Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

A clear title, both as regards the ly futura and as regards the ly contingentia.

In four parts: first, he answers that it is so; second, how on the side of the thing known, there: Ad cuius evidentiam ¹; third, how and why on the side of the one knowing, there: Et licet ²; fourth, a certain corollary is set down, there: Unde manifestum est ³.

II. As to the first, the responsive conclusion to the question is affirmative: God knows future contingents. – It is proved. God knows all things not only those that are in act, but also those that are in potency in Himself and in creatures: therefore He knows future contingents. – The antecedent is clear from what has been said. The consequence is proved: because some of these are future contingents with respect to us.

Note that this addition, namely to us, is not made as a limitation, or as a condition diminishing the meaning of "future"; but as a clarification. For these things are future simply, because they are future in themselves, and not merely with respect to us. But they are declared to be future simply, through being future to us, because they are future according to that measure of duration by which we ourselves are measured, namely according to time; and not according to eternity, as will be shown below at ⁴

III. With respect to secundum ⁵, two modes are set forth by which future contingents are subject to divine cognition, though in different ways. And thus the following conclusion is proposed: Future contingents are known by God as they are actually in themselves, and as they are in their causes: but in the first way, certainly; in the second way, however, insofar as they are knowable. This is proved and explained by distinguishing future contingents according to a twofold state, namely, in act and in the potency of their causes, and by positing three differences between these states. The first concerns the difference of time: for as in act, it has the character of the present; as in potency, of the future. The second concerns contingency: for as in act, it has the character of something determined to one; as in potency, of something contingent toward either part. The third concerns cognition: for as in act, it can be subject to certain cognition, as is evident in bodily vision; as in potency, only to conjecture, etc. From these, indeed, what is intended manifestly follows.

IV. Note here that it is one thing to speak of the nature of contingency, and another to speak of the state of contingency. For since contingency is a difference of beings not accidental but substantial (because each thing according to its own nature in itself is a contingent or necessary being, etc.); and since the nature of a thing is not varied, but is the same in act and in potency; it follows that a contingent thing, whether it be in act and present, or in potency and future, is always of contingent nature. And hence, the difference set down in the text between the contingent in act and in potency, present and future, is not a difference of nature, as if it had one nature thus and another thus: rather it is a difference of state of the same nature. For one and the same nature can have different states, its own reason being preserved: in act and in potency, present and future, etc. For the state of actuality is the state of being determined to one part of a contradiction; while the state of being in cause toward either part indifferently is the state of indetermination: now it is clear that contingency belongs on the side of indetermination, necessity on the side of determination. And therefore a contingent thing, as future and in potency, is said to have the character of the contingent with respect to its state; but as present and in act, it is said to have the character of the necessary with respect to its state. Again, however contingent a thing may be, from the state of presence it contracts a certain mode of necessity, upon supposition of the state reaching to it under such a state, as is clear from I Perihermeneias⁶: because whatever is, when it is, necessarily is. But a thing as future or in potency, since it is not, does not contract such a mode of necessity; but remains contingent, and in a contingent state, without such necessity. And therefore in the text it is said that the contingent, as present, can be subsumed under infallible and certain knowledge: and at the end of the reply to the second objection, it is said that as such it is necessary. V. As to the third point ⁷, first there is set forth the manner in which God knows these things, namely, all at once. And since from the same root hangs the reason why God knows these things, therefore in the text, once the manner of simultaneity has been proposed, the cause of it propter etiam quid of the conclusion sought is shown. Therefore, having formed the conclusion containing both the manner and the cause, let this conclusion be laid down: God knows all future contingents, according to the state in which they actually are, from eternity, all at once. Proof. Eternity, existing wholly at once, embraces the whole of time, and God's knowledge is measured by eternity: therefore He knows all at once things that happen successively, and all things that are in time are present to God from eternity; not only because He has their reasons present with Himself, but because His gaze from eternity is directed upon all things as they are in their own presentiality. Therefore contingents also, insofar as they are subsumed under the divine gaze according to their presentiality, are infallibly known by God. – The antecedent, as to its second part, is proved: because the esse of God is measured by eternity. VI. As to the fourth point ⁸, the corollary is that from these things it is clear that these two stand together, namely, that something be a future contingent, and that it be known with certainty: because according to different states these belong to it. For to be subsumed under certain knowledge belongs to it insofar as it is in act, for thus it terminates the divine intuition; but to be a contingent future belongs to it insofar as it is in its causes; as is already clear from what has been said. VII. Concerning what is said in this article, it must be noted that here there are two doubtful statements. The first and principal is the argument drawn from the side of eternity: the second is the argument contained concerning the reasons of things which God has within Himself. For it is said in the text that all things are present to God from eternity, not only on account of the reasons of things which God has present within Himself, but because His gaze from eternity is directed, etc. Where two causes are manifestly assigned why things are present to God from eternity: namely, the reasons of things, and eternity. Through the reasons indeed all things are present in the order of the known, that is, as known to the knower: through eternity, however, as coexisting to a coexistent. First, then, will be examined, and defended with the light of God and the suffrages of St. Thomas, the principal argument concerning eternity: second, the contained argument concerning the reasons of things ⁹. VIII. Concerning the argument from eternity, two things are brought into doubt: first, that proposition, all things that happen in time are present to eternity; second ¹⁰, the application of this to the intended conclusion, namely, that therefore God certainly knows future contingents. Against that proposition, then, Scotus argues fourfold, in I, dist. XXXIX ¹¹. First, that which is not cannot coexist with anything: but futures are not: therefore. The major is proved: because to coexist signifies a real relation. – Second, if all things coexist with eternity, therefore all things are simply in act: therefore they cannot afterwards be put in act. The first consequence is proved: because 'that which has esse in act in itself with respect to the first cause is simply in act; for that which is such with respect to the first cause is such simply.' – Third, because if this is so, therefore my sitting tomorrow would be twice produced by God. The consequence is proved: because it is already present in itself to eternity, therefore produced; and yet it is not, therefore to be produced, etc. – Fourth (and this is a confirmation of the first, and a destruction of St. Thomas's example in I Contra Gentiles, cap. LXVI, and of its foundation), the coexistence of flowing things around a standing thing requires the existence of both extremes for the same measure of duration: but it is impossible that two instants of time exist at once in the same measure of duration: therefore it is impossible that they 'coexist at once with the other extreme', namely, eternity. The major is evident in the center and in the points of the circumference, if we suppose those points not to stand but to flow: for it is certain that each, when it would be, would coexist with the center, but never at once together; not from any defect of the center, but of themselves, because namely they are not at once together. And so it is with eternity and time. IX. Against the application of the argument to the conclusion, the same Scotus argues threefold in the same place ¹². First thus. My future sitting, as future, is either known certainly by God or not. If so, therefore it is not necessary to posit it as existing in act in order that it be certainly known. If not, therefore God knows things done otherwise than things to be done, against Augustine, V super Genesim ad litteram ¹³. The consequence is proved: since when that sitting will have been done, it will certainly be known by God. – Second thus. God's knowledge takes no certainty from any other object than His own essence: therefore it is not certain from the fact that the sitting is in act, but from elsewhere. The antecedent is proved: because otherwise the divine intellect would be cheapened. – Third thus. The aevum of an angel, according to these men, coexists with the whole of time: therefore the angel, according to that argument, could naturally know all future contingents. X. In answering these objections, I premise that this passage is judged by its opponents full of contradiction and error: while by its followers the doctrine of St. Thomas is reckoned so obscure that hitherto I have seen no one, whether in writing or in speech, defend this saying assertively. And I confess I myself have lain hidden for perhaps fifteen years. But the day before yesterday, while I was meditating on the commentary on this article, there shone forth (as I judge, by the aid of St. Thomas) a truth plain and set in plain view, and therefore passed over in very few words. It must be known, therefore, first, for the evidence of the terms, that to be present, or to coexist, with eternity, formally speaking, abstracts from the presence of the known to the knower. For if eternity were a non-cognitive reality, and a stone existed at some time, there would be true presence or coexistence there, without any cognition. – It is also evident from this and from the text that the discourse is about the esse of things that happen in time, not objective, nor potential, etc., but about esse in act in the nature of things according to themselves, outside their causes: so that the present discourse is about the real coexistence of contingents in act with eternity. And thus, when it is said that all things are present to eternity, the sense is: All things, according to their esse in act in the nature of things, are present, that is, coexisting, with eternity.

XI. These things having been set forth beforehand, note that that temporal things are present to eternity can be understood in two ways. In one way, such that in every now of time they are present to eternity; so that the coexistence of any thing with eternity is measured at any instant of time. And this sense, as it seems to me, the adversaries took from the words of St. Thomas. But they erred: for St. Thomas never even dreamed this; indeed it manifestly implies a contradiction. For the coexistence of a thing with eternity is equal in duration to the measure of that same existence, since it coexists only according to its actual existence: but the existence of the instant in which tomorrow the sun rises is not measured by any preceding or following instant: therefore not by just any instant either. Moreover, if an instant were always, that is, for every instant of time, coexisting with eternity, then it would have coexisted with other instants of time, both past and future: and thus that instant would not be passing; and all instants would truly be one instant; and several instants of the same time would be simultaneous; and the past and the future would be present, etc. All of which are manifestly impossible.

XII. In another way it can be understood that in every now of eternity the things present to eternity are present, such that the coexistence of any thing with eternity is preserved in every now of eternity. And this sense is true, and is intended by Saint Thomas.

True indeed: because, since eternity has only one now, which is equal to eternity itself and exceeds all time, it is necessary that every instant of our time, and whatever is or happens in it, be saved in the now of eternity, and be measured by it—not as by an adequate measure, but by an excessive one. – Hence, so that you may escape the snares more clearly, proceeding from things to propositions, and from propositions back to things, these propositions—"all things that happen in time are present to eternity," or "are present to God from eternity," or "are always present to God," and the like—must be distinguished. For the "are" either consignifies the now of time or the now of eternity. And likewise "from eternity" or "always" is either taken syncategorematically, that is, so as to distribute over every difference of time, or categorematically, that is, so as to import perfect everlastingness, which is imported in eternity and in its now. And in the first way they are false, in the second true. For it is true and undoubted that the first instant of this hour is in the now of eternity; and likewise it is true that the last instant of this hour is in the same now of eternity—not in this now of time which is the beginning of this hour, but in the now of eternity; yet for a different instant of time, as is evident of itself. And therefore it is not unfitting that two contradictories, according to the now of time, be in the same now of eternity, etc.

That this sense is what the text intends is evident from two considerations. First, from the fact that in this way all that is said is verified and coheres. For since the now, whether of time or of eternity, cannot be distinguished into present, past, and future, but is present only, when the now of eternity is demonstrated in act signate, it is true to say that all things are present to eternity; as appears in saying, all things are present to eternity in the now of eternity. And likewise, when the now of eternity is consignified in act exercite, it is most true to say, all things are present to eternity. But the imagination errs while it looks at "are" (sunt), and out of our habit supposes it must consignify a now of time. – Second, from the fact that in this way the reason for what was asked and intended in the text is best rendered. For from this—that the temporal existences of all things, taken according to the now of eternity, are present to eternity—it follows best and directly that to that vision which is measured by eternity, all things are present simultaneously according to their existences, with an instantaneous simultaneity of eternity. And thereby that vision, because it terminates at things present, is certain and infallible, just as ours is. – And it is confirmed. Because, just as for something to be present to our bodily vision nothing else is required except that the visible thing be and be at hand according to the measure of duration by which the vision itself is measured and is; so for something to be present in itself to the divine gaze, it is required that it be and be at hand according to that measure of duration by which the divine vision is measured. Now this is eternity. Therefore it suffices that they be, taken according to eternity, present, and not past or future; although, taken according to time, they are future.

XIII. Hence the answer to all the objections against that proposition, that all things are present to God from eternity¹⁴, is clear. For all of them labor in equivocation, taking things as they are in time or in its instants: whereas the discourse here concerns temporal things, and time itself with its instants, insofar as they are, or make use of, eternity.

And by these same things the answer is clear to the arguments brought forward by Capreolus, in the thirty-sixth distinction of the First Book¹⁵, from Aureol.

XIV. To the objections, however, in the second place¹⁶, against the application of reason to the matter at hand, a reply is given.

And to the first, when it is said that my session tomorrow, as future, is either certainly known or not known, the answer is given by distinguishing: that this session, as future, has esse only in its causes; but it can be compared to its causes in two ways: in one way, as indeterminate causes for producing my session tomorrow or its negation; in another way, as determinate causes for producing it rather than its opposite, or with the exclusion of the opposite. Futures taken in the first way are not taken as futures, but as futures wholly contingent. Futures taken in the second way are indeed taken as futures, but they depart from contingency according as the determination of the causes toward one side requires more or less, or entirely. Therefore contingent futures, as future from indeterminate causes, are not knowable, as is said in the text, neither by God nor by anyone; because they are not ens, neither in act nor in potency, more themselves than their opposites. But from determinate causes they are knowable, in accordance with the determination of the causes. – And when it is said, "therefore God knows things done otherwise than things to be done," the consequence is simply denied: because "otherwise" (aliter), in the authority of Augustine, signifies a mode of knowing on the part of the knower, which in God does not vary. As for the proof, it would be superfluous to respond, so puerile does it seem. For he says that God knows the session with certainty when it exists in act. For who does not know that no knowledge accrues to God? Hence he ought to say, and yet he knows it with certainty according to its actual existence. But this does not prove the consequence. For it is one thing that things, as done, stand differently before God's knowledge than as to be done, and another thing that God knows things done otherwise than things to be done. The former is true, speaking of contingent matter; the latter is false. The former signifies that a thing has one disposition as done and another as to be done: for, as done, it takes on a certain necessity, which it does not have as to be done. And thus, as done, it is certainly knowable; as to be done, not. And again, as done, it can terminate a certain intuition of God; as to be done, not.

To the second it is said that it is one thing for the knowledge of God to take its certainty from the sitting of Socrates, and another for the sitting of Socrates not to be capable of being the term of God's certain knowledge unless insofar as it is in that certain knowledge. The first is indeed unfitting, but the second is necessary: the first is not derived from the text, but the second is. Therefore the whole argument is conceded, as saying nothing against us, but presupposing something false: namely, that from this position it follows that the knowledge of God takes its certainty from another object than its own substance. For it ought to presuppose that He requires certainty also in another object, or in the term of His knowledge, and not only in His own substance: for this is what follows from it, and not that He takes certainty from another.

To the third it is said that it fails in two ways. First, because the angel's knowledge by which he knows temporal things is not measured by the aevum, and therefore the argument proves nothing. Second, because the representation of singular temporal things through the principle of the angelic knowledge, namely the intelligible species, is not measured by the aevum but arrives anew. And therefore it is impossible that angels naturally know future contingents, as will be shown below¹⁷

XV. Against the second argument for the conclusion, namely, that God has within himself the rationes of all things ¹⁸, Scotus argues, in the place cited above ¹⁹, interpreting the rationes of things as their ideas, in four ways. First, because the rationes of the extremes, however perfect they may be, do not give rise to knowledge of a contingent composition of them. - Second, because, merely naturally and prior to every determination of the divine will, they represent when the contingents are not yet determined. - Third, because from the same root it follows that they are in the same way of contingent future things de facto and of things that are not future but simply possible. - Fourth, because from the same root they represent this thing to be at one time no more than at another.

XVI. For the solution of this difficulty, three things must be stated beforehand. First, that although idea and ratio are related as superior and inferior, since an idea is only the terminus of the intellect, whereas a ratio is common both to the terminus and to the principle of intellection; nevertheless, because, as is said in the following question ²⁰, the principle of understanding in God is not multiplied but the terminus, in understanding creatures, and in the text it is said in the plural that the rationes of things are present with God; therefore we rightly interpret by rationes rerum the ideas of those things, which are known to be compared to the divine intellect as that which it understands, and not as that by which, as is said in the following question ²¹.

Secondly I premise that this question does not coincide with that one, whether by one and the same idea God knows the subject and the accidents: for the opponents intend by these argumentations to infer that God knows a contingent complex neither through the same idea nor through different ideas. I have said this lest anyone think that the question to be treated there is being anticipated here ²². But what is disputed here is that ideas do not extend themselves to representing a contingent complex. This would rather have had to be deferred to the following question; but on account of the argument of St. Thomas included here, and impugned in this matter by Scotus, Aureolus ²³ and Gregory ²⁴, it has seemed that it should be treated in this place.

I premise third that, although according to the way of those who hold that the ideas are not the same as the divine substance this may be difficult or impossible, among those who hold that the ideas are the divine essence itself it is most easily evident that the ideas extend to representing contingent truths. For since the divine essence is both the reason for understanding all things as principle and the reason for understanding all things as object, as is clear from the aforesaid ²⁵; and since it itself, as principle or intelligible species, is, even according to Scotus here, a sufficient representative of all things, even of contingent truths; it must be that it itself, as object, is also the sufficient reason of all things, even of contingent truths. Otherwise it itself as object would not be adequate to itself as intelligible species: which is impossible. And thus, since the ideas are the essence itself insofar as it is the objective reason of things, it follows that they extend also to contingent truths.

XVII. With these things prefigured, it is said that, since in St. Thomas the ideas are the very essence of God as it is the objective ratio of things, it is excellently said that, because God has present with himself the rationes or ideas of things, therefore he knows all future contingents with certainty. - Hence, to the first objection ²⁶, the assumption must simply be denied. Nevertheless, for clarity of doctrine, a distinction may be made: that the idea of some quiddity can be called perfect in two ways. In one way, so that "perfect" designates the intrinsic mode of the thing whose idea it is. And thus the assumption is true: because however perfectly man is represented, namely according to every mode of his intrinsic entity, he would never be represented as joined to sitting, or to the fortuitous discovery of a treasure. In another way, so that "perfect" designates the total completeness of the thing in every respect. And thus the assumption is false: since if man were represented according to all his esse (for this is to be represented totally, namely according to all his acts of being), it is necessary that he be represented according to the esse which he has in such and such a contingent conjunction. Now the divine ideas represent things thus perfectly: and therefore the assumption in question is false.

To the second objection and the rest, the antecedent is denied, which is the root of everything, namely that ideas represent by mere nature whatever they represent. For we say that they represent something by mere nature, for instance the quiddities of things; and something not by mere nature, but naturally upon a free supposition, namely the existences of things and contingent conjunctions. For they represent the former before every act of the divine will; the latter, however, only given the free determination of the divine will to one side of contradiction, just as Scotus himself accepts concerning the representation of these things in the essence as a ratio intelligendi. And thus it is clear that the rest collapses: since they do not stand in the same way toward future and non-future things, and toward this time or another, but are determined upon the supposition of the divine will.

And by these things the answer to Gregory's arguments against the same is clear, in distinction 38 of Book I ²⁷.

XVIII. In response to the first, note that two things are taken from it as ambiguous. The first is that the knowledge of God, which is the first cause, is necessary. The second is that things known by God are contingent on account of their proximate causes, but necessary when related to the knowledge of God. And although the second part of this statement is not taken up here formally, it is nevertheless explained formally in the response to the second and third.

For against the first claim the freedom of divine knowledge with respect to creatures as things capable of being made, and of divine causality, plainly stands in opposition. For God freely made the knowability-by-creation of creatures, because He willed it itself: had He not willed it, it would be known neither by God nor by another. And from the same root it is evident that He is a free cause. Therefore God's knowledge with respect to those things that come to be, as such, is neither necessary as regards knowing nor as regards causing. It is therefore altogether false that God's knowledge, which is the first cause, is necessary.

XIX. Against the second statement, however, an objection is raised. Either he means that one and the same thing in itself is contingent and necessary at once, namely, that it has its contingency from its proper causes, but its necessity from the first cause. And this is impossible: because contingent and necessary are substantial differences of beings, and opposed ones, as is evident; therefore it is impossible that the same thing be contingent and necessary in the same respect, however it may be compared to different causes. And the inference holds: because the nature of a thing is not changed in itself on account of the diversity of its relations to different causes. Or he means that a thing contingent in itself has a necessary relation to the first cause, but a contingent relation to its proximate causes: or conversely, that the first cause has a necessary relation to an effect contingent in itself, while the proximate causes have a contingent relation to the same. And against this Scotus argues, in I; dist. II, qu. I, and dist. VIII, qu. V, and dist. XXXIX on this question ²⁸, in four ways.

First, thus. A cause that moves insofar as it is moved, if it is moved necessarily, moves necessarily: but every secondary cause moves, or acts, insofar as it is moved by the first: therefore, if it is moved necessarily by the first, it too moves necessarily. And so no contingent cause is given. - Furthermore, a prior cause naturally and simply regards the effect before the posterior cause does: therefore in that prior one, the first cause will give necessity to the effect: therefore in the second instant of nature, the proximate cause cannot give contingency to the same. - Furthermore, every contingent effect of a secondary cause can be produced by God immediately, the identity of that effect's nature remaining intact: therefore it would be contingent, with the secondary causes removed, depending on the first cause alone: therefore. - Furthermore, God has in fact produced many contingent things immediately: therefore things are not contingent on account of their proximate causes, but from the first cause principally.

XX. To make the difficulty evident, know that to dispute about the root from which contingency arises does not directly pertain to this place, where the question concerns contingents insofar as they are known, not insofar as they are caused: but it pertains partly to question XIX²⁹, in which it is asked about God's will as the cause of things (since knowledge causes nothing unless determined by the will); and partly to question CXV³⁰, in which there is a dispute about the necessitation of lower things by higher bodies. But because in this first argument of the text the matter at issue is contingents insofar as they are caused by God's knowledge, since that knowledge is not only knowledge but also the cause of what is known; and in the response it is said not only that it can stand that the proximate cause be contingent and the remote cause necessary, but that it can stand even that the first cause simply be necessary, and that these do not involve an impossibility; therefore two things must be done. First, this will be treated in general: whether these things are incompatible. Second³¹, it will be shown what in fact is the case: namely, how God is a necessary cause, and what the sense of this text is.

XXI. As to the first point, lest we equivocate, necessary is taken in two ways relevant to our purpose: in the first way, simply, namely that it is altogether impossible for things to be otherwise; in the other way, immutably, namely that it cannot be changed from this into its opposite, although absolutely speaking it could have been the opposite and not this. In the text mention is made of both necessities, in response to the first objection. Of necessity simply, indeed, when it is said in general that a remote cause can be necessary while its effect is contingent, and the example given is the motion of the sun, which is known to be numbered by the philosophers among causes necessary simply. But of necessity by a necessity of immutability, when it is said specifically of God's knowledge that it is a necessary cause. For it is not a necessary cause simply, since it could have not been a cause: but it is necessary by a necessity of immutability, because once it has been determined to be a cause, and to produce only such effects, it cannot be changed.

XXII. In the matter at hand, therefore, I say that it is not repugnant for an effect to be contingent, and for its remote cause—whether or not it be posited as first simply speaking—to be necessary simply speaking. And this is demonstrated in syllogisms, where a contingent conclusion follows from a necessary major premise and a contingent minor. Moreover, all propositions depend upon the first necessary principles. – It is also demonstrated by reason. For plurality must proceed from unity, motion from what is immobile, the deformed from the uniform. But the contingent has the character of plurality, of motion, and of deformity, because it can be otherwise; whereas the necessary has the character of the one, the immobile, and the uniform, because it cannot be otherwise. Therefore, the contingent proceeds naturally from the necessary, and not conversely. Hence it does not repugn, but rather accords with the contingent, that it should have its origin from what is necessary simply speaking. – It is also demonstrated by the evidence of contingent events, which occur among us, as the text says; unless someone were to deny true contingency in these lower things. – It is likewise supported by the authority of Aristotle and Averroes, and of many philosophers.

XXIII. Nor should Scotus be tolerated, in II, dist. I, qu. III, saying that the philosophers tacitly granted two contradictories, in saying that something happens contingently and that the first cause causes necessarily. Nor do his arguments prove it. Hence to the first³², which is his Achilles, which he so often repeated, the reply is made on a twofold head. For first the phrase inasmuch as moved by another is distinguished. Either it signifies a precise cause or a concausal one. If a precise cause, then that proposition involves a contradiction in its predicate: for if the second cause is a cause, then it does not move precisely because moved, but also contributes something of itself; and if it moves precisely because moved, it contributes nothing of itself, and thus it is not a cause. But if a concausal, yet principal, cause, the assumption is denied: since it can stand that it be moved necessarily and not move another necessarily. For the motion of the prior cause is modified in the second cause according to the mode of the second cause itself: and thus, although the second be moved by the first cause necessarily, nevertheless once the motion is received in the second, if the second cause is imagined to be contingent, it is modified by the contingency of the receiver. And since what is prior by nature is modified before it impels toward moving, that motion, already modified toward a contingent cause, will move the second to move not necessarily but contingently. And if the second cause is posited as a natural cause, yet able to fail, that motion, already modified toward the nature of the second cause, will move that second to move not necessarily but in most cases, according to the proper mode of the second cause itself, and not of the first. And thus the ruin of the whole Scotist edifice is evident from one head. – Again, the phrase moved by another is distinguished by another distinction: namely, either by a motion preceding its own action, as water heats having been heated by fire; or by a motion cooperating intrinsically with its own action. In the first mode, even granted that it were true or tenable, in the second mode, however, the said proposition cannot be maintained. For a cause cooperating intrinsically cooperates with each thing according to the mode of the thing with which it cooperates. Such is the cooperation of the first cause, of which it is written³³ that it reaches from end to end mightily, and orders all things sweetly, namely, cooperating with each thing according to its mode.

To the second objection it is said that that priority, universally, is not according to any quasi-duration of nature, such that in one instant of nature the effect is reached by the first cause, and in another by the second, as the objector imagines. Rather, it is according to the independence and immediacy of power: for what is prior reaches the effect more independently and more immediately, immediately with respect to its power, than does the second. Yet in the same instant of nature the effect is reached by both. Nor does it therefore follow, therefore it receives necessity and contingency at once: because it is not reached by the first cause in itself and separately, but as modified in the second. Rather it follows, therefore it receives contingency from two causes at once, one necessary and one contingent.

To the third and fourth objections, it is said that this is not contrary to what we are now discussing in general, but they descend to the contingency of the first cause in point of fact. And therefore it will now be made clear what must be said.

XXIV. As regards how³⁴ the first cause in fact causes, it is briefly said that the first cause, strictly speaking, is neither a necessary cause simply, nor a contingent one, but superior to both. Nor do we have a more proper term than to say that it is a free cause. For necessity simply is repugnant to freedom, while contingency implies an imperfection in freedom, because it posits mutability. And therefore St. Thomas in I Sentences, dist. XXXVIII³⁵, forestalling the inept vocabulary of the moderns, denies that God causes contingently. For since it is a rule that what is higher possesses in itself, in a unified way, what is scattered among lower things, it follows that the first cause, superior to necessary and contingent causes, possesses in itself, not formally but eminently, the nature and mode of necessary and contingent causes, and is the cause of both, and cooperates with both toward their proper effects according to their own modes. And therefore we, to whom every cause seems either necessary or contingent, are astonished, unable to see how one cause can be common to necessary and contingent things immediately. But if we raise the eyes of the mind to a more exalted genus of cause, and a more eminent mode of causing, the astonishment ceases, and all things are in harmony: although we remain in obscurity, not beholding that mode by which, flowing intrinsically into all things, He cooperates with all things according to their own modes cooperatur³⁶. And this is very much to be attended to in matters of this kind. – Nevertheless God, or His knowledge, is called a necessary cause, on account of a necessity not simply so, but of immutability³⁷, which is preserved formally in Him, even insofar as He is a cause.

XXV. Hence, when it is asked whether the first root of contingency is the divine will or the proximate causes, one must answer with a twofold distinction concerning the sense of the question. The first concerns the term "divine will". For the divine will can be understood, that is, as contingency in the divine will, as the moderns understand it. And thus the answer must be negative. First, because it supposes something false, namely that the divine willing is contingent: since it is neither contingent nor necessary, but free and necessary by the necessity of immutability. Second, because even if the divine will caused necessarily simpliciter, contingency could still be preserved, as is clear from what has been said³⁸, on account of the modified reach of the effects of the last deficient causes, or of what is able to be either way. – The divine will can also be understood absolutely, that is, as the efficacy of its willing. And thus the answer is given with St. Thomas, affirmatively: since the divine will is so efficacious a cause that by its command it brings about both necessary things and contingent things.

The second distinction, however, concerns the phrase "first root." For "first" can be understood as meaning "proper," and in that case it must be denied, as is clear from what has been said³⁹. And thus it is clear that the answer should be affirmative.

XXVI. From these things, however, it is clear what must be said in reply to Scotus's third and fourth objections.⁴⁰ For, by granting the assumptions, it is said that those things would be contingent on account of the efficacy of the first cause, and on account of the supplement supplying the place of a contingent cause (in the third objection). And He Himself is the proximate cause (in the fourth objection), not formally contingent, but virtually contingent, as is clear from what has been said⁴¹.

XXVII. As for the sense of the words of the letter in the response to the second and third⁴², insofar as things known, referred to the knowledge of God, are necessary, nothing stands in the way of our thesis: for there is no question there of things known referred to the knowledge of God as to a cause, but as to knowledge. For if all known things were referred to the divine knowledge as effects to a cause, then some would be necessary and others contingent; nor is anything at once necessary and contingent; nor are all known things referred to the divine knowledge as effects to a cause, so that some are necessary and others contingent: nor, speaking more correctly, does such a cause have a necessary relation to anything, but a free relation to all things and an immutable one, as is clear from what has been said⁴³. But if they are referred to the divine knowledge as knowledge, since every thing known, as such, cannot be otherwise than it is, as is clear from I Posterior Analytics⁴⁴; thus all things known are necessary, not simply in themselves, but by supposition, according to that disposition by which they have that they are known, that is, terminating the divine intuition. This is to say that, although the running of Socrates is in itself and simply contingent, nevertheless the running of Socrates, supposing that it is, is necessary while it is, as is clear from I De Interpretatione⁴⁵. And if you add to this that the running of Socrates is not capable of terminating a certain intellect except as present, while it is; it will follow that the running of Socrates, referred to the divine knowledge as such, is necessary, that is, in a state of necessity; although in itself it is contingent, and referred to its proximate causes it is contingent. And thus both the reason and the sense of everything is clear, and the response to the objections. Blessed be God.

XXVIII. In response to the second, three things are in question. The first is that the antecedent is absolutely necessary. The second is that rule: when something pertaining to the act of the soul is posited in the antecedent, the consequent is to be taken not according to the being (esse) that it has in itself, but in the soul⁴⁶. The third is the application of this to the matter at hand⁴⁷⁴⁸.

XXIX. On the first point, note carefully that when disputants debate this matter, equivocation provides such fodder, and leads them so far astray, that certain Thomists go blind in the very midst of light, glossing the letter against its intention.

Know, therefore, that the question concerning the necessity of God's knowledge or foreknowledge with respect to future things can, as far as our purpose is concerned, be treated in two ways. First, absolutely and according to the thing itself: namely, whether God necessarily knows that A will be in the future. And this question is already clear: for He does not know absolutely necessarily that A will be in the future, but freely; yet it stands with this that He knows necessarily, with the necessity of immutability, that A will be in the future, as is evident from what has been said⁴⁹. And in this I know of no doctor who disagrees. But this lies outside the purpose of the present argument, which examines the force of propositions, not of things absolutely.

It can also be discussed in another way, as is signified by such propositions; and thus it is of this that we speak in this argument. Hence, although in the first way—that is, according to the thing taken absolutely—there is no difference between "God knows A to be future" and "God knew A to be future," because God's knowledge in itself is eternal and does not pass into the past, etc., nevertheless there is a great difference between them in the second way. For in the first is signified God's knowing as present, but in the second as past; and therefore the difference between them is as great as that between the necessity of a proposition about the present and one about the past in contingent matter (taking contingency as a difference in the matter of propositions, since a threefold matter of propositions is distinguished: remote, necessary, and contingent). Now it is clear from the common run that between a proposition about the present and one about the past that is true in contingent matter—for example, "Socrates is sitting" and "Socrates sat"—there is this difference: that the proposition about the present is not necessary absolutely, although it is necessary with the qualification while he sits, as is said in I Perihermeneias⁵⁰; whereas the proposition about the past is necessary absolutely, as is evident from their contradictories. For the contradictory of the latter is simply impossible, even by divine power, namely, "Socrates is not sitting"; but the contradictory of the former is possible absolutely, namely, "Socrates is not sitting." For although he truly sits, he does not sit necessarily; but one who already sat not only truly sat, but it is necessary that he sat, since it is impossible that he did not sit. For this alone is denied to God—to make ingenerate the things that have been made—as Agathon said (VI Ethics).⁵¹

XXX. Since, therefore, every true proposition about the past is necessary, it follows that, although this one is contingent, "God wills A to be," yet this one is necessary: "God willed A to be." And similarly, although this one is contingent, "God knows A to be," yet this one is necessary: "God knew A to be." And thus it is clear how excellently and subtly the blessed Thomas said in the text that this antecedent, "God knew A to be," is necessary absolutely; and that he did not mean that it is merely necessary—that is, immutable—as some gloss it, and badly; for he would have added the word "absolutely" in vain, and would have labored in vain in reproaching others. — It is also evident that nothing impedes the absolute necessity of that proposition: the transit of the act of knowing over a future contingent—although this matters greatly when speaking of God's knowledge absolutely. — It is also evident that later thinkers do not seem to have understood this passage. And therefore, in treating of this argument, they turned aside to God's knowledge in itself absolutely and to propositions about the present, as if these were equivalent to those about the past. — This concludes the first point.

XXXI. As regards according to⁵², Gregory of Rimini, in I, dist. XXXVIII⁵³, argues that this rule is false. Because it holds that I know the stone to be material in its being, therefore the stone is material: and yet it is evident that the consequent is understood of the stone in itself, and not according to the being it has in the soul. And similarly a thousand instances could be brought forward, for example, I know Socrates to be running, therefore Socrates runs, etc.

XXXII. To this it is said that this rule, taken formally and rightly understood, is most true. Formally, indeed: both because it must be understood of the consequent with respect to what is inferred in it by the force of the act of the soul posited in the antecedent, and not from anything else assumed in the antecedent; and because it must be understood of that which is inferred by the force of the act of the soul as such, or insofar as it is inferred from such an act, and not absolutely. Rightly, however: because esse in the soul and the "esse in itself" are not to be interpreted in the way they appear at first sight, namely insofar as esse in the soul is distinguished against esse in the nature of things. Rather, "esse in the soul" is taken here as it is common both to that mode of being by which beings in the soul are distinguished from beings outside the soul, and to that esse, or that disposition, by which a thing terminates the act of the soul. But "esse in itself" is taken here strictly, for the esse that is owed to a thing absolutely as such, that is, insofar as it belongs to it absolutely: whether such esse belongs to it according to quidditative predicates, as man is an animal; or according to predicates of existence, as Socrates is, or runs. So that the sense of the rule is that, when something pertaining to the act of the soul is posited in the antecedent, the consequent, insofar as it follows from the force of that act of the soul, is to be understood according to the esse it has in the soul, that is, according to objective esse, or according to the conditions in the object terminating the act of the soul; and not according to the esse it has in itself, that is: and it is not to be understood absolutely and simply as such.

XXXIII. That the rule, understood in this way, is most true is proved. For the acts of the soul of which we are speaking are immanent, and they are nothing other than knowing and appetiting. Such acts, as such, posit nothing in their objects; and therefore what is inferred from their force as belonging to the objects, as such, does not belong to the things as objects absolutely. I say "as such," because on account of the matter, owing to the coincidence between what belongs to something absolutely and what is inferred about it from the force of the act of the soul, it happens that what is inferred from the act of the soul belongs to the thing absolutely and in itself. But this happens to the inferred conclusion insofar as it depends on the act of the soul. Hence, since the consequence "I know that Socrates will run, therefore Socrates will run" is excellent, and the consequence holds by the force of the act of knowing, namely because it is certain, true, and infallible, the consequent is not to be taken in itself, that is, as a proposition true, certain, and infallible of itself, in separation; but as the consequent of such an antecedent, that is, "therefore Socrates will run" with that truth, certainty, and infallibility with which it is known that he will run. And this was said because the act of the soul does not import into it another certainty, truth, and infallibility. Now this consequence, I know that man is corruptible, therefore he is corruptible, is good, like the preceding one; and understood formally, it infers that the consequent is to be understood just as the antecedent; but on account of the matter, the consequent, even taken separately, is certain.

XXXIV. That this is the meaning of the text, however, is clear from the fact that in the text, under being in the soul, two things are subsumed. The first pertains to objective being, as in that example, I understand a stone, therefore the stone is immaterial. The second looks to the condition inherent in the objectified thing, by which the thing terminates the act of the soul, as in that proposition which is the consequent of the conditional proposed, namely, A will be; explaining that it must be taken as it subsists under the divine science, that is, as it is in its own presence. For it is agreed that it speaks of the being of A in actual presence in the order of nature: for that is that condition according to which it terminates the divine intuition, as is clear from what has been said [1]. And if you join together at once that actual being belongs to A in itself, and that to take A as terminating God's science, that is, according to its presentiality, is not to take A in itself, but according as it is in the soul; you will clearly see that A is then taken only according to being in itself when it is taken according to that which belongs to it absolutely as such, and not as inferred from the act of the soul, as we have explained [2].

And so the answer to the objections is clear [3]: because they fight materially, not formally, and they wrongly interpret the word being in the soul. – This concludes the second question.

XXXV. As to the third ⁵⁴, namely, the application of the rule to the cases proposed, an ambiguity arises first, because in the text an implicatio in adiecto is committed, in saying that the consequent is taken as it lies under the knowledge of God, namely, insofar as it is in its presentiality. For it implies that something, if it is taken as future, as such, is taken as present: but it is clear that in the consequent stating A will be, A is taken as future; therefore it does not stand that this consequent, signifying A as future, is taken as present. Although it does stand that the future thing is taken as present: for the judgment about the thing itself absolutely, and about it as signified by a proposition about the future, is different, as is clear from what has been said ⁵⁵. Hence it does not seem intelligible that this consequent, A will be, is taken as present: because if it is taken as present, it is no longer the phrase A will be, but A is: and if it is that proposition A will be, it is no longer taken as present.

Second, it is doubted because this response seems incoherent and discordant. For the antecedent takes knowledge as signified in the past, and not as measured by eternity; and the consequent is said to be taken as present. These do not fit together: because, as is clear from what was said [6], a thing as present corresponds to eternity, and to an act of cognition as it is measured by eternity.

Third, it is doubted, because that response, even granted that it is true, is nevertheless not sufficient. For the whole response ultimately comes back to the necessity of the thing in its presence. But from what was said above [7] it is clear that, even if that reason of the presence of things to eternity were removed, God would still have a certain knowledge of contingents, on account of the rationes of things present with him. Therefore, since this argument works simply, and not only according to that reason; one ought to respond simply, and not only according to that reason, as is done in the text. Therefore it is insufficient.

XXXVI. For the clarification of these matters, the sense of the text must first be explained. For the perception of which, note that this consequent is true, namely A will be, which includes two things: namely, the futurity of A itself, and the presentness of A at some time. For both must concur for its truth: both that it be future, and that at some time that proposition about the present, corresponding to it, namely A is, be true. But since, as is clear from what was said [8], A, considered only in its futurity, is not capable of certain intuition, because of its deficiency, namely because it does not have the character of a certain knowable; it is necessary that A be taken as present, in order that it be the terminus of a certain intuition. And by this, this consequent, A will be, inasmuch as it has the character of futurity, is not the terminus of a certain intuition that A will at some time be; it remains that the reason why it terminates a certain intuition is contained in it in the corresponding proposition about the present, namely A is. So that this consequent, A will be, is not known to be true by a certain intuition from anything else, except because that proposition corresponding to it and contained in it is seen, namely A is at some time. Therefore the sense of the text is that this proposition, namely A will be, which is the consequent in the proposed conditional, can be taken in two ways. First, absolutely: and thus it is not necessary. And it can be taken as standing under divine knowledge, that is, as it is the terminus of a certain and infallible intuition: and thus it is necessary, in that mode of necessity in which this is necessary, A is, while it is; because the term A will be is the terminus of the divine intuition, inasmuch as it includes in itself that proposition about the present, namely A is, and not inasmuch as it is future.

XXXVII. To the first objection, therefore [9], it is denied that there is an implication in the predicate here. For the future is not taken here formally, as present: rather it is an explication and distinction of what is contained within the proposition about the future. Here the futurity of A itself is distinguished into its presence-to-God and its futurition: and both are contained within that consequent. And it is taught that that consequent is capable of certain knowledge by reason of the presence-to-God, and not by reason of the futurition. And because under the aspect of presence-to-God it is necessary, it follows that this consequent, taken according to that disposition whereby it falls under the divine science, is necessary. Where it is evident that no implication intervenes.

To the second objection, then, it is easily answered that the act of knowing in God, through the word of a past time, is not co-signified as past (for it would then be co-signified falsely): but it is co-signified as coexisting with the past. Now the coexistence of an act with the past is no obstacle to eternity: rather, it accompanies it.

To the third, the reply is brief: the objection proceeds from a poor understanding of the letter. For that response is not founded upon the eternity of the act, nor upon the coexistence of things with eternity, as the objection supposes; rather it is founded upon the disposition by which a thing is knowable or not knowable. For a contingent future thing, as such, is not knowable; but as present it is knowable, as is clear from what has been said [10]. And this is true whether the presence of the thing is known by reason of eternity; or by reason of the ideas in the divine mind representing the thing with its conditions of existence; or by reason of the divine essence representing the aforementioned in the manner of an intelligible species; or by reason of species infused into the mind of someone, say some angel, or the soul of Christ. For it makes no difference to the matter at hand in what way one posits the presence of the thing to be known. It is enough for the matter at hand that what follows is not knowable with certainty except by reason of the presence included in the corresponding response.

XXXVIII. In response to the third, everything is clear from what has been said. Note, however, that at the beginning of the reply, where the difference is assigned between the certainty of a thing known by us and by God (since it must be certain in two ways, namely in itself and as it stands under knowledge; but the latter only as known), the reason for this difference is rendered from the eternity of the divine intuition. And indeed this reason is good and sufficient, but it is not the only one: therefore beware lest you be deceived.