Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

A clear title. – In the body there are two parts: first, he answers the question, that it is so; second, how¹.

II. As to the first point, the responsive conclusion answers the question affirmatively: God knows enuntiabilia (propositions). – Proof: God knows whatever is in potency, both in Himself and in a creature; but enuntiabilia are within our power; therefore God knows all of them.

III. With respect to the second, the manner in which God knows enunciables is shown, in a single conclusion: God knows enunciables not by composing and dividing, but by simple understanding; that is, not by way of the second operation of the intellect, but of the first.

It is proved in two ways. First, by analogy. God knows material things immaterially, composite things simply: therefore He knows enunciables, not by enunciating, but by intuiting. – And it is explained how this could be, by a fictitious example in our own intellect: if, in understanding what man is, we were to understand that he is white, etc.

Second, by reason. The species of the divine intellect, that is, its essence, suffices to demonstrate all things: therefore God, in understanding his own essence, understands the essences of all things, and whatever can befall them. – The antecedent is evident. The consequence rests on this, that the reason necessitating us to understand by composing and dividing is that the intelligible species is limited in what it represents. This is proved in the text as follows. The intelligible species represents one thing in such a way that it does not represent another: therefore, in understanding by means of that species one thing, say what man is, other things are not understood, which accrue to it or can accrue to it: therefore man and accidents are understood separately: therefore they must be brought together into one by composition, so that we may understand one to be in another; hence, from first to last, if a species represents one thing in such a way that it does not represent another, the intellect is compelled to compose. And because, if affirmation is the cause of affirmation, negation is the cause of negation, in their proper causes; it follows that, if an intelligible species represents one thing and also others, there is no necessity of composing, but all things are understood by the simple intuition of the object represented through that species, as the assumed consequence said.

IV. Note here that these words of the text can be taken in two ways. First, as if the limitation of the intelligible species in representing were the reason for composing and dividing. And this sense is false and contrary to the mind of St. Thomas: for it would follow that angels would understand by composing, since they have limited species. Second, as if such a limitation, that is, with respect to those things which are naturally apt to belong to something, were the reason for composing. And this sense is true and intended. True indeed: because from the fact that the species represents a thing as subject and not as predicate, composition arises; and not from the fact that it represents the subject, and not some other thing altogether irrelevant to such a subject. Intended, however, because in the text this is twice hinted at: first, in the example of man, when it is said, we would understand all things that can be predicated of man; second, when in the argument, following the same example, it is inferred, not from this very fact do we understand other things that are in him. But on this matter more will be said below in the treatise on the Angels².