Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

Title. Knowledge: by the name of knowledge we understand cognition grasped by the intellect, certain and evident.

In the body, one conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: In God there is knowledge most perfectly. – It is proved. Immateriality is the reason why something is cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is the mode of cognition. But God is at the summit of immateriality. Therefore God is at the summit of cognition: which is to have knowledge most perfectly.

The major premise has two parts, and it is proved with respect to each. With respect to the first part, in two ways. First, by reason, thus. A knowing being has its esse from having its own form and that of another: therefore from the amplitude of its nature: therefore from immateriality. The antecedent is proved: because in this the knowing being differs from the non-knowing. Now the first consequence is evident of itself: because what is itself and other things is more ample than what is itself only. And it is confirmed by the authority of Book III On the Soul: the soul is in a way all things. But the second consequence is proved from what was said in question VII, that the restriction of form comes from matter, and the infinity of forms through recession from matter. – Second, the major premise is proved by the authority of Aristotle, Book II On the Soul, that plants do not know, on account of their materiality.

As to the second part, the major is proved from the degrees of knowing in sense and intellect. The latter is cognitive because it receives species without matter; the former more so, because it is separate and unmixed, as is said in Book III On the Soul. But the minor is evident from what was said above.

II. Concerning the difference assigned between cognizing and non-cognizing things, a doubt is raised. Either, when it is said that the cognizing being is naturally apt to be also other things, you mean that the word to be is understood by identity; and thus it is false, since the intellective soul is not naturally apt to be the same as a stone, an ox, etc. Or by information: and then, either by intentional information, and thus the difference is false, because air is non-cognizing and yet receives colors intentionally; or by natural information, and then it is most false, both because the stone is not in the soul, and because non-cognizing things are in this way other.

Similarly, ly other either stands for all: and thus it is false, because a sense is not naturally apt to be all things, but only certain ones. Or it stands for certain ones: and thus there is no difference; for it is common to all things that are among us to be not only themselves, but also certain other things in some way, namely by information; for all things are not only substances in themselves, but have at least their own accidents conforming to their proper natures; for fire is not only fire, but light, rare, luminous, hot. And just as these things have their own accidents, so the knower has its own proper accidents, the intentional species. Hence in this respect no difference appears between knowers and non-knowers.

III. To make evident this difficult and arduous foundation of a great part of metaphysics and natural philosophy, two things must be done: first, a formal reply must be given to the objections; second, the root of all of them must be brought to light ¹. To the objections it is easily said that the term being abstracts from the modes of being by identity or by information; and likewise the term other abstracts from all or some, just as the term cognitive abstracts from this or that kind of cognitive power. For some knowing being is one that is all things by identity, as God; some is some things by identity and some things by information, as the angels; some is all things by information, as our soul; and some is some things by information, as the purely sensitive soul. And therefore difference taken in common abstracts from all these modes, so that none is excluded but all are contained confusedly.

IV. But this root becomes clear if we consider the essential difference between the mode in which the knower is the known, and that in which matter has form. And likewise, how differently a unity comes about from knower and known, than from matter and form: for the same judgment applies to being (esse) and to one, since they signify the same nature, as is said in Book IV Metaphysics ². It must be known, therefore, that the essential difference lies in this: that the knower is itself the known actually or potentially, whereas matter is never the form itself. From this difference with respect to being (esse) there follows a difference with respect to unity: namely, that knower and known are more one than matter and form, as Averroes said most excellently in Book III of On the Soul, commentary V ³. And he gave the reason stated above, because from intellect and what is understood no third thing results, as it does from matter and form: for by assigning as the reason for the greater unity the exclusion of a third thing, he clearly taught that unity consists in this, that one is the other. Hence Aristotle, in Book III of On the Soul ⁴, taught this same point beforehand, saying that the soul is all sensible and intelligible things. That this is the true essential difference is shown by the fact that all common conceptions of the mind and conclusions accord with it: namely, that there occurs between the cognitive power and the known a diversity between them, and likewise their composition; and likewise, that the known has intentional being (esse) in the knower; and that in no nature can matter and form, subject and accident, be raised so high that one may be the same as the other while their proper natures remain intact, as we find to be the case with knower and known.

V. The necessity of this position arises from two theses. The first is: each thing acts insofar as it is in act, from III Physics⁵ The second is: the known is the specifying principle of cognition, from XII Metaphysics⁶ From these it follows that, since the knower must be a sufficient principle of its own operation, which is to know—because this is common to all perfect natures—it must be the specifying principle of that operation: which is to be the thing known. And if you add to these, from II On the Heavens, text. comm. XVII⁷, that each thing exists for the sake of its own operation, it follows that the cognitive nature is of such a kind in itself as to be, in act or in potency, the very thing known: which is to be not only itself, but another, as the text says. VI. And if you compare this to the other beings, you will see the difference between cognizing and non-cognizing things made manifest from this. For the other beings either receive forms on account of the operations of those forms themselves; or on account of the operation of a third thing, the composite of receiver and received. An example of the first is hot water, and universally in subject and accidental form: for heating is not the proper operation of water, but of heat. And the same judgment holds, in this respect, for cold water: for although coldness is a natural potency of water, yet making cold is the proper operation of coldness, not of water. An example of the second is clear in substantial forms: for matter does not receive form on account of the operation of matter itself, but of the composite of itself and form. But the knower, receiving the known, does not receive it on account of the operation of some composite resulting from them, nor on account of the operation of the known itself; but on account of the specification of its own proper operation as knower. For sight receives the visible on account of the species of vision, which is admittedly sight's proper operation. Nor does it stand in the way that the visible, as received in sight, is an accident, and sight the subject: since this is per accidens, that is, from the necessity of matter, and is not what is intended first per se. For the form, intention, or species of the visible specifies not insofar as it is an accident, but insofar as it is visible⁸ passing into vision; but because such sensible nature cannot undergo this except through the esse of an intention, therefore, on account of matter, an accident concurs. Yet it does not destroy what is intended per se, but establishes it at a less perfect degree. For as must be discussed elsewhere⁹, and as is held by Averroes in XII Metaphysics¹⁰ and III On the Soul¹¹, knower and known are not one with the same intention in all cases, but more or less diminishedly; so much so that in God alone are they entirely identical. VII. And thus the assigned differences are clear¹², and how subtly this saintly Thomas handed down the nature of cognizing things. That it consists in this is shown not only from Aristotle and Averroes, as appears from what has been said, but also from Albert in his treatise on Intellect and the Intelligible¹³. And this must be held most diligently as a foundation, whenever there is talk of intellect: since upon it depend the conclusions of many questions, for instance concerning the concurrence of object and intellect in intellection, and likewise concerning the concurrence of the intelligible species, etc. And hence it appears how crude were those who, treating of sense and the sensible, intellect and the intelligible, and of understanding and sensing, judge of them as if they were other kinds of things. And you will learn to raise up your mind and enter into another order of things.

The title is clear. – In the body, a single conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: God understands Himself through Himself. – It is proved. God is, without any potentiality, pure act: therefore intellect and what is understood are in every way the same: therefore He understands Himself through Himself.

The antecedent is clear. The first consequence, however, rests upon two propositions. One is: the object of the intellect must be in act in the one understanding, in order that he may understand. The other is: every diversity of intellect from its object arises from a nature of potency mixed in. The first is proved from the difference between a transitive and an immanent operation: because the latter has its term within. The second, from book de Anima, as follows. Sense in act is identical with the sensible in act, and likewise intellect in act with the intelligible in act; but they are not ¹ identical in potency: therefore the identity of these follows from the actuality of their state, while diversity follows from potentiality. For from these it is manifestly clear how the first sequel follows, thus: the intelligible must be in the one understanding, and is distinct from him in no way except through potency: therefore the intelligible of that being in which there is no potency is in no way distinct from it: if, then, God is without potency etc., therefore etc. – Next, in the text the consequent is explained as to the phrase omnibus modis, by excluding two modes of diversity, namely between act and potency, and between substance and accident. – The second consequence is clear.

II. Concerning the words of the text in the second proposition grounding the consequence ², note that what is said, namely, on this account alone the sense or intellect is other than the sensible or intelligible, because each is in potency, can be expounded in two ways. First, so that the term each refers to the power and the object. Second, so that it refers to both powers which he had named, namely, the sensitive and the intellective. And if this second sense is held, no difficulty arises, and the plain sense of the text is preserved. But if the first sense is intended, it needs polishing. For from it would be expressly obtained that for the distinction between the knower and the known there is required potentiality not only in the knower but also in the known: which is not true in every case. For this can be understood in two ways. First, that potentiality is required in both, such that each is in itself a being in potency, and this twofold potency is the root of the distinction. And this is false, as is clear when God is seen by some created intellect: for then the object is pure act, and yet there is a distinction between the intellect and the object. Second, that the potentiality of each is required with respect to this; that is, that the object be intelligible in potency by the intellect itself, and that the intellect be in some potency with respect to understanding it. And this is true: but, in my judgment, it is not what is intended here. First, because one potentiality, namely that of the power, suffices. Second, because this potentiality of the object, not in itself but with respect to this, is not a potentiality of imperfection, of which we are speaking. Third, because both of these potencies are ultimately resolved, with respect to this effect which is the distinction between object and power, into the potentiality of the cognitive power itself. Fourth, because the plain sense of the text embraces the first exposition very well, and it satisfies the proposal. And therefore let us follow the first.

III. On the exposition of the consequent ³, where the phrase identical in every respect is explained by the exclusion of two things, namely, the state of potentiality and the diversity of the intellect from the intelligible species, a doubt arises: for the exclusion of these does not sufficiently explain the complete identity of intellect and intelligible. And this is proved in the case of an angel understanding itself. For it is clear that it is neither in potency, nor is the species by which it understands itself other than its own substance; and yet intellect and intelligible are not identical in every respect, even when it understands itself: both because this is proper to God, and because the concept it forms of itself, whatever that may be, is not its own substance.

IV. In this respect it is said in two ways. First, that the phrase namely, so as neither to lack the species, nor for the species to be something else, etc. is taken restrictively; that is, what he had said—namely the same in every way—is limited by these two words, as if he had said: they are the same in every way with respect to these two. And on this reading the doubt raised has no place.

And although this sense of the letter is consonant, insofar as in article 4 it remains to be asked whether God's understanding is the same as God himself; yet considering that this is a discourse on the identity of the understood and the understanding, and that the remaining doubt concerns understanding itself, insofar as there are certain difficulties arising from understanding itself, as distinguished against the intellect, it seems it can be said otherwise, by taking the word "thus," namely "so that it not lack the species, etc.," expositively. V. And to the doubt raised⁴ the answer is given that the exclusion of these two fully establishes every kind of identity of the understanding and the understood. But by the name "species" is to be understood not only the impressed species, but universally both the impressed and the expressed. For where the understanding and the species are not distinguished universally, there the understanding and the understood are entirely one and the same. And this in the doctrine of St. Thomas is undoubtedly true: since the concept itself is the expressed species, which in God alone is substance; and thus in no other being is the complete exclusion of these two preserved. Whether, however, this suffices according to the doctrines of other philosophers is not the present business, but is treated in III De Anima or in XII Metaphysics. That the species is here taken so universally in the present text, the text itself indicates through those words, "when it is actually understanding." If he intended only the impressed species, he would not have needed to say "when it is actually understanding"; since that is also present when our intellect is not actually understanding, but asleep. Hence, by explaining the intelligible species through the state of the intellect in second act, he indicated that he was speaking universally of the species concurring in the second act, which is understanding. Now both species concur in that act. The discourse on the species, therefore, must be interpreted universally, so that the sense may be more universal.

A clear title from the body. – In the body, a single conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: God perfectly comprehends Himself. – It is proved. God knows Himself as perfectly as He is knowable; therefore He perfectly comprehends Himself. The antecedent is proved thus. Each thing is knowable to the extent that it is in act; therefore God's knowability is as great as His actuality. Again, God is cognitive by this, that He is act separated from all matter and potency; therefore the cognitive power is as great as the actuality. Therefore, concluding from both sides, it follows: the knowability is as great as the cognitive power, and conversely. – The first assumption is clear from Metaphysics IX. The second assumption, however, from articles 1 and 2. But the consequence is proved from the notion of comprehension, thus. To comprehend is to arrive at the end of a cognition of something; therefore it is to know a thing as perfectly as the thing is knowable. Therefore, if God knows so perfectly, it follows: therefore He comprehends. – All things are clear. And yet in the text the notion of comprehension is illustrated exemplarily in the cognition of a demonstrable proposition. For the end of its cognition is not attained until it is demonstrated, since it would always remain more knowable than it had been known.

A clear title. - In the body, two parts: first, the responsive conclusion answering the question affirmatively; second, an epilogue on the antecedents 1.

II. As to the first point, the conclusion is: God's understanding is His substance. — It is proved in two ways. First, by leading to an impossibility, with Aristotle. If God's understanding were other than His substance, it would follow that the divine substance would stand to something else as potency stands to act and perfection: this is impossible; therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved: because understanding is the perfection and act of the one who understands.

Second, it is proved ostensively. The substance of God is His own esse, and His own intelligible species; therefore God's understanding is His substance. — The antecedent, as to the first part, is clear from question 3; as to the second, from the second article of this question. But the consequence is proved. Understanding is an act remaining in the one who understands, just as esse: therefore, if the substance of the one understanding is his own esse and the intelligible species itself, it must be that he is his own understanding. The assumption is proved: because understanding follows upon the species, as esse follows upon form.

III. For the evidence of the consequence, together with its proof—since it is somewhat hidden on account of its depth and formality—three things must be noted 2. First, that in the text four things are said about understanding: namely, that it remains in the one understanding; that it is as act and perfection of him; that it is as being (esse) is the act of the existent; that it follows the intelligible species as existing follows form. Of these, the first two are not proved, because they are clear. The third, however, is proved by the fourth, which was left aside as commonly admitted. Note secondly, that the fourth statement, namely that understanding follows the intelligible species as being (esse) follows form, is verified in three respects, as far as the matter at hand is concerned. First, with respect to causality: since form is the reason of being (essendi), and the intelligible species is the reason of understanding. Secondly, with respect to necessity: since actual form necessarily has existence accompanying it; and the intelligible species in act—not in a middle state between potency and act—necessarily has understanding accompanying it. Thirdly, with respect to the mode of causing: since form, by completing what it is, makes being (esse); and the intelligible species in act, not in the genus of being (entis) but in the genus of the intelligible, by completing the intellect makes understanding, as can be seen from article I of this question ¹, and from what was said in question XII ². From these things, however, and especially from this last one, the third statement of the text, which is the effect of this fourth, becomes clear. For from these it follows that understanding is the perfection of the one understanding just as existence is the perfection of the existent; that is, understanding perfects the one understanding in the same proportion in which being (esse) perfects the existent; indeed, understanding is the very being (esse) of the one understanding in the genus of the intelligible, just as being (esse) is the very being (esse) of a being (entis) in the genus of beings (entium). Note thirdly, that the divine substance is form, indeed pure act, both in the genus of beings (entium) and in the genus of intelligibles. And by reason of the first, it is the reason of being (essendi), and is called a being (ens); but by reason of the second, it is the reason of understanding, and is called form or intelligible species. Hence God's being (esse) corresponds to his substance as pure act in the genus of beings (entium); while his understanding corresponds to the same substance in the genus of intelligibles. And proportionately thus: that understanding is the being (esse) of the divine substance as an intelligible species in the genus of the intelligible, just as existence is the being (esse) of the same substance in the genus of beings (entium). And therefore the consequence, together with its proof, was excellent and formal, arguing from the concurrence of both forms into one, and from the identification of that one with its proper being (esse) according to one genus. For from these two things assumed in the antecedent—first, that the substance is itself the intelligible species, and hence is form in both genera; second, that the substance of God is its own being (esse), and hence identifies to itself being (esse) in the genus of beings (entium)—it is inferred, therefore, that it must also be ³ its own understanding; that is, that it identifies to itself the being (esse) that belongs to it in the genus of the intelligible. For the efficacy, infinity, or actuality of the divine substance is no less in the genus of the intelligible than in the genus of beings (entium). And if the opposite were said, it would follow that it would not be pure act in the genus of the intelligible. For intellect in act in the genus of the intelligible, which encloses within itself the nature of knower and known as such, is related to understanding as potency to act, as a being (ens) to being (esse). IV. As for the second point ⁴, the epilogue uniting the threefold identity is clear, along with its corollary, which holds that God's very being (esse), as intelligent, introduces no diversity in God. All things are clear.

The title asks in general, without distinguishing what a thing is from whether it is. – In the body there are two parts: first, he answers the question affirmatively; second, he assigns the manner in which the conclusion is verified¹. II. As to the first, the conclusion is: It is necessary that God know things other than himself. – It is proved in two ways. First thus. God perfectly understands himself: therefore he perfectly knows his power: therefore those things to which his power extends: therefore things other than himself. – The antecedent, although it was proved from what was said before², is proved again by leading to an impossibility, namely: if God does not perfectly understand himself, therefore his esse is not perfect; this is impossible. And the inference holds: because his esse is his understanding. – The first consequence is left as self-evident. The second, however, is proved: because otherwise the power is not perfectly known, as is evident. The third, however: because the divine power extends to things other than itself. This is proved: because it is the first cause of all things. Second it is proved thus, or confirmed. The esse of the first cause is its understanding: therefore all effects preexisting in the first cause are in its understanding: therefore they are in it in an intelligible manner. – The inference is proved: because each thing is in another in the manner of that in which it is. III. Concerning these arguments, note that twice in the text this proposition is assumed, the esse of God is his understanding: once to prove the antecedent of the first argument; and once it constitutes the antecedent of the second argument. And the first time indeed, speaking of divine things in a human manner, it can be interpreted in both ways, namely formally and identically. Formally indeed, because understanding is formally the esse of God, inasmuch as he is understanding, as is clear from what was said³: and therefore, if it were imperfect, the esse of God would be concluded to be imperfect. Identically, however, because the intended conclusion is also inferred in this way, with the common propositions understood. For, since the understanding of God is subjectively and objectively capable of every perfection in itself, and is the same as the esse of God, if it is imperfect, it necessarily follows, therefore the esse of God is imperfect, a posteriori, inferring the imperfection of the prior from the imperfection of the posterior, the prior being that which is identical with the posterior. For if that which identifies were altogether perfect, it would permit no imperfection in the thing identified. IV. But the second time⁴, it is ambiguous in what way it is taken. For if it is taken formally, it is false. For here the discourse is not about the esse of God as in common, as before, but about the esse of God as grounding active power: because in such an esse all the effects of the active cause preexist. But such an esse is formally other than understanding, since it is a perfection naturally prior, etc. – But if it is taken identically, the assumption is true: but the argument is worth nothing. For from the formal and the identical there does not follow the formal: but this is what is at issue. For this proposition, all effects preexist in the esse of the first cause, is formal; but this one, the esse of the first cause is its understanding, is identical: and consequently, from them this formal proposition cannot be inferred, therefore all effects of this kind are in the understanding of God. – And the doubt is confirmed: because this does not hold: all effects are in the esse of God, the esse of God is a relation, therefore all effects are in a relation, and in the manner of a relation. And likewise it does not hold, adding: the esse of God is his willing, therefore all effects are in the willing of God, and in the manner of the will. Therefore neither does it hold for understanding. V. To this it is said in two ways. First, that in this antecedent that proposition, the understanding of God is his esse, is identical with respect to us, although in itself it is formal. And when it is said, from the identical and the formal etc., it is conceded. But it stands together with this that from such an identical with such a formal there follows a formal proposition; that is, although it does not follow by reason of the form, it nevertheless follows by reason of the matter. And this is what is at issue. For, speaking of the natural perfections of God, from their identity it follows that whatever is in one in the manner proper to it, is in the other in the manner proper to that other. And this is because the natural perfections of God naturally have whatever perfection they can have according to their formal rationes. And since all of them can be infinite, they are equal: and thus each one extends itself naturally, in a manner proportional to itself, to all those things to which one of them extends itself. And therefore, since the understanding of God is a natural perfection of God himself, and the esse likewise, and they are the same; it follows that whatever things are in the esse as esse, and in the manner of being, are in the understanding as understanding⁵, and in an intelligible manner. – And from this the solution to the objections is clear. For the divine relations, and the things pertaining to them, are not perfections formally. But the willing of other things, with the things pertaining to it, although it is a perfection, is nevertheless not natural, but free. Second it is said, and better, and without doubt according to the mind of the text, that that proposition is formal. For whatever may be said of the esse of God, nevertheless the esse of God as first cause, as such, is understanding: because not from the fact that he is, but from the fact that he understands, and as he understands, not as he is, he causes and is naturally causative. Nor is it true that the effects of an intellectual cause as such preexist in the esse, as anticipating the understanding. Rather, that they preexist in the esse is per accidens, that is, from the fact that the understanding is esse, as we experience in ourselves with respect to artifacts. For the understanding grounds the active power of every intellectual cause as such, and consequently of the first cause. And therefore it is notably said in the text that this is more evident, if it be added that the esse of the first cause is its understanding. – And thus the objections cease. For willing is what determines the intellectual cause to producing one of two opposites, but does not constitute it: and therefore the esse of the first cause is not formally willing, but understanding.

VI. Concerning the second consequence of the same argument⁶, note that the consequent can be interpreted in two ways, according as intelligible is taken in two ways. In one way, as it is distinguished against sensible: and thus to be in a thing in an intelligible manner is nothing other than to be in that thing immaterially. And according to this sense the consequence is plain: since, if being (esse) is the same as understanding (intelligere), then because understanding is necessarily immaterial, whatever is in being will be immaterially; for each thing is in something in the manner of that in which it is. – In another way, as it is distinguished against being (ens), insofar as the genus of the intelligible is distinguished from the genus of being: and thus to be in a thing in an intelligible manner is to shine forth in it as an object capable of being understood. And according to this sense too the consequence is plain. Since, if being is understanding, all things that are in being are in understanding as understanding is, that is, they are understood; and if they are understood, therefore they are as understood or intelligible; for each thing is in something according to the mode of that in which it is, and hence things that are in understanding are in an intelligible manner.

Between these two senses, however, what seems to matter for our purpose is that, according to the first sense, the conclusion follows from the first antecedent without a middle term; whereas according to the second, it follows through another middle term, which is supplied in the text. And although the text does not exclude either sense, since the second nevertheless entails the first and is more subtle and more formal, it is therefore to be embraced.

VII. As regards the second⁷, the mode is assigned in which things other than God are known by Him, by a single conclusion: Things other than God are known by God not in themselves, but in God Himself. – Proof: God sees Himself and other things through His essence; therefore He sees Himself in Himself, but things other than Himself not in themselves, but in His substance.

The antecedent is clear. The consequent, however, is proved by distinguishing to be seen in two ways: in itself, and in another; and by defining each. For from the definitions of these the inference follows. Namely, if to be seen in itself is to be seen through its own proper and adequate species, while to be seen in another is to be seen through the species of another thing in which that species exists, as is said in the text, it follows that, because God sees Himself and other things through His own essence as a species, He sees Himself in Himself, but other things not in themselves, rather in Him; since it is evident that His essence is the adequate species of God, and not of other things.

VIII. Note here two things for the explanation of the text. First, the sense of the distinction made in the text concerning being known in itself or in another; for "in itself" or "in another" is to be understood objectively, so that to be seen in itself means to be seen not in another object or thing seen, whereas to be seen in another means to be seen in another object, that is, in another thing seen.

Second, the verification of the definitions of the members. Since every intelligible or sensible species has some adequate object, and that is doubtless first and foremost its represented thing and object, it follows that if something is the adequate object of a species, it is not represented by it in another object, but in itself; and conversely, if something is not represented in another object by any species, it must be adequately represented by it. For if it were inadequate, then it would be represented in another, namely in the adequate one: for to every species there must correspond some adequate object, in which all things represented by it are contained; otherwise it would not be adequate to it. And likewise, if something is represented in another object, it must be an inadequate object represented by that species, as is evident. Hence the reason for both definitions is clear. For vision in itself is excellently defined as that which is seen through a species adequate to it: and likewise, vision in another as that which is seen through the species of a container (in which, namely, it shines forth) is seen.

IX. Concerning these definitions there arises at once a difficult question, one rooted in the diversity of opinions, regarding the manner in which God sees other things.

To make this evident, we must first set out that a representative species of many things is compared to the adequate object in one way, but to the inadequate object it can be compared in two ways. For an adequate object can be represented only immediately, immediately and objectively; whereas an inadequate object can be represented both mediately and immediately. Mediately, indeed, by representing it as it is in the adequate object: for then it represents it through the mediation of the adequate object. Immediately, however, by representing it in itself, abstracting from the mode in which it is in the adequate object: for then it represents it immediately, immediately and objectively—and of this alone are we here speaking—and thus does not represent it through the mediation of the first object. An example of this would be if something visible were placed, say a piece of wood, next to a mirror, within the view of Socrates seeing; and let us suppose, whether truly or falsely, that there is not another species in Socrates by which he sees the wood itself and by which he sees the wood in the mirror (for in both ways we experience ourselves as seeing the same thing at once): for it appears that the visible species existing in the seer is compared to the wood in two ways—namely immediately, insofar as it is the means of seeing it in itself; and mediately, insofar as it is the means of seeing it in the mirror.

From this clarification, however, first the first definition collapses⁸. For from it there manifestly follows that something can be seen in itself, and yet not through a species adequate to it: as is clear in the case of an inadequate thing represented, insofar as it is immediately referred to the representing species. – There collapses, second, the whole process of the text concerning the manner in which things other than God are known. For hence it is said that, although the inference holds, A is seen through the species of that which contains it, therefore it is seen in another; nevertheless this does not hold: therefore it is seen only in another, or, which is the same, therefore it is not seen in itself: because that species of the container can be compared to the contained in two ways, namely immediately and mediately, etc. And yet both conclusions are expressly drawn in the text. – From this arises, third, a diversity of opinion concerning the mode of divine cognition. For those who hold that the divine essence, which alone is for God the ratio of understanding, or intelligible species, refers to things other than God in two ways, namely immediately and mediately, consequently concede that God knows things other than himself in two ways, namely in himself and in the known things themselves, by means of one single ratio of knowing, namely the divine essence alone. But those who hold that the divine essence, as the ratio of knowing, cannot represent any known object immediately unless it be an adequate object, consequently say that God sees only himself in himself, but other things in himself, in God, and not in themselves.

X. Concerning the conclusion, and the definition of being seen in another⁹, a doubt arises from Scotus, in the thirty-fifth distinction of the First Book, who holds that God, by His essence as the means of knowing, knows things other than Himself in themselves, as placed in objective or cognized being by the act of understanding of the divine intellect. From this position the following argument can be formed against what was said above. Being seen in another and being seen through the species containing it are not convertible: therefore this is not its definition. – The consequence is evident. And the antecedent is proved. A stone is seen by God through the species containing it, because He sees it through His essence, which is the species of itself and of other things eminently; and yet it is seen in itself objectively: therefore. The second part of the assumption is proved thus. The divine intellect, actuated in some way by its essence as an intelligible species, is in first act sufficient to produce in intelligible being whatever is intelligible: therefore, understanding itself, in understanding the stone, it produces the stone in cognized being, and thereby understands the stone in itself. – The arguments of Scotus, however, which he makes in that same question, pertain more to the following article, where knowledge of other things as distinct will be treated.

XI. To make the difficulty evident, two things must be noted. – First, that although all agree in this, that the divine essence, whether as the ratio cognoscendi or as the object of cognition (for both belong to it), eminently contains all intelligibles, there is nevertheless disagreement on this point: the less learned think that other things are contained in the divine essence with a certain distinction, so that things shine forth as in a mirror; but the wise teach that all things are contained in the divine essence indistinctly and elevatedly, as effects in their eminent causes, yet so perfectly as if they were contained distinctly. And since this is undoubtedly true, as the natures of causes show, it can be clear from this that the divine essence, as an intelligible species, does not represent other things immediately, but through itself as object: for it stands to other things as the species of a cause stands to the effects to which that cause can extend itself. Second, it must be noted that known being or objective being etc. is not interpreted uniformly by all doctors. For Scotus, there and in the following distinction, thinks that known being, represented being, and whatever else is equivalent, is a certain being distinct from being in the nature of things. It is not, however, in his view, the being of an essence; but rather being secundum quid both of essence and of existence of things. Nor does he think such being is relative, but absolute: secundum quid, however, and grounding a relation, as is clear there. And with respect to this he says it makes no difference whether this intellect be this one, say human, or that one, say divine. And in such being he holds that all things other than God are produced by the act of the divine intellect: and thus are understood in themselves, and not only in the divine essence as in a cause. XII. St. Thomas, however, in the Quaestio de Veritate, q. XXI, taught that this is chimerical. For he said that a being of reason, distinct from real being, is sufficiently eliminated by negation and relation. For it is certain that such being is not real: therefore it is of reason: therefore negative or relative. And it is truly marvelous how these men stumbled into the light in this way. For it is certain, first, from the signification of names, that to be known is an extrinsic denomination; and that a thing is said to be seen or known by extrinsic denomination; and consequently not through any known being which it formally has. – It is certain, second, that represented being is nothing in the thing represented, but only an extrinsic denomination: otherwise the image of some chimera would have the power to produce a chimera in such being, which is absurd. – It is certain, third, that since plurality should not be posited without necessity, and everything is best preserved by positing that known being, represented being etc. is only relative being, such being was devised in vain. The second part of the assumption is evident inductively; and therefore I do not wish to linger over it. – This also conflicts with Scotus's own statements: for it follows from this that the stone would have such being before it is understood by God. Proof: because it is first posited in represented being through the divine essence as intelligible species than in known being through the act of intellection; because representation precedes cognition, as cause effect. – Nor does it sound well among the faithful to say that God produces things other than himself outside himself in absolute being, even if only secundum quid, by natural necessity and not freely. – Finally, this contradicts philosophy, explicitly and excellently concurring, that God understands nothing outside himself, not only formally but objectively. Because whatever he understands, he understands through his own essence as intelligible form, and in his own essence as object: nor can he turn his gaze elsewhere, as these men imagine. XIII. Therefore, to the objections on the opposite side, it is said that those definitions, formally understood, admit no instance against us; but are in common most true, under whatever hypothesis is made. For what is seen in itself as such must be seen formally, among those who concede species (among whom the discussion lies), not through the species of another, but through its own, or as its own (which is the same as through its own); and conversely, what is seen through its own species, or through a common one as its own, is seen in itself. – And similarly with the definition of what is seen in another. For what is seen in another, as such, is seen through the species of that container: and conversely, what is seen through the species of the container as such is seen in another. Hence, whether it is true or false that the same species can represent the inadequate mediately and immediately, it matters nothing for our purpose: for we speak formally, whereas that distinction considers the species of the container materially, or the adequate one, as is clear from what has been said. XIV. But to the objection from Scotus, it is said that that Scotist foundation supposes this falsehood, namely, that known being is a certain absolute being etc., outside the intellect. For, as is clear from what has been said, it is nothing other than relative being, by extrinsic denomination. Hence, to the argument taken formally, let it be conceded that God, through his essence as species, is in sufficient first act to produce anything whatever in known being. And when it is inferred, therefore the stone: let it be conceded. But when it is further inferred, therefore such produced things have being in themselves: it is denied; for by such production nothing else comes about except an extrinsic denomination. For from the fact that God, contemplating his essence, contemplates the stone in it, it follows that the stone has that extrinsic denomination whereby it is said to be known by God: nor need it acquire anything else, as is clear, since this suffices.

Title. Propria cognitione: proper cognition of something can be understood in two ways. First, as distinguished from common cognition on the side of the act of knowing, that is, about that thing alone. And in this way God has proper cognition of no thing: because He has only a single cognition, which is not of any one thing alone, but is such that it is of this thing and also of all others. Second, as distinguished from common cognition on the side of the thing known, that is, about the thing's own proper features. And it is taken in this sense in our proposition: for we ask whether God knows things other than Himself in such a way that He beholds what is proper to each individual. II. In the body there are three points: first, he answers the question affirmatively; second, he assigns the way in which it is verified ¹; third, he proves both the responsive conclusion and its mode, by two arguments ². III. As to the first, three things. First the opinion of Averroes is set forth, from Book XII of the Metaphysics, commentary LI. Two things are reported concerning it: namely, the opinion itself, namely that God knows all things according as they share in being; and its mode, namely that He does so by knowing Himself as the first principle of being. And this is illustrated by the example of fire. IV. Second it is refuted, by leading it to an impossibility. If God knew other things only insofar as they are beings, then He would understand beings only in common: therefore confusedly and in potency: therefore imperfectly: therefore God's understanding would not be perfect in every way: therefore neither would God's being be, which is impossible. V. Note that cognition attaining something according to common predicates only can be called imperfect, in potency, confused, in common, universal, etc., in two ways. One way, on the side of the thing known: and in this way it is undoubtedly true that such cognition has these conditions. Another way, on the side of the cognition itself in itself: and thus it is not always true that such cognition, that is, one resting in commons, has these conditions; otherwise metaphysics, which rests in the commons of all things, would be imperfect on the side of the act, etc. Hence the first three consequences ³, taken on the side of the thing known, are evident in themselves; and they are proved in the text from Book I of the Physics, as is clear. Nor does Averroes' reply escape, when he says that, since the object of God's knowledge is not being, which is universal to all beings, comprehending them in common, in potency, confusedly and imperfectly, but rather the essence of God, which is neither universal nor particular, etc.; therefore God's knowledge is neither universal nor particular, neither common nor proper, but elevated equivocally above our knowledge. For although this is true, it nevertheless does not solve the objection. Because predicates known of things in the divine essence must be either common or proper to those things, either particular or universal, even though the first object is neither. And referring to the predicates known, the first three consequences proceed very well: for God's knowledge, if it terminates only in the commons of things, must, as such, on the side of the things known, be called confused, in potency, etc.; because these are conditions of the predicates known. Concerning the fourth consequence, in which the argument passes to the perfection of the cognition in itself, note that it is not inferred that therefore God's cognition is imperfect privatively. Because Averroes would deny the consequence, saying that God's cognition is most perfect; and yet it does not attain things except as they are beings, because it is not naturally apt to attain more about things. But it is inferred that therefore it is not perfect in every way: which cannot be denied by those who posit the antecedent; because here is posited as lacking that mode of perfection whereby it would attain the proper features of things. For this mode signifies some perfection with no admixed imperfection: and consequently it is naturally apt to be in that understanding in which all the nobilities of all understanders are present without imperfections being separable from them, such as is God's understanding; just as His being possesses the nobilities of all beings, as is said in the text. VI. Third ⁴ from this refutation is inferred the responsive conclusion answering the question affirmatively: God knows things other than Himself with proper cognition. For since it is impossible that He rest in commons, therefore He must come to the proper features. – And the text explains what knowing with proper cognition means: namely, to know things not only according to the conditions in which they share, but also according to those by which they are distinguished from one another; for these are proper to each individual. VII. As to the second⁵, three things are done. First examples are cited, by which others try to show the way in which God, by knowing Himself, knows other things: and they concern light and color. And this is clear. Second it is shown that these examples do not show what is intended, thus. Things are in and from God according to two aspects, namely according to that in which they share, and their proper features by which they are distinguished: these examples are not alike with respect to the proper features, but with respect to that in which they share: therefore. – Of this argument, the minor premise is first stated and explained in the text, in both examples, concerning lines with respect to the center, and colors with respect to light: and this is clear. Second, the major premise, thus. Whatever perfection is in things is contained eminently in God: but not only that in which things share, but also what distinguishes them, is a perfection: therefore the whole is in and from God. This last minor premise is explained inductively in living things, in knowers, in the proper forms of things. Third a proportionate example is brought forward to explain what is intended: namely, that God is related to other things as a perfect act to imperfect acts, as man to animal. – It is proved with respect to being: because the essence of God contains all the perfections of things excellently. Then it is proved with respect to being known: because once the perfect act is perfectly known, all the imperfect acts are known in it, both with respect to what is common and with respect to what is proper, as is clear in the example adduced. VIII. Note here that the essence of God has two conditions in containing other things. One is excellence, namely that it is infinitely more perfect than the others: and thus it contains things eminently. The other is comprehension, namely that it comprehends within itself every positive perfection findable in any thing whatever; so that no thing, compared to it, adds anything positive that is not contained in the essence of God; and this because it is being itself (ipsum esse), possessing beforehand within itself every mode of being. That both these conditions should be found in some created thing does not seem possible. Yet by comparing an act perfect in the order of generation, posterior in generation, to acts imperfect prior in generation, as man to animal, the intellective soul to the others, the square to the triangle, six to three, etc., this is somehow preserved. And therefore these examples are brought forward in the text, so that both the excellence and the comprehension of every positive may be shown: for both of these these examples show. And therefore they show what is intended; although all the examples are unfitting for so eminent a containment. And therefore in the text, when introducing the examples, it says, as if I were to say, man to animal; as if to say, if, with permission granted, it may be allowed, etc.

IX. As to the third point⁶, the conclusion is proved, together with an explanation of its manner, in two ways. First, the essence of God has within itself whatever of perfection there is in anything whatsoever, and more besides: therefore God, in knowing himself, knows all things by a proper knowledge.

The antecedent is clear from what has been said. The consequent, however, is proved by the destruction of the consequent, as follows. If God, in knowing himself, does not know other things by a proper knowledge, then he does not know in any way how his perfection is participable. This inference is clear from that proposition implicitly contained in the antecedent, namely: the proper character of each nature consists in some mode of participating the divine perfection. Therefore he does not perfectly know himself. This holds from the antecedent itself, in which it is said that he encloses within himself every mode of perfection. – It follows, therefore, from the destruction of the consequent either that the antecedent is false; or that this is impossible, namely that God does not perfectly know himself. Which also redounds to the falsity of the antecedent: for if it were so, the divine essence would not be of infinite perfection, and consequently would not eminently contain every possible mode of perfection.

X. Second it is proved as follows. If God, in knowing himself, did not know other things by a proper knowledge, then he would not perfectly know all modes of being; therefore he would not perfectly know the nature of being. – All the consequences are evident, formally or as such, from what has been said above.

And note that this argument is directly opposed to the opinion recited at the beginning of the body of the text, indeed proceeding from that opinion's own foundation against the opinion itself. For, since it is esse itself, in knowing itself perfectly it knows the nature of being (just as a separate man, according to Plato, by knowing himself would know perfectly the nature of humanity): therefore every mode of being: therefore every nature; because every nature is nothing other than some mode of being.

Nor let yourself be deceived by the example adduced, because a separate man would not know humanity with that mode by which it is in the matter of Socrates, and with that by which it is in the matter of Plato; rather, from this you may rise to an understanding of what is proposed. For this reason: a separate man, in knowing himself, would not know these particular modes, because those modes come from elsewhere than from his own participation—namely, from matter. But if you suppose that, beyond what belongs on the side of humanity itself, nothing else is present, it will necessarily follow that, once humanity is known, all its modes are known. Now being (esse) stands thus toward all things: for there is nothing in any thing whatsoever which is not some being (esse). And therefore the esse that is in a thing proceeds from nothing other than from esse itself. And when that which belongs on the side of esse itself is set aside, nothing remains; since both matter and all things are certain participations and certain modes of essendi. Therefore, on account of the universality of esse itself, from which all modes of essendi constitute things according to whatever positive ratio, it follows that, once the nature of essendi is known, all things are known according to their proper conditions. And because the first opinion did not see this universality, it erred, judging concerning esse as concerning the other special perfections—namely, living, understanding, and so on—beyond which and their modes there are others; whereas, as is evident, beyond esse and its modes nothing remains.

XI. Note here that, since the whole disagreement in this question turns on the manner in which all things can be known in one known object, it is plainly evident that the common conception of the wise was that God does not understand things other than himself in any other way than by understanding them in himself. Therefore be cautious when you read new arrivals of the law.

XII. In response to the first, note that when it is said the stone is seen in God, the word in can signify the mode of the object, that is, the mode in which the stone is presented as an object; and it can signify the mode of the thing known as such, that is, the mode as known; for the stone is not only presented as an object in God himself, but that mode of being in God is also known. But there is a difference between these. For when it signifies the mode of the object, it is verified with the exclusive term, so that this is true: the stone is seen by God in God himself alone; for it is presented to God in no other way than as contained in God himself, as is clear from what has been said⁷. But when it signifies the mode as known, it is not verified with the exclusive term: thus the stone is seen by God according to the being it has in God himself, but not only so; for the stone is also seen by God according to the being it has in this and that stone, and according to the being it has in its causes, both material and efficient, and, in short, according to all its modes of being, not only those proper to it, but also those possible to it. For God, seeing the stone in himself alone, sees the stone according to all the modes of being that it has and can have. And this is stated in the text in other words, as is evident.

XIII. In response to the third, note that hence⁸ it is clear that for St. Thomas, in order that God may understand all things according to their proper rationes in the essence understood, the eminent perfection of the divine essence suffices, by which He sets forth, and more besides, all and each of the perfections of all things that imitate it in diverse ways. Nor does he require that any relations be posited for this purpose, as is said to be required in the second opinion recited by Scotus at the thirty-fifth distinction of Book I. Therefore the arguments that Scotus brings against those relations are not directed against St. Thomas on this matter. – How much weight they carry against St. Thomas's position on ideas will be seen in the following question.⁹

The title is clear at the beginning of the body. – In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question in the negative: The knowledge of God is in no way discursive. – It is proved. In the knowledge of God there is no discourse according to succession, nor according to causality: therefore it is in no way discursive. The consequence is proved from the sufficient distinction of discourse, which is clearly manifest in us. – The antecedent, however, is proved as regards its first part. Discourse according to succession consists in understanding one thing after another: but God sees all things in one, which is Himself: therefore He does not discourse, understanding one thing after another. – As to the second part, it is proved in two ways. First, because the second kind of discourse includes the first. Second, because the second is from the known to the unknown, and consequently it is knowledge of the second from the first, and not in the first. But God knows all things in the first. Therefore He does not discourse, but His knowledge is like the knowledge at the term of a discourse. For, when effects have already been resolved into their causes, it sees the effects in the causes: so proportionally, though without any prior resolution, God sees all things in Himself, the cause of all things. – And remember here to correct the codex, if it reads in this way, Tertius vero discursus: for it should be read, Terminus vero discursus is.

Title. – Note that this article is of great importance, since it begins the question concerning the manner in which God produces things outside himself. For to ask whether God's knowledge is the cause of things is nothing other than to ask whether God causes through intellect. But because the causality of things can be considered in two ways: first, in itself; and thus a special treatise on it will be given below¹, where everything will be fully examined. In another way, as it is a quality of divine knowledge: and thus it is inquired into here, so that it may be completely shown what sort of knowledge God has, namely whether God's knowledge has this condition, namely to be the cause of things.

II. In the body, a single conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: The knowledge of God is the cause of things. – Concerning this conclusion, three things are done in the text: first, it is proved; second, it is shown in general in what way the knowledge of God is a cause in act second²; third, the conclusion is proved effectively with that mode expressly stated³.

III. As to the first: God's knowledge is related to things as the knowledge of a craftsman is to his works; but the craftsman's knowledge is the cause of his artifacts; therefore God's knowledge is the cause of things. – The major is not proved until the third part of the body⁴. The minor, however, is proved. The craftsman acts through his intellect; therefore the form of the intellect is the principle of operation, just as heat is of heating. And then supply implicitly: but knowledge is that very form of his intellect; therefore. All things are clear.

IV. With respect to second⁵, it is determined in general: Knowledge is a cause only when joined to the will. – It is proved. Knowledge does not signify the reason of a cause from the mere fact that it is in the knower, but from its inclination toward the effect: therefore not except when joined to the will. – The antecedent is proved by a similar case in the natural order, namely heat. The consequence, however, is proved as follows: knowledge of itself is related to opposites; therefore its determination to one side comes from an appetite joined to it. The assumption and the consequence are found in Book IX Metaphysics.

Note here that the text speaks quite cautiously about natural form. For it does not say that a naturally active form, such as heat, needs some inclination superadded in order to be a principle of action, since this would be false. Rather, it says that the form itself, namely heat, insofar as it has this, namely being or remaining in a subject, from this, or as such, does not have that it is, or is signified as, a principle of action. And this is true: for otherwise it would follow that every form which is in something would be a principle of action, which is false. But although from this it does not have the character of an active principle, this is nevertheless required for the character of an active principle. Now the inclination to the work is what gives the form the character of an active principle. – Nor does it matter for the present purpose whether such a determination is intrinsic, from the very nature of the form, as is evident in the case of heat, or extrinsic, as happens in knowledge, which, as has been proven, does not have the character of a cause in act unless it has the will joined to it. For taken by itself it would never cause anything, unless it caused opposites at once, which is impossible.

V. As to the third point, the conclusion is repeated⁶ with a mode added, namely: The knowledge of God is the cause of things insofar as will is joined to it. – It is proved by reason: which is also the proof of the major premise at the beginning of what was assumed⁷. God's act of being (esse) is His very understanding; therefore God is the cause of things through intellect; therefore the knowledge of God is the cause of things insofar as will is joined to it.

The antecedent is clear. And the first consequence is left as evident. The second, however, is clear from the assigned manner in which the intellect is the cause of things. And nevertheless it is confirmed in the text by the singularity of the name: because God's knowledge as cause has been accustomed to be called the knowledge of approbation.

VI. Concerning the first inference of this argument, a doubt arises: namely, what is the basis of this inference, God's being is His understanding, therefore God acts through intellect. For it admits of objection in two ways. First, according to the truth of the matter. For the following does not hold: God's being is His understanding, therefore God produces the Son, or the Holy Spirit, through intellect; since each is produced by God through nature, as will be made clear below ⁸ – Second, according to the opinion of those who hold that God acts by the necessity of nature. For those philosophers would concede that God's being is His understanding: but they would deny the consequence, saying that God produces things through intellect only concomitantly, since He understands Himself to be making them; but through nature alone causally.

VII. To this it is briefly answered that the root of this consequence is the proposition, to act through intellect is more perfect, higher, and more universal than to act through nature; which proposition is proved in Book II Contra Gentiles, chapter XXIII. For, given this supposition, it follows most fittingly, if God's esse is his understanding, then all the effects of God are in God intelligibly, as is clear from what was said above ⁹: for effects must pre-exist in the very essence of the cause, according to the mode of the essence of that cause. But if all things are both in the esse of God and in his understanding as such; and if it is more perfect, higher, and more universal to be the cause of things through understanding than through esse alone; since it is agreed that there must be attributed to God whatever is most perfect, whatever is supreme, whatever is most universal in causing and in the mode of causing, then without any sophistry it follows, therefore God is the cause of things through intellect.

VIII. Therefore, in reply to the objection raised on the opposite side, according to the opinion of certain philosophers¹⁰, it is now clear that they would wrongly deny the consequence. – As for the objection touching the matter of the Trinity, it is said that the objection is not to the point. For the discussion concerns a true efficient cause, which cannot be understood without an essential diversity between cause and caused: but the processions ad intra are not causalities truly and properly so called, nor is the Father truly and properly the cause of the Son, since both share one and the same numerical substance. And therefore it is no wonder if the argument does not hold there. – Nevertheless, one could also say otherwise, namely that this consequence does hold, granted that on the side of what is producible there is nothing repugnant to its being produced through intellect. For if it were repugnant on the side of the producible thing, then although it would have being (esse) intelligibly in the cause, etc., it would still never follow that it could be produced through intellect, as is evident. But it is clear that this is how things stand in the case at hand. For it is repugnant to the divine Persons to be produced in the manner of an artifact; but not to other things. And therefore with respect to other things it is inferred, therefore God acts through intellect, but not with respect to the divine Persons: for of them He is Author by nature, as will appear below ¹¹. IX. In response to the second, await its discussion: since, when causality among things is treated of in its own right, it will be discussed ¹².

A clear title. - The body has two parts: first, it answers the question affirmatively; second, it assigns a certain difference among the knowledge of non-beings in various ways ¹. II. As to the first, the conclusion is: It may be said that God has knowledge of non-beings. - It is proved: God knows all things that are in any way whatever; therefore, all things that can, by a power belonging both to himself and to a creature, be made, thought, and said; therefore, those things that are not in act. Therefore, it may be said that God has knowledge of non-beings. The first consequence is proved by distinguishing the modes of being (essendi), that is, simply and in a qualified sense; and by subdividing the latter according to the manifold diversity of power, namely of the Creator or of a creature, active or passive, real or merely opinionative, etc. - The second consequence is self-evident: for not all these things are in act. - The third is also evident: because since they are not beings simply, but in potency—which is a diminishing condition—the absolute negation of being is verified of them most fittingly, and thus they are non-beings; just as of man in potency it is truly said not-man, and of a chest in potency not-chest. III. As to the second ², the difference is nominal: certain non-beings, it is said, God knows by the science of vision, others by the simple intelligence. And the reason for the names is that things seen among us have two conditions: one is that they are present as objects to the seer; the other, that they have a distinct esse outside the seer. And therefore those things which exist at some time are said to be understood by the science of vision; whereas those which never exist are said not to be seen, but to be known by simple intelligence. For the former have these two conditions on account of the eternity of the divine science, etc.; the latter have neither. IV. Concerning this part there is a small doubt. Since this difference does not pertain to non-beings as such, but rather to non-beings insofar as they are beings, it consequently pertains only accidentally to this article, in which the science of non-beings is treated. The assumption is clear: because things that exist at some time belong to the science of vision for this reason, that they are beings at some time in act, and not insofar as they are non-beings; therefore. To this it is briefly answered that this difference touches non-beings in both ways, namely insofar as they are, and insofar as they are not. For of those things that never exist, but are always in potency, not only their entitative contents in potency, but also the negations of actuality, are known by simple intelligence. And likewise, of those things that exist at some time in act, not only their entitative contents in act at such a time, but also their negations from act at such another time, are known by the science of vision from eternity. And the reason for this is that negation is known through affirmation, and follows its genus in being and in being known per se. And so this difference completely embraces non-beings, as proposed.

A clear title. - In the body, first he answers the question, affirming that it is so; second, how it is so. II. As to the first, the responsive conclusion directly answers the question affirmatively: God knows evils. - It is proved. God perfectly knows all goods; therefore he knows all things that can happen to any of them; therefore he knows evils. The antecedent, together with the first consequence, is left as evident. The second, however, is proved: because there are certain goods to which it can happen that they be corrupted by evils, as is clear both of natural and of moral good. III. As to the second, the mode of knowing is through something else: so that this conclusion, God knows evils through goods, is proved, explained, and confirmed. - It is proved first. The being of evil consists in the privation of good; therefore the knowability of evil consists in the negation of good; therefore God knows evils for this reason, because he knows goods. The antecedent is clear. The consequence, however, is proved: because each thing is knowable in the same way in which it has being. - It is then explained by an example: just as darkness is known through light. - Finally it is confirmed by the authority of Dionysius, as is clear in the text.

Title: the singulars of material things. For concerning these it has already been said¹ that the soul knows itself, which is admittedly singular. — In the body, first he answers the question directly, namely that it does; second, he treats how ².

II. As to the first point, three things. First, he answers the question affirmatively: God knows singulars. — It is proved. All perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher manner: knowledge of singulars is a perfection of man; therefore it pre-exists in God in a higher manner.

Second, he shows the force of this argument from the authority of Aristotle. For that reasoning is grounded in this, that everything known by us must be known by God: and Aristotle assumed this against Empedocles.

Third, he explains that particle added in the conclusion by force of the middle term, namely in a loftier way: this is attended to when he says that we know singulars and universals through distinct powers; but God comprehends all things, both material and immaterial, with a single intellect. And it is proved: because things that are divided among inferior beings are simply and unitedly in God.

III. Note here that, because the major proposition is not true of formal preexistence except in the case of perfections simply so called, therefore, although our knowing of the singular and sensing are the same, the text did not say "to sense," but, the knowing of the singular pertains to our perfection. For sensing is not a perfection simply so called, nor does it preexist in God formally, but only virtually; whereas the knowing of the singular is a perfection simply so called, and it had to be concluded here that it preexists in God formally.

IV. As to the second ³, there are three positions, according to two opinions and a determination. The first opinion, then, concerning the manner in which God knows singulars, holds that God knows singulars by knowing all their universal causes. — It is argued that this suffices. There is nothing in any singular that is not present in it from some universal cause; therefore, once all the universal causes are known, the whole singular is known. This is also illustrated by an example, namely an eclipse.

This opinion is refuted. If God were to know singulars by knowing only universal causes, then he would not know singulars in their singularity; the opposite of which has been proven. — The consequence is proven. The whole aggregate that is in a singular from universal causes, as such, does not suffice to constitute a singular: therefore. The assumption is proven and made manifest. It is proven: because, with designated matter removed, or the principle of individuation, whatever it may be, since it is established that it is not being (ens) universal, a singular will never be constituted. This is made manifest exemplarily in man.

V. The second opinion ⁴ stands in this: God knows singulars by applying universals to particulars. — Against: application is only to something previously known; therefore the application of a universal to a particular presupposes knowledge of the singular, it does not produce it.

VI. The determination ⁵ is: God knows singulars through His essence. — It is proved, as to the first part, thus. God's knowledge is the cause of things: therefore it extends to all things to which His causality extends: therefore to singulars. The antecedent, together with the first consequence, is known. But the second is proved: because God is the cause not only of form, but of individuating matter. — As to the second part, thus. God knows things other than Himself through His essence, insofar as it is their likeness or active principle: therefore His essence is a sufficient principle for knowing all things that are made through it, even in the singular: therefore He knows singulars through His essence. The antecedent is clear from what has been said ⁶. And the consequence is clear from the terms and from the proof of the first part.

VII. Note that the whole determination of this text presupposes that God is the proximate cause of prime matter: concerning which, since there will be a special question below ⁷, let it be supposed for now. For this granted, the rest is clear and undoubted.

In the replies to the arguments, many things must be discussed, but not here: they will be made clear below in their proper places.