Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, a created intellect, not a human one: and note this well. It can know absolutely, whether by a power in another, or in itself. To see through the essence, that is, to understand quidditatively, so as to know completely how to settle the question of what God is: for to know of something what it is, is to see it through its essence. Now I say "completely" to settle what it is, in distinction from incompletely, in the way in which one who knows the common essential predicates of something knows it incompletely (for one who knows the quiddity must have all the quidditative predicates, down to the ultimate difference inclusive): and I do not take "completely," that is, comprehensively. Indeed, knowing what a thing is has breadth with respect to the mode of knowing. For it is divided into comprehending and apprehending; and again, apprehending has many degrees, as will appear below¹. – The question, then, is: Whether any created intellect can know of God what He is. And if you doubt this exposition, see Book I Contra Gentes, chapter III, and Book III of the same work, chapters XLIX and L.

II. The body is divided into four parts: first, the cause of the doubt is stated; second, the negative opinion is recounted²; third, it is refuted³; fourth, an answer is given to the question⁴.

III. As to the first, there is one proposition: God is in Himself most knowable; yet because of His excess in relation to another, He is unknowable to that other. – The first part is proved: because God is pure act. The second, however, is illustrated by the example of the sun and sight.

Note here that, since it is established from II Metaphysics ⁵ that difficulty in knowing can arise from two sources, namely from the object or from the power; and this is a question concerning such difficulty or possibility; it was fitting that what is said here not be omitted, namely that the cause of the doubt is not on the side of the object, but on the side of the object's excellence above the power; which is an esse on the side of the power.

IV. As to the second point, the opinion of some is this: a created intellect cannot see the essence of God. Their reason is God's very excellence above the created intellect, as is stated in the text, where it says: Some, therefore, attending to this.

Note here that this opinion, in my judgment, is not Avicenna's or that of the philosophers (since at least the first created intelligence knows what God is, according to Avicenna⁶, since He is its proximate principle): rather, this opinion belonged to certain Christians, I think. And therefore he argues against it from the things that belong to faith, as will become clear⁷.

V. As to the third point, the aforementioned opinion is refuted in two ways⁸. First, if no created intellect can see God, then either it will never attain its beatitude, or its beatitude consists in something other than God. The consequence is proved: because man's beatitude consists in his highest operation, which is to understand. – Now the consequent, as to its first part, is manifestly impossible; as to its second, it is alien to the faith. And lest this seem to be said arbitrarily, it is proved. God is the principle of the being (esse) of the rational creature; therefore the felicity of the rational creature consists in its union with God. The consequence is proved: because each thing is perfect insofar as it is joined to its principle. And this proposition is taken from the book On the Causes.

VI. Concerning the proof of the consequence, one might doubt: because it argues from the superior to the inferior affirmatively, namely from the highest operation, which is understanding, to such an intellection.

But it is easily answered: by the name of the highest operation is not understood the very genus of the operation, say understanding, as the surface of the text suggests, but the highest within that genus, that is, the most exalted intellection, etc. Hence no fallacy intervenes. – Nor does it stand in the way that he determined the genus of the operation: for he did this on account of man, to whom belong operations of another genus, say sensible ones. He mentions man in the proof, and yet the inference was about created intellect in general, so that he might hand down the doctrine from what is better known, and intimate that the same account holds, in this respect, of every created intellect; indeed, he even makes an argument from the lesser. For if man's beatitude consists in the most exalted intellection, then a fortiori the felicity of other intellectual creatures too will be the most exalted contemplation.

VII. Concerning the destruction of the consequent⁹ as regards the second part, note that, wishing to convince the adversaries that this is against the faith, the Author brought forward a proposition that must be expressly believed, namely, that God is the creator of every rational creature: and from this he argues, therefore in it he rests. Hence this argument takes its antecedent as believed, and deduces the consequence by reason. And therefore it concludes most excellently among believers. And for this reason they err who attribute this argument against Avicenna to St. Thomas.

VIII. Secondly¹⁰ the opinion is refuted as follows. If a created intellect cannot see God, then it cannot see the very cause of things. Therefore the desire of nature will be vain. – The first consequence is left as self-evident. The second, however, is proved thus: there is in man a natural desire to see the cause once the effects have been seen, as his wonder attests; therefore.

IX. Concerning this argument, a twofold doubt arises. The first is simply and ad hominem. For it does not seem true that the created intellect naturally desires to see God: since nature does not bestow an inclination toward something to which the whole power of nature cannot lead. A sign of this is that nature gave organs to every power it placed within the soul. And in II Caeli¹¹ it is said that, if the stars had a power of progressive motion, nature would have given them suitable organs. It therefore seems to follow that nature gives the desire for the divine vision, and yet cannot give what is required for that vision, namely the light of glory, etc. – Also in the doctrine of St. Thomas, as was said in the first article¹² of this work, man is not ordered naturally, but obedientially, to that beatitude. Therefore.

But the second doubt is that, even granting the whole argument, what is intended does not follow. For it infers only, therefore the first cause can be seen, and not, therefore God. For I would say that God, insofar as He is the cause of things, is desired to be seen, and not according to His substance in itself. And thus it will be known not what He is absolutely, but what He is as creator, as governor, and so on; as is evident in our own case. For from the first motion we desire to know what that substance is as first mover; and once its conditions as such are known, the desire comes to rest, as is evident in the completion of the sciences.

X. To make these things evident, know that the rational creature can be considered in two ways: in one way absolutely, in another way as ordered to beatitude. If it is considered in the first way, then its natural desire does not extend beyond the capacity of its nature: and thus I grant that it does not naturally desire the vision of God in itself, considered absolutely. If, however, it is considered in the second way, then it does naturally desire the vision of God: because, as so considered, it knows certain effects, namely of grace and glory, whose cause is God as God is in himself absolutely, not as a universal agent. But once the effects are known, it is natural for any intellectual nature to desire knowledge of their cause. And therefore the desire for the divine vision, although it is not natural to the created intellect considered absolutely, is nevertheless natural to it, given the supposition of the revelation of such effects. And thus both the argument adduced here and the remaining arguments gathered to the same conclusion in chapter 1 of Book III of the Contra Gentes conclude that the desire of the created intellectual nature would be rendered vain if it could not see God.

It should not have been expressly stated, however, that the discourse concerning intellectual creatures is not absolute but ordered to beatitude: for it is common to every science that its terms are always understood formally insofar as they fall under that science, as is clear regarding quantity in the natural sciences. Now it is established from Book II of Contra Gentes, chapter IV, that creatures are not within the consideration of theology except insofar as they are ordered, governed, and predestined by God toward God as the supreme end of all things: otherwise they would not be considered by the theologian in relation to the highest cause, which is proper to him, as is evident from the matter itself.

XI. As to the fourth point¹³, the responsive conclusion is: The blessed see the essence of God. Nor is it proved otherwise than by the rejection of its contradictory: for one part of a contradiction must be true.

In the title, note that the thing asked is one thing, and the occasion of asking is another. For what is asked is indefinite: whether any likeness concurs in the divine vision, in whatever way it may concur. But the occasion of asking is this: it is doubted whether God can be seen through some likeness on the side of the thing seen, that is, one which is representative of God Himself as the ratio of seeing, just as the visible species represents the colored object to bodily sight.

II. In the body he does three things: first, he explains the nature of vision, insofar as it requires a likeness; second, he answers the question raised, at: It is clear, however¹; third, he draws a conclusion, making certain points more explicit².

III. As to the first point, three things are stated, from which a fourth is opportunely suggested. – The first is the number of requirements for vision. And it is said that there are two: namely, the visual power, and the union of the thing seen with the one seeing. And it is proved: Vision does not occur in act unless the thing seen be in some way in the one seeing: therefore. – The second is the mode of union. And it is said that it is twofold: namely, by the essence of the thing seen itself, and by its likeness. And this is made clear in bodily things, for the stone is not in the eye, but the species of the stone: each mode, indeed, was expressed, although one was denied of bodily things, as if by this he hinted that in spiritual things it would not be impossible. – The third is the mode of likeness. And it is said that it is twofold: namely, on the part of the thing seen, and on the part of the visual power. And it is explained according to that member by the force of that true conditional: if the visual power has its esse from the thing seen, the visual power would not only be itself, but also the likeness of the thing seen, as is evident, because the effect is like its cause. – From these, however, you have the fourth, namely, that vision can occur in three ways: first, by the essence of the thing seen; second, by the essence of the visual power; third, by an intermediate likeness representing the thing seen to the visual power. For, as is evident from what has been said, the union of the thing seen with the one seeing can vary in just so many ways. Yet, that we may agree with the text, under the name of the essence of the visual power you should understand not only the visual faculty itself; but whatever belongs to its side, namely whatever strengthening or elevating etc. of the visual power itself; whether that be the light of grace or of glory. For all of this is called by another name the likeness on the part of the one seeing, as is clear from what follows in the text.

IV. As to the second³, two conclusions answering the question are laid down. The first is affirmative: In order to see God, some likeness is required on the part of the visual power. – The second is negative: In order to see God, it is impossible for any intermediate likeness to intervene on the part of the thing seen.

First conclusion is proved. God is the author of the created intellect capable of seeing Him: therefore the created intellect is a participated likeness of His divine essence: therefore for the vision of God, etc. – The antecedent is evident, as is the first consequence, which is nevertheless confirmed by the argument from division: because it is not the divine substance itself. The consequent too is confirmed by a sign: because the intelligible power is called light, etc. All things are clear.

V. The second conclusion is proved in three ways. First thus: A superior being is not seen through a likeness of an inferior order; therefore God is not seen through any created likeness. The antecedent is proved by the authority of Dionysius, and is explained by the example of a bodily likeness. The consequence is evident by the argument a minori ad maius. – Second: No created being is its own esse; therefore God cannot be seen through any created thing. The antecedent is assumed as granted. The consequent is proved: because God is his own esse. – Third thus: Every created being is determined to some genus; therefore none is infinite; therefore God cannot be seen through any of them. The last consequence is proved: because God is infinite, exceeding every mode of being and of understanding.

VI. Against these arguments, although Aureol, as reported by Capreolus, in Book IV, distinction 49, question 5⁴, argues in many ways; nevertheless the whole force of the arguments against this consists in the fact that all the arguments brought forward err by not distinguishing, but by making one and the same judgment about the species in its being and in its representing: even though it is evident that there is a very great difference between them. Hence a species, he says, of an inferior order in its being, and having an esse distinct from the essence, and finite in its being, is of the supreme order in its representing, and having an esse identical with the essence, and infinite: for these belong to it objectively, those formally. Nor does this involve any greater absurdity than that the species of a stone should be an accident formally and a substance objectively, etc.

VII. For the evidence of these points, know that the failure to distinguish between per se and per accidens provides an occasion for error. For the species of things of which the discussion speaks do not, indeed, have of themselves that they are substances or accidents; rather, this is accidental to them. But such a species does of itself require that it be representative of another, not in the manner of a sign (since anything whatsoever can signify anything whatsoever), but in the manner of a likeness⁵. Hence the philosophers, as is said in I de Anima⁶, agreed on this, that cognition comes about through assimilation. And if cognition ought to be quidditative, the species must be similar not only according to genus, but according to the most specific species, formally or eminently. For our soul never knows a house quidditatively unless it has within itself a species of the house that is the quod quid est of the house. Therefore the species by which a thing is to be seen must be the quod quid est of that very thing; not according to the natural mode of being of the thing seen, but in another mode of being. And this mode, taken formally, abstracts from substantial and accidental being, as is clear of itself; and it requires that it be nobler, or at least equally noble, as is the nobility of the mode of being of the thing seen; as is clear inductively and is proved by reason: because the knower as such has a nobler mode of being than the thing known in itself, insofar as it terminates cognition.

VIII. But descending from these considerations to the reason of the letter⁷, it is said that the species of a lower order can be understood in two ways: namely per se, or per accidens. The species of a lower order is taken per accidens when that which is per accidens is considered in its esse; but per se, when what is considered is that it is more or less articulated or elevated, as we see the species in the proper senses to be of a lower order with respect to the species of phantasy, and these with respect to the species of our intellect. And it is evident that through the species of sense the imaginables cannot be seen, nor through images can the intelligibles be understood. And according to this sense the first argument holds, as is clear from the example of the letter. For God is of so elevated a nature that every species however articulated, such as any created thing must be, is of a lower order per se, inasmuch, namely, as it is a species. Nor does the distinction stand in the way, that of being in essendo or in repraesentando⁸. For it has already been shown that, speaking of the esse of a species formally and per se as such, it makes no difference to say "in essendo" and "in repraesentando": since the species must be, according to its proper esse, the quod quid est of the thing seen, and consequently of the same order as the thing; and according to its mode of being, to be related per accidens to substantial or accidental being, since in one case it is a substance, and in another an accident. If therefore the species is of a lower order per se, it is impossible that it be quidditatively similar to a thing of a higher order. – And note, that it is not said that the lower species cannot effect the vision of a higher one (since an inferior angel perhaps sees a superior naturally): but we say that a species of a lower order cannot do this. For it is evident that God is not only superior to created intellect, but of a higher order, even among the philosophers, as appears in XII Metaphys., comment. XLIV.

IX. The second argument also assumes, and rightly, that just as the species of a house in the mind must be the form of a house, so the species of God, whose form is esse itself, must be esse itself, and upon this its likeness to God is founded. Nor does this argument intend that the species of God be esse itself in natural esse, as God is; but that it be esse itself in some mode of being; otherwise the species would not be like the divine quiddity. But it is repugnant for anything to be, in reality, esse itself in any created or creatable mode of being; for however a thing is posited to be in any real mode, it is always a being by participation in that mode of being. Therefore.

X. The third argument proceeds from the same root. For the quidditative species of God must be not this or that, but infinite being (ens), whether according to natural esse or according to some other real esse: otherwise a real likeness, and one adequate—such as knowledge requires—is not had. But it is impossible that, under any created esse whatsoever, there be given one thing adequately similar to infinitely many perfections. Therefore.

XI. Hence it is clear that the distinction between being and being represented⁹, when restricted to representation by way of likeness, is nothing other than a distinction between different conditions of being. And therefore, what is universally denied of the being of things is sufficiently proven to be denied of being in representing by way of likeness. And for this reason the divine genius of St. Thomas disdained to descend to such a distinction: he considered it puerile to adapt to this or that created condition of being what he had clearly proven by denial concerning created being itself. But others were deceived, as has been said¹⁰, through failing to distinguish between per se and per accidens.

XII. As to the third point¹¹, he concludes by way of summary two things: that a likeness of the thing is required on the part of the power to be elevated; and that there is no likeness on the part of God, namely a representative one. And the first is confirmed by the authority of Scripture.

Note that, although to one considering only superficially it appears that the likeness contributes accidentally on the part of the seer to the vision of God, insofar as it is a likeness—since it is posited not so as to assimilate but so as to strengthen and elevate the intellect—yet to one probing more deeply it will appear that it is required per se insofar as it is a likeness: not so as to have the act of representing, but so as to constitute the intellect in an esse like God's own, as being of the same intelligible character. For the one seeing God must be God in a certain way, a sharer in the divine nature. Now what constitutes the created intellect in divine esse is the very light of glory. And therefore this likeness is rightly exalted and sought after by the saints.

XIII. Note here that from this it follows that the blessed cannot form a word of God as clearly seen as such, although they can form a word of those things that are seen in God. For since a word is an expressed likeness, presenting the thing conceived more clearly than does the impressed species, if it is impossible for any impressed created species to be found with respect to something, on account of the eminence of the thing known, much more impossible is it for an expressed species to be found. For all the arguments against the latter are against the former, and against every other species. They will therefore see all things in the Word of God, which in the beginning was with God, and not in any created word: for otherwise they would not see, as the text says.

XIV. In response to the third, note that here the divine essence is posited as constituting the blessed intellect in act in place of the intelligible species. How this is possible can be explained in two ways. First, according to the common manner of judging about the intellect and the intelligible species, as about two partial agents. For on this way it is said that the intelligible species can be taken in two ways: first, as it is an inhering form; second, as it plays the role of the intelligible; and that the first concurs accidentally in understanding, but the second per se, since from this it has the role of co-principiating intellection. And therefore, if an object is found that of itself can co-principiate intellection with such an intellect, it is said to unite itself to the intellect of itself and to make it actual, without giving esse formally to the intellect itself.

And although I have sometimes followed and taught this way, and perhaps written of it, yet when I raise the eyes of my mind, the cognitive nature seems to me all too lowly, if it is judged as though among natural agents. For if the soul is above nature—as the vegetative soul, which is the lowest, testifies, since it moves all the differences of position at once—how much more so the intellect!

XV. It must therefore be said that, although the intellect and the intelligible species stand to each other as two partial agents, one of which supplies the substance and the other the species to intellection, this relation is not the primary one; rather, prior to it is the fact that they stand to each other as matter and form—and this, properly speaking. And therefore, although the secondary relation is preserved by what has been said, the primary one is not: especially since from intellect and species there results a greater unity than from matter and form, as Averroes rightly taught in III de Anima¹² It is necessary, therefore, to maintain that the intellect seeing God is, prior in nature, God, and yet no understood intention is in it, and only afterward does it see God.

But as is said in III Cont. Gent., chapter 51, the divine essence, although it cannot be the form of anything in the genus of beings, that is, in being (in essendo), can nevertheless be the form of a created intellect in the genus of intelligibles. And there indeed the reason given for this is that it is actuality itself in the genus of intelligibles; because it is truth itself, which is the proper form of an intellect in the genus of intelligibles, as you have at length there. Here, however, the reason assigned is that it is esse itself. And he intends, in my judgment, that from the fact that some nature is not its own esse it follows that it is not all of its own esse: and conversely, from the fact that some nature is esse itself it follows that it is all of its own esse: by its own I mean, that is, of its own order. For from these things (with that greatest principle declared in the text understood, namely, quidditative knowledge does not occur except through the esse of the same or of a higher order with respect to the thing known) it manifestly follows that the divine essence has this singular property, that it is that intelligible esse which would be thought to give itself to the intellect, if it were united to it through a species. And hence, precisely because it is esse itself, it has both that it is, and that it is the intelligible form of itself, with respect to the intellect seeing it.

But still the mind does not rest. For we must say what this means, namely that the divine essence makes itself formally understood in act within the genus of intelligibles¹³.

XVI. For the clarification of this, know that, speaking generally, for the intelligible species to be united perfectly to the intellect is not for it to inhere in the intellect (since that union constitutes the intellect not in act, but in habit): rather, it is for the species to constitute the intellect in second act. For the intelligible species is posited as such precisely so that the one understanding may be understanding in complete act. But to constitute it in second act is for it, not to be a second act, but to have itself toward second act as form toward esse. For just as form is the principle of the being of matter, so that the esse of matter and of form is one and the same in different ways, as is clear in the case of light in the diaphanous, and of heat in water, etc.; so the intelligible species, if it is in act in the intelligible genus, is the principle of understanding, such that understanding is as its esse. And therefore, although the species is in some way active with respect to intellection, its formal proportion is nevertheless better and more excellent than its active one. Therefore, for the species to be united in act to the intellect is to constitute the intellect in that which is to be actually understanding. But to be actually understanding is nothing other than for the thing understood to be perfectly in the intellect as cognized: for to know something, as will be shown below¹⁴, is nothing other than for that thing also to be in complete act.

From these things, then, ascending to the divine while stammering, we say that for the divine essence to be united to the intellect through itself, and to constitute it formally in act in the genus of intelligible being, is for that essence itself to make the intellect formally to be in ultimate act, intelligibly God himself, with all that pertains to imperfection removed. Now this is sufficiently accomplished by the divine substance itself concurring immediately in the beatific vision both as object and as formal principle of the vision. – I said, however, with imperfections removed: because the beatific vision is not the act and esse of the divine substance (for this would pertain to imperfection), just as it would not be so of a created intelligible species, if such were posited.

A clear title. – In the body, a single conclusion, answering the question negatively: It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of sight, or by any other power of the sensitive part.

It is proved. The sensitive power is the act of the body: therefore it is commensurate with the body: therefore it does not extend beyond corporeal things: therefore not to God. – The antecedent is evident. The first consequence is proved: because an act is proportioned to that of which it is the act. The second is evident in itself, along with the third: because God is altogether incorporeal. All is plain.

In the title nothing is obscure to those who notice that "through its natural properties" denotes the sufficient cause.

In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question in the negative: It is impossible that any created intellect should see the essence of God by means of its natural powers.

It is proved by a single argument, thus. Cognition comes about insofar as the thing known is in the knower; therefore according to the mode of the knower; therefore according to the mode of the nature of the knower itself. Therefore, if the mode of being of some known thing exceeds the mode of the nature of the knower, cognition of that thing is above the nature of that knower. Therefore, to know subsistent being itself is above the natural capacity of any created intellect, and is connatural to the divine intellect alone. Therefore a created intellect cannot see God through His essence except through grace.

The first consequence is proved: because the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. The second, however, is left as evident. The third, moreover, plainly follows from what precedes; and nevertheless it is explained in the text, and proved a posteriori and inductively, by distinguishing the modes of being of things knowable as such into three, and by showing that they correspond proportionally to the three modes of being of a cognitive nature, as is clearly apparent in the text. The fourth consequence, however, is proved: because no creature is its own esse, but has participated esse. The last, however, is self-evident.

II. Concerning the explanation and proof of the third consequence, note two things. First that, although in the text only three modes of being are posited on the side of the thing known—namely, to be in this matter, to be without matter, and to be being itself subsisting, that is, without all potency—yet because the first mode is distinguished not into several modes of being (and therefore there are only three), but into two modes, one belonging to the thing, the other to reason: namely, to be in this matter, and to abstract from it, or singularly and universally; and singulars as such pertain to the cognitive nature whose act of being is the act of a body, because they belong to the sensitive power, while universals pertain to the nature which is in a body in one way and in another way not, because they belong to the human intellective power, which is partly separate and partly joined, as is said in II Physics, text. 26¹; therefore the orders of knowers can be multiplied according to modes of being more than the orders of things known. And for this reason in the text, in man, in whom both natures are joined, intellect is placed in a higher order than sense. Yet nothing of the force of the argument is lost thereby. Both because, just as the universal and the singular pertain to one mode of being, namely to be in matter, so the sensitive soul and the human soul pertain to one mode of being, namely to be form, that which it was to be, and the perfection of the physical body, as is proved in II On the Soul². And also because from these things we have most excellently that the mode of being of the nature known never exceeds the mode of the knowing nature: which is the point intended.

Second, note that from this process of the text, proceeding by induction from singulars and sense to universals and the human intellect, and from immaterial substances to separate intellects, it is excellently inferred that the mode of being (essendi) of the nature known does not exceed the mode of the knowing nature. And this is a sign that that excess is not the cause of knowledge, as was assumed in the proof of the consequence a priori. And so it is excellently inferred: therefore knowledge of esse itself subsisting per se is connatural to the divine intellect alone, and on this account it stands above all others.

III. Concerning the third consequence³ a doubt arises. Scotus, indeed, in Book IV, dist. 49, qu. 11, and in Book I, dist. 3, qu. 3, and in the Quodlibets, qu. 14, art. 2, attacks it. Yet against variously proposed positions: for in Book I and the Quodlibets, he argues against it with respect to our intellect in relation to its natural object; but in Book IV, with respect to the divine essence and the created intellect.

He argues, therefore, thus first. That conditional does not follow from the premises: therefore. – The antecedent is proved: because from the fact that what is known is received in the knower according to the mode of the knower's nature, nothing else follows except that cognition is a perfection proportioned to the knower, and likewise the object of cognition. But from this there does not follow an intended equality, namely, that the knower's nature must be equal to the object or exceed it. – And it is confirmed. From the proportion between the object and the power, there follows rather dissimilarity and inequality, as between the mover and the moved, and between matter and form: such indeed is the proportion between the power and the object. Hence the eye sees both the heavens and the earth, and yet it does not have a mode of being similar to the heavens and the earth. And all the more, as was proposed, the idea of a stone is not similar to the stone in its mode of being.

Second because, if that conditional were true, it would follow that the inferior angel would not know the superior one: for the superior's mode of being exceeds the inferior's.

Third, because from that position it follows that a created intellect, even illumined by the light of glory, could not see God. – The consequence is proved: because God's mode of being exceeds the being of this whole thing, namely the illumined and habituated intellect, etc.

Fourth, he argues specifically against it as applied to our intellect and the object assigned in the text. For if that conditional is true by the nature of a cognitive power, it follows that the blessed will never see God. – The inference is proved: because no power can be raised above its adequate object. For sight cannot be elevated to seeing a phantasm; nor can any habit or superadded power elevate a power above its object, but only within the breadth of the object—since a power regards its object of itself prior to the advent of any habit, as is evident.

Lastly he adds that the letter argues from propositions that are not syllogistic.

IV. For the clarification of these matters, know that, as will be said more fully in qu. XIV⁴, the radical beginning of cognition is from the fact that a nature is not only itself but other. And since being other does not occur in one way only, diverse orders of knowers arise from diverse modes of being other. Now the diverse modes of being other arise from the diverse grades of those very natures which are not only themselves but other. And therefore, according to the diverse order of those knowing natures themselves, we must posit diverse ways in which the knower is known. From this it plainly follows that being known is modified according to the mode of the nature of the knower, and not conversely. And because natural cognition follows the manner in which the knower is naturally known, therefore the measure of natural cognition must be the very nature of the knower. For example, the human soul is the last substance among intellectual substances, and hence by nature it receives that the things to be known are intelligible to it in the lowest mode. And from this arises the fact that it must be known in a dearticulated way, according to the natures of those things themselves. And from this arises the fact that it must have its knowledge from phantasms; and consequently, that its natural capacity does not extend itself so far as to be those knowable things which are separate from matter. The angel, however, since it is of a higher essence, requiring matter in no way for the perfection of its mode of being, is itself other in a more excellent mode than our soul. Hence it possesses these material and inferior things eminently, but superior ones participatively.

V. And this is the root of the reason made in the letter; which is founded upon this, that the known is in the knower according to the mode of the nature of the knower; and that cognition comes about according to the mode in which the known is in the knower. For now, from the declared root it is evident that from these it follows that, if the nature of the knower is of a lower order than the nature of the thing known, then it will not be able by its own powers to extend itself to the vision of that thing, because that thing is not in it except according to its own proper mode—which is for that thing not to be in it except under a certain diminished participation, which does not suffice for vision.

From this same root, too, all the objections are easily resolved, the terms having been noted earlier in the letter. For this discourse is not about cognition universally, but about vision, that is, cognition that is complete and quidditative. Again, the discourse is about cognition of this kind, not in any way whatsoever possible, but sufficiently from the proper nature of the knower. Moreover, the mode of being of the knower and of the thing known is taken not according to species, but according to genus, or as it were genus. And from these it follows that the objects assigned to the powers are not adequate extensively, but are objects adequate intensively and naturally: because above those objects a power cannot naturally penetrate quidditatively, but only below them.

VI. Hence, in reply to the first objection⁵, it is said that that conditional follows most excellently from the premises, once they are subtly understood, as has been explained. For from the fact that natural knowledge must be proportioned to the nature of the knower, it manifestly follows that a knowing nature cannot be of an order inferior to what is known by it quidditatively and naturally. Such knowledge, after all, exceeds the lower powers. – Nor is it true that Scotus imposes upon the text, namely, that he wants an equality or likeness between the thing known and the knowing nature considered in itself. This we have not even dreamed of. But the text here taught that between the thing known and the knowing nature considered in itself there is required no excess on the side of the thing known: and, as was said⁶, the discussion concerns no excess in the generic mode of being, and in what is known quidditatively and naturally. Hence one need not answer the opposites in any other way. Indeed, the divine or angelic intellect exceeds all these things both generically and more than generically: and yet it knows them all quidditatively. – As for what is brought forward about the eye with respect to the heavens, it is puerile. For the heavens, as visible, have no other mode of being than that of a mixed body: for each is a singular sensible object, etc. Now corruptible and incorruptible are accidental differences of the visible as such, just as the other substantial differences accrue accidentally to the visible, since substance is visible per accidens. Hence sight does not see any visible thing exceeding itself in mode of being: which is the intent of the text.

To the second objection, the inference is denied. For angels do not differ from one another generically in their mode of being (essendi); rather, they all agree, as is said in the text, in this: that they are forms not at all in matter.

To the third, the inference is likewise denied. For the excess of the object over the mode of the knower is not assigned in the text as the cause of the object's not being seen in any way whatever, but rather by reason of the proper powers of the knower. The argument, however, supposes it to be the cause of non-vision absolutely; and therefore it errs according to ng the cause as a cause. To the fourth, the inference is also denied. For, as is already clear, the discussion concerns an object not in any way whatever, but one naturally knowable quidditatively: I concede, however, that by its nature the intellect cannot know quidditatively anything higher than the nature of our soul. Yet this is compatible with the fact that it can be raised by grace to know even God quidditatively. For it is not unfitting that a power be elevated to know something quidditatively which lies outside the object knowable quidditatively by itself naturally. But the objection proceeds as if the object here assigned were the object adequate extensively, as sound is with respect to hearing; and therefore it errs. For it has already been said⁷ that the discussion here concerns the object adequate intensively by the nature of the power according to its proper powers, and not the object adequate extensively, beyond which no habit whatsoever can draw the power.

The propositions, however, from which the text proceeds, although they are not formally syllogistic, are nevertheless virtually so; as we arranged them above⁸ very easily, without so much admixture as Scotus made.

In the title, the created intellect in act or in potency. It stands in need not for something better, but simply in order to attain the vision of God.

In the body, a single conclusion, responsive to the question in the affirmative: The created intellect needs created light for the vision of God. – It is proved. A created intellect seeing God has the divine essence as its intelligible form: therefore it needs a supernatural disposition elevating it to such sublimity: therefore a gratuitous augmentation of the intellective power: therefore created light.

The antecedent is clear from article 2¹. – The first consequence is proved from that maxim: whatever is raised to something exceeding its nature must be disposed by a disposition that is above its nature; and this is declared in the nature of air and fire. – The second consequence, however, is proved because the natural power of a created intellect does not suffice for seeing God's essence. – The third, indeed, is proved because an increase of the intellective power is called illumination. This is declared: because the intelligible as such is called light or radiance. And it is confirmed by the authority of Revelation XXI.

Finally, the formal effect of such light is posited, and it is said to be making deiform: and this is proved by the authority of I John III. And thus he has declared whether it is and what it is with respect to this light itself.

II. Concerning that maxim, note that something's being above the nature of another occurs in two ways. In one way, in dignity: namely, when it is above the essential grade of another's nature, as fire is with respect to air. In another way, in power or efficacy: namely, when it is above what another is able to do, as light is with respect to air; even though air is a substance and light an accident. In our case it is taken in the second way. And therefore that which is supernatural taken simply, if understood in the first way, is God alone. But in the second way, charity, grace, the light of glory, and other things of this kind are supernatural: because they exceed the capacity of every created and creatable nature, both actively and passively; actively indeed, because they can produce effects which no nature can produce; passively, however, because they cannot be brought about or spring forth from any nature whatsoever. And thus the supernatural disposition is taken here.

III. Concerning the proof of the first consequence² there is a doubt. First, because if that maxim is true, it follows that the process into infinity in dispositions follows. And the consequence is evident: because a supernatural disposition itself is a certain form; therefore it must be preceded by another supernatural disposition, and again that one by another, for the same reason, and so on indefinitely.

Second, a doubt arises because, even given that that maxim is true, it nevertheless holds only in true forms and matters. Now, the divine essence is not a true form of the created intellect seeing it, since it does not give esse to it formally. Therefore the argument seems everywhere to collapse.

IV. To the first of these it is briefly answered, with St. Thomas elsewhere³, that that proposition is most true of the form which is as the term of generation: but not of that which is as the way to the term. For we see in natural things that it is the same account for matter to be disposed for a substantial form terminating generation, and for the accidents preceding it; as is clear in the case of water, fire, and heat. And therefore there follows a process to infinity, but there is a standstill in the form which stands as a disposition: for a disposition need not have a disposition, just as a form must have a disposition.

To the second, however, the reply is given by way of elimination. For the divine essence is truly a form intelligible, and not natural: and therefore it need not give being formally, but rather that it give understanding formally; for the being of a species in perfect actuality is the very act of understanding. – Nor is the divine essence truly a form only in the intelligible order, for the created intellect seeing it: but it is also a form as the ultimate terminus of generation. For it is not as an intelligible form in habit, but in act; and with it understanding is not numbered as a second item, just as being is not numbered as a second item with the form of which it is the being (for form and its being are not two termini of generation, but one): and in the same proportional manner runs the intelligible being.

V. Concerning the proof of the second consequence, note that the text at once does two things: it proves the consequence, and it also intimates, as it were, another middle term leading to the conclusion. It proves indeed by understanding that the divine essence being the form of the intellect and seeing God are one and the same thing. And hence, the disposition elevating to the divine essence is that which elevates to seeing. Consequently, since the created intellect is insufficient of itself, that disposition is itself the elevation or augmentation of the intellective power, rendering it sufficient for seeing. – In a certain way it also intimates another middle term, insofar as this augmentation is indicated as posited for two ends: namely, to dispose the intellect for so exalted an intelligible form; and to supply strength to the same, that it may be able to elicit the act of vision. For this latter point is touched upon when mention is made of the insufficiency of the intellect for seeing, and of the augmentation of the intellective power.

VI. Concerning the terms of the consequent, note first ly increase, from III Contra Gentiles, chapter 53, that the power of an agent can be increased in two ways. In one way, by simple intensification: and thus hot water becomes hotter. In another way, by the addition of another form: as the power of air is increased by light superadded to it. Here we are speaking of increase in the second way, not the first: since the first kind of increase gives only an operation of the same character, though more perfect; but the second elevates to an operation of another species and genus, and sometimes of another order, as is evident. – Secondly, ly gratuitous. For since the question concerns the intellect both created and creatable, it must be, if increase is needed, that this increase itself be above the nature of every intellect, both created and creatable, and hence outside the whole order of connatural things; and consequently that it belong to the order of gratuitous gifts, not only in its mode of being received, like the life of those who rise again, but in its very substance or quiddity, like charity.

VII. Against this conclusion many argue. First Scotus, in III, dist. XIV, qu. I, and in IV, dist. XLIX, qu. XI, argues in four ways. First, an object that is of itself intelligible light, sufficiently able to move the intellect to the vision of itself, does not need a co-operating light joined to it for producing the vision. God is such an object. Therefore. – Second, if the light of glory is posited as the form by which the intellect is made and is sufficient for seeing God, then it would be possible by some created form to see God naturally. The inference is proved: for just as a blind man miraculously illuminated sees naturally, so the blessed man supernaturally illuminated sees God naturally; for the light of glory, like any perfection placed in the intellect, perfects the intellect naturally, even though it be posited supernaturally. – Third, because God, through an instrumental second efficient cause, can act without it. But the light of glory is posited as effecting the vision. Therefore. – Fourth, because it seems more necessary to posit an intelligible species of God than the light of glory; but the former is not posited; therefore. The antecedent is proved: because the latter would be for the perfection of the intellect as first act, as memory is; but this perfects it in second act, to which the object present in itself suffices, as is clear from what has been said.

VIII. Durandus then argues in two ways⁴. First, the light of glory is posited on account of the excellence of the object over the created intellect, as is clear in the text of this article: therefore it is in vain. The consequence is proved: because the object exceeds to infinity not only the created intellect in itself, but also when joined with such a light; and consequently such a light does not render the intellect proportionate to what is disproportionate. – Second, because, whatever may be the case, Brother Thomas in IV, dist. XLIX⁵, holds that the vision of God can be communicated to man in the dispositions of the wayfarer alone. Therefore the light of glory, which is the proper disposition of the fatherland, is not required.

Many other arguments are reported by Capreolus⁶, distinction XLIX, question IV, which I deliberately omit: for either they presuppose that the intellect contributes in a purely passive manner to the vision of God; or, because they are easily resolved from these considerations, they have already been resolved by their own authors.

IX. To the first⁷ of Scotus, briefly, the whole may be conceded, and it may be said that the lack is not on the side of God, or of the object, but on the side of the created intellect. Hence, when both are considered, the major premise is denied.

To the second it is said that this must be observed: hold the opinion, but restrain the tongue. Absolutely speaking, there is no difficulty in granting that through some created form, though not as a species, the created intellect naturally sees God. For every habit, and every form, is by its own nature the principle of its own act. One who has charity, as such, naturally loves God meritoriously, etc.: for charity no less inclines to its proper act than the other habits do. Moreover, the sign of naturalness is delight: for we experience that we act with delight in all things whose habits we possess, whether natural or supernatural. Nevertheless, lest an occasion of error be taken, a distinction must be made: that seeing God naturally through some created form can be understood in two ways: in one way, through a created and natural, or connatural, form; in another way, through a created form that is supernatural, and not merely seen supernaturally: and that the first way is impossible, and has been refuted; the second way, however, is necessary. And such is the light of glory. Illumined by it, one sees God most naturally, so much so that it is impossible not to see Him, so long as the light remains. – Hence it is clear that the case of the illumined blind man is not like that of the illumined intellect: because there the power given is natural, though given supernaturally; here, however, the power given is both given supernaturally and is itself supernatural.

To the third, the argument is denied. For it is a sophism of figure of speech: for what is said in respect of what a thing is is changed into what is said in respect of quality, or rather in relation to something else. For created vision of God does not signify a thing absolutely, but signifies an act in its order to a created agent. And thus it is as if one were to argue: God produces a meritorious act by means of Peter's will and charity; therefore he can produce it without them.

To the fourth, the antecedent is denied. Nor does the proof carry any weight: since intellectual memory is irrelevant to happiness, which consists in an act, and not in a habit.

And note well that Scotus, with his followers, can no longer be sustained in this matter: since in the Clementine Ad nostrum, de Haereticis those are expressly condemned as erring who say that the soul does not need the light of glory elevating it to see God. Here you see that the Church, having embraced the doctrine of St. Thomas, determined not only the need for that light, but its cause; namely, that the soul be elevated to such a vision, as is said in the text itself.

X. To the first argument of Durandus⁸, the antecedent being granted, the inference is denied. In reply to the proof, it is said that it proceeds from a perverse interpretation. For when something is posited on account of the excellence of the object above the power, this can happen in one way, so that the excess is equalized by increasing the power; and according to this sense the proof proceeds, but it militates against nothing. In another way, so that the excess does not prevent the power's attainment of an object so excellent; and in this sense the light of glory is posited on account of the excellence of the object above the power. Against this latter sense, it is manifestly clear that the proof does not proceed. – And if force is made of the fact that what is said to be disproportionate is said to become proportionate, the answer has already been given in the text, in article I, in the reply to the last objection, where it is explained how the name of proportion is to be understood in the matter at hand.

With respect to according to, it is said that Durandus did not wish to understand those words of St. Thomas, qu. II, art. 7. For the light of glory can be had in two ways: in one way by way of a passion, in another way by way of a habit. In the first way, it does not place man outside the way; in the second way, it is a proper disposition of the fatherland. And therefore, when he says in the dispositions of the way alone, that is, in dispositions that do not place man outside the way simply, it is to be understood. And that this is the true mind of St. Thomas is clear from this: that in Qu. de Ver., qu. X, art. 11, he holds the same as in IV, and yet in the same Qu. de Ver., qu. XIII, art. 2, and qu. XX, art. 2, he expounds it thus; and likewise in IIa IIae, qu. CLXXV, art. 3. Wherefore without doubt it must be held thus.

XI. In response to the third, since a very subtle doctrine is being handed down, note two things. First, what it is for something to be as connatural to a thing to be as to become. Second, what the proportion is between the light of glory and the divine substance.

To be connatural is to arise, or spring forth, from the intrinsic principles of that nature; as is clear from Book II Physics⁹ and appears in the motion of the elements. To come to be connaturally, however, is for that which does not flow from someone's principles to flow from his principles. But this can in no way be imagined unless one nature is transferred into another: for only thus can the principles from which something flows become the principles of that from which it does not flow.

The proportion between the light of glory and the divine essence, not in the order of natural being, but in the order of intelligible being, is the proportion of a proper connatural disposition to the nature from which it flows. That this follows from what has been said is proved thus. The light of glory is nothing other than a power, as a proper disposition, unitive of the divine essence as an intelligible form, and productive of the vision of God: for that these two are attributed to the light of glory is clear from what has been said. But to have the divine essence as an intelligible form, and likewise to see God, is connatural to God alone. Therefore the light of glory is connatural to the divine nature alone. And from this it follows that the divine essence and the light of glory are of the same order, in the way that a ultimate disposition and a form are of the same order, namely with respect to connaturality: because, namely, to whatever it is natural to have one, it is natural to have the other, and to whom one is not natural, neither is the other. And therefore in the text it is said that the light of glory cannot be connatural to anything, unless that thing were transferred into the divine nature.

XII. From these things, however, the falsity of Scotus's opinion is evident, in question I of the prologue to the First Book of the Sentences Sent., who held that the natural and the supernatural do not distinguish things, but only their relations to active causes. For the light of glory, and charity, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and whatever else there may be of this kind, are all supernatural beings (entia), not only because they can be caused by a supernatural agent alone; but also because they cannot be connatural to any creature made or capable of being made; on account of which they are said to be beings (entia) of a supernatural order—indeed, of a divine one.

And if it be objected against this on account of the infinite distance between God and the light of glory; or that to speak of the light of glory by essence is one thing, and of it by participation another; and that, although the light of glory by essence is proper to God, yet not so by participation, which nevertheless is what we are speaking of: it can easily be answered that the infinite distance infers nothing else than that between any created light of glory and God there are infinitely many intermediate degrees. For between a proper disposition and a substantial form there is the greatest distance, far greater than between two substances; and yet those are of the same order with respect to connaturality, while these are not; although these agree more in nature, because perhaps they are of the same species, as Socrates and Plato, etc. Therefore greater or lesser distance has no bearing on the matter at hand. Hence it is not infinite. – Nor are we deceived, as the second objection proposes. Since, just as the whole breadth of the vision of the divine essence is connatural to God alone, yet diversely, because at the summit incommunicably toward what is outside, below the summit indeed communicably more or less, unto infinity: so the whole breadth of the light of glory and of charity, etc., and likewise the whole breadth of having the divine essence as an intelligible form, is connatural to God alone; but at the summit incommunicably, while within limits it is communicated, yet does not thereby become connatural to another. Just as if light were taken as the proper quality of the sun, the whole breadth of light is connatural to the sun alone; but at the summit incommunicably, below the summit indeed communicably; yet not so as to be connatural to others, because not as flowing from them (if the stars are posited to be of a nature extraneous to the nature of the sun), but as belonging to them through its diffusion from the solar light.

A clear title. – Three things in the body. First, the responsive conclusion is proposed to the question affirmatively, namely: Those who see God, one will see more perfectly than another. Second, a false cause of this is excluded. Third, it is proved from a true cause.

II. As to the second point, note that the same object being seen better by one than by another can arise from two causes. First, because it is seen by one through a clearer species than by another: as we experience that we see better through a species in air than through one in water, and likewise through better spectacles. Second, it can also arise from a keener vision. – It is evident. For, given the identity of the visible object together with an equality of the species and of the visual power, it is impossible to imagine whence a better vision would come: for distance and medium, etc., all pertain to the quality of the species. – The text therefore sufficiently excludes the first cause, from the fact that that vision is not to occur through a species: but it embraces the second.

III. As to the third point, the conclusion is proved as follows. Among those who see God, one has greater charity than another: therefore greater desire: therefore he is more apt and prepared for the reception of God: therefore he has a greater light of glory: therefore a greater capacity for seeing God: therefore he will see God more perfectly than another. – The antecedent is supposed. The first consequence is evident from the terms, as are the second and third. For charity itself is the desire for God; but desire clearly involves a great preparation for the embrace of what is desired. That the light of glory is nothing other than a disposition for the reception of God has already been said¹; and therefore it must correspond to the quantity of desire, as disposition corresponds to aptitude and preparation. The fourth consequence is proved: because it is not the light of nature, but the light of glory, that establishes the intellect in a certain deiformity; for from the fact that we become partakers of the divine nature we are able to see God himself. The last is evident.

The title is declared in the body. – In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question in the negative: It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend God.

It is proved. It is impossible for the light of glory created in any intellect whatsoever to be infinite; therefore it is impossible for any created intellect to know God infinitely; therefore it is impossible to know God as much as He is knowable; therefore it is impossible to know Him perfectly; therefore it is impossible to comprehend God.

The antecedent is evident. The first consequence is proved from the fact that seeing God more or less is measured according to a greater or lesser light of glory; and consequently, to see infinitely, according to the infinite light of glory. The second consequence, however, is proved: because God is infinitely knowable, since He is of infinite entity and actuality. The third, however, is proved by induction in the case of a knowable proposition, which if it is held merely as an opinion, is not perfectly known. The fourth, however, is proved from the very definition of comprehendere, namely that it is perfect knowledge.

In the title, "ly" all distributes over all things and over all their aspects, absolute and relative, real and of reason, not only those that are in any way whatever, but also those that can be without contradiction, that is, over all things simply. – "Ly" in God is understood objectively: so that in this object, which is God, all things contained in it may be seen in any way whatever.

II. In the body, one conclusion, answering the question in the negative: No created intellect can see all things in God; but more or fewer, according to the manner of seeing God. – It is proved. Whatever things are seen in God are seen insofar as they are in Him: therefore they are seen as effects virtually contained in their cause: therefore more or fewer are seen, according as God is seen more perfectly or less perfectly: therefore not all things, unless God be totally comprehended. Therefore by no created intellect can all things be seen in God; but more or fewer, according to the manner of seeing Him.

The antecedent is clear. The first consequence is proved: because all things are in God as in the most eminent cause. The second, however, is proved: because the more perfectly some cause is known, the more effects are seen in it. And this is made manifest from the difference among human intellects concerning some proposition that is a principle of many conclusions. The third evidently follows from the second. The fourth, however, is proved: because no created intellect can comprehend God.

III. Concerning the first consequence, a doubt arises from Scotus¹ and others who hold that things are in God as in a voluntary mirror. And the argument is formed against the letter as follows. Things are in God not only as in a cause, but as in a voluntary mirror: therefore the fallacy of Consequent is committed in inferring: therefore things are seen in God precisely as in a cause. For it is evident that the word precisely is understood implicitly in the text; otherwise it would not infer what was intended, as is clear. – The antecedent is proved. By the authority of Augustine, in the book On Seeing God²: God represents all things distinctly, as a mirror does, and not indistinctly only, as a cause does. And for this reason, since the whole course of the argument rests on this, that God represents things indistinctly only as a cause, it seems to collapse.

IV. To make this evident, know, from Qu. de Verit., qu. XII, art. 6, that things are in God properly as in a cause, but metaphorically as in a mirror. For God is truly and properly a cause: not truly and properly a mirror, but metaphorically. He is called a mirror because he represents distinctly: but he is not properly a mirror, because he does not represent things impressed upon him by another, as the nature of a mirror requires: on account of which condition, the mirror is appropriated to the Word of God proceeding from the Father, Sap. VII³, for he is the brightness of eternal light, and the spotless mirror, as being the express image of the Father. But it is established from Dionysius⁴ and Augustine⁵, that symbolic theology is not argumentative. Nothing therefore efficacious can be inferred from this metaphorical name.

V. To the authority of Augustine, then,⁶ it is said to be a metaphorical locution, on account of that condition, namely because it represents distinctly. Voluntary, however, it is said by reason of the voluntary bestowal of the light of glory, and of so great a light. And this with respect to the beatific vision. With respect, however, to new revelations, God does not concur objectively, but causally. And therefore it is altogether voluntary, and as it were an exemplary mirror.

VI. To the argument in the opposite direction⁷ it is said that one truly sins according to the fallacy of Consequence, as if representing distinctly could occur in only one way, namely as in a mirror. Here you should know that representing distinctly occurs in two ways. In one way, so that the distinction holds on the side of the representant; as appears in a mirror, in which each species representing something remains distinct from the species representing something else in the same mirror. In another way, such that the distinction holds on the side of the things represented; as if we were to say: the intellective soul represents distinctly the form of corporeity, and the form of the mixed body, and the vegetative soul, and the sensitive soul. For these do not have, in the nature of the intellective soul, distinct foundations for those likenesses to it; but by one and the same thing the nature of the intellective soul corresponds to all of them as like, no less than if each had its own proper foundation of likeness. For thus it represents the proper conditions of each, as if it were the adequate species of each. And the reason is that exceeding does not impede the perfection of representing: for the species of white would represent white no less if, along with this, it represented black through the same thing.

Reason therefore errs in two ways. First, because it argues from a metaphorical sense. Second, because it supposes that to represent distinctly is nothing other than a distinction on the side of the representer: which is already evident to be false, and most false in the matter at hand. For God in glory does not have his effects distinctly on the side of himself in his nature, but on the side of the effects: since he himself is the most perfect act, possessing all things beforehand in the highest unity; and from so eminent a perfection he has that he is thus the proper exemplar of this thing and of that—that is, he has what is thus proper to this and proper to that—as if there were a distinct exemplar of each singular.

Hence the consequence of the text is understood with precisely, as it is said in arguing: and it is best, because in God all things other than Himself are not except indistinctly and most unitively, which is to be virtually in the cause. For this is truly the truth according to theology and philosophy, as St. Thomas will say in qu. XIV⁸ And note well: since without this foundation you will always err concerning God and the things existing or seen in Him when you speak, and you will fall into childish and vulgar loquacities.

VII. Concerning the proof of the second consequence⁹, a doubt arises. For Scotus, in III, dist. XIV, qu. II¹⁰, says that this proof contains the fallacy of the Consequent. Since, given that it is true what is said in the text, namely that one who knows a cause more perfectly sees more effects in it, it does not therefore follow that the converse is true, namely that he who sees more effects must see the cause more perfectly. And yet the whole argument rests upon this proposition understood implicitly; and not upon the one expressly stated in the text.

That the converse proposition, which converts that one, is false, Scotus proves there in three ways, in general. First, insofar as a cause receives no perfection from what is caused, because it is prior. Therefore the knowledge of the principle, as it is a cause, is not perfected by the knowledge of its conclusions.

Furthermore, I take one principle known in some degree, and ask whether, without its knowledge being increased, some conclusion can be known through it, or not. If so, the point is established. And if one, then by equal reason other conclusions contained in it can be known, without more perfect knowledge of the principle. If not, therefore a principle known in this degree is not a principle, because it is no principle at all.

Furthermore, in the first book of the Posterior Analytics Posteriorum¹¹, what a thing is is supposed, and that it is is known as a passion of it. But the knowledge of what a thing is is not perfected through the knowledge of the posterior quia. Therefore the knowledge of a principle is not made more perfect by the fact that it makes us know the thing principiated.

VIII. Durandus and Gottifredus¹² also oppose the same argument, insofar as it rests on that manifestation concerning the principle and its conclusions. First, because it is not alike with respect to containment: for the conclusions are contained in the principle in potency and confusedly; whereas in the first cause the effects are contained in act and distinctly. – Then, because it is not alike with respect to being known: for from the principle the conclusions are not known in act unless a deduction, subsumption, application, etc., has been made; whereas in the first cause the effects are seen simply.

IX. For the clarification of these points, know that something can be seen in two ways. In one way, in itself objectively; as a mirror placed opposite the sight is seen in itself. In another way, in another thing objectively; as things situated behind the one seeing are seen in a mirror: for they are seen not in themselves, but in species resembling them shining back in the mirror. And as it is in bodily things, so it is in spiritual things. In the matter at hand, therefore, the discussion is not about the vision of all things in themselves, but in another, namely in the object: yet not as in a mirror, but as in a cause, as is clear from what has been said¹³.

We understand something to be seen in or from a cause, not when the cause seen is related in any manner whatsoever to the vision of the effect, but only if it is related as the per se sufficient cause of that effect. Otherwise, the effect would not be seen by virtue of the vision of the cause, but from elsewhere.

This being granted, the intended point is demonstrated as follows. The same thing, remaining the same, always, insofar as it is from itself, does the same. Therefore a cause known to some degree, remaining entirely the same both in its esse and in its being known, always does the same. Therefore it is impossible that, as such, it should cause some effect to be known which it did not cause to be known from the beginning. Therefore it cannot give rise to knowledge of more effects unless changed. But not in its esse: therefore in its being known. And not in being less known, as is evident: therefore in being more fully known. This is what was intended. – Hence it is clear that seeing more in a cause, and seeing the cause more perfectly, are convertible with one another, each following upon the other.

Since also, if one sees the cause more perfectly, one sees more in it; and if one sees more in it, one sees the cause itself more perfectly. Otherwise, seeing more in it would be an effect without a cause. For if a more perfect mode of seeing the cause is not caused by such a disposition of the cause, some other new disposition of the cause will be the cause of this effect; nor will it be easy to feign that disposition either in being or in being known.

X. From these things, however, the response to Scotus is now evident¹⁴. For in convertible terms the fallacy of the consequent does not arise: but when one is posited, the other is understood to be posited as well.

To the two objections against the truth made manifest—which truth is real in the cause and in the effects, and in the principle, not only in being known, but in being—and in the conclusions, it is easily answered by saying that Scotus either was, or feigned himself to be, blind. For it is one thing for the knowledge of the conclusions in or from the principle as from a sufficient cause to presuppose a more perfect knowledge of the principle; and another thing to make that knowledge itself more perfect. These differ more than heaven and earth. In the text the first is taught, not the second: and arguing against the second only, he attacks the second only. Wherefore, briefly, let it be conceded gratis that neither is the knowledge of the principle as cause perfected through the knowledge of the conclusion; nor that the knowledge of what it is is perfected through the knowledge of that it is, which is the effect of demonstration. But in both cases, other things being equal, a greater knowledge of the principle and of the quiddity is presupposed, if by the force of their knowledge those things are known now, and were not before.

To the second objection, however, which asks the question, either side may be answered. First, by saying that a principle known in some degree, as such, is not the principle of anyone's knowing it in act, on account of the imperfection of the cognition, and not from the nature of that principle itself. For this involves no absurdity. – Second, even granting that, in whatever degree it is known, it is the principle of some conclusion also in knowing, the inference is denied, namely that therefore it, without its cognition being increased, will be the principle of knowing one other thing. And if it is asked why it is that for one conclusion the minimal vision of the principle suffices, and for another it does not: St. Thomas answers in Quaestiones de Veritate, q. VIII, art. 4, ad 12, that, once the cause has been seen, it is at hand from which we perceive some conclusions in or from it, because they are more manifest in it; but this is not so with all of them, because many effects are more hidden, as experience attests.

XI. To the first objection of the others¹⁵ it is said that, on the contrary, there is a similar containment. For the principle of demonstration, insofar as it has active power with respect to the conclusions, contains them in act; and consequently, not confusedly, but distinctly on the side of the things contained, yet in its own order. For it is common to every active cause to contain its effects in act, formally or eminently.

To the second objection it is said that, although it matters greatly to be known from another and to be known in another, and through discourse and without discourse, etc.; yet as regards the knowledge of the plurality of effects on account of a known cause, in such a way that the term on account of denotes a sufficient cause, it does not matter. For equal is the judgment, other things being equal. And therefore the text makes mention of both: both of knowledge in another, as it were throughout; and of knowledge from another, in the manifestation brought forward concerning the demonstrative principle. – It could also be said that the text intends knowledge in another only: and that conclusions can even be known in the principle, and not only from the principle, as is clear in the term of science, where, once the conclusions have been resolved, all things are seen in the principles: and that if someone, upon seeing the principle, begins to see many conclusions, that one without doubt penetrates the principle more perfectly with no discourse at all, and this belongs rather to angelic than to human nature; since to understand belongs to that nature, but to reason belongs to ours. Nor does it stand in the way that the text names knowledge from the principle: because the declaration is a posteriori. For from the fact that we experience that knowing more from the principle proceeds from a greater knowledge of the principle, we have a sign that knowing more in the cause proceeds from nothing other than a greater knowledge of the cause: because if what is seen less and is present in something, then all the more in what is present more. Therefore the demonstrative principle was not brought forward as similar to the cause in the mode of knowledge with respect to the conclusions, etc.: but as a sign a posteriori. Wherefore let the carpers be silent.

XII. Concerning the third consequence¹⁶, a doubt arises from the very nature of the divine knowability itself. First, from Aureolus and Gottifredus¹⁷, directly against the consequence, as follows. To know all things in God admits of degrees: therefore it does not entail comprehending God, which stands indivisibly fixed. The consequence is evident. And the antecedent is proved. To know all things in God can occur in two ways: by having an infinite cognition extensively; and by having an infinite cognition intensively; and this alone is comprehension, because, speaking per se, the perfection of cognition is measured according to its intension. Therefore it is possible to know all things in God clearly, and more clearly, and infinitely clearly, which is to comprehend. The vision of all things in God, then, admits of degrees. – And it is confirmed. All other things besides God, were they posited, would not equal in being (in essendo) God's infinite esse: therefore, if all things are posited as known, they do not equal his knowability. Therefore comprehension does not follow from the knowledge of all things.

XIII. Scotus also, in the place cited above¹⁸, argues against this in two ways. First, thus: If A is present in B and C in a certain order, such that B is the whole reason why A is present in C, then if one seeing B does not comprehend A, much less will one seeing C comprehend A. An example: a subject and two attributes, one of which is present by means of the other: if one seeing the first attribute does not comprehend the subject, neither will one seeing the second. But intensive infinity is present in God, and all things are in Him, and intensive infinity is the reason why all things are in Him; therefore just as seeing intensive infinity does not entail comprehending God, as is evident, so neither does seeing all things in God entail the comprehension of God.

Second, thus. One who knows a single effect in the Word does not comprehend that effect, nor the Word as it is its cause. Therefore, however many effects he may know, he will not comprehend any of them, nor the Word as it is the cause of any of them. Therefore, one who knows all does not comprehend either them or God.

XIV. For the clarification of these matters, know that to see all things is not only to see how many, but how much the divine power is able. For there is present there not only extension according to number, but intensification according to perfection: since God can not only, whatever He has made, make something else; but, whatever He has made, He can always make something more perfect. Hence, although it is impossible for all things to come into being, whether in being or in being known, this conditional nevertheless is true: that if they were to come into being, an adequate effect of the divine power would be produced; and likewise, if they were to be known, an adequate effect of the same would be known. Now it is evident that, once the adequate effect of any power is known, it is easy to comprehend that power itself. And if this happens from the knowledge of all things in themselves, much more does the knowledge of all things in their cause presuppose a comprehension of that cause itself. For so great a knowledge is presupposed as is the force of causing: otherwise, from knowledge of the cause, its adequate effect—that is, the universality of possibles—would remain unknown.

XV. These things having been set forth in advance, to the first¹⁹ the antecedent is denied. The proof, however, assumes or presupposes one falsehood: that there can be known in God how many things are possible without its being known how much is possible. For this has been shown²⁰ to be false. Therefore, seeing all things in God and seeing God infinitely imply one another mutually.

For confirmation, it can be said in two ways. First, by denying the final inference: for although from the knowledge of all things comprehension does not follow, yet it does follow from the knowledge of all things in God, or as cause; and it is of this that we are speaking, not of that. – It also seems to me that one can say secondly, that "to equal the divine being or to be known" can be understood in two ways. In one way, that the entity or knowability of God and of those things be equal: and in this way they would not equal it. In another way, that the knowability of God, or of the divine power as such, would not be of greater knowability than that which all things together would represent; just as we say that understanding is an effect equal to the intellective soul, and yet it is not equal in entity nor in knowability in the first way, but in the second. And in this way all things would equal the divine being and the divine knowability. – But, as was said²¹, it involves a contradiction that all things should be made, whether in being or in being known: for always, whatever has been made, he can make something else and more perfect, and whatever has been revealed, he can reveal something else, since the divine power is inexhaustible.

XVI. To the first objection Scotus²² it is said that the major premise is true when the mode of being in is kept the same, but not when it is varied. For in those things that are formally present in something in a certain order, etc., that proposition is true; and therefore it holds in the example adduced. But in those things of which the first is present formally and the second causally, it is not true. For, just as a priori the vision of a cause entails the vision of the things existing formally in it, but not of all the things contained virtually in it (since the former appear manifestly in it, while the latter lie hidden in its power); so, conversely, the vision of all the things contained virtually in a cause entails a posteriori the comprehension of the cause, whereas the vision of the things existing formally in it entails only the vision of the cause itself; because the former belong to the order of things hidden in the cause, the latter to the order of things manifest in it. And therefore, when B is present formally in A the cause, and C is present virtually, it can happen that the vision of B does not entail the comprehension of A, and yet the vision of C does entail it. Such is the case in the matter at hand. For intensive infinity is in God formally; but all things are in Him, not formally, but virtually: and consequently the former are manifest when God is seen, and conversely; the latter, however, because they are present in Him latently, are seen according to the mode of the vision of God. And therefore the vision of all these things in the cause, as belonging to the order of hidden things, presupposes the comprehension of Him: but not the vision of infinity. – Therefore, when the mode of being in is varied, that major premise is false. But here it is evident that it is varied. Therefore.

To the second argument of the same, it is said that to comprehend some effect can be understood in two ways. In one way, that it be known according to all things, even possibles existing through the power present in it. In another way, that it be known according to all things, even possibles in any manner whatsoever, whether through a power in itself or in another. If comprehend is taken in the first way, I deny that one who sees the stone in the Word does not comprehend it. For I say that the soul of Christ sees in the Word every creature, and whatever is in its power: and consequently comprehends every created thing, in the first way. And by the same reasoning it comprehends the Word as it is the cause of that thing as such. A sign of this is that for comprehending this it is not required that it see the Word more perfectly. Nor is this to comprehend God, except in a certain respect: which is not unfitting. – But if comprehend is taken in the second way, then the final consequence is denied. For some one effect or however many effects are not an adequate object of the divine power: for every possible is its adequate object, and adequate effect. And therefore there is not the same judgment concerning one or several, and all; just as neither concerning an inadequate and an adequate effect. The argument therefore errs, arguing from the unequal to the equal. For although knowing an unequal effect in the cause does not presuppose comprehension of it, yet knowing an equal one does presuppose it.

You will find many other arguments on this subject in Capreolus, in III, dist. XIV, qu. II, and in IV, dist. XLIX, qu. VI. See there: for these seemed opportune to this place.

The title is clear: for he intends through certain likenesses, such as intelligible species, apart from the divine essence itself.

In the body, one conclusion, answering the question in the negative: Those who see God do not see other things in Him through their own species, but through the divine essence itself united to their intellect. – It is proved. Each thing is known insofar as its likeness is in the knower. Therefore a thing comes to be known in two ways: namely, through a likeness of itself, and through a likeness of something similar to it. Therefore it is known in itself, and in another. Therefore for other things to be seen in God is for them to be seen not through their own proper likenesses, but according to their likenesses in God. Therefore things seen in God are seen not through species, but through the divine essence alone united to the intellect.

The first consequence is proved from the fact that whatever things are similar to one and the same thing are also similar to each other: for from this the other member, which could have been turned into a doubt, manifestly follows. – The second consequence, however, is proved by the topic of convertibles. For to be known through its own species is to be known in itself as an object, and conversely; and likewise, to be known through the species of another is to be known in another as an object. – The third proof it does not need: for it is evident that for a thing to be seen in God is for it to be seen in another to which things are assimilated. And on this account they are said to have their similitudes in God, just as every effect has something in its cause to which it is assimilated. – The last consequence, however, holds as regards its second part from what was determined ear¹lier, namely that the divine essence is joined to the intellect not through a species but through itself. And therefore, since according to the force of the present discussion there should have been concluded in the text: "therefore things seen in God are seen not through their proper species but through the species of God"; what was inferred instead was: "but they are seen through the divine essence itself united to the intellect." For that essence holds not only the place of the object in which other things are seen; it also supplies the role of the species by which the intellect is assimilated to the object.

II. On these matters, Capreolus, in III, dist. XIV, qu. II, and in IV, dist. XLIX, qu. VI, cites certain arguments from a certain Irishman and Aureolo, unworthy of mention in this place: either because even a boy could resolve them from the letter of the text; or because they inquire into the distinction between morning knowledge and evening knowledge, concerning which, as such, we shall treat below².

A clear title from the words. – In the body, a single conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: All things that are seen in the Word are seen not successively, but simultaneously. – It is proved. All things seen in the Word are seen not through their proper species, but through the divine essence alone: therefore simultaneously.

The antecedent is clear from the preceding article. – The consequence is proved. The reason why we cannot understand many things at once is the plurality of species: therefore, where there is no plurality of species, nothing prevents us from understanding many things at once. The assumption is proved in two ways, namely by reason and by experience. By reason, thus: the intellect cannot be informed at once by several species for understanding, that is, in complete act, as is evident by analogy in the body with respect to figures; therefore the plurality of species impedes the understanding of many things at once. But by experience: since we experience that we cannot understand at once many parts of some whole through their proper species; and yet we understand those same parts at once, through the species of the whole, in the whole. Therefore, with unity of species it stands to understand many things at once: but not with plurality.

II. Note here first that there are many doubts: namely, whether it is true of all species that plurality impedes, or only of those which are of the same order; and again, whether the discussion concerns any plurality whatsoever of species, or some particular one, namely one that is not ordered to a unity, etc. But since these matters are investigated elsewhere by design in the treatise on the Angels¹, let them be deferred.

Note second, that from this argument it is not established that it is necessary that all things represented by one species be understood simultaneously; rather, it is established that it is possible according to the nature of the intellect, provided no impediment is present. And because in the vision of the Word every good possible must be posited in fact (since beatitude is a state perfected by the aggregation of all goods, and among goods act is better than potency, as is said in IX Metaphysics²), therefore in the text, once the possibility had been declared, it was concluded that in fact all things are seen simultaneously.

III. Against the conclusion of this letter, Scotus, in III, dist. XIV, qu. II, holding that the soul of Christ does not see all things at once in the Word, but successively, toward whatever it wishes to turn itself, argues in two ways. First, thus. We experience that attention to several objects at once is less perfect: therefore it seems impossible for a finite power to see infinite things at once with perfect attention. – Second, thus. If it actually saw infinite things, then the perfection of that soul would infinitely exceed the perfection of another soul: which seems unfitting.

IV. To these, briefly, assuming that the soul of Christ sees in the Word infinite things (as the arguments also assume, and it is true), the answer is easily given: attention to many things, as many intelligibles, is less perfect at once; but not to many as one understood. Whatever is understood by a single species is offered as one intelligible; for one species is of itself one intelligible, nor is it many except insofar as they are one. And therefore to see, whether many or infinite things, in one does not diminish attention to each in that one; since they do not enter into number, neither among themselves nor with it, as seen in it. And mark this well. Hence vain is that other fiction of Scotus, devised to impede understanding many things at once. For diminution of attention arises from diversity of species: with unity of species, indeed, most perfect attention stands firm.

To the second, the consequence can indeed be denied. For seeing finite or infinite things in God does not specify, or per se modify, or quantify the vision of God: rather its cause is this, namely seeing God more perfectly or less perfectly. Nor does it avail to argue: he sees so perfectly that he sees infinite things; therefore he sees infinitely: since, even if infinite things of one order were seen, infinite things of another order would remain, and once those were seen, others would remain; and, as was shown³, never can all things be seen. – And the destruction of the consequent can also be denied. For the soul of Christ, as must be seen elsewhere⁴, exceeds all other souls and angels infinitely: not as the infinite exceeds the finite, for the soul of Christ too has a finite light of glory; but as a thing of a higher order exceeds all things of a lower order; namely because, if lower things were to increase without end, they would never equal a thing of a higher order, as is clear inductively. For Christ is the head over every triumphant Church, etc.

V. Concerning that similitude put forward in the text, namely, just as a body cannot be formed at once by diverse figures etc., a doubt arises. For Scotus, in I, dist. III, qu. I of the third part of that distinction; in his response to the third argument, censuring Algazel, the author of this similitude, says that it is worthless, for two reasons. First, because here what is there the reason of the impossibility is removed. This is proved: because the rationes of opposites are not opposed in the intellect, as is clear from IX Metaphysics⁵ – Second, because the intelligible species are not figures but simple forms, according to the Commentator, VI Metaphysics⁶

VI. To these things it is briefly answered, with St. Thomas in Ia IIae, q. 54, art. 1, ad ultimum, that the ratio of similitude consists in this, that it is terminating. For just as figure is the termination of a body, so the intelligible species, not in habit but in act, is the termination of the intellect, as is evident from what has been said above⁷. And therefore, just as it is impossible for one and the same body to be terminated at once by several terminations, so it is impossible for the intellect to be terminated by several species in act.

Hence, in reply to the first objection it is said that it errs in holding that opposition is not a cause as a cause: for opposition properly so called is not the cause of the incompatibility of figures, since there is no contrariety among figures, neither in reality nor in the intellect. And therefore the passage from Book IX of the Metaphysics is not to the point.

To the second objection, it is said that intelligible species in act are not like figures in many respects, for instance extension, limitation, and so on; they are nevertheless like figures with respect to this condition, namely, that they terminate that of which they are. And this is compatible with the simplicity of the form. Indeed, it is from their very simplicity that they have it that their termini exist in so excellent a mode of being as is the intellectual mode of being.

In the title, possit without a special miracle, insofar as this concerns this life: and the term possit is not taken to mean that it does not involve a contradiction.

II. In the body, one conclusion, answering the question in the negative: God cannot be seen through His essence by a mere human being in this mortal life. – Where note two terms: ly mere, on account of Christ, who was at once wayfarer and comprehensor; ly mortal, on account of the state of human beings after the resurrection, in which the body will not impede the vision of God through essence.

The conclusion is proved in two ways. First a priori. The mode of cognition follows the mode of the nature that knows: therefore, the mode of being of our soul by which it is in a mortal body entails knowing forms in matter, or through them: therefore, in such a state it cannot see God through essence. – The antecedent, together with the first inference, is evident: because this knowing is a certain mode of knowing, especially with respect to things above us. The second inference, however, is proved: because through no created species or nature can God be seen.

Second it is proved by a sign. The more our soul is abstracted from bodily things, the more capable it becomes of abstracted intelligibles; therefore elevation to the highest of intelligibles, which is the divine essence, requires separation from this mortal life. – The antecedent is made manifest: because in dreams and in alienations from the senses of the body, divine revelations are perceived more, and foreknowledge of things to come.

III. Against the sign brought forward in the text, Scotus inveighs, in IV, dist. XLV, qu. II. Against the dream, in two ways. First, because then, the deeper the sleep would be, the more such things would be seen. This is false. Therefore. The consequence is proved: because then there is a greater abstraction from the senses. – Second, because it seems a greater miracle that truth is revealed in sleep than in waking, when the intellect is not too intent upon sensible things: since it is natural to have the use of reason in waking, but not in sleep.

But he inveighs against ecstasies, because this foundation seems to have been taken from the fictions of Mohammed, who is said to have been epileptic, and, in order to conceal his misery, claimed that he had to fall while an angel was speaking to him, etc. Hence Avicenna, fearing for his law, taught in his metaphysics these things about ecstasies.

IV. To make these things evident, know first, from St. Thomas, in Qu. de Ver., qu. XII, art. 9, and IIa IIae, qu. CLXXII, art. 1¹, that two things concur to cognition, namely reception and judgment. As regards the reception of things knowable, abstraction from the senses is of help; as regards judgment, however, it is not. For we perceive better the subtle impressions of higher things when they are at rest; but we cannot judge perfectly unless a resolution has been made as to whether they accord with sensible things, as is said in III Caeli² and VI Ethic.³ Hence the text always uses terms pertaining to reception, namely to be capable of receiving and to perceive.

Know secondly that, since the discussions to be understood must fall beneath the genus of which we are speaking, and here we are speaking of our intellect, and consequently of phantasy in act (because the one understanding must contemplate phantasms), it manifestly follows that here we are not speaking of any abstraction whatsoever from bodily things, but of what lies within the breadth of intellect in act.

V. And from these all things⁴ are resolved. For it is clear that the first objection is of no force: because deep sleep draws one outside the breadth of the intellect in act. – And likewise, although the judgment of truth in sleep is the greater miracle, the reception is not. – And it is the same with judgment in all alienations, from whatever source they come. For if they are drawn from within the breadth of the intellect in act, then the more the phantasy is occupied with spiritual things in ministering to the intellect, the more capable the intellect is of higher intelligibles, as being nearer and less disturbed. And from this it comes about that some of the melancholics are altogether devoid of knowledge of higher things: namely, because they have their phantasy so disturbed that the intellect cannot be in act; as happens in children on account of moisture. Others speak much of higher things and predict truths, others little; according as the interior powers are hindered more or less, and according as they have their phantasms better disposed, and according as the phantasms in these are of higher things than in those, etc.

Nor are these things from the law of Muhammad, as this man did not fear to say here; but from natural philosophy, from experience, from Sacred Scripture, and from the sacred doctors. And concerning philosophy and experience it has been said: although the authorities of the philosophers are not lacking in On Sleep and Waking⁵. Sacred Scripture, moreover, is full of visions in dreams. Indeed, in Numbers XII⁶ God promises that He will speak to the prophets in dreams; and in Joel II⁷ it is said, among the effects of the Holy Spirit, they shall dream dreams, etc. Augustine also, in book XII of the Literal Commentary on Genesis⁸, says: it befits the human soul, insofar as it is abstracted from the senses, to foresee things to come. Gregory also, in book IV of the Dialogues⁹, teaches this same thing; indeed, he says that this befits the soul either from the subtlety of nature or from the revelation of those above. Let this presumptuous voice therefore be silent: this is a most Christian doctrine, and at the same time philosophical.