Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, properly can be taken in two ways. In one way, as distinguished from commonly: and in this way animal is not said properly of man, because it is said of others. In another way, as distinguished from metaphorically: and in this way animal is said properly of man, but to flourish is not. For to be said properly is for what a name signifies to be found in that of which it is said, in itself; but to be said metaphorically is for what a name signifies to be found in that of which it is said, according to its likeness only. Here properly is taken as distinguished from metaphorically.

II. Concerning the order of these articles, a doubt arises: for the order observed in articles 2 and 3 seems to be inverted. Because, in the order of composition, the more common things are to be treated first: but it is more common for a name to be predicated of something properly speaking than substantially; since accidental names too are said properly, as is clear when we say Socrates is white.

III. To this it is briefly answered that the order of these articles is the best. It is not, however, considered according to greater and lesser community, but according to the more intimate and prior reason for doubting. For since the first question is a question whether it is, therefore the first reason for inquiring is: whether God is nameable. The second question, moreover, is clearly a question what it is, and therefore the second reason for inquiring is: what in God is nameable—namely, his substance, or a relation, or a negation, etc. But since the third question is one of that it is, therefore in the third place there must be asked: how God is named. And among these modes there is latitude: for the first looks to the very predication of the name, namely whether it is made properly or metaphorically; the second, to unity and multiplicity, namely whether it is made synonymously, etc.¹ Now it is clear that this is the order preserved in the text. It is therefore the best.

Nor is it true that to be said properly is more common than to be said substantially: rather, they stand to one another as the exceeding and the exceeded. For being said substantially can occur both properly and metaphorically: for we can signify what a thing is of things metaphorically, as the ancients did. Hence, after the determination that names are said of God substantially, it was rightly doubted whether they are said of God properly.

IV. In the body there are two parts: first, he makes a distinction; second, he answers the question. As to the first, he distinguishes those things contained in a name said of God, as follows. In names attributed to God there are two things: namely, the perfection signified, and the mode of signifying. – This distinction is proved thus. Perfections proceeding into creatures from God exist in God in a more eminent way than in creatures: therefore they contain in themselves two things, namely the perfection itself and the mode of being (essendi): therefore our concepts of God contain in themselves two things proportionally, namely the thing conceived and the mode of conceiving: therefore names attributed to God contain in themselves two things, namely the thing signified and the mode of signifying.

The antecedent is evident, together with the first consequence. But the second is proved: because we know God from these perfections, not in any manner whatever, but according to the mode in which they exist in creatures; that is, we know God from His effects in such a way that the mode of being of the effects redounds proportionally into our mode of conceiving. And thus the concept of God must be distinguished into two, not as into diverse concepts, but into one as the thing conceived, and the other as the mode, not of the thing conceived, but of the concept itself; yet this mode of the concept itself is derived from the mode of the thing conceived. The third consequence, moreover, is evident.

V. With respect to secundum, in accordance with the two members of the distinction made above, the question is answered with a single conclusion having two members. The conclusion is this: Some names said of God are said of God properly, and more and priorily with respect to the thing signified; but none with respect to the mode of signifying. – This last part is proved: because they have a mode of signifying proper to creatures. But the first part is left as self-evident from what was said in qu. IV².

VI. In response to the first, note that in the very signification of the name is understood of its proper formal signification, not of its material and common one. For wisdom does not signify a quality except on account of the matter, and as something common: for from its formal and proper signification, neither quality nor habit nor anything else is conveyed, but only the ratio of ordering, judging, and governing, etc.; which can be substance and accident, habit and act, etc.