Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, note: the term infinite by essence does not signify the same thing as a thing of infinite perfection, because the term infinite is not restricted here to the infinite that holds on the side of form, which denotes perfection; but it is taken commonly, so as to include also the infinite on the side of matter, as is clear from the course of the body of the article and from the third argument. Hence "infinite by essence" signifies the same thing as a thing of an altogether indeterminate essence, that is, one determined neither to any genus nor to any species—and this whether per se or reductively. And this is a question about singular things, which can only be found to exist in the nature of things. I say this on account of things taken in abstraction, which may happen to be abstracted to such a degree that according to some account they are not restricted to any genus. Nevertheless, according to the thing itself, even that account, existing in this thing, is determined to some genus and species: for being (ens) in man exists in the human species, etc. So that the sense of the question is: Whether, besides God, some thing existing actually or potentially in the nature of things is of an essence indeterminate simply.

II. In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question in the negative: No thing other than God is infinite simply; although it may be infinite in a certain respect.

This conclusion has two parts, as is evident: and in the text each part is proved. But because the infinite is twofold—namely on the side of act and on the side of potency—he first proves each part of the conclusion separately in the material infinite; then in the formal. Concerning that one, since matter is always bounded by some form, it is not infinite simply speaking; and yet, because it remains in potency to infinitely many forms, there is given an infinite in a certain respect. Concerning this one, however, because a created form is either in matter, and consequently bounded by it, or subsisting without matter and receiving esse. And this latter, because it is without matter, is therefore infinite in a certain respect—that is, with respect to material limits; yet because it has received esse, it is finite simply speaking. For esse so fitted to this one determinate nature, and to no other, must be limited simply speaking; otherwise it would contain within itself every perfection of every nature. – And from the parts of the universe sufficiently enumerated, the universal conclusion proposed has been proved: and quite clearly, if what precedes¹ be recalled.

Take note, novice, that not by doubting, but in the philosophical manner of deferring to his own treatise on the Angels to be treated below², he says that certain persons hold the opinion that angels are subsistent substances.