Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

A clear title. - The body of the article has four parts: first, he states what in this question is clear and what is ambiguous; second, he treats a certain opinion; third, another; fourth, his own, answering the question¹.

II. As to the first point, it is clear that the aevum is intermediate between eternity and time: it is ambiguous, however, in what way it is intermediate, on account of the multitude of opinions.

III. As to the second point, first there is set forth the opinion holding that mediation is found in having a beginning and an end. Second, this is refuted: because such mediation is accidental, as is clear if everlasting things had been produced from eternity.

IV. As to the third point, first is set down the second opinion, which says that mediation is found in being without innovation and vetustation, and yet having a before and after; insofar as in the first respect it agrees with eternity, and in the second with time. — Second, it is disproved in two ways, according to the two understandings it can have: namely, either by referring both conditions to the aevum itself; or by referring the second to the aevum, and the first to the aeviternal as measured by the aevum.

Against the first sense he argues thus. Before and after according to duration cannot exist simultaneously: therefore, when the prior recedes, the posterior arrives anew: therefore, if there is a before and after in the aevum, there will be renewal and growing old. — Against the second sense thus. The aeviternal is neither capable of renewal nor of growing old: therefore it is unchangeable: therefore its measure lacks before and after. The antecedent is yours. The first consequence both is evident in itself and is proved from Book IV of the Physics: because changeability is the proper cause of growing old; therefore unchangeability is not of growing old, in accordance with that saying, if affirmation is the cause of affirmation² etc. But the second consequence is proved from Book IV of the Physics: because the changeability of what is measured is the cause of before and after in the measure; therefore unchangeability will be the cause of the negation of before and after in the same, in accordance with the same root.

V. Concerning these arguments, note that Scotus, in Book II, dist. II, qu. II, does not follow this opinion; yet he strives to solve these arguments of the text, defending them according to their sense, giving this example. If flesh were posited as having no part and part under quantity, then there would be parts in the measure, but not in that whose measure it is. And so in the case at hand, the esse of an angel is without newness: and yet the measure is successive. Hence, to the argument made directly against this, he responds by denying, in his judgment, that the mutability of the measured thing is the precise cause of succession in the measure.

VI. But on the contrary, this response is easily shown to be false, both ad hominem and simply. Ad hominem indeed, because if succession in the measure stands together with mutation and immutation of the proper subject, or of the thing measured, therefore to argue from the succession of the measure to the transmutation of the subject is not valid, but is a fallacy of Consequent. Yet Scotus himself there confesses that that argumentation is sound, and proceeds from effect to cause. Therefore. — And it is confirmed: because Aristotle used it in Book IV ³, nor is the argumentation of the text other than that one; for if succession is in the measure, we say, therefore it is in the thing measured, because the variation of the thing measured is the cause of succession in the measure. It is most remarkable concerning this man, since he approves the very same reasoning when it is Aristotle's, but condemns it when it is St. Thomas's. And therefore it is necessary that he deny either his own approval or his own disapproval.

But simply put, since it is impossible that the indivisible be certified through its own properties by means of the divisible, therefore it is impossible that it be measured by it. — And the inference holds: because measure is the certification of what is measured. The antecedent, moreover, is evident from its own example: for it would never be known how great an indivisible is by a divisible quantity, if it were such. Hence also in fact, by the quantity of the species in the Eucharist, the body of Christ is not measured, because it is not under it divisibly. And the same judgment holds in the quantity of duration. For if it itself is extended, the indivisible and inextended will never be measured according to duration: for how its natural duration would thus be known cannot even be imagined. Therefore there must correspond to an extended measure something extended as measured, and to the indivisible something indivisible, as the text deduces from Aristotle.

VII. As to the fourth point⁴, the responsive conclusion to the question is: The aevum is a mean between eternity and time, because it is immutable, yet joined to mutability. - It is proved. Eternity is the proper measure of an esse wholly permanent; therefore, in proportion to recession from permanence, distance from eternity is observed; therefore change, or that subject to change, recedes most from it; therefore the mean is that which is immutable, yet annexed to mutation in act or in potency. The second inference is evident: because change is directly opposed to permanence, and eternity itself admits neither change nor anything mutable in any way whatsoever. The last, together with the others, is clearly evident.

VIII. In response to the first, note that Scotus argues against four propositions. The first is affirmative: the operations of an angel are measured by time. The second is negative, virtually included in the preceding one: the operations of an angel are not measured by the aevum. The third is affirmative: the beatific vision in the angels is measured by participated eternity. And all of these are held in this response to the first, as is clear from the text. The fourth, however, is also affirmative: the esse of generable things is measured by time: for this was laid down in the response to the last article of the preceding question⁵, and from the body of this question, when it was said that both that which consists in transmutation, namely motion, and that which is subjected to mutation, which we experience to be our substantial esse, are measured by time.

IX. He therefore argues first, in Book II of the Sentences, distinction II, question IV, against the second proposition, by proving its contradictory, which he holds to be true, namely, the operations of an angel are measured by the aevum, in three ways. First thus: The being (esse) and operation of an angel have a uniform mode of enduring while they endure; therefore they have a measure of the same kind. The antecedent is evident: because each is indivisible, and yet subject to defect. The consequence is proved: because measures are proportioned to different modes of enduring, as is clear in the case of successive and permanent things. — Second thus: The beatific act is measured by the aevum, as is clear from Augustine, On Faith to Peter, chapter XVIII⁶ Therefore. — Third: The operation of an angel is measured neither by eternity nor by time; therefore by the aevum.

X. To make the difficulty of this evident, note that Scotus there posits three measures of duration: time, aevum, and eternity; such that time measures successive being, aevum permanent being yet defectible, while eternity measures a thing altogether indefectible. And therefore he holds that the substantial esse of things to which motion is impossible, and angelic operations, etc., are measured in themselves by aevum. And the whole root of his position is that maxim: Whatever things have a uniform mode of enduring while they endure have a measure of the same kind.

In the present text, however, the measures of duration are distinguished according to the mutability and immutability of things. And this is truly so. For the measure of duration is what certifies the natural duration of a thing in itself; otherwise it would be in vain. Now the natural duration of a thing arises from its mutability or immutability. I speak of the mutable or immutable properly, that is, intrinsically: for it is from such mutability alone that the natural duration of a thing depends. For it makes no difference to the natural duration of a thing whether there is in another a destructive power over it or not, but only whether there is in the thing itself that from which it could fail, or not. And in this Scotus erred manifestly, saying: neither never to be, nor to be able not to be by its own power, varies the measure of a thing. And his foundation is very weak, namely that, if an angel were to be annihilated, it would be measured by the aevum no less. For it is clear that naturally not being at some time, and likewise being able naturally not to be, vary the nature of a thing: because corruptible and incorruptible, as is said in Book X of the Metaphysics⁷, are substance or in substance. They vary, I say, the nature generically, so that nothing is univocal to them. Therefore neither is their proper measure the same. And from this it follows that an angel to be annihilated is measured by the aevum: namely because annihilation does not arise from its nature, but from something extrinsic; for of itself, as far as it is concerned, it would always be.

We say, therefore, that a thing altogether immutable is measured by eternity; but that which is immutable simply and mutable in a certain respect is measured by the aevum; and that which is mutable simply is measured by time. And for this reason, since an angel is immutable substantially, yet mutable accidentally, it is measured by the aevum. Its natural operations, however, because they are naturally mutable, cannot be measured by the aevum: for what is measured by the aevum is aeviternal, and the aeviternal is naturally perpetual; but nothing naturally mutable is naturally perpetual.

XI. But against the Scotist foundation, the proposition in question must first be distinguished⁸. For if it is taken in the composite sense, it is most false. For, as is said in Book I of the Perihermeneias⁹, everything must be while it is; and thus all things that endure, while they endure, have a uniform mode of being, because they are necessarily; and yet they do not have the same measure. Nor does the argument, in this sense, prove that proposition, but rather absolutely or in the divided sense. And then it is said that the mode of enduring is distinguishable in many ways: namely, either according to the necessary and the possible; or according to the permanent and the successive; or according to the defectible and the indefectible. And however it is taken, it is always false. For not everything necessary agrees in measure: but the measure of what is necessary in the absolute sense, as God, is one thing; and that of what is necessary simply, but possible in a certain respect, as are the other incorruptible things, is another. And likewise not all possibles are measured by one measure: since some are measured by continuous time, and others by discrete time, as will be said¹⁰. Similarly, not everything permanent agrees in measure; as is clear in the case of the heavens and the lower bodies. Nor do all successive things: since the measure of successive things by continuous succession is one thing, and that of things succeeding by discrete succession is another, as will be said¹¹. As for the defectible and the indefectible, it is already clear that defectibility is not a mode of the thing, as they take it, but signifies an extrinsic power: and therefore it is not to the point. And it would be nothing less false, from the fact that not everything defectible is certified by a single measure. — From these simple cases, moreover, the answer to the composite modes is clear; for instance, the permanent defectible, and the like.

XII. Therefore, as to the form of the proposition¹², it must be said that to have a uniform mode of enduring intrinsic to the thing and per se respecting the natural duration of the thing, is the reason for a uniform or same measure of duration: and not absolutely to have a uniform mode of enduring. And therefore the antecedent of that consequence is false. And now¹³ its proof has been excluded.

To the second, the antecedent is denied, as is clear in the text. Nor is it true that Augustine says this, except in the sense explained below¹⁴, namely by taking "age" (aevum) for participated eternity.

To the third, the antecedent is denied as to its second part: because the operation of an angel is measured by nunc of time—not continuous time, but discrete.

XIII. Against the first proposition, namely, the operations of an angel are measured by time¹⁵, Scotus argues in the same place. But since his arguments militate against those who hold that they are measured by discrete time, which is a species of quantity, and this proposition is not St. Thomas's (for among us discrete time is nothing other than the number of before and after in discrete motion, which is nothing other than the succession of one spiritual operation to another spiritual operation, such as two acts of understanding without the service of phantasms; but number from the category of Quantity follows upon the division of the continuum: it follows that this time must be a transcendent number, composed of transcendent units): because, I say, it is so, I judged that only one argument of Scotus's should be adduced, namely, because many times are posited without necessity. Times must also be multiplied, not only in several subjects, but in the same subject, with respect to the acts of intellect and will, etc. These things seem inconvenient. Therefore.

XIV. To this it is briefly answered that there is great need of multiplying time in the continuous and the discrete, on account of the spiritual operations of spiritual substances: for otherwise they would lack proportionate measures. For these, since they succeed one another immediately, and are instantaneous in themselves, because each is whole at once, are manifestly raised above continuous time and its instants: yet they do not attain to the excellence of the aevum, because they are naturally corruptible. Therefore either so noble beings must remain without their own measure, or discrete time must be posited, by whose instants those operations themselves are measured in themselves. For these are the very motion of the angels' spirit, whose number is time, whereby Augustine says¹⁶ that God moves the spiritual creature.

But the multiplication of discrete time in several angels or in the same angel, in my judgment, is not necessary except materially: just as continuous time too, by which our things are measured, is multiplied materially in all movable things, and aevum in all aeviternal things. For it seems consonant with reason that, just as all aeviternal things are measured by one most simple aevum, which alone is aevum formally, so every operation of this kind is measured by one most simple operation, or by the most simple now of that operation; and likewise every succession of operations by one most simple succession. Now such an operation and succession is that which is found temporally in the first operating being: and this is clearly the highest angel, in whom, as will be said¹⁷, there is also aevum. And because the operations of the intellect are naturally prior and simpler than the operations of the will, there will be one time for all temporal things of this kind; and this is primarily the measure of the successive operations in the intellect of the first angel, and consequently the measure of the other operations both of that angel and of other spiritual beings. Yet with this there still stands, as has been said, the point that a time of this kind is multiplied, as it were materially, according to the number of the works measured: because one and many, which follow upon ens, are multiplied with the things themselves. But I said as it were materially: because it is not necessary that the proportion of our times to the time whose subject is the first motion, and the proportion of these times to their most simple time, be preserved altogether univocally; rather, it is enough if it is as it were such.

XV. Against the third proposition, namely, the operation of the blessed is measured by participated eternity¹⁸, he argues likewise in Book IV, distinction XLIX, question VI. The operation of the blessed is not more immutable than that which is aeviternal: therefore it is not measured by eternity, but by the aevum. The consequence is evident. And the antecedent is proved. First, because the operation of the blessed is simply less noble than the substance of a blessed angel, since substance is nobler than accident. Second, because the perfection of the operation of the blessed itself is not more immutable than the substance of that same operation, since what belongs to something accidentally is not more immutable than what belongs to it essentially: but it is clear that the substance of an operation is measured by the aevum. Therefore. — Moreover, the eternal, as distinguished from the aeviternal, is not only wholly simultaneous, but is indefectible, lacking a potency toward non-being. But no created thing is of this kind. Therefore.

XVI. To make this difficulty evident, know that, although the aevum is nothing other than a participation of eternity, St. Thomas nevertheless distinguishes here (and in III Contra Gentiles, chapter LXI, and in IV Sentences, dist. XLIX, qu. I, art. 2, qu³. 3) between participated eternity and the aevum; not as the perfect from the less perfect within the same species, but as the more perfect from the less perfect of different orders. For eternity, since it is the proper measure of divine being (esse), participated eternity is consequently the proper measure of the being (esse) of the divine order. Now I call it the being (esse) of the divine order because it is impossible that it should be connatural to any created or creatable creature: on which there will be a fuller discussion in qu. XII. The aevum, however, is the measure of a being (esse) indeed immutable, but of the natural order. And this is the difference per se and first between participated eternity and the aevum: for from this one the other differences flow, and all difficulties are resolved. For since the beatific operation belongs to the divine order, therefore it is said to be measured by eternity participatively. Hence also arises the force of the conclusion impugned by Scotus, namely: the created intellect cannot of itself attain to the beatific operation: therefore it is measured by eternity: for from the first antecedent there follows, therefore it belongs to the divine order; and afterwards, therefore it is measured by eternity.

XVII. Hence, to Scotus's first argument¹⁹, the antecedent is denied. For the operation of the blessed, even granted that in itself it is not more immutable than the aeviternal, is nevertheless of a more immutable order, because divine. And therefore it is said to be and is more immutable according to its genus. — I said, however, granted that it is not etc., because a lesser change suffices for the operation of the blessed not to be than for the substance of an angel: for this requires annihilation, that does not. It is also again more immutable, because it contains more mutable things more immutably. For one beatific vision, without any change whatsoever, contains eminently the visions of all who gaze upon the universe; but no aeviternal thing can ascend to this immutability.

For the first proof, however, it is said that, just as act is simply nobler than potency, and yet substance is simply nobler than accident; and on account of the first, the act of understanding is nobler than prime matter, on account of the second, conversely: so in the case at hand, and this is true, that substance is nobler than accident, and likewise this, that the esse of the divine order is nobler than natural esse. And therefore both are true in different orders. For the substance of an angel is nobler according to the esse of nature: but the beatific operation according to the excellence of the deity. And if we wish to speak properly, they seem to be compared equivocally.

To the second objection, however, it is denied that the substance of the blessed act is measured by the aevum. For the substance of an act and its perfection are one thing in number, and they are measured by one and the same measure. Hence not only the blessedness of the act, but the blessed act itself is measured by participated eternity. — It is also false that the perfection is not more immutable than the substance of the act, in the way in which they are distinguished. For if the substance of the act were without the perfection of blessedness, it would be measured by the instant of discrete time. — Now the perfection of the Godhead brings with it the measure of eternity, not in the way in which an accident is superadded; but rather in the way in which a difference, coming to a genus, confers upon it a specific nature. And therefore the proof to the contrary, drawn from what inheres accidentally, has no force. For it is evident that a generic or quasi-generic nature, which of itself is not of such a kind or of such a degree of perfection, attains so great and such a perfection from the perfection of the adventitious difference—which difference is nevertheless conceded to be accidental to the genus—that there results one perfect being. And so it is in the case at hand.

XVIII. To the second objection,²⁰ the principal answer is that, strictly speaking, the blessed one, as such, lacks a potency for not being blessed; just as heaven lacks a potency for not being round. For just as prime matter, if it received one form equivalent to all the forms of generable and corruptible things, would lack a potency for not being that form; so too the intellect possessing the act of beatitude lacks a potency for not being that act. For that act is perfect in all goods, not by aggregation but by elevation: and therefore it makes the blessed one blessed and immutable. - But if the term is extended, as the objector uses it, calling potency for non-being logical or objective potency, it is said that what is eternal by essence must lack all potency for non-being; but this is not so for what is eternal by participation; rather it suffices that it be distinguished from the everlasting by a diversity of order, since the latter belongs to the eternal order by essence, while this belongs to nature.

XIX. Against the fourth proposition²¹ Scotus argues, in the Second Book, at the place cited above²², in no other way than against the first, namely: Substantial being (esse) has the same mode of enduring while it lasts as the aeviternal has, because it is without succession, etc.: therefore. — But to this one need not reply otherwise than above²³: for the measures are not distinguished by having being (esse) in a successive or permanent manner, but by the mutable and the immutable, as was said.

XX. But note here that Scotus, in the same place, tries to solve the argument of St. Thomas, made in response to the third objection in the preceding article, namely, that motion is the measure not only of motion but also of rest. For he says that the substance of an ox is measured absolutely by aevum, but its rest by time; and nothing else follows from that argument. — But this response is not a sufficient evasion: since time is shown in the text to measure not only rest, but the thing at rest; because everything at rest is movable; and everything changeable, insofar as it is changeable, is measured by time. Now it is clear that in respect of substance we are changeable: therefore in respect of substance we are temporal. And here lies the force of the argument. Motion and rest taken substantially, that is, substantial change and rest under substantial being, are measured by time not only in act but in potency: therefore our substantial being is measured by time. The antecedent is clear from the fact that act and potency belong to the measure of the same order, as is had in I Caeli²⁴ and IV Physic.²⁵. The consequence, moreover, holds from the fact that such potency is substantial, as is said in X Metaphys.²⁶.

XXI. In response to the second argument, a doubt arises concerning that proposition, aevum is a whole all at once. It is indeed attacked by that opinion refuted in the text,²⁷ as follows: Aevum is continuously produced by God, and therefore it can fall away from being; and consequently it can be annihilated, and then created again. Therefore it is not a whole all at once. — And you have this in Scotus and in Capreolus, on the Second Book of the Sentences, distinction II, question II.²⁸

To these points the answer is easily clear from what has been said ²⁹. For the aevum, or aeviternity, does not continuously come into being, strictly speaking; rather it is conserved by God. Nor can it fail of being from within itself: but God can annihilate it. And therefore it does not follow, therefore it is not a whole all at once. For if it could of itself be more or less, or precisely so much, with respect to duration, then it would not be a whole all at once; but from the fact that God can do this, it does not follow in the nature of the aevum or aeviternity. For the nature of a thing is not to be measured by divine powers, but by its own. - In the case, however, of annihilation and re-creation, it is said that there would be a succession of instants measuring the creation, annihilation, and re-creation, and not the aevum itself. For those instants are nothing of the aevum; rather they are parts of discrete time, of which we have already spoken ³⁰. For the judgment concerning that angel would then be the same as it would be concerning two angels, one of whom would be created before the other: for then that one angel would use the aevum as if he were two.

XXII. In response to the third, note that the esse of an angel is distinguished there in two ways. In one way, absolutely: and thus it has neither past nor future, but is subject to the divine power, and can be non-being through the power in another. In the other way, as coexisting with the divisions of real or imaginary time: and it has past and future. And thus we say that it was and that it will be. And thus, with respect to the future it is subject to the divine power: not with respect to the past, because this is supposed to be incompossible, as is said in the text. - And note that the authority of Jerome to Marcella³¹: God alone does not know past and future, and similarly Augustine's³²: the present, if it stands still, is eternity, and similar ones, are understood with respect to themselves and all things that are in them. For the angel, with respect to its affections, has past and future: and likewise the aevum, with respect to its adjuncts, does not stand still, as was said in the present article³³.