Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

Title: the singulars of material things. For concerning these it has already been said¹ that the soul knows itself, which is admittedly singular. — In the body, first he answers the question directly, namely that it does; second, he treats how ².

II. As to the first point, three things. First, he answers the question affirmatively: God knows singulars. — It is proved. All perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher manner: knowledge of singulars is a perfection of man; therefore it pre-exists in God in a higher manner.

Second, he shows the force of this argument from the authority of Aristotle. For that reasoning is grounded in this, that everything known by us must be known by God: and Aristotle assumed this against Empedocles.

Third, he explains that particle added in the conclusion by force of the middle term, namely in a loftier way: this is attended to when he says that we know singulars and universals through distinct powers; but God comprehends all things, both material and immaterial, with a single intellect. And it is proved: because things that are divided among inferior beings are simply and unitedly in God.

III. Note here that, because the major proposition is not true of formal preexistence except in the case of perfections simply so called, therefore, although our knowing of the singular and sensing are the same, the text did not say "to sense," but, the knowing of the singular pertains to our perfection. For sensing is not a perfection simply so called, nor does it preexist in God formally, but only virtually; whereas the knowing of the singular is a perfection simply so called, and it had to be concluded here that it preexists in God formally.

IV. As to the second ³, there are three positions, according to two opinions and a determination. The first opinion, then, concerning the manner in which God knows singulars, holds that God knows singulars by knowing all their universal causes. — It is argued that this suffices. There is nothing in any singular that is not present in it from some universal cause; therefore, once all the universal causes are known, the whole singular is known. This is also illustrated by an example, namely an eclipse.

This opinion is refuted. If God were to know singulars by knowing only universal causes, then he would not know singulars in their singularity; the opposite of which has been proven. — The consequence is proven. The whole aggregate that is in a singular from universal causes, as such, does not suffice to constitute a singular: therefore. The assumption is proven and made manifest. It is proven: because, with designated matter removed, or the principle of individuation, whatever it may be, since it is established that it is not being (ens) universal, a singular will never be constituted. This is made manifest exemplarily in man.

V. The second opinion ⁴ stands in this: God knows singulars by applying universals to particulars. — Against: application is only to something previously known; therefore the application of a universal to a particular presupposes knowledge of the singular, it does not produce it.

VI. The determination ⁵ is: God knows singulars through His essence. — It is proved, as to the first part, thus. God's knowledge is the cause of things: therefore it extends to all things to which His causality extends: therefore to singulars. The antecedent, together with the first consequence, is known. But the second is proved: because God is the cause not only of form, but of individuating matter. — As to the second part, thus. God knows things other than Himself through His essence, insofar as it is their likeness or active principle: therefore His essence is a sufficient principle for knowing all things that are made through it, even in the singular: therefore He knows singulars through His essence. The antecedent is clear from what has been said ⁶. And the consequence is clear from the terms and from the proof of the first part.

VII. Note that the whole determination of this text presupposes that God is the proximate cause of prime matter: concerning which, since there will be a special question below ⁷, let it be supposed for now. For this granted, the rest is clear and undoubted.

In the replies to the arguments, many things must be discussed, but not here: they will be made clear below in their proper places.