Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

Title. Propria cognitione: proper cognition of something can be understood in two ways. First, as distinguished from common cognition on the side of the act of knowing, that is, about that thing alone. And in this way God has proper cognition of no thing: because He has only a single cognition, which is not of any one thing alone, but is such that it is of this thing and also of all others. Second, as distinguished from common cognition on the side of the thing known, that is, about the thing's own proper features. And it is taken in this sense in our proposition: for we ask whether God knows things other than Himself in such a way that He beholds what is proper to each individual. II. In the body there are three points: first, he answers the question affirmatively; second, he assigns the way in which it is verified ¹; third, he proves both the responsive conclusion and its mode, by two arguments ². III. As to the first, three things. First the opinion of Averroes is set forth, from Book XII of the Metaphysics, commentary LI. Two things are reported concerning it: namely, the opinion itself, namely that God knows all things according as they share in being; and its mode, namely that He does so by knowing Himself as the first principle of being. And this is illustrated by the example of fire. IV. Second it is refuted, by leading it to an impossibility. If God knew other things only insofar as they are beings, then He would understand beings only in common: therefore confusedly and in potency: therefore imperfectly: therefore God's understanding would not be perfect in every way: therefore neither would God's being be, which is impossible. V. Note that cognition attaining something according to common predicates only can be called imperfect, in potency, confused, in common, universal, etc., in two ways. One way, on the side of the thing known: and in this way it is undoubtedly true that such cognition has these conditions. Another way, on the side of the cognition itself in itself: and thus it is not always true that such cognition, that is, one resting in commons, has these conditions; otherwise metaphysics, which rests in the commons of all things, would be imperfect on the side of the act, etc. Hence the first three consequences ³, taken on the side of the thing known, are evident in themselves; and they are proved in the text from Book I of the Physics, as is clear. Nor does Averroes' reply escape, when he says that, since the object of God's knowledge is not being, which is universal to all beings, comprehending them in common, in potency, confusedly and imperfectly, but rather the essence of God, which is neither universal nor particular, etc.; therefore God's knowledge is neither universal nor particular, neither common nor proper, but elevated equivocally above our knowledge. For although this is true, it nevertheless does not solve the objection. Because predicates known of things in the divine essence must be either common or proper to those things, either particular or universal, even though the first object is neither. And referring to the predicates known, the first three consequences proceed very well: for God's knowledge, if it terminates only in the commons of things, must, as such, on the side of the things known, be called confused, in potency, etc.; because these are conditions of the predicates known. Concerning the fourth consequence, in which the argument passes to the perfection of the cognition in itself, note that it is not inferred that therefore God's cognition is imperfect privatively. Because Averroes would deny the consequence, saying that God's cognition is most perfect; and yet it does not attain things except as they are beings, because it is not naturally apt to attain more about things. But it is inferred that therefore it is not perfect in every way: which cannot be denied by those who posit the antecedent; because here is posited as lacking that mode of perfection whereby it would attain the proper features of things. For this mode signifies some perfection with no admixed imperfection: and consequently it is naturally apt to be in that understanding in which all the nobilities of all understanders are present without imperfections being separable from them, such as is God's understanding; just as His being possesses the nobilities of all beings, as is said in the text. VI. Third ⁴ from this refutation is inferred the responsive conclusion answering the question affirmatively: God knows things other than Himself with proper cognition. For since it is impossible that He rest in commons, therefore He must come to the proper features. – And the text explains what knowing with proper cognition means: namely, to know things not only according to the conditions in which they share, but also according to those by which they are distinguished from one another; for these are proper to each individual. VII. As to the second⁵, three things are done. First examples are cited, by which others try to show the way in which God, by knowing Himself, knows other things: and they concern light and color. And this is clear. Second it is shown that these examples do not show what is intended, thus. Things are in and from God according to two aspects, namely according to that in which they share, and their proper features by which they are distinguished: these examples are not alike with respect to the proper features, but with respect to that in which they share: therefore. – Of this argument, the minor premise is first stated and explained in the text, in both examples, concerning lines with respect to the center, and colors with respect to light: and this is clear. Second, the major premise, thus. Whatever perfection is in things is contained eminently in God: but not only that in which things share, but also what distinguishes them, is a perfection: therefore the whole is in and from God. This last minor premise is explained inductively in living things, in knowers, in the proper forms of things. Third a proportionate example is brought forward to explain what is intended: namely, that God is related to other things as a perfect act to imperfect acts, as man to animal. – It is proved with respect to being: because the essence of God contains all the perfections of things excellently. Then it is proved with respect to being known: because once the perfect act is perfectly known, all the imperfect acts are known in it, both with respect to what is common and with respect to what is proper, as is clear in the example adduced. VIII. Note here that the essence of God has two conditions in containing other things. One is excellence, namely that it is infinitely more perfect than the others: and thus it contains things eminently. The other is comprehension, namely that it comprehends within itself every positive perfection findable in any thing whatever; so that no thing, compared to it, adds anything positive that is not contained in the essence of God; and this because it is being itself (ipsum esse), possessing beforehand within itself every mode of being. That both these conditions should be found in some created thing does not seem possible. Yet by comparing an act perfect in the order of generation, posterior in generation, to acts imperfect prior in generation, as man to animal, the intellective soul to the others, the square to the triangle, six to three, etc., this is somehow preserved. And therefore these examples are brought forward in the text, so that both the excellence and the comprehension of every positive may be shown: for both of these these examples show. And therefore they show what is intended; although all the examples are unfitting for so eminent a containment. And therefore in the text, when introducing the examples, it says, as if I were to say, man to animal; as if to say, if, with permission granted, it may be allowed, etc.

IX. As to the third point⁶, the conclusion is proved, together with an explanation of its manner, in two ways. First, the essence of God has within itself whatever of perfection there is in anything whatsoever, and more besides: therefore God, in knowing himself, knows all things by a proper knowledge.

The antecedent is clear from what has been said. The consequent, however, is proved by the destruction of the consequent, as follows. If God, in knowing himself, does not know other things by a proper knowledge, then he does not know in any way how his perfection is participable. This inference is clear from that proposition implicitly contained in the antecedent, namely: the proper character of each nature consists in some mode of participating the divine perfection. Therefore he does not perfectly know himself. This holds from the antecedent itself, in which it is said that he encloses within himself every mode of perfection. – It follows, therefore, from the destruction of the consequent either that the antecedent is false; or that this is impossible, namely that God does not perfectly know himself. Which also redounds to the falsity of the antecedent: for if it were so, the divine essence would not be of infinite perfection, and consequently would not eminently contain every possible mode of perfection.

X. Second it is proved as follows. If God, in knowing himself, did not know other things by a proper knowledge, then he would not perfectly know all modes of being; therefore he would not perfectly know the nature of being. – All the consequences are evident, formally or as such, from what has been said above.

And note that this argument is directly opposed to the opinion recited at the beginning of the body of the text, indeed proceeding from that opinion's own foundation against the opinion itself. For, since it is esse itself, in knowing itself perfectly it knows the nature of being (just as a separate man, according to Plato, by knowing himself would know perfectly the nature of humanity): therefore every mode of being: therefore every nature; because every nature is nothing other than some mode of being.

Nor let yourself be deceived by the example adduced, because a separate man would not know humanity with that mode by which it is in the matter of Socrates, and with that by which it is in the matter of Plato; rather, from this you may rise to an understanding of what is proposed. For this reason: a separate man, in knowing himself, would not know these particular modes, because those modes come from elsewhere than from his own participation—namely, from matter. But if you suppose that, beyond what belongs on the side of humanity itself, nothing else is present, it will necessarily follow that, once humanity is known, all its modes are known. Now being (esse) stands thus toward all things: for there is nothing in any thing whatsoever which is not some being (esse). And therefore the esse that is in a thing proceeds from nothing other than from esse itself. And when that which belongs on the side of esse itself is set aside, nothing remains; since both matter and all things are certain participations and certain modes of essendi. Therefore, on account of the universality of esse itself, from which all modes of essendi constitute things according to whatever positive ratio, it follows that, once the nature of essendi is known, all things are known according to their proper conditions. And because the first opinion did not see this universality, it erred, judging concerning esse as concerning the other special perfections—namely, living, understanding, and so on—beyond which and their modes there are others; whereas, as is evident, beyond esse and its modes nothing remains.

XI. Note here that, since the whole disagreement in this question turns on the manner in which all things can be known in one known object, it is plainly evident that the common conception of the wise was that God does not understand things other than himself in any other way than by understanding them in himself. Therefore be cautious when you read new arrivals of the law.

XII. In response to the first, note that when it is said the stone is seen in God, the word in can signify the mode of the object, that is, the mode in which the stone is presented as an object; and it can signify the mode of the thing known as such, that is, the mode as known; for the stone is not only presented as an object in God himself, but that mode of being in God is also known. But there is a difference between these. For when it signifies the mode of the object, it is verified with the exclusive term, so that this is true: the stone is seen by God in God himself alone; for it is presented to God in no other way than as contained in God himself, as is clear from what has been said⁷. But when it signifies the mode as known, it is not verified with the exclusive term: thus the stone is seen by God according to the being it has in God himself, but not only so; for the stone is also seen by God according to the being it has in this and that stone, and according to the being it has in its causes, both material and efficient, and, in short, according to all its modes of being, not only those proper to it, but also those possible to it. For God, seeing the stone in himself alone, sees the stone according to all the modes of being that it has and can have. And this is stated in the text in other words, as is evident.

XIII. In response to the third, note that hence⁸ it is clear that for St. Thomas, in order that God may understand all things according to their proper rationes in the essence understood, the eminent perfection of the divine essence suffices, by which He sets forth, and more besides, all and each of the perfections of all things that imitate it in diverse ways. Nor does he require that any relations be posited for this purpose, as is said to be required in the second opinion recited by Scotus at the thirty-fifth distinction of Book I. Therefore the arguments that Scotus brings against those relations are not directed against St. Thomas on this matter. – How much weight they carry against St. Thomas's position on ideas will be seen in the following question.⁹