Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, proper, since it can be taken in three ways—namely, as distinguished from common, as distinguished from metaphorical, and as distinguished from extrinsic—is taken directly in the third way in the present case; so that most intimate proper, or rather most proper, that is, most intimate, is what is meant here. For among names not said metaphorically of something, there is a range, in that the formal ratio of one is more intrinsic to it than that of another, etc. The word most, however, expresses an excessive comparison with respect to the other divine names, whether they are common ones, such as good, wise, etc., or proper ones, such as God, Creator, etc. But whether this comparison extends also to composite divine names does not appear: for no mention is made anywhere in the whole article of composite names, but only of simple ones. Therefore it will still remain in doubt whether the name He Who Is is a more proper name of God than the highest good, or infinite being, etc.

II. In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question affirmatively. But note that this conclusion can be formed in two ways. First thus: This name Qui est is the most proper name of God, for a threefold reason. So that "ly" triplici ratione is part of the conclusion, and is a determination of "ly" maxime proprium. And in this way the sense is: most proper with respect to three things, namely signification, mode of signifying, and consignification, as is expressed in the response to the first. – In another way it can be formed without such a limitation, thus: This name Qui est is the most proper name of God. And in this way "ly" triplici ratione is not part of the conclusion, but a continuation of the conclusion with its proofs, as if to say: and it is proved in three ways.

Two considerations favor the first sense: namely, the insertion of the ly for a threefold reason between the subject and the predicate of the conclusion in the text, and the explanation given in the response to the first argument. Two considerations likewise favor the second sense: first, because in the text, according to each reason individually, the conclusion is inferred without qualification; second, because without qualification the conclusion is simply true. And since it matters little how one formulates it, proceed as you please.

III. The conclusion is therefore proved in the text, as regards the first point, or first of all, thus. "He who is" signifies not some form but esse itself: therefore it signifies the essence of God alone: therefore it is most proper to God. – The first inference is proved: because the essence of God alone is his esse. But the second: because each thing is named from its own form.

IV. Concerning this argument a doubt is raised, because it does not conclude what was intended. For the second inference does not draw the conclusion that this name is more proper than the other names; rather, it draws the conclusion that this name befits God more than other things do, since its signification is preserved in God essentially, while in other things it exists outside the essence. And yet what should have been concluded, as indeed the text itself draws out, is that this name is more proper than the other names.

To this we must briefly reply that the reasoning of the text concludes both points. For since the formal signification of qui est is esse itself, it follows most fittingly both that it befits God more than others, because He has it essentially while others do not; and that it befits God more than other names, because it is essential and prior to the rest, since the others signify what they signify only posteriorly. This, moreover, was intimated implicitly in the text in the word esse, or in the words non formam aliquam, as if to say: it does not signify some form, as other names do, such as wise, living, etc. As for the transcendentals, it was already established that they are posterior to esse itself. And therefore the Author had no need to concern himself with them.

V. As to the second point¹, the conclusion is proved as follows. The essence of God cannot be understood by us, in the state of the wayfarer, in the manner in which it is in itself: therefore every determinate understanding of any kind falls short of the manner in which God is in himself: therefore, the less determined certain names are, the more properly are they said of God by us: therefore He Who Is is the most proper name of God.

The last consequence is proved in the text: because the other names are either less common; or, if they are convertible, they add something of rationality at least above it itself. And it is confirmed by the authority of Damascene. – The prior consequences, however, are not proved in the text. And the first indeed did not need proof, since it is sufficiently clear of itself; for if the mode of God is unknown, it follows that every known mode falls short of the mode of God. – The second is also plainly deduced from it: since, if every known mode falls short of the mode of God, therefore, the more determinate the mode, the more it falls short. For this falling short proceeds from the most eminent amplitude of the mode of the being (esse) of God: and hence, the more ample or more absolute the ratio signified by a name is, the less it recedes from that unbounded ocean of the divine substance. And this is to be said more properly. For no name equals the mode of God; but because it falls short less, it is said more properly; so that to recede least among the others is to be said most properly. Now, to fall short, in the present case, is taken commonly. For certain names, such as the transcendentals, less determinate, fall short negatively, yet more and less, as was said; so much so that certain others, namely determinate ones, fall short contrarily, as body, etc. Therefore every determination falls short, though dissimilarly.

VI. Note here that the word is can be determined in two ways: namely, on the side of the predicate, and on the side of the subject. On the side of the predicate, indeed, as when it is said, is wise, or good, etc.; but on the side of the subject, as when it is said a man or an ox is, etc. Now the name He Who Is is rightly said to be the most indeterminate of all: because in both respects the word He Who Is signifies something indeterminate. For it does not signify one who is good, or wise, or a substance; but most absolutely He Who Is, without any determination. On the side also of the word Who, since no nature is signified by it, and since it is relative to substance, it imports substance in the most common way: not as it is a determinate genus, but as every essence is called substance. And for this reason Damascene said that it signifies the boundless sea of substance—indeed, of substance by reason of the word Who, while a sea without limit by reason of the word is, without all determination: for it can be determined by infinitely many determinations. This is made especially clear by the fact that It is so eminent that It most eminently comprehends within itself infinitely many infinite modes of being (essendi), even such as are thinkable.

VII. As to the third, or thirdly², the conclusion is proved from consignification. "Who is" signifies being (esse) in the present: therefore it belongs most properly to God. – The inference holds: for presentness is most proper to God, as is clear from Augustine.

VIII. Note here that Qui est ("He who is") can be considered in three ways. In one way absolutely and formally: and thus it is to be considered here. Nor does Qui est differ from ens ("being") formally, but with respect to three conditions. The first is that ens does not so explicitly explicate the act of being (actus essendi); the second is that ens does not consignify any time; the third is that the relative closed within ens is of the neuter gender, as is evident when one expounds ens, that is, quod est ("that which is"), as Aristotle expressly expounds it many times. Now the neuter gender, since it is unformed, holds itself more on the side of matter; the masculine, however, since it is formed, intimates actuality. Hence, in saying Qui est, the actuality of the existent is more strongly intimated than in saying quod est.

Because of these conditions, added to those stated in the text, the "Qui est" is considered in the second way as rightly appropriated to God. And thus, since the reason for the appropriation is that He alone in the truth of reality is, while other things both are and are not, insofar as they can be lacking, and while they are, they are only in such a way—that is, of such and so great a perfection, and not absolutely³—it must be that this name, taken in this way, signifies supreme eminence in being (esse), not by its signification, but by appropriation. Just as if this name "knowing" were appropriated among men to someone of most excellent intellect, as if the others, in comparison with him, would not know, etc.: for then, although the signification of the name would not vary, it would nevertheless convey more than it would formally signify, since from such an appropriation the excellence of that person would be shown.

Therefore, in the matter at hand, although He Who Is, taken formally, is verified of every existent thing, and does not signify the infinite sea of substance except in the manner in which being does; yet when it is considered as appropriated, it places in God esse, which is the very essence of God, in the most eminent way, and places that infinite sea in the divine esse. And by this it draws the infinity by indetermination, which it imports in common, to infinity by eminence, signifying that eternal esse. On account of which we have no simple name, as regards its concept, that expounds the divine nature more quidditatively than He Who Is.

In a third way, Qui est is considered as it is the first member of this analogy, namely qui est. And in this way the term Qui est, not by appropriation but by its own proper account, is a proper name of God, and all that has been said above is verified of it: yet for a different reason, because not by appropriation, but by its own proper signification, as was said⁴. And since an analogical term, when uttered simply and without qualification, stands for the first analogate, therefore the term qui est is taken absolutely for the first; and it is most proper to God, on account of what has been said above. And follow this teaching: since these things are both true and consonant with the Author, speaking absolutely and formally.

IX. In response to the first, a doubt arises: because the distinction made there has no place in the matter at hand. For in the phrase Qui est the same thing is both that from which the name is imposed and that to which the name is imposed. Therefore, if it is a more proper name with respect to one, it will be so with respect to both. And yet in the text it is said that it is more proper with respect to that from which, and not with respect to that to which. How can these stand together?

To this it is briefly said that, although it is the same thing, it is nevertheless not compared to the same. For in each of the two names, namely Qui est and Deus, there are two elements, namely the a quo and the ad quod: and by making the comparison proportionally, that is, comparing the a quo of one to the a quo of the other, and the ad quod of one to the ad quod of the other, the clear sense of the text easily appears: that esse is more proper to God than universal providence, and that deity is more proper to God than esse; since deity signifies that nature as it were according to its specific difference, whereas Qui est signifies the same as it were according to genus. Nevertheless, because we have the concept of God, with respect to what it is imposed upon, only in something else, while we have the concept of Qui est with respect to both; therefore, although God in itself is a more proper and more intimate name, yet with respect to us Qui est is more explanatory of God than Deus, for the reason given.

X. And know that Qui est, as appropriated, or as the first analogate of the name, imports only a single formal concept: so that it is not composed of two concepts, like color albus, nor like ens per se, nor like summum bonum, nor like ens infinitum. And with such simplicity it unfolds the infinite ocean of substance. Indeed, if it is conceived rightly and perfectly, it unfolds almost the reason why God is infinite being (ens): for not because He is infinite being (ens infinitum) is He therefore Qui est; but because He is Qui est, therefore He has esse of infinite perfection. Hence Scotus does not seem to have judged rightly, in I, dist. III, qu. I, when he says that the simpler and more perfect concept proper to God, possible for us, is the concept of this name, ens infinitum. For it is now evident that the concept of Qui est is simpler, more perfect, and prior.