Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title nothing is obscure to those who notice that "through its natural properties" denotes the sufficient cause.

In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question in the negative: It is impossible that any created intellect should see the essence of God by means of its natural powers.

It is proved by a single argument, thus. Cognition comes about insofar as the thing known is in the knower; therefore according to the mode of the knower; therefore according to the mode of the nature of the knower itself. Therefore, if the mode of being of some known thing exceeds the mode of the nature of the knower, cognition of that thing is above the nature of that knower. Therefore, to know subsistent being itself is above the natural capacity of any created intellect, and is connatural to the divine intellect alone. Therefore a created intellect cannot see God through His essence except through grace.

The first consequence is proved: because the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. The second, however, is left as evident. The third, moreover, plainly follows from what precedes; and nevertheless it is explained in the text, and proved a posteriori and inductively, by distinguishing the modes of being of things knowable as such into three, and by showing that they correspond proportionally to the three modes of being of a cognitive nature, as is clearly apparent in the text. The fourth consequence, however, is proved: because no creature is its own esse, but has participated esse. The last, however, is self-evident.

II. Concerning the explanation and proof of the third consequence, note two things. First that, although in the text only three modes of being are posited on the side of the thing known—namely, to be in this matter, to be without matter, and to be being itself subsisting, that is, without all potency—yet because the first mode is distinguished not into several modes of being (and therefore there are only three), but into two modes, one belonging to the thing, the other to reason: namely, to be in this matter, and to abstract from it, or singularly and universally; and singulars as such pertain to the cognitive nature whose act of being is the act of a body, because they belong to the sensitive power, while universals pertain to the nature which is in a body in one way and in another way not, because they belong to the human intellective power, which is partly separate and partly joined, as is said in II Physics, text. 26¹; therefore the orders of knowers can be multiplied according to modes of being more than the orders of things known. And for this reason in the text, in man, in whom both natures are joined, intellect is placed in a higher order than sense. Yet nothing of the force of the argument is lost thereby. Both because, just as the universal and the singular pertain to one mode of being, namely to be in matter, so the sensitive soul and the human soul pertain to one mode of being, namely to be form, that which it was to be, and the perfection of the physical body, as is proved in II On the Soul². And also because from these things we have most excellently that the mode of being of the nature known never exceeds the mode of the knowing nature: which is the point intended.

Second, note that from this process of the text, proceeding by induction from singulars and sense to universals and the human intellect, and from immaterial substances to separate intellects, it is excellently inferred that the mode of being (essendi) of the nature known does not exceed the mode of the knowing nature. And this is a sign that that excess is not the cause of knowledge, as was assumed in the proof of the consequence a priori. And so it is excellently inferred: therefore knowledge of esse itself subsisting per se is connatural to the divine intellect alone, and on this account it stands above all others.

III. Concerning the third consequence³ a doubt arises. Scotus, indeed, in Book IV, dist. 49, qu. 11, and in Book I, dist. 3, qu. 3, and in the Quodlibets, qu. 14, art. 2, attacks it. Yet against variously proposed positions: for in Book I and the Quodlibets, he argues against it with respect to our intellect in relation to its natural object; but in Book IV, with respect to the divine essence and the created intellect.

He argues, therefore, thus first. That conditional does not follow from the premises: therefore. – The antecedent is proved: because from the fact that what is known is received in the knower according to the mode of the knower's nature, nothing else follows except that cognition is a perfection proportioned to the knower, and likewise the object of cognition. But from this there does not follow an intended equality, namely, that the knower's nature must be equal to the object or exceed it. – And it is confirmed. From the proportion between the object and the power, there follows rather dissimilarity and inequality, as between the mover and the moved, and between matter and form: such indeed is the proportion between the power and the object. Hence the eye sees both the heavens and the earth, and yet it does not have a mode of being similar to the heavens and the earth. And all the more, as was proposed, the idea of a stone is not similar to the stone in its mode of being.

Second because, if that conditional were true, it would follow that the inferior angel would not know the superior one: for the superior's mode of being exceeds the inferior's.

Third, because from that position it follows that a created intellect, even illumined by the light of glory, could not see God. – The consequence is proved: because God's mode of being exceeds the being of this whole thing, namely the illumined and habituated intellect, etc.

Fourth, he argues specifically against it as applied to our intellect and the object assigned in the text. For if that conditional is true by the nature of a cognitive power, it follows that the blessed will never see God. – The inference is proved: because no power can be raised above its adequate object. For sight cannot be elevated to seeing a phantasm; nor can any habit or superadded power elevate a power above its object, but only within the breadth of the object—since a power regards its object of itself prior to the advent of any habit, as is evident.

Lastly he adds that the letter argues from propositions that are not syllogistic.

IV. For the clarification of these matters, know that, as will be said more fully in qu. XIV⁴, the radical beginning of cognition is from the fact that a nature is not only itself but other. And since being other does not occur in one way only, diverse orders of knowers arise from diverse modes of being other. Now the diverse modes of being other arise from the diverse grades of those very natures which are not only themselves but other. And therefore, according to the diverse order of those knowing natures themselves, we must posit diverse ways in which the knower is known. From this it plainly follows that being known is modified according to the mode of the nature of the knower, and not conversely. And because natural cognition follows the manner in which the knower is naturally known, therefore the measure of natural cognition must be the very nature of the knower. For example, the human soul is the last substance among intellectual substances, and hence by nature it receives that the things to be known are intelligible to it in the lowest mode. And from this arises the fact that it must be known in a dearticulated way, according to the natures of those things themselves. And from this arises the fact that it must have its knowledge from phantasms; and consequently, that its natural capacity does not extend itself so far as to be those knowable things which are separate from matter. The angel, however, since it is of a higher essence, requiring matter in no way for the perfection of its mode of being, is itself other in a more excellent mode than our soul. Hence it possesses these material and inferior things eminently, but superior ones participatively.

V. And this is the root of the reason made in the letter; which is founded upon this, that the known is in the knower according to the mode of the nature of the knower; and that cognition comes about according to the mode in which the known is in the knower. For now, from the declared root it is evident that from these it follows that, if the nature of the knower is of a lower order than the nature of the thing known, then it will not be able by its own powers to extend itself to the vision of that thing, because that thing is not in it except according to its own proper mode—which is for that thing not to be in it except under a certain diminished participation, which does not suffice for vision.

From this same root, too, all the objections are easily resolved, the terms having been noted earlier in the letter. For this discourse is not about cognition universally, but about vision, that is, cognition that is complete and quidditative. Again, the discourse is about cognition of this kind, not in any way whatsoever possible, but sufficiently from the proper nature of the knower. Moreover, the mode of being of the knower and of the thing known is taken not according to species, but according to genus, or as it were genus. And from these it follows that the objects assigned to the powers are not adequate extensively, but are objects adequate intensively and naturally: because above those objects a power cannot naturally penetrate quidditatively, but only below them.

VI. Hence, in reply to the first objection⁵, it is said that that conditional follows most excellently from the premises, once they are subtly understood, as has been explained. For from the fact that natural knowledge must be proportioned to the nature of the knower, it manifestly follows that a knowing nature cannot be of an order inferior to what is known by it quidditatively and naturally. Such knowledge, after all, exceeds the lower powers. – Nor is it true that Scotus imposes upon the text, namely, that he wants an equality or likeness between the thing known and the knowing nature considered in itself. This we have not even dreamed of. But the text here taught that between the thing known and the knowing nature considered in itself there is required no excess on the side of the thing known: and, as was said⁶, the discussion concerns no excess in the generic mode of being, and in what is known quidditatively and naturally. Hence one need not answer the opposites in any other way. Indeed, the divine or angelic intellect exceeds all these things both generically and more than generically: and yet it knows them all quidditatively. – As for what is brought forward about the eye with respect to the heavens, it is puerile. For the heavens, as visible, have no other mode of being than that of a mixed body: for each is a singular sensible object, etc. Now corruptible and incorruptible are accidental differences of the visible as such, just as the other substantial differences accrue accidentally to the visible, since substance is visible per accidens. Hence sight does not see any visible thing exceeding itself in mode of being: which is the intent of the text.

To the second objection, the inference is denied. For angels do not differ from one another generically in their mode of being (essendi); rather, they all agree, as is said in the text, in this: that they are forms not at all in matter.

To the third, the inference is likewise denied. For the excess of the object over the mode of the knower is not assigned in the text as the cause of the object's not being seen in any way whatever, but rather by reason of the proper powers of the knower. The argument, however, supposes it to be the cause of non-vision absolutely; and therefore it errs according to ng the cause as a cause. To the fourth, the inference is also denied. For, as is already clear, the discussion concerns an object not in any way whatever, but one naturally knowable quidditatively: I concede, however, that by its nature the intellect cannot know quidditatively anything higher than the nature of our soul. Yet this is compatible with the fact that it can be raised by grace to know even God quidditatively. For it is not unfitting that a power be elevated to know something quidditatively which lies outside the object knowable quidditatively by itself naturally. But the objection proceeds as if the object here assigned were the object adequate extensively, as sound is with respect to hearing; and therefore it errs. For it has already been said⁷ that the discussion here concerns the object adequate intensively by the nature of the power according to its proper powers, and not the object adequate extensively, beyond which no habit whatsoever can draw the power.

The propositions, however, from which the text proceeds, although they are not formally syllogistic, are nevertheless virtually so; as we arranged them above⁸ very easily, without so much admixture as Scotus made.