Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

A clear title. – In the body, a single conclusion, responsive to the question in the affirmative, with a modification. The conclusion is: God can be named by us from creatures, but not as He is in Himself.

The conclusion is proved with respect to both parts at once. Words are signs of the intellect's conceptions, and the intellect's conceptions are likenesses of things: therefore words are referred to the things to be signified through the mediation of the intellect's conceptions. Therefore, in whatever way something is understood by us, in that same way can it be named by us. Therefore God can be named by us from creatures, and not as He is in Himself.

The antecedent is from the Philosopher, I Periherm. The consequences, both the first and the second, are left as known. But the last is proved, with respect to the first part of the consequent, because God is known by us through creatures in three ways, as was said; and with respect to the second part, because God in this life cannot be seen by us through essence. – And for clarity of the terms, there is added in the text an exemplary declaration from the opposite side, how names do not signify God according as He is in Himself. And he intends that to signify a thing according as it is, is to signify the term of its nature, as "man" (which is impossible here concerning God), since all names signify either terms of common things, or of negations, or of relations, etc., or of composites of these, as is clear inductively.

II. Concerning this part a doubt arises. Scotus, indeed, in I, distinction XXII, single question, discussing this proposition taken as assumed, as a thing is understood, so also is it named, distinguishes it: namely, with respect to the imposition of the name, or with respect to the use of the imposed name. And he says three things. First, that with respect to imposition it seems false. He proves this as follows. Substance is not understood by us distinctly in its own nature, and yet it is signified. Therefore we can impose names signifying more distinctly than we understand. But the consequence, and the antecedent as to its second part, is proved: because, for example, when the accidents and properties of a stone are known, we impose a name upon that substance of the stone, intending that it be signified by the name; and yet we do not know it distinctly. – Second, that with respect to use it is simply false. – Third, that the wayfarer can use many names expressing the divine essence under the aspect of the divine essence itself. These two are proved: because it is likely that in sacred

The writing of names of this kind, as the Jews say of the name tetragrammaton, etc., whether these names were imposed by God or by an angel.

III. To these objections, insofar as they do not accord with the truth, a reply must be given. And to the first indeed, namely that it is not possible to impose a name signifying more distinctly than what is conceived. The cause is given in the text: because words signify things only through the mediation of a conception of the intellect; therefore signification is caused by the conception; therefore distinct signification presupposes a distinct conception, and confused a confused one, and greater a greater, and lesser a lesser, etc. Why, then, should these be excepted from this most universal rule of cause and caused? – But its proof is worth nothing: both because the antecedent is false as to its first part, and because as to its second part it is badly proven. For I say—and we find this to be so by experience—that when accidents are known, we know that some thing underlies them, and that it exists and subsists in itself, etc.: and such a thing will never be signified more than it is known. For if it is known confusedly, as in the example given, it will never be signified except confusedly. From such a name no one will ever understand more than the one imposing it perfectly apprehended: although, by his own better natural ability, once he has come to know the meaning of some name in reality, he may come to know other things by discursive reasoning, just as we draw conclusions from principles. But this does not happen by the force of the name's signification. Hence Scotus himself, in that same place, seems finally to leave the first claim in doubt.

On the second point, however, Scotus speaks well: for we experience that we use many names with confused knowledge before we arrive at a distinct knowledge of those terms.

But concerning the third point: because, as experience testifies, we have no such divine name; and again, because such names would be given to men in vain, since we cannot know God in Himself; and because this novelty is asserted without sufficient authority; and because Dionysius says in Book I of the Celestial Hierarchy that it is impossible for us to be illumined by the divine ray in any other way than when it is hidden under a variety of sacred veils — it seems to me that Scotus's statement is simply false, and one must say, as the text states, that God in this life is not nameable by us except from creatures; and this both with respect to the imposition of names and their use.

IV. In response to the second objection, the novice might wonder how the abstract signifies in the manner of that-which, and not in the manner of a subsistent: since it is a substantive noun, as whiteness, yet it is proper to a substantive noun to signify in the manner of a substance.

To this it is briefly said that the fallacy of the Consequent occurs here, by affirming determinately from the mode of substance to this mode. For a substantive noun signifies in the manner of a substance, that is, as standing per se, that is, in isolation: and not in the manner of a subsistent being.

And if it is urged that snubness also signifies curvature in the nose, and consequently does not signify the form alone, but with its subject: the answer is that here there is no question of signification and what follows upon it, but of the mode of signifying. Now the abstract and the concrete agree in signification: for each signifies the pure form, as is said concerning the white in the Categories¹, and from the nature of the form signified it is necessary that each be conjoined to the subject of the form signified. But in their mode of signifying they differ: for the concrete imports the subject and the composite by its mode of signifying, as its first significate (in token whereof we say that snub is a curved nose, expressing the nose before the curvature); whereas the abstract either does not import the subject by its mode of signifying (but from the nature of the thing signified), or, if it does import it, it imports it not principally but last; hence conversely we say that snubness is the curvature of the nose.

It signifies, therefore, the abstract in the manner of a substance in this respect: because it signifies that thing per se, that is, not with another, by reason of its mode of signifying; and this either simply or principally. The concrete, however, by reason of its mode of signifying, principally signifies something else together with the thing first signified. — Hence the saying of Avicenna, censured by Averroes in Book V of the Metaphysics, commentary XIV, is true if it is understood with respect to the mode of signifying. Nor does Averroes's argument conclude the opposite: for it holds only in what is signified formally by the force of the signification itself.

In the title, a name is said, that is, it is attributed according to its formal signification: and not according to what it copulates, or for what it supposits, etc. Substantially, as distinguished from accidentally, calling an accident everything that is outside the being (esse) of a thing: for thus man is said substantially of Socrates, while capable of discipline and white are said accidentally of the same. Nor should you restrict the question: but, in accordance with the breadth of the title, whether a name is said substantially completely, as the ultimate difference or definition, or substantially incompletely, as animal with respect to man, all of this falls under the present question, when we ask: Whether any name is said substantially of God.

II. In the body there are five parts: first, he sets forth in which names this question has its place; second, he reports two opinions; third, he rejects them; fourth, he answers the question in the affirmative; fifth, he shows what is the meaning when names of this kind are attributed to God. And the distinction of the parts is evident in the text.

III. As to the first, he says two things. First, that there are three kinds of names said of God: negative ones, such as incorporeal, immeasurable, etc.; relative ones, such as Lord, end, efficient cause; and positive absolute ones, such as being, wise, living, etc. – Second, that the question does not concern the first or second kind, but only the third: for it is evident that those signify a pure negation, or a relation, just as white signifies a pure quality.

IV. With respect to the second, there are two opinions. The first is that of those who hold that these names are said of God negatively; the second, relatively. And this is evident.

V. As to the third, it is clearly argued against both opinions at once in three ways. In the second argument, however, note that it is founded on that great maxim: Every first name is said of that of which it is said formally, rather than of the others, however it may be said of them otherwise.

VI. As to the fourth point, the responsive conclusion to the question is affirmative: Names of this kind are said of God substantially, though imperfectly. – It is proved. Names signify God as known by our intellect: therefore as known from creatures: therefore as creatures are assimilated to him: therefore as the supereminent principle whose form is participated defectively by them: therefore substantially.

The antecedent is clear from I Periherm.¹, together with the first and second consequences. The third, however, is self-evident. The fourth is proved from Question IV: because it is not by a specific or generic likeness that the divine substance is represented; therefore analogically, as principle, etc. The last follows manifestly: for if the quod quid est of every creature is a certain diminished likeness of the most simple divine substance, then the divine substance itself must be participated, represented, known, named, and signified, etc.

VII. As for the fifth, the sense of the propositions is made clear from what has been said, by stating explicitly that when we say God is good, the sense is that which we call goodness in creatures is in God, and this in a higher manner.

Note two things here. First, that the word est denotes a formal habitude: so that what is intended is, est in Deo formaliter. Thus Deus est corpus, etc., cannot be expounded. – Second, that the words et hoc altiori modo are not to be taken as part of what is signified. For when we say Deus est bonus, the goodness of God and its eminence are not signified, but goodness only: the eminence, however, is intimated by the mode of signifying, as is clear from the following article. So that, in saying Deus est bonus, from what is signified we have only that what is formally conveyed by the name boni is in God formally. And since the name boni conveys goodness in concretion, which has no place in God, because it is an imperfect mode; therefore it is intimated that goodness is in God in a more eminent mode than it is signified, because it is signified as it is in creatures.

VIII. In response to the first, note that, among the excellent doctors, it is not the same thing to signify what a thing is and to be a substantial name: for the first requires perfection, the second does not, as is said in the text. And the root of this is that they speak properly of the quid in a posterioristic and metaphysical manner, which cannot do without proper terms, and not topically, which is content with common ones.

IX. In response to the second, the distinction is made, in other words: to import process in two ways, either formally or originatively.

In the title, properly can be taken in two ways. In one way, as distinguished from commonly: and in this way animal is not said properly of man, because it is said of others. In another way, as distinguished from metaphorically: and in this way animal is said properly of man, but to flourish is not. For to be said properly is for what a name signifies to be found in that of which it is said, in itself; but to be said metaphorically is for what a name signifies to be found in that of which it is said, according to its likeness only. Here properly is taken as distinguished from metaphorically.

II. Concerning the order of these articles, a doubt arises: for the order observed in articles 2 and 3 seems to be inverted. Because, in the order of composition, the more common things are to be treated first: but it is more common for a name to be predicated of something properly speaking than substantially; since accidental names too are said properly, as is clear when we say Socrates is white.

III. To this it is briefly answered that the order of these articles is the best. It is not, however, considered according to greater and lesser community, but according to the more intimate and prior reason for doubting. For since the first question is a question whether it is, therefore the first reason for inquiring is: whether God is nameable. The second question, moreover, is clearly a question what it is, and therefore the second reason for inquiring is: what in God is nameable—namely, his substance, or a relation, or a negation, etc. But since the third question is one of that it is, therefore in the third place there must be asked: how God is named. And among these modes there is latitude: for the first looks to the very predication of the name, namely whether it is made properly or metaphorically; the second, to unity and multiplicity, namely whether it is made synonymously, etc.¹ Now it is clear that this is the order preserved in the text. It is therefore the best.

Nor is it true that to be said properly is more common than to be said substantially: rather, they stand to one another as the exceeding and the exceeded. For being said substantially can occur both properly and metaphorically: for we can signify what a thing is of things metaphorically, as the ancients did. Hence, after the determination that names are said of God substantially, it was rightly doubted whether they are said of God properly.

IV. In the body there are two parts: first, he makes a distinction; second, he answers the question. As to the first, he distinguishes those things contained in a name said of God, as follows. In names attributed to God there are two things: namely, the perfection signified, and the mode of signifying. – This distinction is proved thus. Perfections proceeding into creatures from God exist in God in a more eminent way than in creatures: therefore they contain in themselves two things, namely the perfection itself and the mode of being (essendi): therefore our concepts of God contain in themselves two things proportionally, namely the thing conceived and the mode of conceiving: therefore names attributed to God contain in themselves two things, namely the thing signified and the mode of signifying.

The antecedent is evident, together with the first consequence. But the second is proved: because we know God from these perfections, not in any manner whatever, but according to the mode in which they exist in creatures; that is, we know God from His effects in such a way that the mode of being of the effects redounds proportionally into our mode of conceiving. And thus the concept of God must be distinguished into two, not as into diverse concepts, but into one as the thing conceived, and the other as the mode, not of the thing conceived, but of the concept itself; yet this mode of the concept itself is derived from the mode of the thing conceived. The third consequence, moreover, is evident.

V. With respect to secundum, in accordance with the two members of the distinction made above, the question is answered with a single conclusion having two members. The conclusion is this: Some names said of God are said of God properly, and more and priorily with respect to the thing signified; but none with respect to the mode of signifying. – This last part is proved: because they have a mode of signifying proper to creatures. But the first part is left as self-evident from what was said in qu. IV².

VI. In response to the first, note that in the very signification of the name is understood of its proper formal signification, not of its material and common one. For wisdom does not signify a quality except on account of the matter, and as something common: for from its formal and proper signification, neither quality nor habit nor anything else is conveyed, but only the ratio of ordering, judging, and governing, etc.; which can be substance and accident, habit and act, etc.

In the title, synonyms, that is, terms having entirely the same signification: so that it is the same thing to say God is wise and God is good, etc.

II. In the body, it answers the question with a single negative conclusion, thus: Names of this kind attributed to God are not synonyms.

It is proved in two ways: first, according to those two lines of argument refuted in art. 2; second, in accordance with the position we follow. The first proof is: the rationes of these names are diverse, according to diverse things denied or caused, among them; therefore they are not synonyms.

The second proof is: our intellect knows God from creatures; therefore our conceptions of God are proportionate to the perfections that proceed from God into creatures; therefore they are various and multiple, and yet corresponding to the one utterly simple God; therefore the rationes of names of this kind attributed to God are diverse; therefore such names are not synonyms. – The antecedent, together with the first consequence, is evident. The second, however, is proved by the force of proportion: for just as the same God, simply and utterly one, is represented in real being (esse reale) by many perfections, so too is he represented in intentional being (esse intentionale); which is to say, by many conceptions. The third is proved thus: because the conception itself is the ratio of the name. The last is self-evident.

III. Concerning that proposition assumed to prove the third consequence, namely the ratio signified by a name is the conception of the intellect about the thing signified, there is doubt. First, because in IV Metaphysics, text. comm. XXVIII¹, it is said that the ratio signified by a name is a definition; but it is evident that a definition is not a conception, since it is identified with what is defined. Second, because the ratio of a name belongs to second intentions, whereas the concept belongs to first intentions.

To this it is briefly said that ratio, among philosophers and theologians, in the matter at hand, can be taken in two ways, namely formally or denominatively; just as white is taken formally for whiteness, and denominatively for the thing that is white. If it is taken formally, it is thus a name of a second intention and signifies a certain relation. If denominatively, it signifies a conception and a definition, but in different ways. For a mental conception is called the ratio of a name because it is that by which the name is referred to its significate outside the soul; a definition, however, because it is that by which the meaning of the name is explicated. In the present text, moreover, it is clear that ratio is taken denominatively for a mental conception. And it was said to be signified by the name because it is signified proximately; the definition, however, is the ratio signified by the name ultimately. – And thus the solution of the objections is clear.

IV. Note here that the question of the present letter is not about things, but about names. And therefore, although the present question could perhaps have been decided from the diversity of objective formal reasons, as the Scotists do, by mixing in a matter concerning things, namely, the distinction of the divine attributes; yet the divine genius of the Author, since he learned from I Periherm.² that names are signs of the passions which are in the soul, most formally shows the diversity of signification in names from the diversity of the conceptions of the soul signified, without mixing in other difficulties concerning things. For with this decision both parts of the contradiction stand in the matter of the attributes. Wherefore, lest so great a divinity of the work be defiled, there is not to be treated here of that distinction of attributes; but let it be a special question.

V. In response to the second, note that in the many concepts two things are contained, namely their conformity to the object and their plurality. If it is asked, therefore: To the many concepts we have of a thing, say God, what corresponds in reality? one must answer that to the concepts themselves there corresponds a single thing, imitable or representable in many ways; but to the plurality of those concepts there corresponds no plurality in the object itself, but rather its eminence, by virtue of which it has that it contains in a unified way what another apprehends in a divided way. Hence to argue from the distinction of concepts to the distinction of the object is to argue from the distinction of effects to the distinction of the cause—which is plainly absurd, since the unity of a cause stands together with a multitude of effects, as is evident. And for this reason both points are touched upon in the text, when it says that to them there corresponds one being (ens) simply, represented in many ways.

VI. In response to the third, note that the proposition God is one in reality and many according to reason can be understood in two ways. In one way, as being multiple by reason subjectively, that is, that it is the subject of several concepts: and this is false, since there is a single concept in the divine intellect by which God understands himself and all things at once. In another way, objectively, that is, that it is the object of several concepts, whether actually or virtually: and thus it is true, and to the point. So that God is said to be multiple according to reason, that is, he is the object verifying actually or virtually several conceptions of him.

VII. In the same reply, note that the root of the aforesaid ³ proposition, on God’s side, is His eminent unity; but on the side of our intellect, it is its proportion to sensible things. And the meaning is that the cause of such and so great a plurality of notions concerning God, which are signified by names, is the great remoteness of our intellect from that highest unity, so that it understands in so inarticulate a way, according as the imitations of the divine are diversified in things outside. For just as outside, justice is one thing, wisdom another, etc., so also in our intellect; and this, as will become clear below ⁴, is because it is the lowest intellect. – And note that he did not say: because the intellect receives from things; but he said: because the intellect apprehends in such a manifold way, just as things represent in a manifold way. Hence, if our intellect did not receive knowledge from things, as happened in Adam, the very same thing would nonetheless follow, from the fact that the intellect is proportioned to things, as is said in the letter.

VIII. From this root, however, you who look to others can easily derive the root of the plurality of rationes concerning God. For if so great a plurality arises from the supreme unity of the object with respect to an intellect so remote, a lesser plurality will arise from that same object with respect to an intellect nearer; but there will be no plurality with respect to what is nearest. And since it is established that the nearest intellect is not one that is in any way distinguished from what is understood, only the divine intellect remains, with respect to which, from that supreme unity, no plurality of concepts arises. The root, therefore—speaking absolutely and universally, and not merely with respect to us—of why God is multiple by way of ratio is His perfect unity and the finitude of created intellects. – We have said this here because it follows from this text: not because it pertains to this question, which concerns the Names, and consequently only those things that depend on us.

In the title, "ly" univoce is taken as in the Categories¹ univocals are defined; nor is it necessary to add or subtract anything, as is also said at the end of this article.

In four parts: first, he answers the question negatively, that it is not univocally; second, that neither is it purely equivocally²; third, he affirms that it is analogically³; fourth, he compares analogy with the two aforementioned⁴.

II. As to the first point, the conclusion is negative: Common names applied to God and creatures are not said of them univocally. – It is proved thus. Every inadequate effect receives in a divided and multiplied way what exists in its cause simply and in one and the same manner: therefore it receives the likeness of the agent not according to the same ratio: therefore creatures participate in a divided way, etc., in the perfections which exist unitedly in God. Therefore names that import a perfection, when said of creatures, signify something distinct from other things; but when said of God, they do not signify something as distinct. Therefore such names, when said of creatures, comprehend the thing signified; but when said of God, they leave the thing signified as exceeding the signification of the name. Therefore such names are not said of God and other things according to the same ratio. Therefore they are not said univocally of God and creatures.

The antecedent is declared by the example of the sun and lower things: such that the declaration is not so much exemplary as proportional. From which proportionality also, the first consequence, once made manifest, is left behind along with the second. The third, however, with the rest, is left in the text as self-evident in itself, because from what is signified formally to the signs as such, with respect to the unity and plurality of the concept, it is clear that the process is optimal. Yet the consequent itself of the third consequence and the fourth is declared exemplarily in the word wise, which is a name common to God and to many creatures.

III. Concerning the first inference a doubt arises for novices, because it does not seem to hold: since many things are of the same kind in genus, or at least univocal by logical univocity, of which we are speaking, in inferior and celestial bodies; and yet these inferior things are related to celestial bodies as to causes that have in unity what is participated here in a divided way. – The antecedent is evident: for corporeity and diaphaneity and light etc. are of the same rational character here and there.

IV. To this it is briefly said that that greatest assumption in the antecedent, from which the diversity of the concept is inferred, is understood formally, that is, in this way: so that the divided participation of what is simply and unitedly in the cause always excludes identity of concept, even logical identity, from that participated thing itself; but not from other things, if there are any others common to effect and cause not by virtue of such participation. Now this is how things stand in the objections brought forward. For diaphaneity, and similar things, are found dividedly in the higher beings, just as they are here. Corporeity, however, if it exists there unitedly, namely without composition of matter and form, as Averroes thinks ⁵, is not said univocally of those beings and of these. Hence Averroes himself denies, on Porphyry ⁶, that body is a genus of the category of Substance, and posits composite body, etc. But if even there it results from matter and form, then it is already evident that it is had dividedly even there. – Therefore say that the heavenly bodies, insofar as they have something united which is participated here dividedly, as seems to be the case with their active powers, all or many of which they possess in a single nature of light, have nothing of the same concept as these.

V. Concerning the third consequence, a difficulty arises that is not small, from two heads. First, that the consequence is worthless, since it proceeds from the conditions of things to the conditions of names. For it is evident that our intellect, on which names depend, is naturally suited to divide what is united; and therefore it can understand and signify a perfection, say wisdom, without understanding and signifying its conditions which it has in reality, say that it is identical with other perfections, or not identical. Hence these consequences are worthless: Wisdom in creatures is a thing distinct from justice, etc., therefore the name of wisdom, said of creatures, signifies wisdom together with its distinction from justice, etc.; just as this does not hold: Quantity in mixed bodies is a thing conjoined with color, therefore the name quantity, said of mixed bodies, signifies quantity conjoined with color, etc.

Second, because, whatever may be said of the inference, the consequent proposition itself, on which the present position rests, is false in itself. And this is made evident by the following reason. The name wisdom, taken absolutely, either signifies finite wisdom, or infinite wisdom, or both; or neither of these, but abstracts from finitude and infinitude. Not the first: for then this would be false, God is wise. Not the second: for then this would be false, man is wise. Nor the third: for then both of the aforementioned propositions would be false. Therefore the fourth. And if so, then in saying man is wise and God is wise, the term wise does not signify a distinct thing more in the first than in the second, since it is predicated simply and absolutely in both, without any addition. – And it is confirmed: because the author of this position seems to have been deceived here in that he did not distinguish between the formal signification of the name and its material supposition. For although, when I say man is wise, the term wise, by reason of the subject matter, does predicate a distinct thing, etc.—namely, because wisdom itself in man is a thing distinct from his act of being (esse), etc.—nevertheless, by its formal signification it predicates nothing other than that he is wise, whether or not it exists there as a distinct reality.

VI. For the clarification of these points, three things must be done: first, to explain the terms assumed; second, to exclude the false sense of this process⁷; third, to make manifest the true one⁸. – Know that to signify something as distinct, or under the aspect of the distinct, happens in two ways. In one way, formally, that is, to signify something and its distinction from other things: and thus it is not understood in the text. In another way fundamentally, or causally: and this is to signify something as grounding its distinction from other things. And thus it is taken in our proposition. For the text intends that wisdom, and other things of this kind, signify in creatures not the quiddity of wisdom and its distinction from justice, but the quiddity of wisdom as grounding its diversity from justice. Now this, as will be shown below⁹, wisdom has from nothing else than from its own quiddity: and therefore, to signify wisdom as distinct from other things is nothing else than to signify wisdom as a quiddity. – But when you hear the words from other things, do not understand "from all the rest": for in that way every name, even in God, would signify something distinct, nor would there be any difference in this respect between the divine names and those of creatures. But understand from other perfections simply, or from other things with which it could possibly be found together, as the text plainly indicates.

VII. Now this process can have two senses. The first is that from the identity and distinction real of the perfections there is inferred a difference of names, in respect of signifying the perfection as distinct, and signifying it not as distinct. And according to this sense the objections raised proceed. But this sense is false, as was proved by way of objection; nor is it intended in the text. – The other sense, however, is that from the identity and distinction formal of the perfections there is inferred the aforementioned difference of names. And this sense is intended, true, formal, and concluding what is intended.

To make this evident, know that two perfections are joined, for the purpose at hand, in two ways: namely, identically and formally. Identically, as if we were to suppose that Socrates' wisdom and his justice are one and the same thing. – Formally, however, it can be imagined in two ways. First, if we suppose that the proper formal account of wisdom and the proper formal account of justice are one formal account, such that that one account is not a third account, but is only the proper formal account of wisdom and of justice. And an identity of this kind is simply impossible, involving two contradictories. For if those two are not one third account, then they are not one account: since no account is the ground of formal identity of one to another, given that they are not one in themselves. And if they are one account, then they are one third account: because one thing in itself is not the other.

Second, it can be understood if we suppose that the formal reason of wisdom and the formal reason of justice are contained eminently in one formal reason of a higher order, and are formally identified. And this identity is not only possible, but is in fact the case for all perfections in God. For we must not think that the proper formal reason of wisdom exists in God; rather, as the text states, the reason of wisdom in God is not proper to wisdom itself, but is proper to something higher, namely to the deity, and is common, by an eminent formality, to justice, goodness, power, etc. For just as the thing that is wisdom and the thing that is justice in creatures are elevated into one thing of a higher order, namely the deity, and therefore are one thing in God; so too the formal reason of wisdom and the formal reason of justice are elevated into one formal reason of a higher order, namely the proper reason of the deity, and they are one formal reason in number, containing both reasons eminently—not merely virtually, as the reason of light contains the reason of heat, but formally, as the reason of light contains the reason of the heating virtue. Hence with the utmost subtlety the divine genius of St. Thomas, from the fact that the reason of wisdom in God is formally not only wisdom itself but also justice, and consequently is the proper reason not of wisdom but of some third thing, whereas in creatures it is formally the very proper reason of wisdom, inferred: Therefore the reason of wisdom in God is one thing, and that of wisdom in creatures another; and hence the common name is not predicated of them according to one reason. That this may be perceived more clearly, let us offer examples. For if it is asked: what is man insofar as he is wise? it will be answered that he is one who orders or directs, or something of that sort. But if it is asked: what is God insofar as He is wise? the answer must be something eminently possessing within itself being as one who orders or directs. Where it is manifestly clear that, although the term wise is a common name of God and man, nevertheless the reason of each according to that name is not entirely the same; indeed, neither is it that reason nor those others, but rather a certain higher reason. And this is what is said in the text, acutely perceived.

VIII. To the objections on the other side¹⁰ it is said. And to the first it is said that this argument does not proceed from the conditions of things to the conditions of names, absolutely; but from the diversity of the formal ratio signified by the name in this and in that, in order to destroy the univocity of the name. For as is clear from what has been said, not from identity or diversity real, but from the identity and diversity formal of the perfections among themselves, does the text proceed. Nor would it even have been permitted, from the formal identity of the perfections among themselves, to destroy the univocity of the name, unless from the formal identity of those things which in themselves are not the same, it were established that there follows a third ratio higher than all such diverse things. For from the fact that there is only a third ratio, it immediately becomes clear that there is a formal distinction between the elevated perfection and the non-elevated one; or between that which is formally identified with others and that which is not formally identified with others.

To the second it is said that the argument presupposes that the name of wisdom, taken absolutely, not as signifying a species of quality, but taken transcendentally, signifies one formal concept simply and absolutely. But this is precisely what is here inquired into and disputed, and it is concluded to be false: for it signifies one formal concept according to analogy, and not simply. How, however, one concept according to analogy is predicated of many things has been treated at length by us in the treatise On the Analogy of Names¹¹. – Hence, to the question raised, it would have to be said that the name imports both wisdoms, but not after the manner of a univocal; and therefore the inference is worthless, since it presupposes this.

In confirmation it is said that when I say God is wise, the term wise, by its formal signification, imports a wisdom formally identical with justice, etc.; indeed, to speak more correctly, it signifies not wisdom, but something prepossessing eminently the ratio of wisdom¹². But when I say man is wise, the term wise predicates the very ratio of wisdom; as is clear from the answers that must be given to those asking what is God insofar as he is wise? and what is man insofar as he is wise? For that which the name signifies formally is what is answered to one asking: what is A insofar as it has that name? The Author, therefore, was not deceived, but perceived most formally the formal ratio of univocals, according to Aristotle's definition.

IX. Against the aforesaid conclusion¹³ Scotus, in I, dist. III, qu. I et III, et dist. VIII, qu. III, argues in many ways. First, because names of this kind have a certain common concept, even while doubt remains concerning the concepts of God and creature. – Second, because metaphysical processes use one formal ratio in such cases, and by removing from it all conditions of imperfection, attribute it to God. – Third, because otherwise God would not be naturally knowable through any simple concept: since that concept would be contained neither essentially nor virtually in anything shining forth in the phantasm. – Fourth, because every comparison is in something univocal in some degree, as is clear from VII Physics¹⁴: for it is evident that God is a more perfect being than the creature.

X. And although these matters have been treated at length in the commentaries on De Ente et Essentia¹⁵, nevertheless a brief answer is now given.

To the first, indeed: that argument concludes nothing other than the otherness of the concept of wisdom, for example, in common, from the wisdom of God and the wisdom of the creature. But to infer from this, therefore a univocal concept, is the sophism of the Consequent: since an analogous concept is also other than its inferiors. Yet not in that mode of otherness by which a univocal concept is other than the things univocated by it: because this one is other as cut off from them, but that one as containing them, as we have written at length in the treatise De Analogia Nominum¹⁶.

To the second, it is said that the metaphysical processes use one ratio simply at the beginning of inquiry; but at the end, they use a ratio one not simply, but by analogy: for thus the ratio of wisdom is one, when it has been stripped of its imperfections. Hence there is not the same reason, as Scotus objects, concerning stone and wisdom: because the ratio of stone can neither at the beginning nor at the end of inquiry remain one analogically, preserved formally in God and in stone: because the ratio of stone always includes imperfection.

To the third, it is said that God is knowable by a simple concept contained in the object shining forth in the phantasm, participatively or imitatively. Nor must He be contained essentially or virtually: for a third mode is given.

To the fourth, then, it is said that comparison takes place also in the analogical, which is the mean between the univocal and the equivocal: and therefore the assumption is denied. For when it is said, God is a more perfect being than a creature, the comparison is made in the ratio of being, one by analogy, and thus common to both, as we have taught elsewhere¹⁷.

XI. As to the second¹⁸, the conclusion is negative: Names of this kind are not said of God and other things in a purely equivocal manner. – It is proved thus. If they were said equivocally, nothing could be known or demonstrated about God from creatures: but this is against the Philosopher and the Apostle: therefore. – The consequence is proved: because the fallacy of Equivocation would creep in. The destruction of the consequent is evident.

XII. Two things must be noted here. First is the word purely. For the text does not say absolutely that they are not equivocal: but with a qualification it says that they are not purely equivocal. This qualification was added because, in truth, analogues are comprehended under equivocals, which are defined in the Categories, ¹⁹ For equivocals are found in multiple ways. Some are those whose name is common, and whose account according to that name is wholly different: and these are called purely equivocal; and of these the text here speaks. But others are those whose name is common, and whose account according to that name is different in some respect: and these are found in many ways, and comprehend under themselves the analogues, as we have shown elsewhere.²⁰

According to it is: the word "nothing" as placed in the consequent does not stand for nothing simply. For, given that all such names were equivocal, we could still know that God is Creator, and above all things, and that He is not a body, etc. But it stands for nothing formally common to God and creatures, namely being (ens), act, good, wise, etc.: for none of these could be known of God, but the fallacy of Equivocation would always be incurred, as is evident.

XIII. As to the third point²¹, the affirmative answer to the question is this: Whatever names are common to God and creatures are said of them according to an analogy of one to another, that is, of creature to God. – The phrase of one to another is explained by distinguishing the analogy of names: namely, either it is according to a proportion of certain things among themselves, and this is called of one to another; or according to a proportion of certain things not among themselves, but to a third, and this is called of two to a third, or of many to one. Examples appear in the text.

The conclusion is then proved. As to the first part, by the argument from division a divisione: which is why the text says: Dicendum est igitur etc. As to the second part, thus. We cannot name anything except from creatures; therefore names common to both are said according to the order of one thing to the other. As to the third part, because God is the cause in which the perfections of all things preexist.

XIV. Remember here that we set forth examples, not because the matter is so, but so that learners may understand. For being is not analogous to God and creatures by extrinsic denomination, as healthy is; but in this the likeness holds, that in both cases there is analogy by reason of the order of two things to one another, although dissimilarly here and there. For between God and creature there is a formal imitative likeness (which is also touched upon in the text, when creatures are said to be ordered to God as to a cause, in which all perfections pre-exist); but between a healthy animal and urine there is no likeness, only a relation of signification. And therefore there the analogical community is according to formal predication; here, however, properly speaking it is a community of attribution to one thing according to any predication whatsoever, whether extrinsic or intrinsic, etc.

XV. As to the fourth²², the conclusion is: This mode of predication is intermediate between the univocal and the equivocal. – It is proved by the argument from definition to the thing defined: here there is not one ratio simply, nor are they wholly diverse, but the same in a certain respect and diverse in a certain respect. For it signifies diverse proportions to one thing: and therefore, by reason of the diverse proportions, there is a diversity in a certain respect; but by reason of the one thing to which, or in respect of which, those diverse proportions are made, it is one in a certain respect, as is clear from the example of healthy, etc. Therefore. – If you wish to understand this matter fully, consult the oft-cited little work On the Analogy of Names.

XVI. In response to the first, a difficulty arises: because the end of the response contradicts its beginning. For at the beginning it is said that equivocals are reduced to the univocal in predications; but at the end it is said that in predications univocals are reduced to what is not univocal.

XVII. To this it is said in two ways. First: in this reply a twofold comparison was made in predications. The first is between univocals and purely equivocals, and this was made at the beginning. The second is between univocals and non-univocals, and this was made at the end. And therefore there is no contradiction. – But this reply labors under a difficulty, because the argument has not thereby been satisfied. For the force of the argument rests on this: that the univocal is related to the equivocal as one to many. But it is clear that this is true not only of purely equivocals, but of equivocals in any way whatever, or non-univocals: since one is prior not only to many simply, but also to many in a qualified sense. And thus the univocal remains prior to all non-univocals, insofar as they include some kind of multiplicity within themselves. – Therefore it seems one must reply second, that in both places a comparison was made between the same things, namely univocals and equivocals in common, or non-univocals. And yet there is no contradiction: because at the beginning the discussion concerns the resolutive reduction of a predicate into itself; but at the end, concerning the resolutive reduction of diverse predicates. For it is one thing to resolve diverse things into one, and another to resolve something into itself: there one thing is reduced into another, here one thing is distinguished into its own parts, as is evident in natural things.

To the point, then: when the discussion was of the order of different predicates, it was said that the univocal is not prior, because being (ens) is first, to which all else is reduced. But when the discussion was of the resolution of a predicate into itself, it was said that the univocal precedes the non-univocal, as one precedes many; because being itself, which is said analogically of man and white, is resolved into itself as said univocally of men, and also said univocally of whites. And this was what the force of the argument concluded. – Conclude, therefore, that in comparing different predicates with one another, the analogous precedes; but in resolving one and the same predicate into itself, the univocal precedes, as one precedes many.

The remaining points made in this reply concerning the order of agents will become clear below²³, when the action of God ad extra is treated.

The title, as it stands, is understood in its full breadth, as is clear from the response.

The body is in four parts: first, a rule is given for discerning of what a name is said priorly and of what posteriorly; second, the question is answered with respect to metaphorical names¹; third, with respect to those said properly, according to the opinion refuted in the second article ²; fourth, according to the truth ³.

II. As to the first point, the rule is: the analogical term is said first of that which enters into the definition of the others, and only afterwards of the others. — It is proved. In every analogical name there is one respect shared by all the rest; therefore that one is posited in the definition of the others; therefore that one is prior to the others according to the account of that analogy. This is illustrated exemplarily in the analogue healthy. — The antecedent, together with the first consequence, is proved no otherwise. The second consequence, however, is proved: because the account which a name signifies is its definition; hence what is prior according to the definition of that name is prior according to its account—which is nothing other than that the analogical term is said first of that which defines the others, and only then of the others.

III. Concerning the antecedent and its first consequence, a doubt arises that must not be passed over. First, against the man himself: because St. Thomas himself, in Qu. de Ver., qu. II, art. XI ⁴, holds that it is not universally true that the first analogate must be posited in the concepts of the other analogates. – Second, simply. Both because from what has been said ⁵ it is clear that wisdom is said analogically of God and other things: and yet a creature is not called wise in reference to God, nor conversely, as is evident, but each is called wise absolutely. And because in the concept of man as wise, the wisdom of God is not contained; nor in the concept of God as He is wise is the wisdom of man contained. Therefore.

IV. To this it is briefly answered that analogues are found in two ways. For some signify the very respects to the first analogue, as is clear in the case of "healthy". But others signify only the foundations of those respects, as is commonly found in all truly analogous names, properly and formally preserved in all the analogates. That universal proposition, therefore, assumed in the antecedent is to be understood universally according to the first mode of analogy: so that the sense is that in all names which are said of many things analogically, that is, according to diverse respects, one thing must be posited. But in the question On Truth he said the opposite concerning the second mode of analogy. And this answer is more universal than the one we assigned elsewhere, in ⁶, from Question On Truth, because this answer holds also for analogues according to proportionality, though metaphorically named: for in these too one thing is posited in the notion of another, on account of the aforesaid cause. – As for the objections raised in second place, this will be treated in the fourth part of this article, at ⁷.

V. As to the second ⁸, the responsive conclusion is: Names said metaphorically are said first of creatures than of God. – It is proved. The meaning of these names as they are said of God cannot be understood without their meaning as they are said of creatures: therefore. – The antecedent is evident by way of example: in general indeed concerning to laugh, but in our case concerning lion. The consequence, however, holds by the rule assigned ⁹.

VI. As to the third point, the hypothetical conclusion is: If common names taken properly were said of God only causally, they would be said of creatures prior to being said of God. — It is proved. Their signification, as they are said of God, could not be understood without their signification in creatures: therefore. — The antecedent is clear from the example good. The consequence holds by the rule assigned.

VII. As to the fourth point, the responsive conclusion is: Names of this kind, with respect to the thing signified, are said of God first; with respect to the imposition of the name, they are said of creatures first.

This conclusion is proved with respect to the first part. These names signify not only that God is such causally, but also essentially; and from God the perfections of other things emanate; therefore they belong to God prior to others, as regards the thing itself. – With respect to the second part, however: we know and name creatures first; therefore. It is proved secondly by a sign: they have a mode of signifying that befits creatures; therefore.

VIII. Concerning that statement in the proof of the first part of the conclusion, namely, such names signify not only that God is a cause, but that He is essentially such, a doubt arises. For if, when it is said God is good, the sense is, God is causally and formally good, there follows first that the word good, said of God, does not signify one thing, against Aristotle, IV Metaphysics¹⁰ There follows secondly the opposite of what was intended. Since the sense would be, God is the cause of the goodness of others, and possessing goodness in Himself: where it is manifestly clear that the goodness of others falls within the account of God as He is good.

IX. To this it is said that those words can be soundly understood in two ways. First, as understood of the possible separately: that is, that names of this kind can be said and verified of God in both ways, namely causally and formally, yet separately. So that the statement God is good is true taken causally, and is also true taken formally: and not that it imports both at once. And thus the opposing objection introduces no ambiguity: for it speaks of both significations together.

Second, so that they may be expounded according to both meanings at once. And thus it must be said that names of this kind are said of God formally and causally, but fundamentally. For example, when it is said God is good, it is signified not only that God is a possessor of goodness, but also that God possesses the ratio of goodness of such a kind as is naturally apt to ground the causality of the goodness of others: so that the word such does not add any mode or ratio above the divine goodness, but circumscribes that formal ratio according to which God is said to be good; for it was already defined in ¹¹ that this is not the same as ours, except by analogy. Now that ratio, although it does not import causality, nevertheless grounds it proximately. And it is similar with the others. – And thus no ambiguity remains. For according to this, names of this kind signify one thing. Nor need the goodness of a creature be co-understood: since they do not import causality formally, but fundamentally only.

Both responses are good. The first, however, is more literal, since the letter speaks against the refuted opinion; and it is evident that that opinion was speaking of the signification of causality not fundamentally but formally, as is clear.

X. Concerning the proof of the same part, and that first part itself ¹², note that when it is said that such common names are said of God first with respect to the thing signified, you are not to understand this materially but formally; so that this must be verified of the thing formally signified. And the reason assigned in the text embraces both things necessary for this: namely, both that the name is preserved formally; and that that formal ratio is prior in being to the others—which is proved because it is the cause of the others. For neither of these by itself would suffice to conclude that the names are said first of that one, as is clear inductively: for the ratio of healthy in the cause, although it is prior in being with respect to the ratio of healthy in the animal, since nevertheless the ratio of healthy is not formally in the cause, is said of the cause later; likewise the ratio of good, although it is formally in man, is nevertheless not said of him before it is said of other things.

Nor should anyone trouble you, saying: "Therefore the account is not the same for all common names of God and of other things: since there are certain perfections whose formal rationes, even though they are preserved in God, are not the cause that other things are such, because those formal rationes have no causality." Remember the authority of the Apostle, stated in the letter to Ephesians III: "I bend my knees to the Father of my Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named." For if divine paternity, which is a relation and is therefore most remote from the causality of others, is the cause of all other paternities, then a fortiori goodness is the cause of every goodness, and knowledge of every knowledge, and so with the rest. And if it be asked in what genus of cause: two genera are never lacking, namely final and formal exemplar, whatever may be said concerning efficient causality.

XI. Concerning the same part, a further doubt arises regarding man. First, because in article 2 of this question the opposite seems to have been said, when it was said that, in saying God is good, the meaning is that that which we call goodness in creatures preexists in God more eminently. Here you see plainly that in the signification of good as said of God, the goodness of the creature is contained; and consequently it ought to be said first of creatures. — Again, in article 5 it was said that these names are said of creatures in relation to God: therefore in the account of these names as they are said of creatures, God is contained: therefore they are said first of God, such that God is posited in the definition of the others. The opposite of this is held here, and it is clear from ¹³.

XII. To this it is briefly answered that, according to the truth, these names are said analogically, that is, proportionally, and first of God than of other things: because, since they are said formally of both, the formality in God is nevertheless prior in reality to that formality in other things. Yet it is not prior in such a way that the defining is prior to the defined: rather, it is prior as the exemplary cause is prior at least to the thing exemplified. And therefore, just as all exemplified things are such in relation to the exemplar, so all creatures are said to be such—say, good—in relation to the divine goodness. And just as exemplified things need not be signified with a relation to their exemplar, although they have it; so the goodness of a creature need not be signified in relation to the divine goodness, although, according to its esse, it always regards it as its exemplar. – The words of article 5, and similar ones, are therefore not refuted here, but expounded: namely, that they are understood according to esse, and not according to signification, except fundamentally, insofar as the formal rationes signified by them in creatures found an order to God as cause. – The words of article 2, however, were not adduced in order to define the signification of the name as predicated of God, but in order to expound it from what is better known to us. And therefore they offer no obstacle. For no comparison, or connotation of another, is contained in the ratio of names of this kind, whether they are said of God or of creatures: but they are said truly absolutely, since they signify absolute perfections.

And by these things the solution to the objections in the first part of the body of this article is made clear ¹⁴.

The title is clear by way of exemplar: namely Lord, Savior and Creator, etc.

In the body he does five things: first, he sets forth the responsive conclusion to the question; second, he closes off the broad way of proving the conclusion¹; third, there: Veruntamen, he undertakes the true way²; fourth, there: Cum igitur Deus, he proves the conclusion³; fifth, there: non propter aliquam, he excludes a tacit objection⁴.

II. As to the first point, the responsive conclusion to the question is affirmative and particular, namely: Certain names importing a relation to creatures are said of God from time.

III. As to the second point, know that this conclusion seems to have some difficulty because nothing new can come to God: and therefore, if names of this kind do not posit some real thing in God, there will be no difficulty; but if they posit a real thing, it would be otherwise. And since the text intends to prove the conclusion by this middle term, namely that they posit in God only a relation of reason; therefore the broadest way that immediately led to this, namely that no relation is a thing of nature, being erroneous, was at once excluded. And this is the first point.

This error is recited by Averroes, XII Metaphysics, comm. 19, and it is refuted as follows. Natural things have an order and natural relation to one another: therefore. The consequence is evident. And the antecedent (besides the evidence it has from XII Metaphysics⁵, comm. 52, where the order of the universe is said to be its good) is assumed as self-evident. – Here it would be asked whether there are real relations. But since we would exceed the limits of our purpose, let this be a special question.

IV. As to the third point, the proper way to investigate the middle term of the conclusion to be drawn is to see when a relation is a thing of nature, and when it is not; and whence it has that it is a thing of nature, and whence that it is not but only of reason. Entering upon this way, then, the argument proceeds as follows. A relation requires two extremes: therefore it can be found to be a thing of nature or of reason in three ways. Namely, either on the side of both extremes it will be a thing of reason; or on the side of both extremes it will be a thing of nature; or on the one side a thing of nature, and on the other a thing of reason.

The antecedent is clear. The consequent, however, is proved. The extremes vary in three ways: namely, that between certain things there is a relation only by reason; or in each there is some thing from which the one regards the other; or one regards the other not of the same kind. – The assumption, as to the first part, is declared from what is contained under those three modes of relatives: namely, those regarding the same, and non-beings, and those according to second intentions. Where note that in the first grade the intellect makes the extremes non-beings, but still extremes, when it distinguishes one into two: in the second, however, the intellect makes one extreme both a being and an extreme. – As to the second part, it is declared from the two genera of relatives contained under it: namely, those following upon quantity, and upon action and passion, as is clear in Book V Metaphysics. – As to the third, it is declared similarly from two, namely sense or knowledge etc., and right in relation to column: and it is confirmed by the authority of Aristotle.

V. Here many things are said against which objections are raised by others: for instance, that between being (ens) and non-being there is no real relation; and that between the mover and the movable there is a real relation; and that knowledge has a real relation to the knowable. But since these things are said here per accidens, therefore special questions will be made concerning them.

VI. Nevertheless, one very difficult doubt must not be passed over concerning those words of the text, in which it is said that the relations of reason in the other extreme, for instance the knowable and the sensible, are inasmuch as the intellect apprehends them as the terms of opposed relations, for instance of knowledge and sense. Now the doubt is twofold: first concerning the sense of the text, then concerning the thing itself. Concerning the sense, whether he intends that the correlative is required in order that the extreme be understood under the aspect of the term of the relative itself; for example, whether the relation of lordship is required in order that God be understood as Lord of the creature, inasmuch as the creature is His servant: or rather whether he intends that the correlative accompanies the understanding of the other extreme under the aspect of term; so that the relation of lordship accompanies God, apprehended as term. But it matters greatly whether he intends it in this way or in that. For in the first way, the correlative is posited as belonging to the intrinsic essence of the term, indeed the correlative is posited as the term itself: but in the second way, the correlative is posited as following upon the essence of the term. And consequently, in the first sense it is posited that the term of a relative must be a relative: but in the second, that it is an absolute being. And therefore there arises from this a difficult question: Whether the term of a relative, as such, is an absolute being or a relative one.

VII. And since this question is necessary here, and untouched, except by Scotus, by whom it seems to be badly defined, therefore it must be treated. Scotus, then, in I, distinction XXX, question I, moving, as I think, from the words of this text, so that he might carp in his usual manner, proves in several ways that the term of a relative, insofar as it is a term, is an absolute thing. And on this account, there is no need to posit a correlative to terminate the other relative, neither according to the thing nor according to reason. And he proves this fourfold.

First thus. Per se, the difference between relatives of the third mode and the others is that the others are mutual, whereas those of the third mode are not mutual. Therefore in relatives of the third mode, the terminus is an absolute thing. – The antecedent is clear from Book V of the Metaphysics, the chapter on that which is toward something⁶. The consequence, however, is self-evident: since it is not a correlative, and is a terminus, therefore the thing that terminates is an absolute thing.

Second thus. Act defines potency, and not conversely: therefore act, as term, is an absolute thing. – The antecedent is clear from Book IX of the Metaphysics⁷ The consequence is proved as follows. Act defines potency as it terminates the relation of potency to itself: and it defines it because it is prior to potency: therefore, as term, it is prior to potency. But, as correlative, it is not prior to potency: because correlatives define one another mutually, as Porphyry says⁸. Therefore, as correlative, it is not a term. Therefore it is so as an absolute thing.

Thirdly thus. A relative, as such, is defined by its correlative term: therefore the term is prior to the relative: therefore the term is not itself the correlative. – The antecedent is evident. The first consequence holds from Book VII⁹ and Book IX Metaphysics¹⁰: for there the priority of substance with respect to accident, and here of act with respect to potency, is had from this, that they define those things. But the second consequence is evident: because otherwise there would be a circle in prior and posterior according to definition; which is impossible.

Fourth, thus. In relations of the third mode, one extreme has no relation except while it is actually considered: and it terminates the relation of the other extreme to itself, with no intellect considering it, indeed even while it does not exist: therefore it terminates by reason of something absolute, and not by reason of a relation co-thought along with it.

These are Scotus's motives, subtle enough. And he thought them effective, so much so that he asserts their conclusion to be true.

VIII. But in order that it may be known how far this opinion is from the truth, we must begin with the text of Book V of the Metaphysics Metaph.¹¹ on which it grounded itself. For it erred twice over in that text. First, because he supposes that that text is to be understood of the extremes, or foundations, of relatives: so that Aristotle wished to say that certain extremes are called relative because of the relations they have to one another, while others are so called because of a relation existing in one extreme only. That this is against the sense, indeed the very words, of Aristotle is evident as follows. Aristotle there¹² explicitly says he is making a distinction among those things which are relative in themselves. But it is clear that the foundations of relations are not relative except accidentally, as is expressly stated there¹³. Therefore that text is not understood of things denominated relatively, but of the relatives themselves, that is, of things said ad aliquid. Nor can that text be saved in any other way.

Second he errs in the difference he assigns. For in that text it is not said that some things are mutual relatives and others are not, as Scotus dreamed; rather, the difference is assigned in the cause or reason of being ordered toward something else. Thus the text affirms that even relatives of the third mode are, on both sides, ordered toward something else; but it places the difference in this: that in relatives of the first and second modes, the reason why they are ordered toward something else is that each is this very thing, namely to be ordered toward another; whereas in relatives of the third mode, on the side of one extreme, the reason why it is ordered toward something else is not this very thing, namely to be ordered toward another, but rather that another is ordered toward it¹⁴. Where it is plainly evident that the whole difference consists in the reason of being (esse) ordered toward something else, and not in being mutual or non-mutual.

IX. And since that text is the foundation of the theologians writing speculatively on the matter of this article, therefore, for greater clarity, it must be examined, as follows. That text implies two contradictories: therefore. – The antecedent is made manifest. The text speaks of those things that are in themselves relative, and denies of some of them that this very thing which is, is ordered toward another: therefore it denies the definition of the thing defined, or what is equivalent, on the subjective side, of what is defined per se. The antecedent is clear for both parts in that text ¹⁵. For he says: the knowable and the sensible, and other things of this kind, are per se relative; and that they are not said to be relative because they themselves are toward another, but because other things are said to be toward them. The consequence is clear from the definition of the relative, given by Aristotle himself in the Categories¹⁶. And since this contradiction is manifest, it seems it must be said¹⁷ that Aristotle speaks of the relative according to its foundations, when he says: they themselves are not toward another, but other things are toward them.

X. And this paralogism, as I think, retained in mind, deceived all who have erred in this text. For its solution, know that, because the metaphysician treats of relatives as they are per se parts of being, that is, as they are real beings, therefore this distinction is to be understood of relatives insofar as they are real beings: and not of them taken as they abstract from real being, that is, insofar as they signify ad, without regard to their esse, just as they are defined in the Categories (and for this reason this distinction is omitted there). Among relatives therefore per se, the distinction is posited with respect to the real esse which they posit (not which they suppose), in this: that some relatives are such that they are real beings because they themselves are in the nature of things such beings as are ordered to another; but others are not real beings because they themselves are in the nature of things ordered to another, but for this reason alone can be numbered among real things, because other real things are said of them. So that the distinction consists in this: among the per se relatives, some are real relatives by intrinsic denomination or predication; but others by extrinsic denomination; for by the relative reality of another, they too are reckoned among real relatives. And according to this sense agrees the common saying, namely, that from this text it is held that not all relatives are mutual with respect to reality.

Nor is it an obstacle if it be objected that the text makes no mention of real esse. For it is presupposed that the text speaks of such esse, from the fact that it belongs to the metaphysician to treat of things insofar as they are parts of real being; and consequently, of relations insofar as they are toward another in reality, and not insofar as they are understood as toward another.

And from this it is clear that there is no contradiction¹⁸. For the definition is not denied of the thing defined; rather, it is intimated that that definition belongs to that which is toward another, whether it be a real being or a being of reason. Nor is it denied of that which is toward another; rather, it is denied by some that such a thing exists in the nature of things as being toward another—yet this is compatible with its being formally, in virtue of this very thing that they are, toward another, as their definition requires. The argument therefore equivocates. – It is therefore singular to beings related in the third mode that one is in reality toward another precisely because the other is toward it.

XI. From these points, however, the answer to the question is easily evident, as far as relatives of the third mode are concerned. But so that a universal doctrine may be had, know that by the term terminus, in this context, is understood that to which the relative is said, and which must be posited in the definition of the relative: for Scotus himself concedes that these two things belong to the terminus. Then thus. If being (ens) as such were the terminus of a relative, it would follow first that, since in the definition of ad aliquid it is said: "those things are said ad aliquid of which the very fact that they are involves being toward something else," the word aliud would stand for an absolute thing: and thus the double, in its very being (esse), would not be toward something else, that is, toward the half; nor would the slave be toward the master, nor the father toward the son, etc. But from the Praedicamenta¹⁹ and its expositors it is established that this is false: for all say that the word aliud stands for the terminus, and in assigning it they give the correlative. Indeed the text expressly says²⁰ that the master is not said to be ad aliquid as something existing in the slave, except toward him under the aspect of slave. And Averroes says there that always that to which a relative is said must be in the category of Relation. – It would follow second that in the definition of some creature God would necessarily fall under his own proper absolute aspect. And since this is impossible, it would follow that some natural creature would remain naturally unknowable. The consequence is clear regarding passive creation, regarding the relation of the universe to God as ultimate end, etc. – It would follow third that the relative would require in its definition, on the side of the terminus, two things: namely, the correlative, and an absolute being (ens). And since from the Praedicamenta²¹ it is clear that the correlative is required as that to which the relative is said, there is no reason why that absolute being should be required. – It would follow fourth that in the divine Persons relations ad intra could not be preserved unless the Persons were posited as really distinguished in absolute beings (entia). The consequence holds: because a real relative requires a terminus really distinct from itself; therefore if the terminus of divine paternity is an absolute thing (res absoluta), then some absolute thing in the divinity is really distinguished from the Father.

It must therefore be said with the Peripatetics and the other philosophers, as far as I recall having seen, that the term of a relative and its correlative are the same: indeed, to terminate a relative is in the very account of each correlative.

XII. And to the first objection of Scotus²² the reply is already clear: for the terminus of the relative of the third mode is its correlative. And this is expressly stated in that text of Book V of the Metaphysics, where it is said there²³ of the terminus that it is of something in itself, and that something else is said of it: for this can be verified only of a correlative; therefore. But how it is also verified of the same that it is not said of another has already been shown²⁴.

To the second objection it is said that a falsehood is presupposed, namely, that the discussion there concerns act as terminating the relation of potency. For there Aristotle treats of the nature of potency and of the nature of act according to the transcendent relations by which potency essentially regards act, and such an act regards potency. And Aristotle holds that because potency cannot be understood without act, whereas act can both be understood and be without potency, as is evident in the case of pure act, therefore act is prior to potency. The objection thus proceeds from a bad understanding of the meaning of that text. — Although it may be said that relatives of this kind, one of which signifies act and the other potency, are not well assigned: and therefore they are neither simultaneous in nature nor do they define one another, etc., as Averroes said in his commentary on the Categories²⁵

To the third objection, strictly speaking, the antecedent must be denied: because, as Albert the Great taught²⁶, a relative is not defined by a term, but with reference to a term; for it does not have its esse by a term, in whatever genus of cause, but with reference to a term. The consequence, moreover, is altogether false: because the definer can be simultaneous in nature and in intellect with the thing defined. - As to the authorities of Aristotle, it is said that they hold because they speak of matter, in which there is an order between the definer and the thing defined. For wherever there must be an order between the definer and the thing defined, there the consequence holds, therefore the definer is prior; but where there is no order, priority cannot be inferred. Now among correlatives there is no order, but they are altogether simultaneous, as is clear in the Postpraedicamenta²⁷. Therefore. - And note that this objection militates against its own author, by arguing thus. Whatever may be said of the term, it is certain that in mutual relatives one is definitive of the other, and conversely: therefore prior and posterior according to definition, etc. The consequence is well known. The antecedent, however, is Porphyry's²⁸, here alleged by Scotus on his own behalf. Therefore.

Finally, as to the last objection, which frightens beginners, the solution is clear from the words of Aristotle²⁹. The antecedent is indeed denied: for in relatives of the third mode, both extremes have relation simultaneously, but dissimilarly; because one is a relative by reason of the relation that is in it toward the other, while the other is a relative by reason of the real relation of the former to itself, the relative. Nor must any other existence of this correlative be required than the existence of its counterpart: for from it, by extrinsic denomination, it too is said to be. For this is what is singular in relatives of the third mode: that a real relative is said to be toward a term that is not real formally, but only by extrinsic denomination; yet that term is real fundamentally, or with respect to its substratum or that which is denominated.

XIII. From these points, moreover, the answer is clear to the doubt raised concerning the literal sense of this text ³⁰. For since it is established that God terminates servitude only as Lord formally, because "Lord" Dominus is the proper term of the servant, it is evident that the intention of the literal sense is that the correlative must be co-understood in something, if that thing is to be understood under the aspect of a term.

Nor do the words of St. Thomas in Qu. de Potentia Dei, qu. VII, art. 10, ad 4, stand against this, where he says that to terminate the order of created servitude, which is contained within the notion of lordship, belongs to God; and he means that it belongs to God according to reality, as is clear from the argument to which he is replying. This, I say, does not stand against it, because it is understood of terminating fundamentally: for this belongs to God according to reality, just as the power of coercing subjects. And that this is what he means is made manifest from the fact that, with respect to the order toward subjects, he denies that it belongs to God: since neither formally nor fundamentally does God have that by which He could be ordered toward subjects.

XIV. As to the fourth point³¹, the conclusion proposed is proved as follows. God is outside the whole order of the universe, in such a way that creatures are ordered toward him, and not conversely: therefore creatures are really referred to God, whereas in God there is no relation to creatures except one of reason. Therefore nothing prevents certain names importing a relation from being said of God from time to time (ex tempore).

The antecedent is clear. The first consequence follows from that maxim laid down in the preceding part, namely: whenever the extremes are not of one order, and one is referred to the other, in the remainder there is no relation except of reason. Therefore, if God is outside the order, etc. The second consequence, however, is clear as self-evident.

XV. Against the argument adduced in the text for this conclusion, Scotus presses his objection in two ways in the place cited above³². First, he says, that argument begs the question. For, since God is manifestly prior to the creature, and therefore has some order as prior to posterior, to assume that there is no order in him is nothing other than to assume that God has no real order toward the creature; but this was what had to be proved. — Second, it sins, he says, according to the fallacy of the Consequent. For the negation of order does not entail the negation of relation in common, since it is not a negation of relations of equality. And yet the text, from the negation of order, denies every real relation.

Aureolus also, as you have in the XXX Distinction of the First Book³³ in Capreolus, presses against this argument. But since he assumes either motives already resolved expressly by St. Thomas, or assumes something other than this argument in its place, I judged it should be omitted.

XVI. To Scotus's objections, then, it is answered that we are laboring in equivocation. For the text speaks not of order formally, which is a relation, but of order fundamentally: so that to be of the same order formally is nothing other than to be of the same account with respect to the cause of the relation; and not to be of the same order is to be of another account. Thus only between those things is there a real relation on both sides in which there is one and the same cause for referring one thing to another. But this occurs in many ways: because in relatives of the first mode, namely those pertaining to quantity, there is specific identity in the cause; but in relatives of the second mode, namely those pertaining to action and passion, there is a quasi-specific or formal identity, since on both sides the cause is a proper perfection, though in the patient as possessed and in the agent as preserved, as Averroes taught concerning the intelligences in Book XII Metaphysics, commentary 36. But in relatives of the third mode, namely those pertaining to measure and measured, in one extreme there is no cause of its own referability to the other: and therefore it is said to be of another order with respect to the cause of the relation.

Hence it is clear that it does not beg the question. For it is not the same thing to say that in God there is no cause insofar as He is referred to a creature, although in the creature there is a cause of referring it to God, and to say that in God there is no real order to creatures: rather, the former is the cause of the latter. And therefore this argument proceeds from cause to effect. — Nor does it err with respect to what follows. Because it speaks not of order formally, but fundamentally, which must also exist even in relations of parity: for two white things of the same kind are, both simply and in respect of this, that they cause toward each other relations, of the same kind; but this is to be of the same order³⁴.

XVII. As to the fifth point³⁵, note that the intended conclusion could be impeded by two things. First, by the formal signification itself of these names, namely, if they signified in God some thing of nature: for no thing of nature can be posited in God in a temporal manner. Second, by the foundation of that reason. For given that Lord does not posit above God a relation of reason, and on this account temporality is not prohibited; yet if that relation of reason could not denominate temporally except on account of some change in the thing denominated itself, it would be necessary to say that no name of this kind can be said of God from some point in time: since in God no change is possible, but He is altogether immobile, as was said in q. IX. Therefore, since the text had already excluded the impediment arising from the formal signification; so that it might bring forward the confirmed proof of the conclusion, it excluded the impediment according to the second ground, tacitly responding to the aforementioned objection, when it said that God is said from some point in time to be Lord, for example, not on account of any change in Himself, but in the creature. And it proves this by means of a similar case.

XVIII. In reply to the fourth, note keenly that a correlative of the third mode, such as the knowable, or in the present case Lord, and the like, can be judged to be according to two genera of being: first, in the genus of being simply; second, in the genus of being in a certain respect, that is, of a being of reason. If we speak of them according to esse simply, then they are for no other reason than because their counterparts, which are terminated at them formally, are in the nature of things: so that for their esse outside the soul this is sufficient; for they are contained under this weakest mode of being. And thus to be Lord posits nothing in God, with every intellect set aside, except to terminate formally the relation of servant, which God in himself terminates subjectively, that is, as it were as the subject of the formal term. But it does indeed posit, or presuppose, something in the creature, namely the relation of servitude to God as subject, etc. Nor does this very terminating formally the relation of servitude posit anything more than the esse of the thing terminated itself: although it posits that in another way. And according to this, God is Lord anew, and without any intellect, by the sole servitude of the creature: because to be Lord posits no esse in the nature of things, except the esse of its opposite. Nor is it unfitting, in the matter of relatives, for one of the opposites to be because the other is, as Aristotle taught³⁶. And the reason is that relative opposites differ from the other opposites in this, that they posit one another simultaneously, nor is one constituted in the destruction of the other, as St. Thomas taught³⁷. — But if you should object that in the matter of relatives denomination does not take place from an extrinsic, as is determined in II Contra Gent., chap. XIII: I reply that this is true formally, but not really. For God is not called Lord from servitude formally, but from the relation of dominion, which is as it were inhering in him. But nevertheless God is called Lord, and really Lord, from the reality of servitude: because to be Lord posits no esse, except that the term is of a real servitude. And thus this denomination is formally from what is intrinsic, and really from what is extrinsic.

But if we speak of them according to esse rationis, then the esse of Lord posits in God a relation of reason. And thus it is said, and truly, that God is called Lord from lordship, which is a relation of reason. Not that there are here two relations of lordship, one outside the soul and one of reason: but because that relation of lordship, which is said to be an ens in so weak a manner, has been judged by the doctors in two ways. Sometimes according to its proper esse: and thus it was called a relation and an ens rationis only, because it has no proper esse except through reason. Sometimes according to an alien esse, namely that of its opposite, from which it somehow merits the name of ens: and thus it was called an ens, and was counted among the parts of being in V Metaphysics³⁸, because something else is said in relation to it. And because in this way it posits no esse in what is denominated, but only in what terminates it, therefore it is always and simply said of these that they posit no esse in what is denominated, for instance in God or in the knowable, except an esse of reason, which pertains to their proper esse. And note well that it is not said that they posit no esse at all, but that they posit no esse in what is denominated: for they posit esse in the terminating opposite, which suffices for their esse outside the mind.

XIX. And if you have perceived this distinction and know how to apply it, you will verify the diverse sayings of the doctors: for instance, that these relations are not beings outside the soul (for this is true according to proper being); and that they are, because they are opposed (for this is true according to alien being). And you will see that St. Thomas touched upon both in this response; Augustine too, in Book V On the Trinity, the last chapter. - You will also note that, out of compassion for novices, the Author made more use of these relations according to being of reason than according to that diminution of being not easily intelligible. - From these things it is also clear how, with no intellect considering it, God can be called formally Lord, and how only fundamentally, etc.: by distinguishing the proper or alien being of it. - And from this you have Scotus's defect, in I, dist. XXX, qu. I, believing that God is called Lord from the relation alone which is in the creature. For he posits a formal effect, namely being Lord, without a formal cause, namely the relation of lordship: which is not intelligible.

In the title, the name "nature" is taken as it is distinguished from the name both of an operation and of a perfection, as it were superadded to nature in the manner of a property.

II. In the body there is one conclusion, responsive to the question with a distinction, thus: "God" is a name of nature, as regards that to which the name is imposed; but of operation, as regards that from which it is imposed. — This conclusion is proved in the text as regards two things: namely, as regards the distinction which it contains within itself, and as regards its second part. The first part, however, is left as known.

The distinction is therefore proved as follows. Names of things known in themselves have that from which and that to which the name is imposed as one and the same; but names of things known only through others, such as effects, operations, or properties, have that from which the name is imposed other than that to which it is imposed. But the divine names are names of things of the second order. Therefore in them that from which is other, etc. Therefore the name God has something else from which, etc. — The major premise is proved: because a thing is named just as it is known. And this is made clear by the example of stone with respect to the second part, and by sensible qualities with respect to the first. The minor premise is evident from what was said in Question XII¹.

The second part of the conclusion is proved. For God is a name imposed by universal providence: therefore. — The antecedent is proved in two ways. First, from the common usage of speakers. Second, by the authority of Dionysius. And it is confirmed, in the response ² by the authority of Damascene.

A clear title. - In the body, four parts: first, he distinguishes the term communicable; second, he sets forth certain rules¹; third, he answers the question raised²; fourth, he completes the doctrine concerning the communicability of the divine names³.

II. As to the first point, communicability is posited in two ways: namely, properly, and metaphorically. And this is sufficiently clear in the text, in which each member is defined, and both are opened up by example through the name lion.

III. As to the second point, four rules are set forth for distinguishing communicable names from others, and how differently they are communicable. Two rules concern sensible things, while two concern separate forms; and thus nothing in the universe has been passed over.

First rule: Every name signifying a nature distinct from the individual is communicable properly, either according to the thing itself, or at least according to the concept. — It is proved a priori. Every form existing in an individuating supposit is in itself common in the manner just described; therefore. — The antecedent, as regards the community of the thing, is proved in the case of human nature. As regards community of concept only, it is proved from the nature of the sun as follows. The specific nature is understood by us through abstraction from the singular; therefore, to be in one or in several singulars lies outside the understanding of the specific nature; therefore, while preserving the understanding of the specific nature, the sun can also be understood as existing in several.

Note here that communicability properly so called is subdivided in this rule: namely, into communicability according to the thing and the concept together, and according to the concept alone. And it is indicated at the same time that the foundation of real communicability is the being found of that nature in many. This, as Avicenna said⁴, is found in three ways: namely, either in simultaneous act, as is evident in human nature, of which several singulars are simultaneously in act; or in successive act, as is said of the Phoenix, that the life of the successor requires the death of the predecessor; or in potency alone, as a house of a thousand angles, if it should never come to be. The foundation of communicability according to the concept alone, however, has been assigned on the side of our intellect; and it was stated that it is the cognition of the nature without cognition of the individuating principles. And this occurs in several ways, as will be shown below⁵.

IV. The second rule is: Every name signifying a singular is incommunicable properly speaking, both according to the thing and according to the concept; although it may be communicable metaphorically. — It is proved a priori, with respect to the first part: because the singular as such is divided off from all others. With respect to the second, indeed: because the plurality of this individual cannot fall within the apprehension of the intellect. With respect to the third, however, by the example of Achilles.

V. The third rule is: Every name signifying a form not individuated through another supposit, but through itself, insofar as it is in itself, is properly incommunicable both in reality and in reason, though not metaphorically. — It is proved a priori, as to the first part: because they subsist through themselves. As to the second part, however: because they would be understood insofar as they are. — But know that we lack names of this kind: because we cannot understand such forms insofar as they are in themselves.

VI. The fourth rule is: Every name we have that signifies forms of this kind as subsisting in themselves is communicable properly, not according to the thing, but according to the concept alone. – The last part is proved a priori. Forms of this kind are understood by us not in their own manner, but in the manner of composite things, namely things having form in matter; therefore, with respect to the meaning of names, the judgment is the same concerning names that signify forms, whether they are separate or in something else. – The antecedent is proved from a sign: we impose concrete names upon those forms; therefore we understand them in the manner of composites. The antecedent is evident. And the consequence is proved: concretes signify a nature in something; therefore, if etc.

VII. Note here the breadth implied in the communicability of names according to reason. Sun and Gabriel, for example, are common names according to reason, but dissimilarly. Sun is called communicable because its nature abstracts from this, and consequently the unity or plurality of singulars lies outside its reason: whereas Gabriel is so because it is understood in the manner in which the natures of composites are understood. That you may understand this more clearly, know that the term according to reason, universally and properly speaking, does not in this context mean the same as according to definition: rather it signifies a mode of being (essendi) in our reason. So that the sense is that every specific nature, as it is presented to our intellect, is common to many, because it is presented not as this, but as a specific nature: whether that nature is of itself (ex se) something else's this, as the nature of the sun and of all sensible things; or whether it is of itself (ex se) this, as is evident concerning God, and will be proved concerning the angels⁶. The breadth, moreover, is clearly derived from this: that the nature of the sun, since it is not of itself (ex se) this, both on the part of itself and on the part of the intellect has it that it be presented to our intellect not as this; and consequently its community according to reason has a foundation on both sides: but the nature of Gabriel, since it is of itself (ex se) this, derives from our manner of understanding alone that it be presented to us as itself, and not as this; and therefore this communicability has a foundation only on our side. Hence you can understand how it should be understood that Gabriel is universal, and predicable of many, and a species, etc.: for these things and their like suffice to be verified not of them absolutely, but as objects, or as known by us. And since we have written diffusely on these matters in the commentaries On Being (Ente) and Essence⁷, there is no need to repeat the same things here.

VIII. As to the third⁸, he answers the question with a single three-part conclusion: This name God is incommunicable according to reality, but communicable according to opinion and according to likeness. – The first part is proved as follows: the divine nature signified by this name is incommunicable according to reality; therefore. The second part is likewise explained by the example of the sun, and confirmed by the authority of the gloss on Galatians IV. The third part, however, is explained with respect to those who participate in divinity, with the authority of the Psalm added.

Note here that, because the aforesaid conclusion, together with the following one, follows manifestly from the rules stated above, it was not necessary to add any further proofs.

IX. As to the fourth⁹, the following conclusion is proposed: If there were some divine name signifying that nature inasmuch as it is this, that name would be altogether incommunicable properly speaking to what is outside. And this is made clear by a fictitious example concerning the sun; and there is inserted a doubt concerning the name Tetragrammaton.

Note here that this conclusion was set down not only as a complement to this doctrine, but from a genuine doubt, as I judge, concerning that name which among the Hebrews was held in such reverence. For that name lies hidden in us in exercised act (in actu exercito), though in signified act (in actu signato) it is called the Tetragrammaton. And therefore the text speaks with hesitation.

In the title, note that the term God is sometimes truly predicated of these three supposits, namely, of the true God, and of God by participation, and of God by opinion: as is clear when Moses is called¹ the God of Pharaoh, and Beelzebub the God of Accaron². Sometimes, however, it is affirmed of the true God alone, as when it is said³ that there is but one God. What is not here brought into doubt is whether the term God, insofar as it signifies one having true deity, is univocal: for this is self-evidently known to be not only univocal, but incommunicable, as was said⁴; and therefore, according to that signification, it is predicated negatively of all others. But what is doubted here is whether, when the term God is truly affirmed of these three (namely, when it is said⁵ that the Lord himself is God, and that Moses is the God of Pharaoh, and Beelzebub is the God of Accaron), it is taken univocally, or equivocally, or analogically: that is, whether it has one signification or several, and if several, whether wholly so or in a certain respect. And thus the title is clear, together with the reply to the first.

II. In the body, a single responsive conclusion to the question: This name God is said of these three not univocally, nor equivocally, but analogically. – It is proved from the rationes of the terms, with respect to each part. Univocal terms have a ratio altogether the same, equivocal terms one altogether different, and analogous terms a first ratio closed in others: but "God" said of these holds not in the first way, nor in the second, but in the third: therefore it is analogical.

The major is better known in itself: you will note it very well, for dispelling from yourself and others the ignorance of a perverse disposition in the matter of analogy, etc. The minor, however, is proved by induction in each case. For it is evident that God participated, and likewise an imagined God, cannot be understood without the ratio of true God, but well the reverse: just as a depicted or imagined lion cannot be understood without the co-understanding of a true lion.

In the title, proper, since it can be taken in three ways—namely, as distinguished from common, as distinguished from metaphorical, and as distinguished from extrinsic—is taken directly in the third way in the present case; so that most intimate proper, or rather most proper, that is, most intimate, is what is meant here. For among names not said metaphorically of something, there is a range, in that the formal ratio of one is more intrinsic to it than that of another, etc. The word most, however, expresses an excessive comparison with respect to the other divine names, whether they are common ones, such as good, wise, etc., or proper ones, such as God, Creator, etc. But whether this comparison extends also to composite divine names does not appear: for no mention is made anywhere in the whole article of composite names, but only of simple ones. Therefore it will still remain in doubt whether the name He Who Is is a more proper name of God than the highest good, or infinite being, etc.

II. In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question affirmatively. But note that this conclusion can be formed in two ways. First thus: This name Qui est is the most proper name of God, for a threefold reason. So that "ly" triplici ratione is part of the conclusion, and is a determination of "ly" maxime proprium. And in this way the sense is: most proper with respect to three things, namely signification, mode of signifying, and consignification, as is expressed in the response to the first. – In another way it can be formed without such a limitation, thus: This name Qui est is the most proper name of God. And in this way "ly" triplici ratione is not part of the conclusion, but a continuation of the conclusion with its proofs, as if to say: and it is proved in three ways.

Two considerations favor the first sense: namely, the insertion of the ly for a threefold reason between the subject and the predicate of the conclusion in the text, and the explanation given in the response to the first argument. Two considerations likewise favor the second sense: first, because in the text, according to each reason individually, the conclusion is inferred without qualification; second, because without qualification the conclusion is simply true. And since it matters little how one formulates it, proceed as you please.

III. The conclusion is therefore proved in the text, as regards the first point, or first of all, thus. "He who is" signifies not some form but esse itself: therefore it signifies the essence of God alone: therefore it is most proper to God. – The first inference is proved: because the essence of God alone is his esse. But the second: because each thing is named from its own form.

IV. Concerning this argument a doubt is raised, because it does not conclude what was intended. For the second inference does not draw the conclusion that this name is more proper than the other names; rather, it draws the conclusion that this name befits God more than other things do, since its signification is preserved in God essentially, while in other things it exists outside the essence. And yet what should have been concluded, as indeed the text itself draws out, is that this name is more proper than the other names.

To this we must briefly reply that the reasoning of the text concludes both points. For since the formal signification of qui est is esse itself, it follows most fittingly both that it befits God more than others, because He has it essentially while others do not; and that it befits God more than other names, because it is essential and prior to the rest, since the others signify what they signify only posteriorly. This, moreover, was intimated implicitly in the text in the word esse, or in the words non formam aliquam, as if to say: it does not signify some form, as other names do, such as wise, living, etc. As for the transcendentals, it was already established that they are posterior to esse itself. And therefore the Author had no need to concern himself with them.

V. As to the second point¹, the conclusion is proved as follows. The essence of God cannot be understood by us, in the state of the wayfarer, in the manner in which it is in itself: therefore every determinate understanding of any kind falls short of the manner in which God is in himself: therefore, the less determined certain names are, the more properly are they said of God by us: therefore He Who Is is the most proper name of God.

The last consequence is proved in the text: because the other names are either less common; or, if they are convertible, they add something of rationality at least above it itself. And it is confirmed by the authority of Damascene. – The prior consequences, however, are not proved in the text. And the first indeed did not need proof, since it is sufficiently clear of itself; for if the mode of God is unknown, it follows that every known mode falls short of the mode of God. – The second is also plainly deduced from it: since, if every known mode falls short of the mode of God, therefore, the more determinate the mode, the more it falls short. For this falling short proceeds from the most eminent amplitude of the mode of the being (esse) of God: and hence, the more ample or more absolute the ratio signified by a name is, the less it recedes from that unbounded ocean of the divine substance. And this is to be said more properly. For no name equals the mode of God; but because it falls short less, it is said more properly; so that to recede least among the others is to be said most properly. Now, to fall short, in the present case, is taken commonly. For certain names, such as the transcendentals, less determinate, fall short negatively, yet more and less, as was said; so much so that certain others, namely determinate ones, fall short contrarily, as body, etc. Therefore every determination falls short, though dissimilarly.

VI. Note here that the word is can be determined in two ways: namely, on the side of the predicate, and on the side of the subject. On the side of the predicate, indeed, as when it is said, is wise, or good, etc.; but on the side of the subject, as when it is said a man or an ox is, etc. Now the name He Who Is is rightly said to be the most indeterminate of all: because in both respects the word He Who Is signifies something indeterminate. For it does not signify one who is good, or wise, or a substance; but most absolutely He Who Is, without any determination. On the side also of the word Who, since no nature is signified by it, and since it is relative to substance, it imports substance in the most common way: not as it is a determinate genus, but as every essence is called substance. And for this reason Damascene said that it signifies the boundless sea of substance—indeed, of substance by reason of the word Who, while a sea without limit by reason of the word is, without all determination: for it can be determined by infinitely many determinations. This is made especially clear by the fact that It is so eminent that It most eminently comprehends within itself infinitely many infinite modes of being (essendi), even such as are thinkable.

VII. As to the third, or thirdly², the conclusion is proved from consignification. "Who is" signifies being (esse) in the present: therefore it belongs most properly to God. – The inference holds: for presentness is most proper to God, as is clear from Augustine.

VIII. Note here that Qui est ("He who is") can be considered in three ways. In one way absolutely and formally: and thus it is to be considered here. Nor does Qui est differ from ens ("being") formally, but with respect to three conditions. The first is that ens does not so explicitly explicate the act of being (actus essendi); the second is that ens does not consignify any time; the third is that the relative closed within ens is of the neuter gender, as is evident when one expounds ens, that is, quod est ("that which is"), as Aristotle expressly expounds it many times. Now the neuter gender, since it is unformed, holds itself more on the side of matter; the masculine, however, since it is formed, intimates actuality. Hence, in saying Qui est, the actuality of the existent is more strongly intimated than in saying quod est.

Because of these conditions, added to those stated in the text, the "Qui est" is considered in the second way as rightly appropriated to God. And thus, since the reason for the appropriation is that He alone in the truth of reality is, while other things both are and are not, insofar as they can be lacking, and while they are, they are only in such a way—that is, of such and so great a perfection, and not absolutely³—it must be that this name, taken in this way, signifies supreme eminence in being (esse), not by its signification, but by appropriation. Just as if this name "knowing" were appropriated among men to someone of most excellent intellect, as if the others, in comparison with him, would not know, etc.: for then, although the signification of the name would not vary, it would nevertheless convey more than it would formally signify, since from such an appropriation the excellence of that person would be shown.

Therefore, in the matter at hand, although He Who Is, taken formally, is verified of every existent thing, and does not signify the infinite sea of substance except in the manner in which being does; yet when it is considered as appropriated, it places in God esse, which is the very essence of God, in the most eminent way, and places that infinite sea in the divine esse. And by this it draws the infinity by indetermination, which it imports in common, to infinity by eminence, signifying that eternal esse. On account of which we have no simple name, as regards its concept, that expounds the divine nature more quidditatively than He Who Is.

In a third way, Qui est is considered as it is the first member of this analogy, namely qui est. And in this way the term Qui est, not by appropriation but by its own proper account, is a proper name of God, and all that has been said above is verified of it: yet for a different reason, because not by appropriation, but by its own proper signification, as was said⁴. And since an analogical term, when uttered simply and without qualification, stands for the first analogate, therefore the term qui est is taken absolutely for the first; and it is most proper to God, on account of what has been said above. And follow this teaching: since these things are both true and consonant with the Author, speaking absolutely and formally.

IX. In response to the first, a doubt arises: because the distinction made there has no place in the matter at hand. For in the phrase Qui est the same thing is both that from which the name is imposed and that to which the name is imposed. Therefore, if it is a more proper name with respect to one, it will be so with respect to both. And yet in the text it is said that it is more proper with respect to that from which, and not with respect to that to which. How can these stand together?

To this it is briefly said that, although it is the same thing, it is nevertheless not compared to the same. For in each of the two names, namely Qui est and Deus, there are two elements, namely the a quo and the ad quod: and by making the comparison proportionally, that is, comparing the a quo of one to the a quo of the other, and the ad quod of one to the ad quod of the other, the clear sense of the text easily appears: that esse is more proper to God than universal providence, and that deity is more proper to God than esse; since deity signifies that nature as it were according to its specific difference, whereas Qui est signifies the same as it were according to genus. Nevertheless, because we have the concept of God, with respect to what it is imposed upon, only in something else, while we have the concept of Qui est with respect to both; therefore, although God in itself is a more proper and more intimate name, yet with respect to us Qui est is more explanatory of God than Deus, for the reason given.

X. And know that Qui est, as appropriated, or as the first analogate of the name, imports only a single formal concept: so that it is not composed of two concepts, like color albus, nor like ens per se, nor like summum bonum, nor like ens infinitum. And with such simplicity it unfolds the infinite ocean of substance. Indeed, if it is conceived rightly and perfectly, it unfolds almost the reason why God is infinite being (ens): for not because He is infinite being (ens infinitum) is He therefore Qui est; but because He is Qui est, therefore He has esse of infinite perfection. Hence Scotus does not seem to have judged rightly, in I, dist. III, qu. I, when he says that the simpler and more perfect concept proper to God, possible for us, is the concept of this name, ens infinitum. For it is now evident that the concept of Qui est is simpler, more perfect, and prior.