Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title, as it stands, is understood in its full breadth, as is clear from the response.

The body is in four parts: first, a rule is given for discerning of what a name is said priorly and of what posteriorly; second, the question is answered with respect to metaphorical names¹; third, with respect to those said properly, according to the opinion refuted in the second article ²; fourth, according to the truth ³.

II. As to the first point, the rule is: the analogical term is said first of that which enters into the definition of the others, and only afterwards of the others. — It is proved. In every analogical name there is one respect shared by all the rest; therefore that one is posited in the definition of the others; therefore that one is prior to the others according to the account of that analogy. This is illustrated exemplarily in the analogue healthy. — The antecedent, together with the first consequence, is proved no otherwise. The second consequence, however, is proved: because the account which a name signifies is its definition; hence what is prior according to the definition of that name is prior according to its account—which is nothing other than that the analogical term is said first of that which defines the others, and only then of the others.

III. Concerning the antecedent and its first consequence, a doubt arises that must not be passed over. First, against the man himself: because St. Thomas himself, in Qu. de Ver., qu. II, art. XI ⁴, holds that it is not universally true that the first analogate must be posited in the concepts of the other analogates. – Second, simply. Both because from what has been said ⁵ it is clear that wisdom is said analogically of God and other things: and yet a creature is not called wise in reference to God, nor conversely, as is evident, but each is called wise absolutely. And because in the concept of man as wise, the wisdom of God is not contained; nor in the concept of God as He is wise is the wisdom of man contained. Therefore.

IV. To this it is briefly answered that analogues are found in two ways. For some signify the very respects to the first analogue, as is clear in the case of "healthy". But others signify only the foundations of those respects, as is commonly found in all truly analogous names, properly and formally preserved in all the analogates. That universal proposition, therefore, assumed in the antecedent is to be understood universally according to the first mode of analogy: so that the sense is that in all names which are said of many things analogically, that is, according to diverse respects, one thing must be posited. But in the question On Truth he said the opposite concerning the second mode of analogy. And this answer is more universal than the one we assigned elsewhere, in ⁶, from Question On Truth, because this answer holds also for analogues according to proportionality, though metaphorically named: for in these too one thing is posited in the notion of another, on account of the aforesaid cause. – As for the objections raised in second place, this will be treated in the fourth part of this article, at ⁷.

V. As to the second ⁸, the responsive conclusion is: Names said metaphorically are said first of creatures than of God. – It is proved. The meaning of these names as they are said of God cannot be understood without their meaning as they are said of creatures: therefore. – The antecedent is evident by way of example: in general indeed concerning to laugh, but in our case concerning lion. The consequence, however, holds by the rule assigned ⁹.

VI. As to the third point, the hypothetical conclusion is: If common names taken properly were said of God only causally, they would be said of creatures prior to being said of God. — It is proved. Their signification, as they are said of God, could not be understood without their signification in creatures: therefore. — The antecedent is clear from the example good. The consequence holds by the rule assigned.

VII. As to the fourth point, the responsive conclusion is: Names of this kind, with respect to the thing signified, are said of God first; with respect to the imposition of the name, they are said of creatures first.

This conclusion is proved with respect to the first part. These names signify not only that God is such causally, but also essentially; and from God the perfections of other things emanate; therefore they belong to God prior to others, as regards the thing itself. – With respect to the second part, however: we know and name creatures first; therefore. It is proved secondly by a sign: they have a mode of signifying that befits creatures; therefore.

VIII. Concerning that statement in the proof of the first part of the conclusion, namely, such names signify not only that God is a cause, but that He is essentially such, a doubt arises. For if, when it is said God is good, the sense is, God is causally and formally good, there follows first that the word good, said of God, does not signify one thing, against Aristotle, IV Metaphysics¹⁰ There follows secondly the opposite of what was intended. Since the sense would be, God is the cause of the goodness of others, and possessing goodness in Himself: where it is manifestly clear that the goodness of others falls within the account of God as He is good.

IX. To this it is said that those words can be soundly understood in two ways. First, as understood of the possible separately: that is, that names of this kind can be said and verified of God in both ways, namely causally and formally, yet separately. So that the statement God is good is true taken causally, and is also true taken formally: and not that it imports both at once. And thus the opposing objection introduces no ambiguity: for it speaks of both significations together.

Second, so that they may be expounded according to both meanings at once. And thus it must be said that names of this kind are said of God formally and causally, but fundamentally. For example, when it is said God is good, it is signified not only that God is a possessor of goodness, but also that God possesses the ratio of goodness of such a kind as is naturally apt to ground the causality of the goodness of others: so that the word such does not add any mode or ratio above the divine goodness, but circumscribes that formal ratio according to which God is said to be good; for it was already defined in ¹¹ that this is not the same as ours, except by analogy. Now that ratio, although it does not import causality, nevertheless grounds it proximately. And it is similar with the others. – And thus no ambiguity remains. For according to this, names of this kind signify one thing. Nor need the goodness of a creature be co-understood: since they do not import causality formally, but fundamentally only.

Both responses are good. The first, however, is more literal, since the letter speaks against the refuted opinion; and it is evident that that opinion was speaking of the signification of causality not fundamentally but formally, as is clear.

X. Concerning the proof of the same part, and that first part itself ¹², note that when it is said that such common names are said of God first with respect to the thing signified, you are not to understand this materially but formally; so that this must be verified of the thing formally signified. And the reason assigned in the text embraces both things necessary for this: namely, both that the name is preserved formally; and that that formal ratio is prior in being to the others—which is proved because it is the cause of the others. For neither of these by itself would suffice to conclude that the names are said first of that one, as is clear inductively: for the ratio of healthy in the cause, although it is prior in being with respect to the ratio of healthy in the animal, since nevertheless the ratio of healthy is not formally in the cause, is said of the cause later; likewise the ratio of good, although it is formally in man, is nevertheless not said of him before it is said of other things.

Nor should anyone trouble you, saying: "Therefore the account is not the same for all common names of God and of other things: since there are certain perfections whose formal rationes, even though they are preserved in God, are not the cause that other things are such, because those formal rationes have no causality." Remember the authority of the Apostle, stated in the letter to Ephesians III: "I bend my knees to the Father of my Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named." For if divine paternity, which is a relation and is therefore most remote from the causality of others, is the cause of all other paternities, then a fortiori goodness is the cause of every goodness, and knowledge of every knowledge, and so with the rest. And if it be asked in what genus of cause: two genera are never lacking, namely final and formal exemplar, whatever may be said concerning efficient causality.

XI. Concerning the same part, a further doubt arises regarding man. First, because in article 2 of this question the opposite seems to have been said, when it was said that, in saying God is good, the meaning is that that which we call goodness in creatures preexists in God more eminently. Here you see plainly that in the signification of good as said of God, the goodness of the creature is contained; and consequently it ought to be said first of creatures. — Again, in article 5 it was said that these names are said of creatures in relation to God: therefore in the account of these names as they are said of creatures, God is contained: therefore they are said first of God, such that God is posited in the definition of the others. The opposite of this is held here, and it is clear from ¹³.

XII. To this it is briefly answered that, according to the truth, these names are said analogically, that is, proportionally, and first of God than of other things: because, since they are said formally of both, the formality in God is nevertheless prior in reality to that formality in other things. Yet it is not prior in such a way that the defining is prior to the defined: rather, it is prior as the exemplary cause is prior at least to the thing exemplified. And therefore, just as all exemplified things are such in relation to the exemplar, so all creatures are said to be such—say, good—in relation to the divine goodness. And just as exemplified things need not be signified with a relation to their exemplar, although they have it; so the goodness of a creature need not be signified in relation to the divine goodness, although, according to its esse, it always regards it as its exemplar. – The words of article 5, and similar ones, are therefore not refuted here, but expounded: namely, that they are understood according to esse, and not according to signification, except fundamentally, insofar as the formal rationes signified by them in creatures found an order to God as cause. – The words of article 2, however, were not adduced in order to define the signification of the name as predicated of God, but in order to expound it from what is better known to us. And therefore they offer no obstacle. For no comparison, or connotation of another, is contained in the ratio of names of this kind, whether they are said of God or of creatures: but they are said truly absolutely, since they signify absolute perfections.

And by these things the solution to the objections in the first part of the body of this article is made clear ¹⁴.