Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the body there are two parts: first he distinguishes; second he answers the question, there: Therefore thus¹. – As to the first, the distinction is this. God is in something in two ways: namely, effectively and objectively. These modes differ, as regards our purpose, because the first is general, inasmuch as God is effectively in all things; the second special, inasmuch as He is objectively only in a rational creature. And this mode of being is called being by grace: because it is by grace that the rational creature has that it may know and love God in act or in habit. – Again, the general mode of being in all things is distinguished into being by essence, presence and power; as is clear in the case of a king with respect to his own place, and a place within his sight, and his kingdom; and thence by applying this to God.

II. Note here first that, although the text at the beginning of the body posits a distinction in the mode of God's being (essendi) in things, namely effectively or objectively, it nevertheless does not afterwards subdivide the mode of being into being by essence, presence, and power, since such a subdivision would be false; rather, it intends to subdistinguish the general mode in which God is in all things. And it takes the distinction from human affairs and applies it to God with respect to all created things.

Note, secondly, that in the text the declared meaning is not only applied to God: but it is in some way proved to be the correct interpretation of these words, from the fact that each phrase is set against each of the errors of eminent men. For against the Manichaeans, "to be by power," that is, to be in all things immediately by the immediation of virtue: so that all things do whatever they do by the power of God. Against Averroes, however, "to be by presence," penetrating all and each by His gaze. Against Avicenna, on the other hand, "to be by essence," that is, immediately by the immediation of the supposit: because in each thing there is something created by God immediately.

III. As to the second², he answers the question affirmatively: God is in all things by presence, essence, and power.

IV. Concerning each individual mode, individual doubts arise from Aureol, as Capreolus reports, in Book I, distinction 37. – Concerning that special mode³, there is a doubt. First, because God is present objectively in the non-saints; and in certain saints, namely infants, not objectively. Then also because Augustine says⁴ that God is in the saints more intensely.

To this it is briefly said that this mode, namely through grace, is not distinguished against the mode of God's being objectively: rather, it is a part of it, named through grace by the sacred doctors. And it signifies that God is objectively as understood, knowledge giving birth to charity—which is evident to befit the saints alone; and also infants, because they receive the habit of faith and charity from baptism. – Augustine and the Master, however, described this mode not formally, as St. Thomas did, but causally. For from the fact that God makes rational creatures godlike, which is to act more intensely and more fully, there arises that God is known by them and held dear.

V. Against the mode of presence he argues: because the thing known is in the knower, and not conversely. And on this account, according to knowledge, God ought not to be said to be in things.

To this it is briefly answered that in cognition there are two things: the mode of knowing and the power of cognition. If the mode is considered, the objection proceeds very well. But if the power of cognition, then it is the other way around: for the power of cognition consists in the penetration of all things, down to their innermost depths; hence at Hebrews IV⁵ it is said of the word of God—which is acknowledged to be a sign of intellect—that it reaches even to the division of soul and spirit, of joints also and marrow, and of the cognitions and intentions of the heart. And attending to this, Saint Thomas said that God is in all things by presence. – Yet it may also be said that it is one thing to speak of knowledge absolutely, and another to speak of intuitive knowledge, which is what is treated here. For this kind tends toward things by its own proper character as intuitive; and therefore it best establishes a mode of being (essendi) through presence; although by the character of knowledge in general, the knower does not tend toward the thing known.

VI. Against the mode through essence it objects: because it coincides with the mode through potency.

It has already been said in response to this⁶: because by power he posits the immediation of the power; but by essence, the immediation of the supposit. The former is with respect to all things, as regards all that is in them; the latter is with respect to all things, but not as regards all that is in them, rather as regards something in each, as is clear from what has been said⁷.

VII. Against the mode of power it objects: because a king is not truly in his kingdom according to power, but according to the apprehension of those who carry out his commands.

To this it is briefly said that a king is in his kingdom according to power in the manner befitting his power; but such a manner is by apprehension, etc. God, however, is in all things according to power proportionally, that is, in a way congruent to His power; but such is the participation of the divine virtue according to res in all things. Hence nothing stands in the way, unless one should suppose processes proportional to doctrine to be alien to it: which is erroneous in the art of knowing.