Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

A clear title from the words. – In the body, a single conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: All things that are seen in the Word are seen not successively, but simultaneously. – It is proved. All things seen in the Word are seen not through their proper species, but through the divine essence alone: therefore simultaneously.

The antecedent is clear from the preceding article. – The consequence is proved. The reason why we cannot understand many things at once is the plurality of species: therefore, where there is no plurality of species, nothing prevents us from understanding many things at once. The assumption is proved in two ways, namely by reason and by experience. By reason, thus: the intellect cannot be informed at once by several species for understanding, that is, in complete act, as is evident by analogy in the body with respect to figures; therefore the plurality of species impedes the understanding of many things at once. But by experience: since we experience that we cannot understand at once many parts of some whole through their proper species; and yet we understand those same parts at once, through the species of the whole, in the whole. Therefore, with unity of species it stands to understand many things at once: but not with plurality.

II. Note here first that there are many doubts: namely, whether it is true of all species that plurality impedes, or only of those which are of the same order; and again, whether the discussion concerns any plurality whatsoever of species, or some particular one, namely one that is not ordered to a unity, etc. But since these matters are investigated elsewhere by design in the treatise on the Angels¹, let them be deferred.

Note second, that from this argument it is not established that it is necessary that all things represented by one species be understood simultaneously; rather, it is established that it is possible according to the nature of the intellect, provided no impediment is present. And because in the vision of the Word every good possible must be posited in fact (since beatitude is a state perfected by the aggregation of all goods, and among goods act is better than potency, as is said in IX Metaphysics²), therefore in the text, once the possibility had been declared, it was concluded that in fact all things are seen simultaneously.

III. Against the conclusion of this letter, Scotus, in III, dist. XIV, qu. II, holding that the soul of Christ does not see all things at once in the Word, but successively, toward whatever it wishes to turn itself, argues in two ways. First, thus. We experience that attention to several objects at once is less perfect: therefore it seems impossible for a finite power to see infinite things at once with perfect attention. – Second, thus. If it actually saw infinite things, then the perfection of that soul would infinitely exceed the perfection of another soul: which seems unfitting.

IV. To these, briefly, assuming that the soul of Christ sees in the Word infinite things (as the arguments also assume, and it is true), the answer is easily given: attention to many things, as many intelligibles, is less perfect at once; but not to many as one understood. Whatever is understood by a single species is offered as one intelligible; for one species is of itself one intelligible, nor is it many except insofar as they are one. And therefore to see, whether many or infinite things, in one does not diminish attention to each in that one; since they do not enter into number, neither among themselves nor with it, as seen in it. And mark this well. Hence vain is that other fiction of Scotus, devised to impede understanding many things at once. For diminution of attention arises from diversity of species: with unity of species, indeed, most perfect attention stands firm.

To the second, the consequence can indeed be denied. For seeing finite or infinite things in God does not specify, or per se modify, or quantify the vision of God: rather its cause is this, namely seeing God more perfectly or less perfectly. Nor does it avail to argue: he sees so perfectly that he sees infinite things; therefore he sees infinitely: since, even if infinite things of one order were seen, infinite things of another order would remain, and once those were seen, others would remain; and, as was shown³, never can all things be seen. – And the destruction of the consequent can also be denied. For the soul of Christ, as must be seen elsewhere⁴, exceeds all other souls and angels infinitely: not as the infinite exceeds the finite, for the soul of Christ too has a finite light of glory; but as a thing of a higher order exceeds all things of a lower order; namely because, if lower things were to increase without end, they would never equal a thing of a higher order, as is clear inductively. For Christ is the head over every triumphant Church, etc.

V. Concerning that similitude put forward in the text, namely, just as a body cannot be formed at once by diverse figures etc., a doubt arises. For Scotus, in I, dist. III, qu. I of the third part of that distinction; in his response to the third argument, censuring Algazel, the author of this similitude, says that it is worthless, for two reasons. First, because here what is there the reason of the impossibility is removed. This is proved: because the rationes of opposites are not opposed in the intellect, as is clear from IX Metaphysics⁵ – Second, because the intelligible species are not figures but simple forms, according to the Commentator, VI Metaphysics⁶

VI. To these things it is briefly answered, with St. Thomas in Ia IIae, q. 54, art. 1, ad ultimum, that the ratio of similitude consists in this, that it is terminating. For just as figure is the termination of a body, so the intelligible species, not in habit but in act, is the termination of the intellect, as is evident from what has been said above⁷. And therefore, just as it is impossible for one and the same body to be terminated at once by several terminations, so it is impossible for the intellect to be terminated by several species in act.

Hence, in reply to the first objection it is said that it errs in holding that opposition is not a cause as a cause: for opposition properly so called is not the cause of the incompatibility of figures, since there is no contrariety among figures, neither in reality nor in the intellect. And therefore the passage from Book IX of the Metaphysics is not to the point.

To the second objection, it is said that intelligible species in act are not like figures in many respects, for instance extension, limitation, and so on; they are nevertheless like figures with respect to this condition, namely, that they terminate that of which they are. And this is compatible with the simplicity of the form. Indeed, it is from their very simplicity that they have it that their termini exist in so excellent a mode of being as is the intellectual mode of being.