Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, a name is said, that is, it is attributed according to its formal signification: and not according to what it copulates, or for what it supposits, etc. Substantially, as distinguished from accidentally, calling an accident everything that is outside the being (esse) of a thing: for thus man is said substantially of Socrates, while capable of discipline and white are said accidentally of the same. Nor should you restrict the question: but, in accordance with the breadth of the title, whether a name is said substantially completely, as the ultimate difference or definition, or substantially incompletely, as animal with respect to man, all of this falls under the present question, when we ask: Whether any name is said substantially of God.

II. In the body there are five parts: first, he sets forth in which names this question has its place; second, he reports two opinions; third, he rejects them; fourth, he answers the question in the affirmative; fifth, he shows what is the meaning when names of this kind are attributed to God. And the distinction of the parts is evident in the text.

III. As to the first, he says two things. First, that there are three kinds of names said of God: negative ones, such as incorporeal, immeasurable, etc.; relative ones, such as Lord, end, efficient cause; and positive absolute ones, such as being, wise, living, etc. – Second, that the question does not concern the first or second kind, but only the third: for it is evident that those signify a pure negation, or a relation, just as white signifies a pure quality.

IV. With respect to the second, there are two opinions. The first is that of those who hold that these names are said of God negatively; the second, relatively. And this is evident.

V. As to the third, it is clearly argued against both opinions at once in three ways. In the second argument, however, note that it is founded on that great maxim: Every first name is said of that of which it is said formally, rather than of the others, however it may be said of them otherwise.

VI. As to the fourth point, the responsive conclusion to the question is affirmative: Names of this kind are said of God substantially, though imperfectly. – It is proved. Names signify God as known by our intellect: therefore as known from creatures: therefore as creatures are assimilated to him: therefore as the supereminent principle whose form is participated defectively by them: therefore substantially.

The antecedent is clear from I Periherm.¹, together with the first and second consequences. The third, however, is self-evident. The fourth is proved from Question IV: because it is not by a specific or generic likeness that the divine substance is represented; therefore analogically, as principle, etc. The last follows manifestly: for if the quod quid est of every creature is a certain diminished likeness of the most simple divine substance, then the divine substance itself must be participated, represented, known, named, and signified, etc.

VII. As for the fifth, the sense of the propositions is made clear from what has been said, by stating explicitly that when we say God is good, the sense is that which we call goodness in creatures is in God, and this in a higher manner.

Note two things here. First, that the word est denotes a formal habitude: so that what is intended is, est in Deo formaliter. Thus Deus est corpus, etc., cannot be expounded. – Second, that the words et hoc altiori modo are not to be taken as part of what is signified. For when we say Deus est bonus, the goodness of God and its eminence are not signified, but goodness only: the eminence, however, is intimated by the mode of signifying, as is clear from the following article. So that, in saying Deus est bonus, from what is signified we have only that what is formally conveyed by the name boni is in God formally. And since the name boni conveys goodness in concretion, which has no place in God, because it is an imperfect mode; therefore it is intimated that goodness is in God in a more eminent mode than it is signified, because it is signified as it is in creatures.

VIII. In response to the first, note that, among the excellent doctors, it is not the same thing to signify what a thing is and to be a substantial name: for the first requires perfection, the second does not, as is said in the text. And the root of this is that they speak properly of the quid in a posterioristic and metaphysical manner, which cannot do without proper terms, and not topically, which is content with common ones.

IX. In response to the second, the distinction is made, in other words: to import process in two ways, either formally or originatively.