Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, "ly" univoce is taken as in the Categories¹ univocals are defined; nor is it necessary to add or subtract anything, as is also said at the end of this article.

In four parts: first, he answers the question negatively, that it is not univocally; second, that neither is it purely equivocally²; third, he affirms that it is analogically³; fourth, he compares analogy with the two aforementioned⁴.

II. As to the first point, the conclusion is negative: Common names applied to God and creatures are not said of them univocally. – It is proved thus. Every inadequate effect receives in a divided and multiplied way what exists in its cause simply and in one and the same manner: therefore it receives the likeness of the agent not according to the same ratio: therefore creatures participate in a divided way, etc., in the perfections which exist unitedly in God. Therefore names that import a perfection, when said of creatures, signify something distinct from other things; but when said of God, they do not signify something as distinct. Therefore such names, when said of creatures, comprehend the thing signified; but when said of God, they leave the thing signified as exceeding the signification of the name. Therefore such names are not said of God and other things according to the same ratio. Therefore they are not said univocally of God and creatures.

The antecedent is declared by the example of the sun and lower things: such that the declaration is not so much exemplary as proportional. From which proportionality also, the first consequence, once made manifest, is left behind along with the second. The third, however, with the rest, is left in the text as self-evident in itself, because from what is signified formally to the signs as such, with respect to the unity and plurality of the concept, it is clear that the process is optimal. Yet the consequent itself of the third consequence and the fourth is declared exemplarily in the word wise, which is a name common to God and to many creatures.

III. Concerning the first inference a doubt arises for novices, because it does not seem to hold: since many things are of the same kind in genus, or at least univocal by logical univocity, of which we are speaking, in inferior and celestial bodies; and yet these inferior things are related to celestial bodies as to causes that have in unity what is participated here in a divided way. – The antecedent is evident: for corporeity and diaphaneity and light etc. are of the same rational character here and there.

IV. To this it is briefly said that that greatest assumption in the antecedent, from which the diversity of the concept is inferred, is understood formally, that is, in this way: so that the divided participation of what is simply and unitedly in the cause always excludes identity of concept, even logical identity, from that participated thing itself; but not from other things, if there are any others common to effect and cause not by virtue of such participation. Now this is how things stand in the objections brought forward. For diaphaneity, and similar things, are found dividedly in the higher beings, just as they are here. Corporeity, however, if it exists there unitedly, namely without composition of matter and form, as Averroes thinks ⁵, is not said univocally of those beings and of these. Hence Averroes himself denies, on Porphyry ⁶, that body is a genus of the category of Substance, and posits composite body, etc. But if even there it results from matter and form, then it is already evident that it is had dividedly even there. – Therefore say that the heavenly bodies, insofar as they have something united which is participated here dividedly, as seems to be the case with their active powers, all or many of which they possess in a single nature of light, have nothing of the same concept as these.

V. Concerning the third consequence, a difficulty arises that is not small, from two heads. First, that the consequence is worthless, since it proceeds from the conditions of things to the conditions of names. For it is evident that our intellect, on which names depend, is naturally suited to divide what is united; and therefore it can understand and signify a perfection, say wisdom, without understanding and signifying its conditions which it has in reality, say that it is identical with other perfections, or not identical. Hence these consequences are worthless: Wisdom in creatures is a thing distinct from justice, etc., therefore the name of wisdom, said of creatures, signifies wisdom together with its distinction from justice, etc.; just as this does not hold: Quantity in mixed bodies is a thing conjoined with color, therefore the name quantity, said of mixed bodies, signifies quantity conjoined with color, etc.

Second, because, whatever may be said of the inference, the consequent proposition itself, on which the present position rests, is false in itself. And this is made evident by the following reason. The name wisdom, taken absolutely, either signifies finite wisdom, or infinite wisdom, or both; or neither of these, but abstracts from finitude and infinitude. Not the first: for then this would be false, God is wise. Not the second: for then this would be false, man is wise. Nor the third: for then both of the aforementioned propositions would be false. Therefore the fourth. And if so, then in saying man is wise and God is wise, the term wise does not signify a distinct thing more in the first than in the second, since it is predicated simply and absolutely in both, without any addition. – And it is confirmed: because the author of this position seems to have been deceived here in that he did not distinguish between the formal signification of the name and its material supposition. For although, when I say man is wise, the term wise, by reason of the subject matter, does predicate a distinct thing, etc.—namely, because wisdom itself in man is a thing distinct from his act of being (esse), etc.—nevertheless, by its formal signification it predicates nothing other than that he is wise, whether or not it exists there as a distinct reality.

VI. For the clarification of these points, three things must be done: first, to explain the terms assumed; second, to exclude the false sense of this process⁷; third, to make manifest the true one⁸. – Know that to signify something as distinct, or under the aspect of the distinct, happens in two ways. In one way, formally, that is, to signify something and its distinction from other things: and thus it is not understood in the text. In another way fundamentally, or causally: and this is to signify something as grounding its distinction from other things. And thus it is taken in our proposition. For the text intends that wisdom, and other things of this kind, signify in creatures not the quiddity of wisdom and its distinction from justice, but the quiddity of wisdom as grounding its diversity from justice. Now this, as will be shown below⁹, wisdom has from nothing else than from its own quiddity: and therefore, to signify wisdom as distinct from other things is nothing else than to signify wisdom as a quiddity. – But when you hear the words from other things, do not understand "from all the rest": for in that way every name, even in God, would signify something distinct, nor would there be any difference in this respect between the divine names and those of creatures. But understand from other perfections simply, or from other things with which it could possibly be found together, as the text plainly indicates.

VII. Now this process can have two senses. The first is that from the identity and distinction real of the perfections there is inferred a difference of names, in respect of signifying the perfection as distinct, and signifying it not as distinct. And according to this sense the objections raised proceed. But this sense is false, as was proved by way of objection; nor is it intended in the text. – The other sense, however, is that from the identity and distinction formal of the perfections there is inferred the aforementioned difference of names. And this sense is intended, true, formal, and concluding what is intended.

To make this evident, know that two perfections are joined, for the purpose at hand, in two ways: namely, identically and formally. Identically, as if we were to suppose that Socrates' wisdom and his justice are one and the same thing. – Formally, however, it can be imagined in two ways. First, if we suppose that the proper formal account of wisdom and the proper formal account of justice are one formal account, such that that one account is not a third account, but is only the proper formal account of wisdom and of justice. And an identity of this kind is simply impossible, involving two contradictories. For if those two are not one third account, then they are not one account: since no account is the ground of formal identity of one to another, given that they are not one in themselves. And if they are one account, then they are one third account: because one thing in itself is not the other.

Second, it can be understood if we suppose that the formal reason of wisdom and the formal reason of justice are contained eminently in one formal reason of a higher order, and are formally identified. And this identity is not only possible, but is in fact the case for all perfections in God. For we must not think that the proper formal reason of wisdom exists in God; rather, as the text states, the reason of wisdom in God is not proper to wisdom itself, but is proper to something higher, namely to the deity, and is common, by an eminent formality, to justice, goodness, power, etc. For just as the thing that is wisdom and the thing that is justice in creatures are elevated into one thing of a higher order, namely the deity, and therefore are one thing in God; so too the formal reason of wisdom and the formal reason of justice are elevated into one formal reason of a higher order, namely the proper reason of the deity, and they are one formal reason in number, containing both reasons eminently—not merely virtually, as the reason of light contains the reason of heat, but formally, as the reason of light contains the reason of the heating virtue. Hence with the utmost subtlety the divine genius of St. Thomas, from the fact that the reason of wisdom in God is formally not only wisdom itself but also justice, and consequently is the proper reason not of wisdom but of some third thing, whereas in creatures it is formally the very proper reason of wisdom, inferred: Therefore the reason of wisdom in God is one thing, and that of wisdom in creatures another; and hence the common name is not predicated of them according to one reason. That this may be perceived more clearly, let us offer examples. For if it is asked: what is man insofar as he is wise? it will be answered that he is one who orders or directs, or something of that sort. But if it is asked: what is God insofar as He is wise? the answer must be something eminently possessing within itself being as one who orders or directs. Where it is manifestly clear that, although the term wise is a common name of God and man, nevertheless the reason of each according to that name is not entirely the same; indeed, neither is it that reason nor those others, but rather a certain higher reason. And this is what is said in the text, acutely perceived.

VIII. To the objections on the other side¹⁰ it is said. And to the first it is said that this argument does not proceed from the conditions of things to the conditions of names, absolutely; but from the diversity of the formal ratio signified by the name in this and in that, in order to destroy the univocity of the name. For as is clear from what has been said, not from identity or diversity real, but from the identity and diversity formal of the perfections among themselves, does the text proceed. Nor would it even have been permitted, from the formal identity of the perfections among themselves, to destroy the univocity of the name, unless from the formal identity of those things which in themselves are not the same, it were established that there follows a third ratio higher than all such diverse things. For from the fact that there is only a third ratio, it immediately becomes clear that there is a formal distinction between the elevated perfection and the non-elevated one; or between that which is formally identified with others and that which is not formally identified with others.

To the second it is said that the argument presupposes that the name of wisdom, taken absolutely, not as signifying a species of quality, but taken transcendentally, signifies one formal concept simply and absolutely. But this is precisely what is here inquired into and disputed, and it is concluded to be false: for it signifies one formal concept according to analogy, and not simply. How, however, one concept according to analogy is predicated of many things has been treated at length by us in the treatise On the Analogy of Names¹¹. – Hence, to the question raised, it would have to be said that the name imports both wisdoms, but not after the manner of a univocal; and therefore the inference is worthless, since it presupposes this.

In confirmation it is said that when I say God is wise, the term wise, by its formal signification, imports a wisdom formally identical with justice, etc.; indeed, to speak more correctly, it signifies not wisdom, but something prepossessing eminently the ratio of wisdom¹². But when I say man is wise, the term wise predicates the very ratio of wisdom; as is clear from the answers that must be given to those asking what is God insofar as he is wise? and what is man insofar as he is wise? For that which the name signifies formally is what is answered to one asking: what is A insofar as it has that name? The Author, therefore, was not deceived, but perceived most formally the formal ratio of univocals, according to Aristotle's definition.

IX. Against the aforesaid conclusion¹³ Scotus, in I, dist. III, qu. I et III, et dist. VIII, qu. III, argues in many ways. First, because names of this kind have a certain common concept, even while doubt remains concerning the concepts of God and creature. – Second, because metaphysical processes use one formal ratio in such cases, and by removing from it all conditions of imperfection, attribute it to God. – Third, because otherwise God would not be naturally knowable through any simple concept: since that concept would be contained neither essentially nor virtually in anything shining forth in the phantasm. – Fourth, because every comparison is in something univocal in some degree, as is clear from VII Physics¹⁴: for it is evident that God is a more perfect being than the creature.

X. And although these matters have been treated at length in the commentaries on De Ente et Essentia¹⁵, nevertheless a brief answer is now given.

To the first, indeed: that argument concludes nothing other than the otherness of the concept of wisdom, for example, in common, from the wisdom of God and the wisdom of the creature. But to infer from this, therefore a univocal concept, is the sophism of the Consequent: since an analogous concept is also other than its inferiors. Yet not in that mode of otherness by which a univocal concept is other than the things univocated by it: because this one is other as cut off from them, but that one as containing them, as we have written at length in the treatise De Analogia Nominum¹⁶.

To the second, it is said that the metaphysical processes use one ratio simply at the beginning of inquiry; but at the end, they use a ratio one not simply, but by analogy: for thus the ratio of wisdom is one, when it has been stripped of its imperfections. Hence there is not the same reason, as Scotus objects, concerning stone and wisdom: because the ratio of stone can neither at the beginning nor at the end of inquiry remain one analogically, preserved formally in God and in stone: because the ratio of stone always includes imperfection.

To the third, it is said that God is knowable by a simple concept contained in the object shining forth in the phantasm, participatively or imitatively. Nor must He be contained essentially or virtually: for a third mode is given.

To the fourth, then, it is said that comparison takes place also in the analogical, which is the mean between the univocal and the equivocal: and therefore the assumption is denied. For when it is said, God is a more perfect being than a creature, the comparison is made in the ratio of being, one by analogy, and thus common to both, as we have taught elsewhere¹⁷.

XI. As to the second¹⁸, the conclusion is negative: Names of this kind are not said of God and other things in a purely equivocal manner. – It is proved thus. If they were said equivocally, nothing could be known or demonstrated about God from creatures: but this is against the Philosopher and the Apostle: therefore. – The consequence is proved: because the fallacy of Equivocation would creep in. The destruction of the consequent is evident.

XII. Two things must be noted here. First is the word purely. For the text does not say absolutely that they are not equivocal: but with a qualification it says that they are not purely equivocal. This qualification was added because, in truth, analogues are comprehended under equivocals, which are defined in the Categories, ¹⁹ For equivocals are found in multiple ways. Some are those whose name is common, and whose account according to that name is wholly different: and these are called purely equivocal; and of these the text here speaks. But others are those whose name is common, and whose account according to that name is different in some respect: and these are found in many ways, and comprehend under themselves the analogues, as we have shown elsewhere.²⁰

According to it is: the word "nothing" as placed in the consequent does not stand for nothing simply. For, given that all such names were equivocal, we could still know that God is Creator, and above all things, and that He is not a body, etc. But it stands for nothing formally common to God and creatures, namely being (ens), act, good, wise, etc.: for none of these could be known of God, but the fallacy of Equivocation would always be incurred, as is evident.

XIII. As to the third point²¹, the affirmative answer to the question is this: Whatever names are common to God and creatures are said of them according to an analogy of one to another, that is, of creature to God. – The phrase of one to another is explained by distinguishing the analogy of names: namely, either it is according to a proportion of certain things among themselves, and this is called of one to another; or according to a proportion of certain things not among themselves, but to a third, and this is called of two to a third, or of many to one. Examples appear in the text.

The conclusion is then proved. As to the first part, by the argument from division a divisione: which is why the text says: Dicendum est igitur etc. As to the second part, thus. We cannot name anything except from creatures; therefore names common to both are said according to the order of one thing to the other. As to the third part, because God is the cause in which the perfections of all things preexist.

XIV. Remember here that we set forth examples, not because the matter is so, but so that learners may understand. For being is not analogous to God and creatures by extrinsic denomination, as healthy is; but in this the likeness holds, that in both cases there is analogy by reason of the order of two things to one another, although dissimilarly here and there. For between God and creature there is a formal imitative likeness (which is also touched upon in the text, when creatures are said to be ordered to God as to a cause, in which all perfections pre-exist); but between a healthy animal and urine there is no likeness, only a relation of signification. And therefore there the analogical community is according to formal predication; here, however, properly speaking it is a community of attribution to one thing according to any predication whatsoever, whether extrinsic or intrinsic, etc.

XV. As to the fourth²², the conclusion is: This mode of predication is intermediate between the univocal and the equivocal. – It is proved by the argument from definition to the thing defined: here there is not one ratio simply, nor are they wholly diverse, but the same in a certain respect and diverse in a certain respect. For it signifies diverse proportions to one thing: and therefore, by reason of the diverse proportions, there is a diversity in a certain respect; but by reason of the one thing to which, or in respect of which, those diverse proportions are made, it is one in a certain respect, as is clear from the example of healthy, etc. Therefore. – If you wish to understand this matter fully, consult the oft-cited little work On the Analogy of Names.

XVI. In response to the first, a difficulty arises: because the end of the response contradicts its beginning. For at the beginning it is said that equivocals are reduced to the univocal in predications; but at the end it is said that in predications univocals are reduced to what is not univocal.

XVII. To this it is said in two ways. First: in this reply a twofold comparison was made in predications. The first is between univocals and purely equivocals, and this was made at the beginning. The second is between univocals and non-univocals, and this was made at the end. And therefore there is no contradiction. – But this reply labors under a difficulty, because the argument has not thereby been satisfied. For the force of the argument rests on this: that the univocal is related to the equivocal as one to many. But it is clear that this is true not only of purely equivocals, but of equivocals in any way whatever, or non-univocals: since one is prior not only to many simply, but also to many in a qualified sense. And thus the univocal remains prior to all non-univocals, insofar as they include some kind of multiplicity within themselves. – Therefore it seems one must reply second, that in both places a comparison was made between the same things, namely univocals and equivocals in common, or non-univocals. And yet there is no contradiction: because at the beginning the discussion concerns the resolutive reduction of a predicate into itself; but at the end, concerning the resolutive reduction of diverse predicates. For it is one thing to resolve diverse things into one, and another to resolve something into itself: there one thing is reduced into another, here one thing is distinguished into its own parts, as is evident in natural things.

To the point, then: when the discussion was of the order of different predicates, it was said that the univocal is not prior, because being (ens) is first, to which all else is reduced. But when the discussion was of the resolution of a predicate into itself, it was said that the univocal precedes the non-univocal, as one precedes many; because being itself, which is said analogically of man and white, is resolved into itself as said univocally of men, and also said univocally of whites. And this was what the force of the argument concluded. – Conclude, therefore, that in comparing different predicates with one another, the analogous precedes; but in resolving one and the same predicate into itself, the univocal precedes, as one precedes many.

The remaining points made in this reply concerning the order of agents will become clear below²³, when the action of God ad extra is treated.