Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title asks in general, without distinguishing what a thing is from whether it is. – In the body there are two parts: first, he answers the question affirmatively; second, he assigns the manner in which the conclusion is verified¹. II. As to the first, the conclusion is: It is necessary that God know things other than himself. – It is proved in two ways. First thus. God perfectly understands himself: therefore he perfectly knows his power: therefore those things to which his power extends: therefore things other than himself. – The antecedent, although it was proved from what was said before², is proved again by leading to an impossibility, namely: if God does not perfectly understand himself, therefore his esse is not perfect; this is impossible. And the inference holds: because his esse is his understanding. – The first consequence is left as self-evident. The second, however, is proved: because otherwise the power is not perfectly known, as is evident. The third, however: because the divine power extends to things other than itself. This is proved: because it is the first cause of all things. Second it is proved thus, or confirmed. The esse of the first cause is its understanding: therefore all effects preexisting in the first cause are in its understanding: therefore they are in it in an intelligible manner. – The inference is proved: because each thing is in another in the manner of that in which it is. III. Concerning these arguments, note that twice in the text this proposition is assumed, the esse of God is his understanding: once to prove the antecedent of the first argument; and once it constitutes the antecedent of the second argument. And the first time indeed, speaking of divine things in a human manner, it can be interpreted in both ways, namely formally and identically. Formally indeed, because understanding is formally the esse of God, inasmuch as he is understanding, as is clear from what was said³: and therefore, if it were imperfect, the esse of God would be concluded to be imperfect. Identically, however, because the intended conclusion is also inferred in this way, with the common propositions understood. For, since the understanding of God is subjectively and objectively capable of every perfection in itself, and is the same as the esse of God, if it is imperfect, it necessarily follows, therefore the esse of God is imperfect, a posteriori, inferring the imperfection of the prior from the imperfection of the posterior, the prior being that which is identical with the posterior. For if that which identifies were altogether perfect, it would permit no imperfection in the thing identified. IV. But the second time⁴, it is ambiguous in what way it is taken. For if it is taken formally, it is false. For here the discourse is not about the esse of God as in common, as before, but about the esse of God as grounding active power: because in such an esse all the effects of the active cause preexist. But such an esse is formally other than understanding, since it is a perfection naturally prior, etc. – But if it is taken identically, the assumption is true: but the argument is worth nothing. For from the formal and the identical there does not follow the formal: but this is what is at issue. For this proposition, all effects preexist in the esse of the first cause, is formal; but this one, the esse of the first cause is its understanding, is identical: and consequently, from them this formal proposition cannot be inferred, therefore all effects of this kind are in the understanding of God. – And the doubt is confirmed: because this does not hold: all effects are in the esse of God, the esse of God is a relation, therefore all effects are in a relation, and in the manner of a relation. And likewise it does not hold, adding: the esse of God is his willing, therefore all effects are in the willing of God, and in the manner of the will. Therefore neither does it hold for understanding. V. To this it is said in two ways. First, that in this antecedent that proposition, the understanding of God is his esse, is identical with respect to us, although in itself it is formal. And when it is said, from the identical and the formal etc., it is conceded. But it stands together with this that from such an identical with such a formal there follows a formal proposition; that is, although it does not follow by reason of the form, it nevertheless follows by reason of the matter. And this is what is at issue. For, speaking of the natural perfections of God, from their identity it follows that whatever is in one in the manner proper to it, is in the other in the manner proper to that other. And this is because the natural perfections of God naturally have whatever perfection they can have according to their formal rationes. And since all of them can be infinite, they are equal: and thus each one extends itself naturally, in a manner proportional to itself, to all those things to which one of them extends itself. And therefore, since the understanding of God is a natural perfection of God himself, and the esse likewise, and they are the same; it follows that whatever things are in the esse as esse, and in the manner of being, are in the understanding as understanding⁵, and in an intelligible manner. – And from this the solution to the objections is clear. For the divine relations, and the things pertaining to them, are not perfections formally. But the willing of other things, with the things pertaining to it, although it is a perfection, is nevertheless not natural, but free. Second it is said, and better, and without doubt according to the mind of the text, that that proposition is formal. For whatever may be said of the esse of God, nevertheless the esse of God as first cause, as such, is understanding: because not from the fact that he is, but from the fact that he understands, and as he understands, not as he is, he causes and is naturally causative. Nor is it true that the effects of an intellectual cause as such preexist in the esse, as anticipating the understanding. Rather, that they preexist in the esse is per accidens, that is, from the fact that the understanding is esse, as we experience in ourselves with respect to artifacts. For the understanding grounds the active power of every intellectual cause as such, and consequently of the first cause. And therefore it is notably said in the text that this is more evident, if it be added that the esse of the first cause is its understanding. – And thus the objections cease. For willing is what determines the intellectual cause to producing one of two opposites, but does not constitute it: and therefore the esse of the first cause is not formally willing, but understanding.

VI. Concerning the second consequence of the same argument⁶, note that the consequent can be interpreted in two ways, according as intelligible is taken in two ways. In one way, as it is distinguished against sensible: and thus to be in a thing in an intelligible manner is nothing other than to be in that thing immaterially. And according to this sense the consequence is plain: since, if being (esse) is the same as understanding (intelligere), then because understanding is necessarily immaterial, whatever is in being will be immaterially; for each thing is in something in the manner of that in which it is. – In another way, as it is distinguished against being (ens), insofar as the genus of the intelligible is distinguished from the genus of being: and thus to be in a thing in an intelligible manner is to shine forth in it as an object capable of being understood. And according to this sense too the consequence is plain. Since, if being is understanding, all things that are in being are in understanding as understanding is, that is, they are understood; and if they are understood, therefore they are as understood or intelligible; for each thing is in something according to the mode of that in which it is, and hence things that are in understanding are in an intelligible manner.

Between these two senses, however, what seems to matter for our purpose is that, according to the first sense, the conclusion follows from the first antecedent without a middle term; whereas according to the second, it follows through another middle term, which is supplied in the text. And although the text does not exclude either sense, since the second nevertheless entails the first and is more subtle and more formal, it is therefore to be embraced.

VII. As regards the second⁷, the mode is assigned in which things other than God are known by Him, by a single conclusion: Things other than God are known by God not in themselves, but in God Himself. – Proof: God sees Himself and other things through His essence; therefore He sees Himself in Himself, but things other than Himself not in themselves, but in His substance.

The antecedent is clear. The consequent, however, is proved by distinguishing to be seen in two ways: in itself, and in another; and by defining each. For from the definitions of these the inference follows. Namely, if to be seen in itself is to be seen through its own proper and adequate species, while to be seen in another is to be seen through the species of another thing in which that species exists, as is said in the text, it follows that, because God sees Himself and other things through His own essence as a species, He sees Himself in Himself, but other things not in themselves, rather in Him; since it is evident that His essence is the adequate species of God, and not of other things.

VIII. Note here two things for the explanation of the text. First, the sense of the distinction made in the text concerning being known in itself or in another; for "in itself" or "in another" is to be understood objectively, so that to be seen in itself means to be seen not in another object or thing seen, whereas to be seen in another means to be seen in another object, that is, in another thing seen.

Second, the verification of the definitions of the members. Since every intelligible or sensible species has some adequate object, and that is doubtless first and foremost its represented thing and object, it follows that if something is the adequate object of a species, it is not represented by it in another object, but in itself; and conversely, if something is not represented in another object by any species, it must be adequately represented by it. For if it were inadequate, then it would be represented in another, namely in the adequate one: for to every species there must correspond some adequate object, in which all things represented by it are contained; otherwise it would not be adequate to it. And likewise, if something is represented in another object, it must be an inadequate object represented by that species, as is evident. Hence the reason for both definitions is clear. For vision in itself is excellently defined as that which is seen through a species adequate to it: and likewise, vision in another as that which is seen through the species of a container (in which, namely, it shines forth) is seen.

IX. Concerning these definitions there arises at once a difficult question, one rooted in the diversity of opinions, regarding the manner in which God sees other things.

To make this evident, we must first set out that a representative species of many things is compared to the adequate object in one way, but to the inadequate object it can be compared in two ways. For an adequate object can be represented only immediately, immediately and objectively; whereas an inadequate object can be represented both mediately and immediately. Mediately, indeed, by representing it as it is in the adequate object: for then it represents it through the mediation of the adequate object. Immediately, however, by representing it in itself, abstracting from the mode in which it is in the adequate object: for then it represents it immediately, immediately and objectively—and of this alone are we here speaking—and thus does not represent it through the mediation of the first object. An example of this would be if something visible were placed, say a piece of wood, next to a mirror, within the view of Socrates seeing; and let us suppose, whether truly or falsely, that there is not another species in Socrates by which he sees the wood itself and by which he sees the wood in the mirror (for in both ways we experience ourselves as seeing the same thing at once): for it appears that the visible species existing in the seer is compared to the wood in two ways—namely immediately, insofar as it is the means of seeing it in itself; and mediately, insofar as it is the means of seeing it in the mirror.

From this clarification, however, first the first definition collapses⁸. For from it there manifestly follows that something can be seen in itself, and yet not through a species adequate to it: as is clear in the case of an inadequate thing represented, insofar as it is immediately referred to the representing species. – There collapses, second, the whole process of the text concerning the manner in which things other than God are known. For hence it is said that, although the inference holds, A is seen through the species of that which contains it, therefore it is seen in another; nevertheless this does not hold: therefore it is seen only in another, or, which is the same, therefore it is not seen in itself: because that species of the container can be compared to the contained in two ways, namely immediately and mediately, etc. And yet both conclusions are expressly drawn in the text. – From this arises, third, a diversity of opinion concerning the mode of divine cognition. For those who hold that the divine essence, which alone is for God the ratio of understanding, or intelligible species, refers to things other than God in two ways, namely immediately and mediately, consequently concede that God knows things other than himself in two ways, namely in himself and in the known things themselves, by means of one single ratio of knowing, namely the divine essence alone. But those who hold that the divine essence, as the ratio of knowing, cannot represent any known object immediately unless it be an adequate object, consequently say that God sees only himself in himself, but other things in himself, in God, and not in themselves.

X. Concerning the conclusion, and the definition of being seen in another⁹, a doubt arises from Scotus, in the thirty-fifth distinction of the First Book, who holds that God, by His essence as the means of knowing, knows things other than Himself in themselves, as placed in objective or cognized being by the act of understanding of the divine intellect. From this position the following argument can be formed against what was said above. Being seen in another and being seen through the species containing it are not convertible: therefore this is not its definition. – The consequence is evident. And the antecedent is proved. A stone is seen by God through the species containing it, because He sees it through His essence, which is the species of itself and of other things eminently; and yet it is seen in itself objectively: therefore. The second part of the assumption is proved thus. The divine intellect, actuated in some way by its essence as an intelligible species, is in first act sufficient to produce in intelligible being whatever is intelligible: therefore, understanding itself, in understanding the stone, it produces the stone in cognized being, and thereby understands the stone in itself. – The arguments of Scotus, however, which he makes in that same question, pertain more to the following article, where knowledge of other things as distinct will be treated.

XI. To make the difficulty evident, two things must be noted. – First, that although all agree in this, that the divine essence, whether as the ratio cognoscendi or as the object of cognition (for both belong to it), eminently contains all intelligibles, there is nevertheless disagreement on this point: the less learned think that other things are contained in the divine essence with a certain distinction, so that things shine forth as in a mirror; but the wise teach that all things are contained in the divine essence indistinctly and elevatedly, as effects in their eminent causes, yet so perfectly as if they were contained distinctly. And since this is undoubtedly true, as the natures of causes show, it can be clear from this that the divine essence, as an intelligible species, does not represent other things immediately, but through itself as object: for it stands to other things as the species of a cause stands to the effects to which that cause can extend itself. Second, it must be noted that known being or objective being etc. is not interpreted uniformly by all doctors. For Scotus, there and in the following distinction, thinks that known being, represented being, and whatever else is equivalent, is a certain being distinct from being in the nature of things. It is not, however, in his view, the being of an essence; but rather being secundum quid both of essence and of existence of things. Nor does he think such being is relative, but absolute: secundum quid, however, and grounding a relation, as is clear there. And with respect to this he says it makes no difference whether this intellect be this one, say human, or that one, say divine. And in such being he holds that all things other than God are produced by the act of the divine intellect: and thus are understood in themselves, and not only in the divine essence as in a cause. XII. St. Thomas, however, in the Quaestio de Veritate, q. XXI, taught that this is chimerical. For he said that a being of reason, distinct from real being, is sufficiently eliminated by negation and relation. For it is certain that such being is not real: therefore it is of reason: therefore negative or relative. And it is truly marvelous how these men stumbled into the light in this way. For it is certain, first, from the signification of names, that to be known is an extrinsic denomination; and that a thing is said to be seen or known by extrinsic denomination; and consequently not through any known being which it formally has. – It is certain, second, that represented being is nothing in the thing represented, but only an extrinsic denomination: otherwise the image of some chimera would have the power to produce a chimera in such being, which is absurd. – It is certain, third, that since plurality should not be posited without necessity, and everything is best preserved by positing that known being, represented being etc. is only relative being, such being was devised in vain. The second part of the assumption is evident inductively; and therefore I do not wish to linger over it. – This also conflicts with Scotus's own statements: for it follows from this that the stone would have such being before it is understood by God. Proof: because it is first posited in represented being through the divine essence as intelligible species than in known being through the act of intellection; because representation precedes cognition, as cause effect. – Nor does it sound well among the faithful to say that God produces things other than himself outside himself in absolute being, even if only secundum quid, by natural necessity and not freely. – Finally, this contradicts philosophy, explicitly and excellently concurring, that God understands nothing outside himself, not only formally but objectively. Because whatever he understands, he understands through his own essence as intelligible form, and in his own essence as object: nor can he turn his gaze elsewhere, as these men imagine. XIII. Therefore, to the objections on the opposite side, it is said that those definitions, formally understood, admit no instance against us; but are in common most true, under whatever hypothesis is made. For what is seen in itself as such must be seen formally, among those who concede species (among whom the discussion lies), not through the species of another, but through its own, or as its own (which is the same as through its own); and conversely, what is seen through its own species, or through a common one as its own, is seen in itself. – And similarly with the definition of what is seen in another. For what is seen in another, as such, is seen through the species of that container: and conversely, what is seen through the species of the container as such is seen in another. Hence, whether it is true or false that the same species can represent the inadequate mediately and immediately, it matters nothing for our purpose: for we speak formally, whereas that distinction considers the species of the container materially, or the adequate one, as is clear from what has been said. XIV. But to the objection from Scotus, it is said that that Scotist foundation supposes this falsehood, namely, that known being is a certain absolute being etc., outside the intellect. For, as is clear from what has been said, it is nothing other than relative being, by extrinsic denomination. Hence, to the argument taken formally, let it be conceded that God, through his essence as species, is in sufficient first act to produce anything whatever in known being. And when it is inferred, therefore the stone: let it be conceded. But when it is further inferred, therefore such produced things have being in themselves: it is denied; for by such production nothing else comes about except an extrinsic denomination. For from the fact that God, contemplating his essence, contemplates the stone in it, it follows that the stone has that extrinsic denomination whereby it is said to be known by God: nor need it acquire anything else, as is clear, since this suffices.