Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

A clear title. - In the body, four parts: first, he distinguishes the term communicable; second, he sets forth certain rules¹; third, he answers the question raised²; fourth, he completes the doctrine concerning the communicability of the divine names³.

II. As to the first point, communicability is posited in two ways: namely, properly, and metaphorically. And this is sufficiently clear in the text, in which each member is defined, and both are opened up by example through the name lion.

III. As to the second point, four rules are set forth for distinguishing communicable names from others, and how differently they are communicable. Two rules concern sensible things, while two concern separate forms; and thus nothing in the universe has been passed over.

First rule: Every name signifying a nature distinct from the individual is communicable properly, either according to the thing itself, or at least according to the concept. — It is proved a priori. Every form existing in an individuating supposit is in itself common in the manner just described; therefore. — The antecedent, as regards the community of the thing, is proved in the case of human nature. As regards community of concept only, it is proved from the nature of the sun as follows. The specific nature is understood by us through abstraction from the singular; therefore, to be in one or in several singulars lies outside the understanding of the specific nature; therefore, while preserving the understanding of the specific nature, the sun can also be understood as existing in several.

Note here that communicability properly so called is subdivided in this rule: namely, into communicability according to the thing and the concept together, and according to the concept alone. And it is indicated at the same time that the foundation of real communicability is the being found of that nature in many. This, as Avicenna said⁴, is found in three ways: namely, either in simultaneous act, as is evident in human nature, of which several singulars are simultaneously in act; or in successive act, as is said of the Phoenix, that the life of the successor requires the death of the predecessor; or in potency alone, as a house of a thousand angles, if it should never come to be. The foundation of communicability according to the concept alone, however, has been assigned on the side of our intellect; and it was stated that it is the cognition of the nature without cognition of the individuating principles. And this occurs in several ways, as will be shown below⁵.

IV. The second rule is: Every name signifying a singular is incommunicable properly speaking, both according to the thing and according to the concept; although it may be communicable metaphorically. — It is proved a priori, with respect to the first part: because the singular as such is divided off from all others. With respect to the second, indeed: because the plurality of this individual cannot fall within the apprehension of the intellect. With respect to the third, however, by the example of Achilles.

V. The third rule is: Every name signifying a form not individuated through another supposit, but through itself, insofar as it is in itself, is properly incommunicable both in reality and in reason, though not metaphorically. — It is proved a priori, as to the first part: because they subsist through themselves. As to the second part, however: because they would be understood insofar as they are. — But know that we lack names of this kind: because we cannot understand such forms insofar as they are in themselves.

VI. The fourth rule is: Every name we have that signifies forms of this kind as subsisting in themselves is communicable properly, not according to the thing, but according to the concept alone. – The last part is proved a priori. Forms of this kind are understood by us not in their own manner, but in the manner of composite things, namely things having form in matter; therefore, with respect to the meaning of names, the judgment is the same concerning names that signify forms, whether they are separate or in something else. – The antecedent is proved from a sign: we impose concrete names upon those forms; therefore we understand them in the manner of composites. The antecedent is evident. And the consequence is proved: concretes signify a nature in something; therefore, if etc.

VII. Note here the breadth implied in the communicability of names according to reason. Sun and Gabriel, for example, are common names according to reason, but dissimilarly. Sun is called communicable because its nature abstracts from this, and consequently the unity or plurality of singulars lies outside its reason: whereas Gabriel is so because it is understood in the manner in which the natures of composites are understood. That you may understand this more clearly, know that the term according to reason, universally and properly speaking, does not in this context mean the same as according to definition: rather it signifies a mode of being (essendi) in our reason. So that the sense is that every specific nature, as it is presented to our intellect, is common to many, because it is presented not as this, but as a specific nature: whether that nature is of itself (ex se) something else's this, as the nature of the sun and of all sensible things; or whether it is of itself (ex se) this, as is evident concerning God, and will be proved concerning the angels⁶. The breadth, moreover, is clearly derived from this: that the nature of the sun, since it is not of itself (ex se) this, both on the part of itself and on the part of the intellect has it that it be presented to our intellect not as this; and consequently its community according to reason has a foundation on both sides: but the nature of Gabriel, since it is of itself (ex se) this, derives from our manner of understanding alone that it be presented to us as itself, and not as this; and therefore this communicability has a foundation only on our side. Hence you can understand how it should be understood that Gabriel is universal, and predicable of many, and a species, etc.: for these things and their like suffice to be verified not of them absolutely, but as objects, or as known by us. And since we have written diffusely on these matters in the commentaries On Being (Ente) and Essence⁷, there is no need to repeat the same things here.

VIII. As to the third⁸, he answers the question with a single three-part conclusion: This name God is incommunicable according to reality, but communicable according to opinion and according to likeness. – The first part is proved as follows: the divine nature signified by this name is incommunicable according to reality; therefore. The second part is likewise explained by the example of the sun, and confirmed by the authority of the gloss on Galatians IV. The third part, however, is explained with respect to those who participate in divinity, with the authority of the Psalm added.

Note here that, because the aforesaid conclusion, together with the following one, follows manifestly from the rules stated above, it was not necessary to add any further proofs.

IX. As to the fourth⁹, the following conclusion is proposed: If there were some divine name signifying that nature inasmuch as it is this, that name would be altogether incommunicable properly speaking to what is outside. And this is made clear by a fictitious example concerning the sun; and there is inserted a doubt concerning the name Tetragrammaton.

Note here that this conclusion was set down not only as a complement to this doctrine, but from a genuine doubt, as I judge, concerning that name which among the Hebrews was held in such reverence. For that name lies hidden in us in exercised act (in actu exercito), though in signified act (in actu signato) it is called the Tetragrammaton. And therefore the text speaks with hesitation.