what is understood, and not that by which one understands; therefore, a multitude of ideas is not repugnant to the divine simplicity. — The major premise is proved: because understanding many things does not posit composition or imperfection, etc., but understanding by means of many species does indeed posit this. The minor premise is proved inductively from the idea of a house in the mind of the craftsman, etc.

V. Concerning the difference assigned in the text between that and whereby, a doubt arises. First, either the discourse concerns a real plurality or one of reason. If real, the plurality of both prejudices divine simplicity. If of reason, each can with equal reason be made plural. For the divine essence, as species, comprehends all intelligible species, just as it itself comprehends all objects as objects: and thus plurality according to reason is equal in both.

Secondly, the intellect from God cannot be anything but one in number, as is clear in XII Metaphys. ⁶ Therefore it is repugnant to multiply that by which what is understood by God is understood. Therefore it is false that a plurality of that which is understood is not prejudicial. Thirdly, in God there is wisdom and art and knowledge: therefore that by which He understands is multiplied in God. The consequence is proved, because these are related as that by which God understands; as the text also expressly says in the reply to the second.

VI. For the clarification of these points, know that, as regards the terms by which and that which, the discussion here concerns the by which and the that which in exercised act; namely, those formal reasons, or things, which exercise the act of the that which itself, or the act of the by which itself. Thus, in the case at hand, the idea is what is understood in exercised act, since it signifies what stands to intellection as object or term: art, however, is the by which in exercised act, because it imports what stands as the formal principle of intellection. And so with the others. As for multitude or plurality, know that here there is no question of real plurality; nor of plurality of reason, speaking formally; but of plurality simply of the that which or of the by which. So that the intention of the text is to establish a difference in this: that the formal reason exercising the act of the that which can be multiplied simply, and can be said absolutely to be many; whereas the reason exercising the act of the by which cannot be multiplied in such a way that it could be said absolutely to be many. VII. To the first objection raised on the opposite side ⁷, the reply is clear. For we say that, since the idea is what is understood, and every distinction of reason suffices for the plurality of what is known (for one thing known is the point as principle, and another as end); therefore for the plurality of ideas that relative distinction suffices, by which the essence, as imitable in this way, is one thing known, and as imitable in that way, is another thing known, etc. But for the plurality of the principle of understanding, not just any distinction of reason suffices: rather a distinction according to the proper and per se reason of the principle of understanding is required. Therefore the reason of the multitude of the by which is not the same as that of the that which. When, then, it is said, the divine essence contains just as many objects as does the reason, it is granted. But it is denied that, just as that plurality which is understood in it as objects suffices for the plurality simply of its that which, so the same plurality which is understood in it as reason or species of understanding suffices for the plurality of its by which; for the reason already given. To the second objection, however, the answer is given in two ways. First, that what is understood by God is one only as distinguished against many disparate things: and not as distinguished simply against many things. The ideas are not many disparate things known, neither among themselves nor from the divine essence: since each of them is the very essence. For it would be against the simplicity of the understanding if it had many disparate things known, as such, that is, in cognitional being (for we speak formally): as happens in us when we understand a triangle and an ox. But to have many things known that are not disparate—indeed, communicating in one number—does not prejudice simplicity. – Second, that what is understood per se first by God must be one. But the idea is what is understood per se second, and therefore it admits of multitude. For it was not said in the text that everything of the sort of the that which can be multiplied; but that multiplying the that which does not prejudice simplicity. And this is sufficiently verified if the that which per se second can be plurified. To the third it is said that it labors under equivocation. For the text does not intend that several diverse formal reasons of the by which sort cannot be posited in God: but that none of them can be multiplied. For there are not in God many wisdoms, nor many arts, etc. But there are in God many ideas. VIII. As for the third point ⁸, the manner is shown in which the aforementioned objective plurality is in the divine intellect. God perfectly understands the essence: therefore he knows it in every way in which it is knowable: therefore he knows it not only in itself, but also insofar as it is participable in any way by a creature; therefore he knows it as imitable in this way by such a creature: therefore as the proper reason of this creature: therefore he knows the plural reasons of things, which we call ideas. The antecedent is clear, along with the first consequence. The second, however, is proved: because God is knowable in both ways. The fourth is proved: because the species of creatures are according to the modes of participating the likeness of the divine essence. The fifth is clear from this: because the judgment about this creature and about others is the same. IX. In reply to the first, note diligently that here there is no question of just any likeness, but only of the exemplar. Now nothing is imitable exemplarily unless it be the object of the intellect. And therefore, although the divine essence absolutely is priorly imitable than it is an object, nevertheless it is not priorly imitable exemplarily than it is an object: because of the reason of the exemplar, as was said ⁹, objective being belongs. Hence, if God were not an intellectual agent, his essence would indeed be imitable, but not exemplarily: and thereby it would not have the reason of an idea. And this the text intimates, saying that it names not the essence, but the reason understood from it. X. In reply to the second and third objections, for clearer understanding, note three things together. First, that the idea signifies the divine essence imitable exemplarily. And because imitability can be taken in two ways, namely fundamentally, that is, for the absolute, and formally, that is, for the respect, the signification of idea can be imagined in three ways: first, as signifying only the absolute; second, only the respective; third, both. And indeed that it signifies not only the foundation of imitability is proved from this: since that is entirely one in all the ideas (because it is the divine essence itself, most simple, in which the absolute imitable by a stone cannot be distinguished from the absolute imitable by a lion), the plurality of ideas in God could not be sustained: for it is impossible to understand several ideas unless the thing signified by the idea is understood as pluralified. That it also signifies not only the respect is clear from this: it is said to signify the divine essence. Hence it remains that it signifies both; not in the way in which the word garment would signify a white man if imposed on each (since thus the idea would not have one reason); but in the way in which names signify the absolute relatively, as Savior and Creator, etc. And thereby, of the reason of the idea in God are both essence and relation; not as parts composing one common reason, but as thing and mode, as determinable and determination, as common and proper. Second, note that the ideas, both in craftsmen and in God, happen to be understood in two ways: first, as they are the ideas of other things; second, as they are in themselves. An example of both members is found in the text, in the reply to the second objection: when the craftsman contemplates the house to be made, the intellection terminates at the idea of the house inasmuch as the idea is the idea of the house; but when the craftsman, in a reflex act, considers the very thing he conceives in his mind as an idea, the intellection terminates at it as it is in itself. In the same way also in God. From this distinction you can easily perceive that the ideas are constituted not by being understood as they are in themselves, but by being understood as the ideas of other things. Nor does it matter for our purpose whether that understanding is actual or habitual. And therefore it is granted that in God there are several ideas before they are ideas understood in themselves. And for this reason in the text, at the end of the reply to the second objection, concerning the second mode in which they are understood, it says, and this is for there to be several ideas in his intellect as understood. Because it is one thing for there to be several ideas in his intellect, and another for there to be several ideas in his intellect as understood: for the first says them to be objectively in the intellect as the reasons of other things; the second truly says them to be objectively there as understood in themselves. Therefore he added as understood. Third, note that these respects distinguishing the ideas, since they are also constitutive of them, do not follow upon the act of the divine intellect understanding the ideas; but they come about through the act of the divine intellect understanding its own essence comparatively. So that one must not imagine that first the essence is understood as imitable, and then the ideal respect follows: but that the very intellection of the essence as imitable is the constitution of the ideal respect. – From this, moreover, you have that the ideal respects are not posited as necessary in order that God may distinctly understand creatures, as some seem to interpret: for it is evident that the perfection of the divine intellection does not beg from respects of reason. But they are posited as necessary, necessarily constituted from the perfection of the divine intellection. Hence in the body of the article the Author said that, because God understands his essence most perfectly, therefore he understands it as imitable in so many ways: for this is to constitute several ideal respects, and to understand several ideas as they are the reasons of other things, and to understand creatures distinctly in the divine essence set before him. And if you have contemplated these things well, you will laugh at the objections of others: which I did not bring forward, because they do not fight against the sense of the exposition of the doctrine of St. Thomas.

A clear title. – In the body there are two parts: first, he distinguishes; second, he answers the question raised.

II. As to the first, the divine idea is taken in two ways: as exemplar, and as ratio. – The distinction is made manifest in two ways. First, from the difference between the two offices attributed to the ideas by Plato, to generate and to produce knowledge. Second, from the difference between the speculative and the practical.

III. With respect to second, he answers the question with two affirmative propositions, according to the members of the distinction set out above. The first is: Idea, insofar as it is an exemplar, is of all things made by God at whatever time.—The second is: Idea, as ratio, is of all things that can be made and known according to their proper rationes, both speculative and practical.

These propositions are not otherwise proved in the text itself, since they are evident from q. 14¹ and from what has been said above². Yet you should not overlook the fact that idea, taken as ratio, is understood as the objective ratio, as the text itself explained in the first article³. Therefore an idea is said to be the objective ratio of a thing. In this way too, a Platonic idea would be a ratio of knowing.

IV. In the response to the third, note that here St. Thomas retracts what was said in Qu. de Ver., q. III, art. 5, and in I Sent., dist. XXXVI, in the last article⁴, concerning the idea of prime matter. Nor is there any need to devise glosses, since the middle term here assumed, namely, that it is not knowable in itself, expressly overturns what was said elsewhere, as is clear to one who looks closely.

But a doubt remains here: of what composite is prime matter the idea? If, however, the text is looked at attentively, it will easily become clear that the idea as ratio corresponding to prime matter is the idea of body, which is the genus in the category of Substance; for it would be defined according to its form, if it were to be defined. For the idea as ratio is knowable through its own ratio, as is said in the text ⁵ But the idea of it as exemplar must be sought in no other way than the ideas of genera, concerning which the text says ⁶ that they do not have an idea distinct from the species, etc.