Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

A clear title. - The body has two parts: first, it answers the question affirmatively; second, it assigns a certain difference among the knowledge of non-beings in various ways ¹. II. As to the first, the conclusion is: It may be said that God has knowledge of non-beings. - It is proved: God knows all things that are in any way whatever; therefore, all things that can, by a power belonging both to himself and to a creature, be made, thought, and said; therefore, those things that are not in act. Therefore, it may be said that God has knowledge of non-beings. The first consequence is proved by distinguishing the modes of being (essendi), that is, simply and in a qualified sense; and by subdividing the latter according to the manifold diversity of power, namely of the Creator or of a creature, active or passive, real or merely opinionative, etc. - The second consequence is self-evident: for not all these things are in act. - The third is also evident: because since they are not beings simply, but in potency—which is a diminishing condition—the absolute negation of being is verified of them most fittingly, and thus they are non-beings; just as of man in potency it is truly said not-man, and of a chest in potency not-chest. III. As to the second ², the difference is nominal: certain non-beings, it is said, God knows by the science of vision, others by the simple intelligence. And the reason for the names is that things seen among us have two conditions: one is that they are present as objects to the seer; the other, that they have a distinct esse outside the seer. And therefore those things which exist at some time are said to be understood by the science of vision; whereas those which never exist are said not to be seen, but to be known by simple intelligence. For the former have these two conditions on account of the eternity of the divine science, etc.; the latter have neither. IV. Concerning this part there is a small doubt. Since this difference does not pertain to non-beings as such, but rather to non-beings insofar as they are beings, it consequently pertains only accidentally to this article, in which the science of non-beings is treated. The assumption is clear: because things that exist at some time belong to the science of vision for this reason, that they are beings at some time in act, and not insofar as they are non-beings; therefore. To this it is briefly answered that this difference touches non-beings in both ways, namely insofar as they are, and insofar as they are not. For of those things that never exist, but are always in potency, not only their entitative contents in potency, but also the negations of actuality, are known by simple intelligence. And likewise, of those things that exist at some time in act, not only their entitative contents in act at such a time, but also their negations from act at such another time, are known by the science of vision from eternity. And the reason for this is that negation is known through affirmation, and follows its genus in being and in being known per se. And so this difference completely embraces non-beings, as proposed.