Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, the created intellect in act or in potency. It stands in need not for something better, but simply in order to attain the vision of God.

In the body, a single conclusion, responsive to the question in the affirmative: The created intellect needs created light for the vision of God. – It is proved. A created intellect seeing God has the divine essence as its intelligible form: therefore it needs a supernatural disposition elevating it to such sublimity: therefore a gratuitous augmentation of the intellective power: therefore created light.

The antecedent is clear from article 2¹. – The first consequence is proved from that maxim: whatever is raised to something exceeding its nature must be disposed by a disposition that is above its nature; and this is declared in the nature of air and fire. – The second consequence, however, is proved because the natural power of a created intellect does not suffice for seeing God's essence. – The third, indeed, is proved because an increase of the intellective power is called illumination. This is declared: because the intelligible as such is called light or radiance. And it is confirmed by the authority of Revelation XXI.

Finally, the formal effect of such light is posited, and it is said to be making deiform: and this is proved by the authority of I John III. And thus he has declared whether it is and what it is with respect to this light itself.

II. Concerning that maxim, note that something's being above the nature of another occurs in two ways. In one way, in dignity: namely, when it is above the essential grade of another's nature, as fire is with respect to air. In another way, in power or efficacy: namely, when it is above what another is able to do, as light is with respect to air; even though air is a substance and light an accident. In our case it is taken in the second way. And therefore that which is supernatural taken simply, if understood in the first way, is God alone. But in the second way, charity, grace, the light of glory, and other things of this kind are supernatural: because they exceed the capacity of every created and creatable nature, both actively and passively; actively indeed, because they can produce effects which no nature can produce; passively, however, because they cannot be brought about or spring forth from any nature whatsoever. And thus the supernatural disposition is taken here.

III. Concerning the proof of the first consequence² there is a doubt. First, because if that maxim is true, it follows that the process into infinity in dispositions follows. And the consequence is evident: because a supernatural disposition itself is a certain form; therefore it must be preceded by another supernatural disposition, and again that one by another, for the same reason, and so on indefinitely.

Second, a doubt arises because, even given that that maxim is true, it nevertheless holds only in true forms and matters. Now, the divine essence is not a true form of the created intellect seeing it, since it does not give esse to it formally. Therefore the argument seems everywhere to collapse.

IV. To the first of these it is briefly answered, with St. Thomas elsewhere³, that that proposition is most true of the form which is as the term of generation: but not of that which is as the way to the term. For we see in natural things that it is the same account for matter to be disposed for a substantial form terminating generation, and for the accidents preceding it; as is clear in the case of water, fire, and heat. And therefore there follows a process to infinity, but there is a standstill in the form which stands as a disposition: for a disposition need not have a disposition, just as a form must have a disposition.

To the second, however, the reply is given by way of elimination. For the divine essence is truly a form intelligible, and not natural: and therefore it need not give being formally, but rather that it give understanding formally; for the being of a species in perfect actuality is the very act of understanding. – Nor is the divine essence truly a form only in the intelligible order, for the created intellect seeing it: but it is also a form as the ultimate terminus of generation. For it is not as an intelligible form in habit, but in act; and with it understanding is not numbered as a second item, just as being is not numbered as a second item with the form of which it is the being (for form and its being are not two termini of generation, but one): and in the same proportional manner runs the intelligible being.

V. Concerning the proof of the second consequence, note that the text at once does two things: it proves the consequence, and it also intimates, as it were, another middle term leading to the conclusion. It proves indeed by understanding that the divine essence being the form of the intellect and seeing God are one and the same thing. And hence, the disposition elevating to the divine essence is that which elevates to seeing. Consequently, since the created intellect is insufficient of itself, that disposition is itself the elevation or augmentation of the intellective power, rendering it sufficient for seeing. – In a certain way it also intimates another middle term, insofar as this augmentation is indicated as posited for two ends: namely, to dispose the intellect for so exalted an intelligible form; and to supply strength to the same, that it may be able to elicit the act of vision. For this latter point is touched upon when mention is made of the insufficiency of the intellect for seeing, and of the augmentation of the intellective power.

VI. Concerning the terms of the consequent, note first ly increase, from III Contra Gentiles, chapter 53, that the power of an agent can be increased in two ways. In one way, by simple intensification: and thus hot water becomes hotter. In another way, by the addition of another form: as the power of air is increased by light superadded to it. Here we are speaking of increase in the second way, not the first: since the first kind of increase gives only an operation of the same character, though more perfect; but the second elevates to an operation of another species and genus, and sometimes of another order, as is evident. – Secondly, ly gratuitous. For since the question concerns the intellect both created and creatable, it must be, if increase is needed, that this increase itself be above the nature of every intellect, both created and creatable, and hence outside the whole order of connatural things; and consequently that it belong to the order of gratuitous gifts, not only in its mode of being received, like the life of those who rise again, but in its very substance or quiddity, like charity.

VII. Against this conclusion many argue. First Scotus, in III, dist. XIV, qu. I, and in IV, dist. XLIX, qu. XI, argues in four ways. First, an object that is of itself intelligible light, sufficiently able to move the intellect to the vision of itself, does not need a co-operating light joined to it for producing the vision. God is such an object. Therefore. – Second, if the light of glory is posited as the form by which the intellect is made and is sufficient for seeing God, then it would be possible by some created form to see God naturally. The inference is proved: for just as a blind man miraculously illuminated sees naturally, so the blessed man supernaturally illuminated sees God naturally; for the light of glory, like any perfection placed in the intellect, perfects the intellect naturally, even though it be posited supernaturally. – Third, because God, through an instrumental second efficient cause, can act without it. But the light of glory is posited as effecting the vision. Therefore. – Fourth, because it seems more necessary to posit an intelligible species of God than the light of glory; but the former is not posited; therefore. The antecedent is proved: because the latter would be for the perfection of the intellect as first act, as memory is; but this perfects it in second act, to which the object present in itself suffices, as is clear from what has been said.

VIII. Durandus then argues in two ways⁴. First, the light of glory is posited on account of the excellence of the object over the created intellect, as is clear in the text of this article: therefore it is in vain. The consequence is proved: because the object exceeds to infinity not only the created intellect in itself, but also when joined with such a light; and consequently such a light does not render the intellect proportionate to what is disproportionate. – Second, because, whatever may be the case, Brother Thomas in IV, dist. XLIX⁵, holds that the vision of God can be communicated to man in the dispositions of the wayfarer alone. Therefore the light of glory, which is the proper disposition of the fatherland, is not required.

Many other arguments are reported by Capreolus⁶, distinction XLIX, question IV, which I deliberately omit: for either they presuppose that the intellect contributes in a purely passive manner to the vision of God; or, because they are easily resolved from these considerations, they have already been resolved by their own authors.

IX. To the first⁷ of Scotus, briefly, the whole may be conceded, and it may be said that the lack is not on the side of God, or of the object, but on the side of the created intellect. Hence, when both are considered, the major premise is denied.

To the second it is said that this must be observed: hold the opinion, but restrain the tongue. Absolutely speaking, there is no difficulty in granting that through some created form, though not as a species, the created intellect naturally sees God. For every habit, and every form, is by its own nature the principle of its own act. One who has charity, as such, naturally loves God meritoriously, etc.: for charity no less inclines to its proper act than the other habits do. Moreover, the sign of naturalness is delight: for we experience that we act with delight in all things whose habits we possess, whether natural or supernatural. Nevertheless, lest an occasion of error be taken, a distinction must be made: that seeing God naturally through some created form can be understood in two ways: in one way, through a created and natural, or connatural, form; in another way, through a created form that is supernatural, and not merely seen supernaturally: and that the first way is impossible, and has been refuted; the second way, however, is necessary. And such is the light of glory. Illumined by it, one sees God most naturally, so much so that it is impossible not to see Him, so long as the light remains. – Hence it is clear that the case of the illumined blind man is not like that of the illumined intellect: because there the power given is natural, though given supernaturally; here, however, the power given is both given supernaturally and is itself supernatural.

To the third, the argument is denied. For it is a sophism of figure of speech: for what is said in respect of what a thing is is changed into what is said in respect of quality, or rather in relation to something else. For created vision of God does not signify a thing absolutely, but signifies an act in its order to a created agent. And thus it is as if one were to argue: God produces a meritorious act by means of Peter's will and charity; therefore he can produce it without them.

To the fourth, the antecedent is denied. Nor does the proof carry any weight: since intellectual memory is irrelevant to happiness, which consists in an act, and not in a habit.

And note well that Scotus, with his followers, can no longer be sustained in this matter: since in the Clementine Ad nostrum, de Haereticis those are expressly condemned as erring who say that the soul does not need the light of glory elevating it to see God. Here you see that the Church, having embraced the doctrine of St. Thomas, determined not only the need for that light, but its cause; namely, that the soul be elevated to such a vision, as is said in the text itself.

X. To the first argument of Durandus⁸, the antecedent being granted, the inference is denied. In reply to the proof, it is said that it proceeds from a perverse interpretation. For when something is posited on account of the excellence of the object above the power, this can happen in one way, so that the excess is equalized by increasing the power; and according to this sense the proof proceeds, but it militates against nothing. In another way, so that the excess does not prevent the power's attainment of an object so excellent; and in this sense the light of glory is posited on account of the excellence of the object above the power. Against this latter sense, it is manifestly clear that the proof does not proceed. – And if force is made of the fact that what is said to be disproportionate is said to become proportionate, the answer has already been given in the text, in article I, in the reply to the last objection, where it is explained how the name of proportion is to be understood in the matter at hand.

With respect to according to, it is said that Durandus did not wish to understand those words of St. Thomas, qu. II, art. 7. For the light of glory can be had in two ways: in one way by way of a passion, in another way by way of a habit. In the first way, it does not place man outside the way; in the second way, it is a proper disposition of the fatherland. And therefore, when he says in the dispositions of the way alone, that is, in dispositions that do not place man outside the way simply, it is to be understood. And that this is the true mind of St. Thomas is clear from this: that in Qu. de Ver., qu. X, art. 11, he holds the same as in IV, and yet in the same Qu. de Ver., qu. XIII, art. 2, and qu. XX, art. 2, he expounds it thus; and likewise in IIa IIae, qu. CLXXV, art. 3. Wherefore without doubt it must be held thus.

XI. In response to the third, since a very subtle doctrine is being handed down, note two things. First, what it is for something to be as connatural to a thing to be as to become. Second, what the proportion is between the light of glory and the divine substance.

To be connatural is to arise, or spring forth, from the intrinsic principles of that nature; as is clear from Book II Physics⁹ and appears in the motion of the elements. To come to be connaturally, however, is for that which does not flow from someone's principles to flow from his principles. But this can in no way be imagined unless one nature is transferred into another: for only thus can the principles from which something flows become the principles of that from which it does not flow.

The proportion between the light of glory and the divine essence, not in the order of natural being, but in the order of intelligible being, is the proportion of a proper connatural disposition to the nature from which it flows. That this follows from what has been said is proved thus. The light of glory is nothing other than a power, as a proper disposition, unitive of the divine essence as an intelligible form, and productive of the vision of God: for that these two are attributed to the light of glory is clear from what has been said. But to have the divine essence as an intelligible form, and likewise to see God, is connatural to God alone. Therefore the light of glory is connatural to the divine nature alone. And from this it follows that the divine essence and the light of glory are of the same order, in the way that a ultimate disposition and a form are of the same order, namely with respect to connaturality: because, namely, to whatever it is natural to have one, it is natural to have the other, and to whom one is not natural, neither is the other. And therefore in the text it is said that the light of glory cannot be connatural to anything, unless that thing were transferred into the divine nature.

XII. From these things, however, the falsity of Scotus's opinion is evident, in question I of the prologue to the First Book of the Sentences Sent., who held that the natural and the supernatural do not distinguish things, but only their relations to active causes. For the light of glory, and charity, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and whatever else there may be of this kind, are all supernatural beings (entia), not only because they can be caused by a supernatural agent alone; but also because they cannot be connatural to any creature made or capable of being made; on account of which they are said to be beings (entia) of a supernatural order—indeed, of a divine one.

And if it be objected against this on account of the infinite distance between God and the light of glory; or that to speak of the light of glory by essence is one thing, and of it by participation another; and that, although the light of glory by essence is proper to God, yet not so by participation, which nevertheless is what we are speaking of: it can easily be answered that the infinite distance infers nothing else than that between any created light of glory and God there are infinitely many intermediate degrees. For between a proper disposition and a substantial form there is the greatest distance, far greater than between two substances; and yet those are of the same order with respect to connaturality, while these are not; although these agree more in nature, because perhaps they are of the same species, as Socrates and Plato, etc. Therefore greater or lesser distance has no bearing on the matter at hand. Hence it is not infinite. – Nor are we deceived, as the second objection proposes. Since, just as the whole breadth of the vision of the divine essence is connatural to God alone, yet diversely, because at the summit incommunicably toward what is outside, below the summit indeed communicably more or less, unto infinity: so the whole breadth of the light of glory and of charity, etc., and likewise the whole breadth of having the divine essence as an intelligible form, is connatural to God alone; but at the summit incommunicably, while within limits it is communicated, yet does not thereby become connatural to another. Just as if light were taken as the proper quality of the sun, the whole breadth of light is connatural to the sun alone; but at the summit incommunicably, below the summit indeed communicably; yet not so as to be connatural to others, because not as flowing from them (if the stars are posited to be of a nature extraneous to the nature of the sun), but as belonging to them through its diffusion from the solar light.