Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, another really. – In the body, five points. First, he shows that the doubt in this question is not what is sought, but the reason of what is sought.

Second, he reports a certain opinion concerning the question (namely, the reason for the otherness between these): namely, that these differ on account of having a beginning and an end and not having them.

Third, it is rejected: because this is per accidens. It is proved: because, with this difference removed, another one posited by Boethius would remain; namely, that of being whole at once and being successive.

Fourth, the rejected opinion is saved according to a twofold sense: namely, by understanding that distinction with respect to what is measured; or with respect to principle and end in potency.

Fifth, the question is answered, insofar as it is open to doubt, by a single conclusion that in a certain way embraces all that has been said. And it is this: Between eternity and time, the difference per se and first is that of being whole at once and not being of this kind; so that the remaining differences follow upon this one. And from what has been said, this is left evident.

II. Note here that the opinion recited in the text can have three senses: first, of having a beginning and an end in itself as measure, yet in act; second, in the things measured, likewise in act; third, in potency, yet in itself as measure. And because, when some difference is assigned to something, it is understood that that difference belongs to it in itself; and again, when we say "beginning" or "end" absolutely, it is understood in act; therefore the first sense is rejected absolutely. But the second and third, which can be tolerated by way of exposition, are then set forth as true. Yet since they touched not the radical difference but a secondary one, he therefore, in answering at last, laid bare the root. All things are clear in the text.

III. Concerning that statement in the second sense, namely that the motion of the heavens, if it were eternal, would not be measured by time according to the whole, but according to its parts, a doubt arises from Scotus, in the Second Book, distinction II, question III. But since this pertains to Book IV of the Physics, at text 117 ¹, therefore it is omitted here, where it is not treated deliberately.

And likewise the doubt concerning the identity of now throughout the whole of time, touched upon in the response to the second argument, when it is treated in that same fourth book, from text 103 up to text 108², will there, God willing, be treated; and a special question concerns these matters.

IV. In response to the third, there is a doubt concerning that statement, namely that the esse of generable things is measured by time. For Scotus argues against it in the Second Book, distinction II, question IV, holding that it is measured absolutely by the aevum. But since in the following article the nature of the aevum is to be explained, and Scotus uses the same argument both against this and against the measure of angelic operation, therefore let this be deferred to the following article³.