Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, a created intellect, not a human one: and note this well. It can know absolutely, whether by a power in another, or in itself. To see through the essence, that is, to understand quidditatively, so as to know completely how to settle the question of what God is: for to know of something what it is, is to see it through its essence. Now I say "completely" to settle what it is, in distinction from incompletely, in the way in which one who knows the common essential predicates of something knows it incompletely (for one who knows the quiddity must have all the quidditative predicates, down to the ultimate difference inclusive): and I do not take "completely," that is, comprehensively. Indeed, knowing what a thing is has breadth with respect to the mode of knowing. For it is divided into comprehending and apprehending; and again, apprehending has many degrees, as will appear below¹. – The question, then, is: Whether any created intellect can know of God what He is. And if you doubt this exposition, see Book I Contra Gentes, chapter III, and Book III of the same work, chapters XLIX and L.

II. The body is divided into four parts: first, the cause of the doubt is stated; second, the negative opinion is recounted²; third, it is refuted³; fourth, an answer is given to the question⁴.

III. As to the first, there is one proposition: God is in Himself most knowable; yet because of His excess in relation to another, He is unknowable to that other. – The first part is proved: because God is pure act. The second, however, is illustrated by the example of the sun and sight.

Note here that, since it is established from II Metaphysics ⁵ that difficulty in knowing can arise from two sources, namely from the object or from the power; and this is a question concerning such difficulty or possibility; it was fitting that what is said here not be omitted, namely that the cause of the doubt is not on the side of the object, but on the side of the object's excellence above the power; which is an esse on the side of the power.

IV. As to the second point, the opinion of some is this: a created intellect cannot see the essence of God. Their reason is God's very excellence above the created intellect, as is stated in the text, where it says: Some, therefore, attending to this.

Note here that this opinion, in my judgment, is not Avicenna's or that of the philosophers (since at least the first created intelligence knows what God is, according to Avicenna⁶, since He is its proximate principle): rather, this opinion belonged to certain Christians, I think. And therefore he argues against it from the things that belong to faith, as will become clear⁷.

V. As to the third point, the aforementioned opinion is refuted in two ways⁸. First, if no created intellect can see God, then either it will never attain its beatitude, or its beatitude consists in something other than God. The consequence is proved: because man's beatitude consists in his highest operation, which is to understand. – Now the consequent, as to its first part, is manifestly impossible; as to its second, it is alien to the faith. And lest this seem to be said arbitrarily, it is proved. God is the principle of the being (esse) of the rational creature; therefore the felicity of the rational creature consists in its union with God. The consequence is proved: because each thing is perfect insofar as it is joined to its principle. And this proposition is taken from the book On the Causes.

VI. Concerning the proof of the consequence, one might doubt: because it argues from the superior to the inferior affirmatively, namely from the highest operation, which is understanding, to such an intellection.

But it is easily answered: by the name of the highest operation is not understood the very genus of the operation, say understanding, as the surface of the text suggests, but the highest within that genus, that is, the most exalted intellection, etc. Hence no fallacy intervenes. – Nor does it stand in the way that he determined the genus of the operation: for he did this on account of man, to whom belong operations of another genus, say sensible ones. He mentions man in the proof, and yet the inference was about created intellect in general, so that he might hand down the doctrine from what is better known, and intimate that the same account holds, in this respect, of every created intellect; indeed, he even makes an argument from the lesser. For if man's beatitude consists in the most exalted intellection, then a fortiori the felicity of other intellectual creatures too will be the most exalted contemplation.

VII. Concerning the destruction of the consequent⁹ as regards the second part, note that, wishing to convince the adversaries that this is against the faith, the Author brought forward a proposition that must be expressly believed, namely, that God is the creator of every rational creature: and from this he argues, therefore in it he rests. Hence this argument takes its antecedent as believed, and deduces the consequence by reason. And therefore it concludes most excellently among believers. And for this reason they err who attribute this argument against Avicenna to St. Thomas.

VIII. Secondly¹⁰ the opinion is refuted as follows. If a created intellect cannot see God, then it cannot see the very cause of things. Therefore the desire of nature will be vain. – The first consequence is left as self-evident. The second, however, is proved thus: there is in man a natural desire to see the cause once the effects have been seen, as his wonder attests; therefore.

IX. Concerning this argument, a twofold doubt arises. The first is simply and ad hominem. For it does not seem true that the created intellect naturally desires to see God: since nature does not bestow an inclination toward something to which the whole power of nature cannot lead. A sign of this is that nature gave organs to every power it placed within the soul. And in II Caeli¹¹ it is said that, if the stars had a power of progressive motion, nature would have given them suitable organs. It therefore seems to follow that nature gives the desire for the divine vision, and yet cannot give what is required for that vision, namely the light of glory, etc. – Also in the doctrine of St. Thomas, as was said in the first article¹² of this work, man is not ordered naturally, but obedientially, to that beatitude. Therefore.

But the second doubt is that, even granting the whole argument, what is intended does not follow. For it infers only, therefore the first cause can be seen, and not, therefore God. For I would say that God, insofar as He is the cause of things, is desired to be seen, and not according to His substance in itself. And thus it will be known not what He is absolutely, but what He is as creator, as governor, and so on; as is evident in our own case. For from the first motion we desire to know what that substance is as first mover; and once its conditions as such are known, the desire comes to rest, as is evident in the completion of the sciences.

X. To make these things evident, know that the rational creature can be considered in two ways: in one way absolutely, in another way as ordered to beatitude. If it is considered in the first way, then its natural desire does not extend beyond the capacity of its nature: and thus I grant that it does not naturally desire the vision of God in itself, considered absolutely. If, however, it is considered in the second way, then it does naturally desire the vision of God: because, as so considered, it knows certain effects, namely of grace and glory, whose cause is God as God is in himself absolutely, not as a universal agent. But once the effects are known, it is natural for any intellectual nature to desire knowledge of their cause. And therefore the desire for the divine vision, although it is not natural to the created intellect considered absolutely, is nevertheless natural to it, given the supposition of the revelation of such effects. And thus both the argument adduced here and the remaining arguments gathered to the same conclusion in chapter 1 of Book III of the Contra Gentes conclude that the desire of the created intellectual nature would be rendered vain if it could not see God.

It should not have been expressly stated, however, that the discourse concerning intellectual creatures is not absolute but ordered to beatitude: for it is common to every science that its terms are always understood formally insofar as they fall under that science, as is clear regarding quantity in the natural sciences. Now it is established from Book II of Contra Gentes, chapter IV, that creatures are not within the consideration of theology except insofar as they are ordered, governed, and predestined by God toward God as the supreme end of all things: otherwise they would not be considered by the theologian in relation to the highest cause, which is proper to him, as is evident from the matter itself.

XI. As to the fourth point¹³, the responsive conclusion is: The blessed see the essence of God. Nor is it proved otherwise than by the rejection of its contradictory: for one part of a contradiction must be true.