Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

Title. – Note that this article is of great importance, since it begins the question concerning the manner in which God produces things outside himself. For to ask whether God's knowledge is the cause of things is nothing other than to ask whether God causes through intellect. But because the causality of things can be considered in two ways: first, in itself; and thus a special treatise on it will be given below¹, where everything will be fully examined. In another way, as it is a quality of divine knowledge: and thus it is inquired into here, so that it may be completely shown what sort of knowledge God has, namely whether God's knowledge has this condition, namely to be the cause of things.

II. In the body, a single conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: The knowledge of God is the cause of things. – Concerning this conclusion, three things are done in the text: first, it is proved; second, it is shown in general in what way the knowledge of God is a cause in act second²; third, the conclusion is proved effectively with that mode expressly stated³.

III. As to the first: God's knowledge is related to things as the knowledge of a craftsman is to his works; but the craftsman's knowledge is the cause of his artifacts; therefore God's knowledge is the cause of things. – The major is not proved until the third part of the body⁴. The minor, however, is proved. The craftsman acts through his intellect; therefore the form of the intellect is the principle of operation, just as heat is of heating. And then supply implicitly: but knowledge is that very form of his intellect; therefore. All things are clear.

IV. With respect to second⁵, it is determined in general: Knowledge is a cause only when joined to the will. – It is proved. Knowledge does not signify the reason of a cause from the mere fact that it is in the knower, but from its inclination toward the effect: therefore not except when joined to the will. – The antecedent is proved by a similar case in the natural order, namely heat. The consequence, however, is proved as follows: knowledge of itself is related to opposites; therefore its determination to one side comes from an appetite joined to it. The assumption and the consequence are found in Book IX Metaphysics.

Note here that the text speaks quite cautiously about natural form. For it does not say that a naturally active form, such as heat, needs some inclination superadded in order to be a principle of action, since this would be false. Rather, it says that the form itself, namely heat, insofar as it has this, namely being or remaining in a subject, from this, or as such, does not have that it is, or is signified as, a principle of action. And this is true: for otherwise it would follow that every form which is in something would be a principle of action, which is false. But although from this it does not have the character of an active principle, this is nevertheless required for the character of an active principle. Now the inclination to the work is what gives the form the character of an active principle. – Nor does it matter for the present purpose whether such a determination is intrinsic, from the very nature of the form, as is evident in the case of heat, or extrinsic, as happens in knowledge, which, as has been proven, does not have the character of a cause in act unless it has the will joined to it. For taken by itself it would never cause anything, unless it caused opposites at once, which is impossible.

V. As to the third point, the conclusion is repeated⁶ with a mode added, namely: The knowledge of God is the cause of things insofar as will is joined to it. – It is proved by reason: which is also the proof of the major premise at the beginning of what was assumed⁷. God's act of being (esse) is His very understanding; therefore God is the cause of things through intellect; therefore the knowledge of God is the cause of things insofar as will is joined to it.

The antecedent is clear. And the first consequence is left as evident. The second, however, is clear from the assigned manner in which the intellect is the cause of things. And nevertheless it is confirmed in the text by the singularity of the name: because God's knowledge as cause has been accustomed to be called the knowledge of approbation.

VI. Concerning the first inference of this argument, a doubt arises: namely, what is the basis of this inference, God's being is His understanding, therefore God acts through intellect. For it admits of objection in two ways. First, according to the truth of the matter. For the following does not hold: God's being is His understanding, therefore God produces the Son, or the Holy Spirit, through intellect; since each is produced by God through nature, as will be made clear below ⁸ – Second, according to the opinion of those who hold that God acts by the necessity of nature. For those philosophers would concede that God's being is His understanding: but they would deny the consequence, saying that God produces things through intellect only concomitantly, since He understands Himself to be making them; but through nature alone causally.

VII. To this it is briefly answered that the root of this consequence is the proposition, to act through intellect is more perfect, higher, and more universal than to act through nature; which proposition is proved in Book II Contra Gentiles, chapter XXIII. For, given this supposition, it follows most fittingly, if God's esse is his understanding, then all the effects of God are in God intelligibly, as is clear from what was said above ⁹: for effects must pre-exist in the very essence of the cause, according to the mode of the essence of that cause. But if all things are both in the esse of God and in his understanding as such; and if it is more perfect, higher, and more universal to be the cause of things through understanding than through esse alone; since it is agreed that there must be attributed to God whatever is most perfect, whatever is supreme, whatever is most universal in causing and in the mode of causing, then without any sophistry it follows, therefore God is the cause of things through intellect.

VIII. Therefore, in reply to the objection raised on the opposite side, according to the opinion of certain philosophers¹⁰, it is now clear that they would wrongly deny the consequence. – As for the objection touching the matter of the Trinity, it is said that the objection is not to the point. For the discussion concerns a true efficient cause, which cannot be understood without an essential diversity between cause and caused: but the processions ad intra are not causalities truly and properly so called, nor is the Father truly and properly the cause of the Son, since both share one and the same numerical substance. And therefore it is no wonder if the argument does not hold there. – Nevertheless, one could also say otherwise, namely that this consequence does hold, granted that on the side of what is producible there is nothing repugnant to its being produced through intellect. For if it were repugnant on the side of the producible thing, then although it would have being (esse) intelligibly in the cause, etc., it would still never follow that it could be produced through intellect, as is evident. But it is clear that this is how things stand in the case at hand. For it is repugnant to the divine Persons to be produced in the manner of an artifact; but not to other things. And therefore with respect to other things it is inferred, therefore God acts through intellect, but not with respect to the divine Persons: for of them He is Author by nature, as will appear below ¹¹. IX. In response to the second, await its discussion: since, when causality among things is treated of in its own right, it will be discussed ¹².