Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

A clear title. – In the body, four parts: first, the manner of investigating the divine eternity; second, he pursues it with respect to the parts placed in the intrinsic definition, there: For ¹; third, with respect to the parts placed in the definition as added, there: Likewise those things are said ²; fourth, applying everything to the matter at hand, the question is answered affirmatively, there: Therefore thus ³.

II. As to the first point: Eternity is to be known through time. – It is proved: because it is related to it as the simple to the composite. For eternity, as will be shown⁴, is unity, while time is number: the former without succession, the latter consisting of before and after, etc. Now it is evident that number is composite with respect to unity: and likewise before and after compose, with respect to that which stands without these differences.

III. As to the second: The intelligibility of eternity consists in the apprehension of the uniformity of that which is wholly outside motion. — It is explained. The intelligibility of time consists in the numbering of before and after in motion: therefore. The consequence is proved: because they are proportionally related, just as time is to the succession of part after part in motion, so is eternity to a thing lacking these.

IV. Note here that this proposition as set down in the text, namely the ratio of eternity consists in the apprehension of uniformity, can be expounded in two ways with respect to the phrase in apprehension. In one way, so that it signifies eternity's consisting in being apprehended or known: thus that eternity would be completive by the soul, just as is said of time. And thus, in my judgment, it is not to be understood: because the unity of everlasting uniformity exists in act without the act of the soul, no less than does the unity of the divine essence. In another way, so that it signifies the same as in objective conception, which by frequent usage we call a ratio; as if he had said: the ratio of eternity consists in apprehension, that is, in the ratio of uniformity. And this is the intended meaning.

Yet it can still be explained in two ways. For it may be interpreted formally or materially: formally, indeed, so that the ratio of eternity is uniformity itself; but materially, so that it is the unity of uniformity. And although some think this text must be interpreted materially, on account of the words of St. Thomas in I Sent., dist. XIX, qu. II, art. I (where he says that just as numbered before and after constitute time, so the permanence of the act as one by unity, insofar as it has the ratio of a measure, is eternity); and from this they think all the objections of Aureol, recited in the ninth distinction of the First Book ⁵ by Capreolus, are answered—objections which proceed against this saying as understood formally and not materially—nevertheless I understand this text formally, as well as the others, moved by this reason: nothing compels a material sense; for the formal understanding is always preferred to the others, provided it can be preserved equally.

Know, therefore, that since uniformity is a species of unity (for it speaks of unity contracted to a form: for we say synonymously of a uniform thing that it is a thing of one form), to add unity to uniformity is a redundancy; just as to add animal to man. Hence in I Sent.⁶ it is not said that "uniformity acts as one," but that "permanence acts as one." And accordingly, to say that eternity is uniformity and to say that it is unity do not differ, except that uniformity is said more specifically, more perfectly, and better; just as the proximate genus, rather than the remote, better explains the nature of a thing universally. And therefore deservedly in this gloss, published last, the better explanation has been given. The account of eternity, then, consists in the account of uniformity, insofar as uniformity has the character of a measure. –

It is clear, moreover, that this is the meaning of the text, from the fact that the apprehension (that is, the account) of uniformity is expressly set in opposition to the numbering of the prior and posterior of motion.

V. But Aureol's arguments are easily answered. For they consist in these two points. The first is this. Uniformity is immutability itself, and consequently it is that which is measured by eternity; therefore it is not formally eternity. The consequence holds: because immutability is one attribute, and eternity another. The antecedent is proved: because uniformity is opposed to motion with respect to its variety; therefore. – The second is this. Time is not formally the disformity of motion; therefore eternity is not formally the uniformity of what is outside motion. And the inference holds from the course of this passage of the text.

To these things it is answered, by showing how uniformity is related to immutability. For a thing, as was made clear in the preceding question⁷, is said to be and is immutable, through the negation of any potency whatever to be otherwise: and from this there arises in it the negation of all succession, and consequently of all number of prior and posterior. This, however, when the ratio of measure is added, is to be uniform. For uniformity posits nothing other than one (to which first of all the ratio of measure belongs, as is said in Book X of the Metaphysics⁸) in form, taking form in the most universal way. And therefore we use the name of uniformity also in motion, just as unity likewise extends to all things. And hence it comes about that uniformity is manifold, according to the things to which it is applied, just as unity is: for the uniformity of motion is one thing, that of a permanent thing another, that of what is measured another, that of the measure another. And yet one arguing uses the word "uniformity" as if it were univocal, contrary to the doctrine of Aristotle, Book IV of the Metaphysics⁹

Formally, therefore, against Aureol's arguments, it is denied that uniformity is formally immutability: rather, it is as its passion. And likewise it is denied that it is what is measured: rather, it is the measure. As to the proof, however, it is said that uniformity is opposed to the variety of motion not absolutely, but to motion in the way in which we first call motion uniform. But this is not what is being discussed here: rather, uniformity is being discussed insofar as it is the measure of immutability. – To the second, however, the inference is denied: since the disformity of motion and the uniformity of an immobile thing are not proportionally related to the ratio of time and eternity. For for the ratio of eternity, the unity of an immutable form suffices; but for the ratio of time, the diversity of the form of motion does not suffice, but there is required a diversity of such a form, namely of a prior one after a posterior one as such. And therefore, since the disformity of motion signifies nothing but a diverse form of motion, it does not posit number of such a form of motion according to priority and posteriority; and consequently it does not suffice for the ratio of time. The uniformity of an immobile thing, however, because it posits the unity of every form, that is, of the condition of the immutable thing, embraces all the constituents of eternity formally.

VI. As to the third point¹⁰: A wholly unchangeable being lacks a beginning and an end. – It is proved: because it lacks succession. This is explained: because what is measured by time has a beginning and an end in time, from the fact that everything moved has a beginning and an end.

VII. Note here briefly, since these points are taken from Book IV of the Physics, that the present discussion is directly concerned with the beginning and end of duration, except for the last proposition, in which it is proved that what is measured by time has the termini of its duration from the termini of the subject of the motion. For he is not speaking of the termini of the duration of the subject, since a mobile thing, say the heaven, could be posited as eternal; but rather of the termini of the magnitude of the subject. And his intention is that, because every mobile thing begins to be moved from some terminus within itself and is moved up to another terminus within itself, therefore everything measured by time has a beginning and an end of its duration. And this is an excellent reason a priori: namely, because prior and posterior in motion and time derive from the prior and posterior of the magnitude of the mobile thing and of the space, as is clear in Book IV ¹¹ and Book VI of the Physics¹² Now I have called "terminus from which" and "terminus to which" either those which are such both formally and materially, as in rectilinear motion; or formally only, as in circular motion. Nor does it stand in the way if the heaven is posited as having been moved from eternity: because, as is said in Book II of On the Heavens¹³ it suffices that it began virtually, that is, that it have within itself that from which, had it begun, its motion would have been initiated, say the point of Aries.

VIII. As to the fourth¹⁴, the elicited responsive conclusion is stated affirmatively, namely: That definition is fitting. –

It is proved: because eternity is made known from two things: namely, from its proper measure, in the words interminabilis vitae; and from its proper quiddity, in the words tota simul existens.

IX. Note here that, because the definition is investigated through a compositional process aided by division, the text accordingly distinguished, on the side of the measure, the measure of duration as measured by the mode of successive number and by the mode of an immobile unity: and having excluded the first, because it is time, it introduced the second. On the side of the thing measured, however, it distinguished the thing measured into that which is terminated at beginning and end, and into that which is unbounded on both sides: and having excluded the first, because it is temporal, it introduced the second. And since these points are posited in the definition of eternity brought forward, the conclusion reached is fitting. – Nor does it matter that the word perfect was omitted: first, because it was touched upon implicitly, by positing the uniformity of what is altogether immobile; for such is not the uniformity of the now of time, since it is not outside motion. Second, because this was to be explained in the reply to the fifth objection.

A clear title. – In the body, two points. First, he responds directly to the question in the affirmative: God is supremely eternal. It is proved. God is supremely immutable; therefore He is supremely eternal. – The inference is proved: because eternity follows upon immutability, just as time follows upon motion.

II. Second, the manner in which God is eternal is assigned by positing another conclusion, namely: God is His own eternity. For this is to say that He is not eternal denominatively, but essentially. – This conclusion he first shows to contain within itself a certain singular excellence of God; second, he proves it; third, he explains it.

For since eternity is a species of duration, in saying that God is his own eternity it is also said that he is his own duration. This, however—that a thing should be its own duration—is singular in God: for it is said to belong to no other in the letter.

The conclusion is then proved, together with the singularity contained within it. God is His own uniform esse, and nothing other than God is its own esse: therefore He alone is His own duration, which in Him is eternity.

It is finally declared by way of similitude: because just as it is its essence, so too is it its eternity.

III. Concerning the force and meaning of the proof of the second conclusion, note that res is here taken for a subsistent thing, to which, strictly speaking, there belongs only esse. Thus the text does not intend that every thing other than God be distinguished from its duration, since time is not distinguished from it; rather, it intends that no thing which both is what it is and endures is its own duration. The force of the argument consists in this: since a thing, its esse, and its duration are related in a certain order (for duration does not belong to a thing except through esse as mediator; for a thing does not endure except by reason of its esse; because, namely, it retains esse, every thing endures, and on account of nothing else): when, I say, this is so, it follows that if one of the extremes is not identical with the middle term, then neither is it identical with the other extreme; for the extremes stand farther apart from each other than from the middle. Now an enduring thing other than God, which is one extreme, is not identical with its esse, as we have supposed. Therefore neither is it identical with its duration, which is the other extreme.

IV. Concerning the same proof, a doubt from Aureol, as reported by Capreolus, in the ninth distinction of the First Book¹, arises. For he attacks what is said implicitly there, namely that God's eternity is formally duration. Since every duration, when compared to another, is greater, lesser, or equal: eternity is not of this kind. It is proved: because it cannot be understood to be greater, with "before" post or "after" ante excluded, in lasting longer; therefore every greater duration has "before" ante or "after" post; which is repugnant to eternity.

V. To this, briefly, one can reply in two ways. First, by denying the minor. And in answer to the proof, it is said that to include a greater duration before and after within itself can happen in two ways: in one way formally, in another way virtually and eminently, just as heat is in the sun; and that eternity, which is greater than the others, is truly said of it that it endures before or after some time, because it possesses these beforehand within itself eminently. – Second, one can reply, strictly speaking, by denying the major. For comparison properly occurs only among things of one and the same nature; but eternity is a duration of a nature altogether different from time. And this is so speaking of it in itself: although, conceived as coexisting, eternity is compared with time even by illustrious men.

VI. In response to the first, note two things. First is that, just as a moving point is said to cause a line, and yet it does not cause that line to be in any genus of cause; and therefore it is not the cause of the line in real being, but is its cause in cognized being, because it produces knowledge of it in us: so too a standing now is said to cause eternity, not in real being, but in cognized being, because it causes the concept of it in us. And just as it is impossible for a point to move, and yet we conceive and say that a point moved—that is, if it were moved—would cause a line: so, given that it is impossible for the now to stand still, nevertheless we say very well that a standing now makes eternity, that is, if it stood still, it would constitute eternity.

Second is that from this it is evident how vain was the labor of Aureol's arguments against us, where above², in attacking this saying of Boethius and St. Thomas, because the now cannot be conceived as standing still, and in removing the now from God. For he equivocates concerning the now, indeed he presupposes that only the now of time is given: whereas the now of eternity is of another account than the now of time. And again, as was said, the very now of time, if it stood still, would constitute eternity: just as a point, if it were moved, would make a line. Therefore I judged it unnecessary to bring forward his objections: for they are most easily resolved by these considerations.

In the title, proper is distinguished against common. – In the body, two conclusions. The first is: Eternity truly and properly exists in God alone. It is proved. God alone is entirely immutable; therefore God alone is truly and properly eternal. – The inference holds: because eternity follows upon immutability.

The second is: Eternity is found participatively in other things. It is proved. Immutability is participated in four ways by other things; therefore, eternity. – The inference holds: because insofar as some things are immutable, to that extent they are eternal. The antecedent is explained according to the four degrees of immutability. The first is according to long duration: and in this respect things are corruptible but very long-lived, such as mountains and hills. The second is according to perpetuity with respect to the whole: and in this respect the elements are corruptible with respect to their parts but not with respect to the whole—although in the text these degrees are enumerated in an inverted order. The third is according to substantial incorruptibility simply speaking: and in this respect are heavenly bodies and angels. The fourth is according to the immutability of operation, entirely of one and the same number: and in this respect are the blessed as such.

II. In response to the third, if you do not know, novice, how it is to be understood that "necessary" signifies a certain mode of truth, recall book two of Perihermenias¹, where the modal propositions are treated; and you will see that "necessary," in its signified act, adds above the proposition a mode of composition, in which alone truth is found. And thus you will understand that "necessary," in its exercised act, of which this argument makes mention, truly exercises the mode of composition, by reason of which both the principles and the conclusions of demonstrations are called necessary.

In the title, another really. – In the body, five points. First, he shows that the doubt in this question is not what is sought, but the reason of what is sought.

Second, he reports a certain opinion concerning the question (namely, the reason for the otherness between these): namely, that these differ on account of having a beginning and an end and not having them.

Third, it is rejected: because this is per accidens. It is proved: because, with this difference removed, another one posited by Boethius would remain; namely, that of being whole at once and being successive.

Fourth, the rejected opinion is saved according to a twofold sense: namely, by understanding that distinction with respect to what is measured; or with respect to principle and end in potency.

Fifth, the question is answered, insofar as it is open to doubt, by a single conclusion that in a certain way embraces all that has been said. And it is this: Between eternity and time, the difference per se and first is that of being whole at once and not being of this kind; so that the remaining differences follow upon this one. And from what has been said, this is left evident.

II. Note here that the opinion recited in the text can have three senses: first, of having a beginning and an end in itself as measure, yet in act; second, in the things measured, likewise in act; third, in potency, yet in itself as measure. And because, when some difference is assigned to something, it is understood that that difference belongs to it in itself; and again, when we say "beginning" or "end" absolutely, it is understood in act; therefore the first sense is rejected absolutely. But the second and third, which can be tolerated by way of exposition, are then set forth as true. Yet since they touched not the radical difference but a secondary one, he therefore, in answering at last, laid bare the root. All things are clear in the text.

III. Concerning that statement in the second sense, namely that the motion of the heavens, if it were eternal, would not be measured by time according to the whole, but according to its parts, a doubt arises from Scotus, in the Second Book, distinction II, question III. But since this pertains to Book IV of the Physics, at text 117 ¹, therefore it is omitted here, where it is not treated deliberately.

And likewise the doubt concerning the identity of now throughout the whole of time, touched upon in the response to the second argument, when it is treated in that same fourth book, from text 103 up to text 108², will there, God willing, be treated; and a special question concerns these matters.

IV. In response to the third, there is a doubt concerning that statement, namely that the esse of generable things is measured by time. For Scotus argues against it in the Second Book, distinction II, question IV, holding that it is measured absolutely by the aevum. But since in the following article the nature of the aevum is to be explained, and Scotus uses the same argument both against this and against the measure of angelic operation, therefore let this be deferred to the following article³.

A clear title. - The body of the article has four parts: first, he states what in this question is clear and what is ambiguous; second, he treats a certain opinion; third, another; fourth, his own, answering the question¹.

II. As to the first point, it is clear that the aevum is intermediate between eternity and time: it is ambiguous, however, in what way it is intermediate, on account of the multitude of opinions.

III. As to the second point, first there is set forth the opinion holding that mediation is found in having a beginning and an end. Second, this is refuted: because such mediation is accidental, as is clear if everlasting things had been produced from eternity.

IV. As to the third point, first is set down the second opinion, which says that mediation is found in being without innovation and vetustation, and yet having a before and after; insofar as in the first respect it agrees with eternity, and in the second with time. — Second, it is disproved in two ways, according to the two understandings it can have: namely, either by referring both conditions to the aevum itself; or by referring the second to the aevum, and the first to the aeviternal as measured by the aevum.

Against the first sense he argues thus. Before and after according to duration cannot exist simultaneously: therefore, when the prior recedes, the posterior arrives anew: therefore, if there is a before and after in the aevum, there will be renewal and growing old. — Against the second sense thus. The aeviternal is neither capable of renewal nor of growing old: therefore it is unchangeable: therefore its measure lacks before and after. The antecedent is yours. The first consequence both is evident in itself and is proved from Book IV of the Physics: because changeability is the proper cause of growing old; therefore unchangeability is not of growing old, in accordance with that saying, if affirmation is the cause of affirmation² etc. But the second consequence is proved from Book IV of the Physics: because the changeability of what is measured is the cause of before and after in the measure; therefore unchangeability will be the cause of the negation of before and after in the same, in accordance with the same root.

V. Concerning these arguments, note that Scotus, in Book II, dist. II, qu. II, does not follow this opinion; yet he strives to solve these arguments of the text, defending them according to their sense, giving this example. If flesh were posited as having no part and part under quantity, then there would be parts in the measure, but not in that whose measure it is. And so in the case at hand, the esse of an angel is without newness: and yet the measure is successive. Hence, to the argument made directly against this, he responds by denying, in his judgment, that the mutability of the measured thing is the precise cause of succession in the measure.

VI. But on the contrary, this response is easily shown to be false, both ad hominem and simply. Ad hominem indeed, because if succession in the measure stands together with mutation and immutation of the proper subject, or of the thing measured, therefore to argue from the succession of the measure to the transmutation of the subject is not valid, but is a fallacy of Consequent. Yet Scotus himself there confesses that that argumentation is sound, and proceeds from effect to cause. Therefore. — And it is confirmed: because Aristotle used it in Book IV ³, nor is the argumentation of the text other than that one; for if succession is in the measure, we say, therefore it is in the thing measured, because the variation of the thing measured is the cause of succession in the measure. It is most remarkable concerning this man, since he approves the very same reasoning when it is Aristotle's, but condemns it when it is St. Thomas's. And therefore it is necessary that he deny either his own approval or his own disapproval.

But simply put, since it is impossible that the indivisible be certified through its own properties by means of the divisible, therefore it is impossible that it be measured by it. — And the inference holds: because measure is the certification of what is measured. The antecedent, moreover, is evident from its own example: for it would never be known how great an indivisible is by a divisible quantity, if it were such. Hence also in fact, by the quantity of the species in the Eucharist, the body of Christ is not measured, because it is not under it divisibly. And the same judgment holds in the quantity of duration. For if it itself is extended, the indivisible and inextended will never be measured according to duration: for how its natural duration would thus be known cannot even be imagined. Therefore there must correspond to an extended measure something extended as measured, and to the indivisible something indivisible, as the text deduces from Aristotle.

VII. As to the fourth point⁴, the responsive conclusion to the question is: The aevum is a mean between eternity and time, because it is immutable, yet joined to mutability. - It is proved. Eternity is the proper measure of an esse wholly permanent; therefore, in proportion to recession from permanence, distance from eternity is observed; therefore change, or that subject to change, recedes most from it; therefore the mean is that which is immutable, yet annexed to mutation in act or in potency. The second inference is evident: because change is directly opposed to permanence, and eternity itself admits neither change nor anything mutable in any way whatsoever. The last, together with the others, is clearly evident.

VIII. In response to the first, note that Scotus argues against four propositions. The first is affirmative: the operations of an angel are measured by time. The second is negative, virtually included in the preceding one: the operations of an angel are not measured by the aevum. The third is affirmative: the beatific vision in the angels is measured by participated eternity. And all of these are held in this response to the first, as is clear from the text. The fourth, however, is also affirmative: the esse of generable things is measured by time: for this was laid down in the response to the last article of the preceding question⁵, and from the body of this question, when it was said that both that which consists in transmutation, namely motion, and that which is subjected to mutation, which we experience to be our substantial esse, are measured by time.

IX. He therefore argues first, in Book II of the Sentences, distinction II, question IV, against the second proposition, by proving its contradictory, which he holds to be true, namely, the operations of an angel are measured by the aevum, in three ways. First thus: The being (esse) and operation of an angel have a uniform mode of enduring while they endure; therefore they have a measure of the same kind. The antecedent is evident: because each is indivisible, and yet subject to defect. The consequence is proved: because measures are proportioned to different modes of enduring, as is clear in the case of successive and permanent things. — Second thus: The beatific act is measured by the aevum, as is clear from Augustine, On Faith to Peter, chapter XVIII⁶ Therefore. — Third: The operation of an angel is measured neither by eternity nor by time; therefore by the aevum.

X. To make the difficulty of this evident, note that Scotus there posits three measures of duration: time, aevum, and eternity; such that time measures successive being, aevum permanent being yet defectible, while eternity measures a thing altogether indefectible. And therefore he holds that the substantial esse of things to which motion is impossible, and angelic operations, etc., are measured in themselves by aevum. And the whole root of his position is that maxim: Whatever things have a uniform mode of enduring while they endure have a measure of the same kind.

In the present text, however, the measures of duration are distinguished according to the mutability and immutability of things. And this is truly so. For the measure of duration is what certifies the natural duration of a thing in itself; otherwise it would be in vain. Now the natural duration of a thing arises from its mutability or immutability. I speak of the mutable or immutable properly, that is, intrinsically: for it is from such mutability alone that the natural duration of a thing depends. For it makes no difference to the natural duration of a thing whether there is in another a destructive power over it or not, but only whether there is in the thing itself that from which it could fail, or not. And in this Scotus erred manifestly, saying: neither never to be, nor to be able not to be by its own power, varies the measure of a thing. And his foundation is very weak, namely that, if an angel were to be annihilated, it would be measured by the aevum no less. For it is clear that naturally not being at some time, and likewise being able naturally not to be, vary the nature of a thing: because corruptible and incorruptible, as is said in Book X of the Metaphysics⁷, are substance or in substance. They vary, I say, the nature generically, so that nothing is univocal to them. Therefore neither is their proper measure the same. And from this it follows that an angel to be annihilated is measured by the aevum: namely because annihilation does not arise from its nature, but from something extrinsic; for of itself, as far as it is concerned, it would always be.

We say, therefore, that a thing altogether immutable is measured by eternity; but that which is immutable simply and mutable in a certain respect is measured by the aevum; and that which is mutable simply is measured by time. And for this reason, since an angel is immutable substantially, yet mutable accidentally, it is measured by the aevum. Its natural operations, however, because they are naturally mutable, cannot be measured by the aevum: for what is measured by the aevum is aeviternal, and the aeviternal is naturally perpetual; but nothing naturally mutable is naturally perpetual.

XI. But against the Scotist foundation, the proposition in question must first be distinguished⁸. For if it is taken in the composite sense, it is most false. For, as is said in Book I of the Perihermeneias⁹, everything must be while it is; and thus all things that endure, while they endure, have a uniform mode of being, because they are necessarily; and yet they do not have the same measure. Nor does the argument, in this sense, prove that proposition, but rather absolutely or in the divided sense. And then it is said that the mode of enduring is distinguishable in many ways: namely, either according to the necessary and the possible; or according to the permanent and the successive; or according to the defectible and the indefectible. And however it is taken, it is always false. For not everything necessary agrees in measure: but the measure of what is necessary in the absolute sense, as God, is one thing; and that of what is necessary simply, but possible in a certain respect, as are the other incorruptible things, is another. And likewise not all possibles are measured by one measure: since some are measured by continuous time, and others by discrete time, as will be said¹⁰. Similarly, not everything permanent agrees in measure; as is clear in the case of the heavens and the lower bodies. Nor do all successive things: since the measure of successive things by continuous succession is one thing, and that of things succeeding by discrete succession is another, as will be said¹¹. As for the defectible and the indefectible, it is already clear that defectibility is not a mode of the thing, as they take it, but signifies an extrinsic power: and therefore it is not to the point. And it would be nothing less false, from the fact that not everything defectible is certified by a single measure. — From these simple cases, moreover, the answer to the composite modes is clear; for instance, the permanent defectible, and the like.

XII. Therefore, as to the form of the proposition¹², it must be said that to have a uniform mode of enduring intrinsic to the thing and per se respecting the natural duration of the thing, is the reason for a uniform or same measure of duration: and not absolutely to have a uniform mode of enduring. And therefore the antecedent of that consequence is false. And now¹³ its proof has been excluded.

To the second, the antecedent is denied, as is clear in the text. Nor is it true that Augustine says this, except in the sense explained below¹⁴, namely by taking "age" (aevum) for participated eternity.

To the third, the antecedent is denied as to its second part: because the operation of an angel is measured by nunc of time—not continuous time, but discrete.

XIII. Against the first proposition, namely, the operations of an angel are measured by time¹⁵, Scotus argues in the same place. But since his arguments militate against those who hold that they are measured by discrete time, which is a species of quantity, and this proposition is not St. Thomas's (for among us discrete time is nothing other than the number of before and after in discrete motion, which is nothing other than the succession of one spiritual operation to another spiritual operation, such as two acts of understanding without the service of phantasms; but number from the category of Quantity follows upon the division of the continuum: it follows that this time must be a transcendent number, composed of transcendent units): because, I say, it is so, I judged that only one argument of Scotus's should be adduced, namely, because many times are posited without necessity. Times must also be multiplied, not only in several subjects, but in the same subject, with respect to the acts of intellect and will, etc. These things seem inconvenient. Therefore.

XIV. To this it is briefly answered that there is great need of multiplying time in the continuous and the discrete, on account of the spiritual operations of spiritual substances: for otherwise they would lack proportionate measures. For these, since they succeed one another immediately, and are instantaneous in themselves, because each is whole at once, are manifestly raised above continuous time and its instants: yet they do not attain to the excellence of the aevum, because they are naturally corruptible. Therefore either so noble beings must remain without their own measure, or discrete time must be posited, by whose instants those operations themselves are measured in themselves. For these are the very motion of the angels' spirit, whose number is time, whereby Augustine says¹⁶ that God moves the spiritual creature.

But the multiplication of discrete time in several angels or in the same angel, in my judgment, is not necessary except materially: just as continuous time too, by which our things are measured, is multiplied materially in all movable things, and aevum in all aeviternal things. For it seems consonant with reason that, just as all aeviternal things are measured by one most simple aevum, which alone is aevum formally, so every operation of this kind is measured by one most simple operation, or by the most simple now of that operation; and likewise every succession of operations by one most simple succession. Now such an operation and succession is that which is found temporally in the first operating being: and this is clearly the highest angel, in whom, as will be said¹⁷, there is also aevum. And because the operations of the intellect are naturally prior and simpler than the operations of the will, there will be one time for all temporal things of this kind; and this is primarily the measure of the successive operations in the intellect of the first angel, and consequently the measure of the other operations both of that angel and of other spiritual beings. Yet with this there still stands, as has been said, the point that a time of this kind is multiplied, as it were materially, according to the number of the works measured: because one and many, which follow upon ens, are multiplied with the things themselves. But I said as it were materially: because it is not necessary that the proportion of our times to the time whose subject is the first motion, and the proportion of these times to their most simple time, be preserved altogether univocally; rather, it is enough if it is as it were such.

XV. Against the third proposition, namely, the operation of the blessed is measured by participated eternity¹⁸, he argues likewise in Book IV, distinction XLIX, question VI. The operation of the blessed is not more immutable than that which is aeviternal: therefore it is not measured by eternity, but by the aevum. The consequence is evident. And the antecedent is proved. First, because the operation of the blessed is simply less noble than the substance of a blessed angel, since substance is nobler than accident. Second, because the perfection of the operation of the blessed itself is not more immutable than the substance of that same operation, since what belongs to something accidentally is not more immutable than what belongs to it essentially: but it is clear that the substance of an operation is measured by the aevum. Therefore. — Moreover, the eternal, as distinguished from the aeviternal, is not only wholly simultaneous, but is indefectible, lacking a potency toward non-being. But no created thing is of this kind. Therefore.

XVI. To make this difficulty evident, know that, although the aevum is nothing other than a participation of eternity, St. Thomas nevertheless distinguishes here (and in III Contra Gentiles, chapter LXI, and in IV Sentences, dist. XLIX, qu. I, art. 2, qu³. 3) between participated eternity and the aevum; not as the perfect from the less perfect within the same species, but as the more perfect from the less perfect of different orders. For eternity, since it is the proper measure of divine being (esse), participated eternity is consequently the proper measure of the being (esse) of the divine order. Now I call it the being (esse) of the divine order because it is impossible that it should be connatural to any created or creatable creature: on which there will be a fuller discussion in qu. XII. The aevum, however, is the measure of a being (esse) indeed immutable, but of the natural order. And this is the difference per se and first between participated eternity and the aevum: for from this one the other differences flow, and all difficulties are resolved. For since the beatific operation belongs to the divine order, therefore it is said to be measured by eternity participatively. Hence also arises the force of the conclusion impugned by Scotus, namely: the created intellect cannot of itself attain to the beatific operation: therefore it is measured by eternity: for from the first antecedent there follows, therefore it belongs to the divine order; and afterwards, therefore it is measured by eternity.

XVII. Hence, to Scotus's first argument¹⁹, the antecedent is denied. For the operation of the blessed, even granted that in itself it is not more immutable than the aeviternal, is nevertheless of a more immutable order, because divine. And therefore it is said to be and is more immutable according to its genus. — I said, however, granted that it is not etc., because a lesser change suffices for the operation of the blessed not to be than for the substance of an angel: for this requires annihilation, that does not. It is also again more immutable, because it contains more mutable things more immutably. For one beatific vision, without any change whatsoever, contains eminently the visions of all who gaze upon the universe; but no aeviternal thing can ascend to this immutability.

For the first proof, however, it is said that, just as act is simply nobler than potency, and yet substance is simply nobler than accident; and on account of the first, the act of understanding is nobler than prime matter, on account of the second, conversely: so in the case at hand, and this is true, that substance is nobler than accident, and likewise this, that the esse of the divine order is nobler than natural esse. And therefore both are true in different orders. For the substance of an angel is nobler according to the esse of nature: but the beatific operation according to the excellence of the deity. And if we wish to speak properly, they seem to be compared equivocally.

To the second objection, however, it is denied that the substance of the blessed act is measured by the aevum. For the substance of an act and its perfection are one thing in number, and they are measured by one and the same measure. Hence not only the blessedness of the act, but the blessed act itself is measured by participated eternity. — It is also false that the perfection is not more immutable than the substance of the act, in the way in which they are distinguished. For if the substance of the act were without the perfection of blessedness, it would be measured by the instant of discrete time. — Now the perfection of the Godhead brings with it the measure of eternity, not in the way in which an accident is superadded; but rather in the way in which a difference, coming to a genus, confers upon it a specific nature. And therefore the proof to the contrary, drawn from what inheres accidentally, has no force. For it is evident that a generic or quasi-generic nature, which of itself is not of such a kind or of such a degree of perfection, attains so great and such a perfection from the perfection of the adventitious difference—which difference is nevertheless conceded to be accidental to the genus—that there results one perfect being. And so it is in the case at hand.

XVIII. To the second objection,²⁰ the principal answer is that, strictly speaking, the blessed one, as such, lacks a potency for not being blessed; just as heaven lacks a potency for not being round. For just as prime matter, if it received one form equivalent to all the forms of generable and corruptible things, would lack a potency for not being that form; so too the intellect possessing the act of beatitude lacks a potency for not being that act. For that act is perfect in all goods, not by aggregation but by elevation: and therefore it makes the blessed one blessed and immutable. - But if the term is extended, as the objector uses it, calling potency for non-being logical or objective potency, it is said that what is eternal by essence must lack all potency for non-being; but this is not so for what is eternal by participation; rather it suffices that it be distinguished from the everlasting by a diversity of order, since the latter belongs to the eternal order by essence, while this belongs to nature.

XIX. Against the fourth proposition²¹ Scotus argues, in the Second Book, at the place cited above²², in no other way than against the first, namely: Substantial being (esse) has the same mode of enduring while it lasts as the aeviternal has, because it is without succession, etc.: therefore. — But to this one need not reply otherwise than above²³: for the measures are not distinguished by having being (esse) in a successive or permanent manner, but by the mutable and the immutable, as was said.

XX. But note here that Scotus, in the same place, tries to solve the argument of St. Thomas, made in response to the third objection in the preceding article, namely, that motion is the measure not only of motion but also of rest. For he says that the substance of an ox is measured absolutely by aevum, but its rest by time; and nothing else follows from that argument. — But this response is not a sufficient evasion: since time is shown in the text to measure not only rest, but the thing at rest; because everything at rest is movable; and everything changeable, insofar as it is changeable, is measured by time. Now it is clear that in respect of substance we are changeable: therefore in respect of substance we are temporal. And here lies the force of the argument. Motion and rest taken substantially, that is, substantial change and rest under substantial being, are measured by time not only in act but in potency: therefore our substantial being is measured by time. The antecedent is clear from the fact that act and potency belong to the measure of the same order, as is had in I Caeli²⁴ and IV Physic.²⁵. The consequence, moreover, holds from the fact that such potency is substantial, as is said in X Metaphys.²⁶.

XXI. In response to the second argument, a doubt arises concerning that proposition, aevum is a whole all at once. It is indeed attacked by that opinion refuted in the text,²⁷ as follows: Aevum is continuously produced by God, and therefore it can fall away from being; and consequently it can be annihilated, and then created again. Therefore it is not a whole all at once. — And you have this in Scotus and in Capreolus, on the Second Book of the Sentences, distinction II, question II.²⁸

To these points the answer is easily clear from what has been said ²⁹. For the aevum, or aeviternity, does not continuously come into being, strictly speaking; rather it is conserved by God. Nor can it fail of being from within itself: but God can annihilate it. And therefore it does not follow, therefore it is not a whole all at once. For if it could of itself be more or less, or precisely so much, with respect to duration, then it would not be a whole all at once; but from the fact that God can do this, it does not follow in the nature of the aevum or aeviternity. For the nature of a thing is not to be measured by divine powers, but by its own. - In the case, however, of annihilation and re-creation, it is said that there would be a succession of instants measuring the creation, annihilation, and re-creation, and not the aevum itself. For those instants are nothing of the aevum; rather they are parts of discrete time, of which we have already spoken ³⁰. For the judgment concerning that angel would then be the same as it would be concerning two angels, one of whom would be created before the other: for then that one angel would use the aevum as if he were two.

XXII. In response to the third, note that the esse of an angel is distinguished there in two ways. In one way, absolutely: and thus it has neither past nor future, but is subject to the divine power, and can be non-being through the power in another. In the other way, as coexisting with the divisions of real or imaginary time: and it has past and future. And thus we say that it was and that it will be. And thus, with respect to the future it is subject to the divine power: not with respect to the past, because this is supposed to be incompossible, as is said in the text. - And note that the authority of Jerome to Marcella³¹: God alone does not know past and future, and similarly Augustine's³²: the present, if it stands still, is eternity, and similar ones, are understood with respect to themselves and all things that are in them. For the angel, with respect to its affections, has past and future: and likewise the aevum, with respect to its adjuncts, does not stand still, as was said in the present article³³.

In the title, one in number. — In the body, four. First, the diverse opinions on the question at issue are set forth.

Second, the way of examining which opinion is truer is set forth: and it is said that one must proceed from the cause of the unity of time. And it is proved: because we arrive at knowledge of spiritual things through corporeal things.

Third, he enters upon the way itself. Here four opinions concerning the cause of the unity of time are brought forward: the first, from the unity of number; the second, from the unity of a principle, namely eternity; the third, from the unity of the first subject, namely prime matter; the fourth, from the unity of the first motion. — And the first is indeed rejected as follows. Time is not number absolutely, but a numbered thing, namely in continuous motion: therefore it is not one from the unity of number but one in number. — The second and third, however, are rejected together, as follows. Time is one simply: therefore it is not one only by a remote principle and subject. The inference holds: because things one in subject or principle are one only in a qualified sense. — The fourth, however, is proved as follows. The first motion is the most simple: therefore it is the measure of the others: therefore it is related to time not only as the measured to the measure, but as the subject to the accident: therefore from its unity time is one. The first consequence is proved from Book X of the Metaphysics. The others, however, are left as self-evident: since it is established that the quantity of the first measured thing is the measure conjoined to it, but of the others separate; and for this reason it is not multiplied with the multiplication of the others, but only of the first; just as universally an accident is multiplied with the multiplication of its subject. Therefore, since the first is not multiplied, neither is the measure; as in the case at hand.

Fourth, he principally derives from that assigned route a response to the question, positing two conclusions according to the two opinions about the angels. The first is: there are many aeons. It is proved. The first things of the aeviternal order are many; therefore. The second is: the aeon is one only. It is proved. The first thing of the aeviternal order is one only; therefore. — The antecedents are those very diverse opinions. The inferences are grounded on the treatment made concerning the unity of time, whose root was: a measure is multiplied by the multiplication of what is first measured by it. — And since from these no certain answer to the question is obtained, therefore he adds that the second conclusion must be held, because the opinion supporting it is more probable, as will be clear below. And thus the responsive conclusion is: The aeon is one only.

II. Note here that, just as every motion has its own prior and posterior within itself, so too it has its own numbered number of those, and consequently its own time. But since the number of any motion whatsoever is not by its nature certifying of all motions, but only the number of the first motion, on account of its greatest simplicity; therefore only the number of the first motion has the complete account of time. And for this reason time is one in number formally and taken completely: and there are many times as it were materially, or incompletely. And the same judgment holds concerning the aevum: for in the same way it is one and many. - Whether, however, the aevum is an accident, or the being (esse), or the essence of the aeviternal thing, must be inquired into in a special question: for this belongs to the business of metaphysics.

III. Concerning the things defined here, there are several doubts. First, Scotus, in the Second Book, distinction II, question III, censured the fact that the first aeviternal being is measured by the aevum (although it is itself the first, and the extrinsic measure of the others), on one ground. A measure is, by the nature of the thing, better known than what is measured: but nothing in the first aeviternal being is better known than its aeviternal substance: therefore nothing in it has the character of a measure of that substance. - Durandus, however¹ censured the extrinsic measurement of one aeviternal being by another, in three ways. First thus. That whose duration is more certain from its own definition than from comparison with something extrinsic is not measured in its duration by anything extrinsic. But an aeviternal being is of this kind. It is proved: because its proper definition is to be immutable according to nature. Second, infinite duration is not measurable: therefore. Third, not as much is not measurable: therefore. The inference holds: because the aevum lacks succession. - These and several other objections are recounted by Capreolus, in the Second Book, dist. II²; yet we shall deliberately pass over the rest, and say whence all of them will be resolved.

IV. For the clarification of this, then, know that, as may already be evident from what has been said³, the aeviternal is not measured by the aevum, whether intrinsically or extrinsically, in the manner of a continuous or successive or even discrete quantity, but in the manner of a unity: for the aevum is indivisible, whole at once, etc. For since the aevum is an immutable unity conjoined to mutability, the less any immutable thing is conjoined to mutability, the more immutable it is and the less composite, and thereby simpler, and consequently more one. We now suppose, moreover, that the aeviternal, the lower it is, the more closely it is conjoined to plurality: whence it also has less universal species, and operations that encompass fewer places or bodies. And therefore the supreme aeviternal, as the most immutable among immutable things thus (that is, joined to mutation), is most one: and consequently by its nature it possesses that whereby the other aeviternals, as such, are measured extrinsically through approach to and withdrawal from it.

V. Against Scotus⁴ therefore, the minor premise is denied. For I say that the aevum, existing in the first aeviternal being—whether it is its substance or its existence, or not—is better known in the respect of measure than the substance of the aeviternal being itself, as immutable. Since the aevum is nothing other than the unity, by way of measure, of such immutability: and hence the aevum itself is formally a unity, to which the reason of measure is primarily owed, as is clear from V⁵ and X Metaphysics.⁶ But a substance so immutable is one denominatively; and this denomination is expressed by the term aeviternal. It is universally evident, moreover, that what is formally such is more certain and better known by nature than what is such only denominatively. Therefore, although the substance of an angel is simply the best known among all things in it, nevertheless the aevum, in the genus or respect of measure, is better known than that substance: just as, although corporeal substance is better known in itself than quantity, yet in the genus of measure quantity is better known in itself.

VI. But to Durandus⁷ one must reply by denying the major premise, as is clear in quidditative perfection and measure. For quidditative perfection is better known from within than from without; and yet each quiddity is measured by the first quiddity of its genus. The sophism is therefore taking what is not a cause as a cause. For the cause of extrinsic measure's being more certain from outside than inside is not that, but rather the dependence of intrinsic certainty upon the extrinsic, as upon something simpler, as was said⁸. - To the second and third objections it is likewise said that they have no force against the measurable considered under unity. For the infinite and the non-quantum do not escape the ratio of uniformity.

There still remains the question of what that first aeviternal thing may be; but since it would be incidental to our present purpose, it will be treated in the tractate on the Angels⁹.