Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

A clear title. – In the body there are two parts: first, he distinguishes speculative from practical science in general; second, he answers the question raised¹.

II. As to the first, the distinction is this. Some science is purely speculative, some purely practical, and some practical in a qualified sense and speculative in a qualified sense. — This is explained as follows. A science is called speculative in three ways, namely by its object, or by its mode, or by its end: therefore some science is purely speculative, etc. The antecedent is explained by way of example. The consequence is proved: because a science speculative by its object is purely speculative; whereas a science speculative by its mode alone, or by its end alone, is practical in a qualified sense and speculative in a qualified sense; while a science that is speculative in none of these ways is left as purely practical.

III. Concerning this part, note first that "practical" and "speculative" are here taken not only as they are conditions of a science considered in itself, but also on the part of the knower. And therefore it is said that the art of house-building, in one who does not intend to build houses, is speculative as regards its end, and practical as regards its mode and object: for the phrase on the part of the knower must be glossed as referring to the end, and not to the science itself. For if we speak of the end of the science itself, it is also practical as regards its end, since its end is the building of houses. And if you attend to this, you will confound the mockeries of your adversaries.

Note, secondly that just as speculative science is threefold, so too is practical science. The first is practical from the object, the manner, and the end even of the knower: and this is practical only. The second is practical from the object, manner, and end of the science, not of the knower: and this is truly practical; but in the text it is called speculative in a qualified sense, on the part of the end of the knower. The third is practical from the object, but not from the manner nor the end of the science: and this is also practical in a qualified sense, namely on the part of the object, and speculative in a qualified sense, namely on account of the manner and end of the science; because they accompany one another; for when something is known practically, it is already by its very nature ordered to action, and conversely.

Note third, that by the speculative in this manner only, that is, concerning the operable object considered speculatively, is not meant a science of the operable in general: for a science of the operable, whether it proceeds from the proximate principles of the operation or from the remote and universal principles of the operation, falls under the same member. Rather is meant a science of the operable which investigates not how the thing is made, but what it is, etc., as the text says. For such knowledge does not pertain to craftsmen but to philosophers; who, though they know what a lyre or a house is, nevertheless do not possess the science of making them.

IV. As to the second², three things are said: first, God's knowledge is compared to God himself; second, to things other than himself; third, an answer is given to a tacit objection. – On the first, the conclusion is stated: God's knowledge of himself is purely speculative. – It is proved: because he himself is not capable of being made or produced.

On the second, the conclusion is proposed: Knowledge of things other than itself is speculative, and also practical in various ways. – It is first proved that it is speculative: because it knows all things in a speculative manner, what they are, etc. Then, that it is practical in various ways: because concerning the things that can be made but are never made, it has practical knowledge virtually, that is, from the object and the mode and end of the knowledge, not from the end of the knower; but concerning those which are in fact sometimes made, it has practical knowledge simply and actually.

Objection to which a reply is given: God does not do evil, nor are evils among the things capable of being made or made by God; how, then, will these belong to practical science? – The reply is that, just as medicine concerns not only the healthy but the sick, so the science of God concerns them not by doing, but by permitting, ordering, impeding, etc.

V. Note here that we can speak of God's knowledge in two ways. First absolutely, according as it is in itself. And thus, since it is one and simple, possessing in itself eminently every perfection of knowledge, it is neither practical nor speculative, but contains both eminently on a higher level, in accordance with what was said in the prologue³. In another way, in relation to such a thing known: and thus it is said here that it is speculative or practical. In relation, indeed, to this thing known which is His own essence (not insofar as the essence is the adequate object of knowledge, for thus it pertains to God's knowledge absolutely; but insofar as it is a certain special thing known, distinct from other things known, namely those other than God), it is speculative: in relation to the others, however, it is practical etc., as is said in the text.

VI. Concerning the conclusions set forth⁴ a doubt arises from Scotus. For he himself, in the Prologue to the First Book of the Sentences⁵, holds the opposite of the first conclusion, when he defines God's knowledge of Himself to be simply practical: or to lack nothing in order to be practical, except that God's will is not good by a rule, but naturally from itself. And in the thirty-eighth distinction of the First Book⁶, he holds the opposite of the second conclusion, insofar as God has practical knowledge of things other than Himself: for he holds that He does not have practical knowledge of things other than Himself, but speculative. His reason against the first conclusion consists in this. Knowledge of God's essence is naturally prior to the love of that essence, and corrective of it: therefore it is practical. – And to the argument for the conclusion laid down in the text, namely that God is not operable, he replies that God is operable, that is, attainable through immanent operation, namely of love. The reason against the second, however, consists in this. No knowledge of things prior to the determination of the divine will dictates that things are to be done: therefore there is no practical knowledge there of things. The antecedent is evident. And the consequence is proved: because practical knowledge is dictative toward action. – In the Prologue, however,⁷ he grounds himself on priority, thus. No knowledge of things etc. is prior in act to the divine will etc.: therefore it is not practical.

VII. But to these objections, given what was said in the prologue⁸ and in the special question on Practice, it is not difficult to reply. To the first, then, the consequence must be denied, whatever may be said of the antecedent: for more is required for practical knowledge, as was shown there.

– The solution given by our Scotus would indeed hold, if God, or the act by which He loves Himself, were made, or if practical knowledge were even regulated. For every cause must be a cause either of operation or of effect; but practical knowledge signifies a cause, as is clear from its name, and from Book IX of the Metaphysics⁹. And with respect to creatures capable of being made, the cause in God is posited in relation to the effect, not in relation to the making: because that making is the substance of God. With respect to God Himself, however, it can be posited in relation to neither: because neither He Himself nor His operation is made or depends on anything. It is therefore ridiculous to hear that God is operable by His own practical knowledge. But to the objection raised in the first place against the second conclusion, the consequence is denied. For it is manifestly false that practical knowledge must be dictative for acting: it suffices that it be regulative. For the art of house-building does not dictate that a house is to be built; rather, it is indifferent to opposites, as is clear from Book IX of the Metaphysics¹⁰. And thereby the response to the objection brought forward in the second place is clear. For the assumption is false: since, as is said in Book IX of the Metaphysics¹¹, a rational power—which practical knowledge is acknowledged to be—is determined by appetite, and not conversely; and therefore it is presupposed by appetite as indifferent. Hence one wonders at this man, how his brilliant mind does not notice that, just as the art of house-building absolutely precedes the act of the will, and is preceded by the will as determining it toward acting, and precedes the execution, namely the very building of the house; so the rationes of all works capable of being made shine forth naturally in the divine essence, preceding every act of the will; but they must be preceded by the divine will, so that they may be determined toward acting. Hence certain rationes are determined toward acting, and certain are not, as is said in the text. And those also which are determined by the divine will precede the execution, namely the making ad extra. Nor does it matter for our purpose whether the executive power in God is the will itself or a third power: since the will itself also, as determining, precedes, and as executing, follows.