Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

Concerning the order of this question and the preceding ones, there is a doubt. For unity is prior to being (ens) than simplicity and immutability, and the other things treated from question III up to this point; therefore unity is treated inconveniently in the last place. – The antecedent is proved: because every being (ens) is one, but not simple nor immutable; and that is prior from which the consequence is not convertible.

II. To this it is said that, just as the treatise on the nature of the animal according to all its quidditative predicates precedes the treatise on the unity of the animal, so the treatise on the divine nature according to all its quasi-quidditative predicates precedes the treatise on its unity: since unity is a quasi-passion of being (ens), and the unity of such a thing is a quasi-passion of that thing. Now the four things treated of thus far, after the question whether it is concerning the divine nature—namely simplicity and perfection, infinity and immutability—are contained within the breadth of quidditative predicates, as is evident inductively; and therefore they were treated of first. And for their completion, there have been inserted questions on goodness, on the existence of God in things, and on eternity. And so, with the quiddity as it were settled, he arrives at the first passion, namely unity. – That this was the Author's intention you can infer from the introduction to question III placed above in the text: for there these five things are proposed for treatment.

Nor does the objection raised stand in the way: for it is denied that unity is prior to the things said above. And in proof of this, it is said that that from which the consequence does not convert by reason of itself is prior, but not if it is by reason of another. For example, to be colored with respect to man is that from which the consequence does not convert, yet it is not prior to man, although it is a more common predicate: and this because colored is that from which the consequence does not convert, not by reason of itself, but by reason of its subject. For by reason of the subject it holds that he is a man, therefore he is colored, and not conversely. Hence that from which the consequence does not convert is prior, or includes something prior by reason of which the consequence does not convert. And so in the case at hand, one is not formally prior, but includes being (ens), by reason of which the sequel does not hold, it is one, therefore it is immutable, but rather conversely.

III. A famous title. – In the body, two conclusions. The first directly answers the question: "One" adds nothing above ens (being), not any thing, but only a negation of division. – It is proved: "one" signifies nothing other than being as undivided; therefore.

The second conclusion is a corollary: One is convertible with being. And nevertheless it is proved: the being (esse) of any thing consists in indivision; therefore. – The antecedent is proved in two ways. First, inductively, from the being of simple things and of composites. Second, from a sign, namely that each thing preserves its unity just as it preserves its entity. All this is plainly evident in the text.

IV. Concerning the first conclusion, a doubt arises from a twofold source: since Avicenna holds¹ that unity adds some thing above being (ens); and Scotus holds that it adds a certain reality. But because Avicenna's position is refuted by Aristotle in Book IV of the Metaphysics², and is disputed here in the text, Scotus's opinion must be treated, in Book IV of the Metaphysics³. Supposing, therefore, that unity signifies a passion of being (entis), he says that it formally imports something positive, really the same as the being itself; just as he universally holds that a passion is identified with its proper subject. And his followers there strive to prove this point in several ways.

First, the one formally, that is, as distinct from being (ens), is really identical with being: therefore it is something positive. The inference holds: because a negation cannot be identified with a real being. – Second, the one formally is outside nothingness, as being a passion of being: therefore it is positive. – Third, the one formally has the character of the first measure and principle of number: therefore, as before. – Fourth, the one signifies a perfection simply speaking: therefore. The antecedent is proved: both because in each thing itself is better than not itself, and because it is reduced to the supremely one, just as to the supremely good and just, etc.; for this is proper to perfections simply speaking.

V. To these things a brief reply is given. And first the antecedent is distinguished: for being the same occurs in two ways, namely positively and negatively. Now one thing is negatively the same as an entity: because it signifies not another nature, but the same in another way, as is said in IV Metaphysics⁴ And thus the inference is worthless.

With respect to according to, however, it is said that one being formally is not more outside of nothing than other privative or negative beings in the genus. It is therefore outside of nothing thus: and then the consequence is denied.

To the third argument, the consequence is denied: because to measure is common to positives and negatives. For not only in the genera of being (ens) does the most simple measure the rest, but also in the genera of diseases and sins, as is clear in moral matters; for the least among the vices of gluttony is the measure of the rest. And the least absolutely, that is, one, measures multitude absolutely. Yet each of these is a negative, namely multitude and one, as is said in the text of this question. Now I understand transcendent number and absolute multitude to be the same thing. And therefore it follows that the principle of negative number is a negative.

To the fourth, the antecedent is denied. For "one" does not signify a perfection unless the privative division signifies an imperfection. Hence, just as relation does not formally signify a perfection simply speaking, neither does its unity; otherwise paternity and filiation in God would be at once imperfect, because not one. And just as substantial being (esse) signifies a perfection, so does its unity. "One" therefore abstracts from both perfection and imperfection. – To the first proof, however, drawn from Anselm's definition ⁵, it is said that the particle "better" is lacking here: for what is not good cannot be better. – To the second, however, it is said that that reduction is not proper to perfections simply speaking, but is common also to general negatives. Hence the reduction is made to the supremely immutable, the supremely immaterial, etc. – Although it could also fittingly be said that, as is stated in IV⁶ and VII Metaphysics⁷, the analogate investigated in the absolute is sought for the first: and by this, the first one, which is a substantial one, is a perfection simply speaking, and is reduced to the supremely one. But from this nothing follows against our intent: because that perfection belongs to it by reason of the substance it implies.

VI. In response to the first objection, note that the Scotists inveigh against the argument of Averroes, in IV Metaphysics, commentary III, against Avicenna, which St. Thomas used. For they say⁸ that it is a sophism of Figure of Speech, because the whereby is changed into the what: for that whereby a thing is one is one as whereby, not as what. And therefore no process to infinity follows; just as none follows from white and whiteness.

But this objection is very crude. First, because it is established that in the transcendentals the concrete is truly predicated of the abstract (for entity is a being, and unity is one); and by this quo is not changed into quod; rather, reason itself uses that same quo in both ways, namely as quo and as quod. And therefore it concludes excellently: neither is it similar in the case of white and whiteness, because whiteness is not white. – Second, because if "one" added another nature above being, say above man or lion, then by the same reasoning whereby this proposition is true, the nature of man is one, the same will be true: the nature of unity is one; for every nature is one. Nor does the adjacency of the nature excuse this, namely because the nature of unity always inheres in another, and on that account is a quo; for it is common to every nature, whether subsistent or non-subsistent, to be one, as is evident in accidents. Therefore the argument stands in its full force.

But concerning the one, which is the principle of number and what sort of accident it is, this is not the business of the present work; it will be a special question.

VII. In response to the second objection, note carefully: since this argument causes the learned to waver, because they do not penetrate this response. Know that the response of the text rests on those words, being is divided into one and many, as into one simply and many in a certain respect: and the simply and in a certain respect do not modify the one or the many, but modify the is divided. And the sense is that being is divided simply into one, and in a certain respect into many: that is, the one is contained under being simply, but the many in a certain respect. Hence this is immediately proved in the text: for even the, he says, many are not contained under being except as participating in one. And since it is established that the nature of such a division is such that the member taken simply equals the thing divided taken absolutely (and rightly so, because a member in a certain respect does not partake of the thing divided except in a certain respect); therefore the response stands very well, both that the one is convertible with being, and yet is a member of the division. An example of this is if man is distinguished into man in act and man in potency: and likewise a house into a house in act and in potency, etc. – The remaining points set down in this response are for the perfection of the doctrine, and for the explanation of the intended meaning: since both the one, whether simply or in a certain respect, and the many, whether simply or in a certain respect, participate in one.

A clear title. – In the body, a single conclusion, responsive to the question in the affirmative: One is opposed to many in different ways.

It is proved. The one, the principle of number, is opposed to number as a measure to what is measured; but the one converted with being is opposed as the undivided to the divided. Therefore. – The antecedent, in its first part, is proved from Book X of the Metaphysics: because measure belongs first to the one, and number is a measured multitude. The second part is evident. The consequence, moreover, is clear: because one opposition is relative and the other privative.

II. Note here that, although the text intends to speak of different unities and multitudes, from this doctrine you will nevertheless be able to draw most excellently the conclusion that the same unity, taken in different ways—namely as the principle of number and as an undivided thing—is opposed in different ways to the same multitude taken in different ways, namely under the aspect of number and under the aspect of a divided thing. And thus this distinction will sometimes be a distinction of things and sometimes a distinction of reasons. And when it is a distinction of reasons, it belongs both to each unity and to each multitude: since one, convertible with being (ens), is the principle of transcendent number, while one in the category of quantity is the undivided.

III. In response to the second, a difficulty arises as to how it is verified that multitude is composed of unities, not according to what they have of indivision, but according to what they have of entity. For this is manifestly impossible in transcendent multitude, of which the text speaks. For either the discourse is about multitude as multitude is; or about many things. Not about many things, as is clear from the force of the argument and the reply, when it is said that multitude is a heterogeneous whole. But concerning multitude itself, it is evident that it is not composed of one things, but of unities: otherwise transcendent multitude, as multitude is, would be substance, being composed as it were from the substances of things.

IV. To this it is said that both one and many, taken transcendentally, can be understood in two ways: in one way, substantially; in another way, completively, or formally. If they are understood in the first way, it is evident that multitude is composed of things that are one, and that it is a substance, or a real being: and thus the text¹ seems to be interpreted according to the plain sense of the letter. – And if it is objected: therefore he does not speak of multitude formally, it will be said that he speaks of multitude formally with respect to what it really is.

Speaking, however, more deeply and more formally, it seems to me that what must be said is that this is a discourse on unity and multitude formally and universally: and that by those words, unities according to that which they have of entity, the text does not mean the thing which is one; rather, it means the very nature of unity, insofar as it exercises the act of being. That this may be perceived more clearly, let us begin from one in the genus of quantity. Unity can be taken from the genus of quantity in two ways. In one way, as it is not a number, which is to be undivided in itself, just as number is divided into several unities. And thus it is clear that it does not compose number; just as neither does not-house compose a house. In another way, as it is in itself such an entity, say an accident: and thus it composes number. Transcendental unity likewise can be taken in two ways. First, as it is undivided, which is to be not a multitude: and thus it is impossible for it to compose a multitude, for the reason given. In another way, according to that which it is, that is, according to the very negation of division, but insofar as it has the character of being: and thus it composes a multitude taken formally and completively. So that this distinction, contracted to one and many transcendentally, is not a distinction of privation from a positive subject; rather, it is a distinction of a privative act from a positive act. So that indivision itself, insofar as it exercises an act of privation, does not compose; and this same thing, insofar as it has the character of a certain entity, composes a multitude, which, according to truth, is formally a negative being, more than one is. – And that this is the meaning of the text is evident not only from its formal sense, but also from the reply to the fourth objection, where it is said that divided things do not have the character of multitude, unless each of the things divided has the character of one. For here it clearly appeared that multitude arises formally from unities taken formally: and consequently from negations, since he had taught in the preceding article that only a negation is added formally.

V. In response to the fourth, a doubt arises as to how these words are verified: division is prior to unity, not simply, but according to the manner of our apprehension. For it seems that division is prior to unity simply. Since a habit is naturally prior to its privation, and division is related to unity as habit to privation: therefore. – Nor can it be said that division is not truly a habit by which unity is privated in itself, but is a habit according to our way of understanding; for one would have to assign, at least circumlocutorily, what that habit is by which unity is privated in itself. Nor would it be easy to devise this. For that habit in itself is either something positive or negative. If positive, then something positive beyond being (ens) would be prior to unity, which is impossible. If negative, then some negation is prior to unity; and if this is not unfitting, why is it unfitting that division, which is a negation, be prior to unity?

VI. To this it is said that the labor is in equivocation. For both propositions are true: both that division is prior to unity simply, that is, in itself, in intelligible being (since division is a negation, which is a being of reason): and that division is posterior to unity simply, that is, according to simple being, which is being in the nature of things; for intelligible being is only being in a certain respect.

The first proposition is proved from what has been said. For it is not intelligible that affirmation should not be prior to negation. Now to be one is to be this and not to be not-this: wherein it is evident that the negation of the other extreme of contradiction is included in the intelligibility of unity. The extremes of contradiction, therefore, whose very opposition is division, naturally precede unity. For first there is man, and in that same prior there is not-man, in the order of intelligible being: and thus there is division. Then man is man and is not not-man, which is to be one, that is, undivided. For it is not divided in itself, so as to be man and not-man. In respect of the privation of such division, each thing is and is called one: if one is a privative name according to truth, as we suppose. Nor is it unfitting that the negation of division be prior to the negation of unity: although it is impossible that the positing of division in reality precede the positing of unity.

The second proposition is evident in itself. For it is not necessary, in order that man be and be understood as one, that the negation of man be in some nature, say bovine or celestial. For if man alone existed, he would nevertheless be one: just as, before the creation of the world, God was one, and not-God was in no thing; but once other things were created, the division of God from not-God was posited in the nature of things. Concerning which division the text says that it is not prior simply, as is clear from the end of the response, where it is said: second we apprehend that this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division. What could be clearer? In saying this being is not that being, he expressed division in the nature of things. And on account of the same division he said that we define simples from composites. He therefore subordinated division, both real and positive, to unity formally: but not contradictory division in intelligible being.

The title asks about numerical unity. – In the body, one conclusion, answered in the affirmative: God is one.

It is proved in three ways. First, God is formally, in the same way, God and this: therefore He is one. – The antecedent is clear from qu. III: because this God and the divine nature are altogether the same. The consequence is proved: it is impossible for this to be multiplied; therefore neither can God be.

Second, God is universally perfect: therefore one. – The consequence is proved by destruction of the consequent, leading to the opposite of the antecedent, as is clearly evident in the text.

Third, God reduces all things that are in the universe to one order per se: therefore God is one. – As to the first part, the antecedent is proved: because diverse things do not come together into one order except from some one. As to the second part, thus: God is the most perfect and first principle: therefore He is a principle per se, and not per accidens. – The consequence is proved in two ways. First, because things are better disposed by one principle than by many. Second, because of one thing there is not a cause per se except one: but per accidens, many.

A title clear from what has been said. – In the body, a single conclusion, answered affirmatively: God is most one.

It is proved. God is maximally being and maximally undivided: therefore. – The antecedent is proved as to the first part: because He is ipsum esse. As to the second: because, being altogether simple, He lacks all divisibility. – But the consequence is proved from the notion of one, which includes both being and indivision. All things are clear in the text.

II. In response to the first, the doubt is how privation admits of more and less on account of division. For division itself is a negation, concerning which the same question arises, how it admits of more and less.

To this it is answered briefly that division admits of more and less by reason of its foundation. For what is rational is more distant from a stone than from an ox; and therefore the division between man and stone is greater. And for this reason the unity of the genus in which man and stone agree is lesser, as is evident.