Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, God is taken properly, as it is a name of nature: so that the question concerns the essence of God, not His power or knowledge. The word infinite, since it is a compound of in and finite, has an in that is negative, not privative. Now finite signifies the termini of quantitative perfection; since the notion of finite and infinite accords with quantity, according to the Philosopher, I Physics¹; and just as there is a twofold quantity, namely of bulk and of perfection, so there are twofold termini, and a twofold finitude and infinitude. Here, however, since quantity of bulk has already been excluded from God², we must understand infinitude of perfection.

And diligently note that, because, as is said in III Physics ³, the infinite is not a substance but an accident of things, it follows that infinity or finitude is required according to the nature of the thing. For the mode of infinity of a thing is one thing, that of power another, that of knowledge another. Quidditative infinity is indeed considered with respect to the exclusion of essential termini, namely differences and the like. And since the question at hand concerns the infinity of the divine nature, therefore the discussion is about the infinity of substantial perfection. So that the sense is: Whether God according to his essence is of such perfection that he excludes all essential termini or limits.

II. In the body he does three things: first, he reports the opinion of the ancients; second, he distinguishes concerning finitude and infinitude⁴; third, he answers the question⁵.

III. As to the first, he does two things. First is this. Among the ancients, the first principle is infinite, because from it infinite things come to be. - Second. Certain of the ancients, erring, attributed infinity of bulk to the first principle, because they posited the first principle as material. Hence it followed as a consequence that they posited quantitative infinity, since quantity follows upon matter: and thus an error concerning the genus of the principle caused an error concerning the mode of infinity.

IV. With respect to the second⁶, it is distinguished both as finite and as infinite in respect of perfection: because some perfection is found on the side of matter, and some on the side of form. And they differ in this, that finitude on the side of matter signifies perfection, while infinitude on that side signifies imperfection; but on the side of form it is the reverse: for infinitude there signifies perfection, and finitude imperfection, as is stated quite clearly in the text.

V. Concerning this part, before proceeding further, there is a doubt both against the finitude and against the infinitude of the form. Against its finitude indeed, because the form of an ox—indeed even the intellectual soul according to St. Thomas⁷—is perfected by its conjunction with matter. Therefore the finitude of a form does not signify imperfection, but perfection. — Against its infinitude truly, because negation posits no perfection; nor does any thing acquire perfection from mere separation from another. Therefore infinity on the part of the form does not signify perfection.

VI. To the first of these it is said that "form" can be taken in two ways: namely, absolutely, insofar as it is form; and in a qualified sense, that is, insofar as it is such a form, for instance, one informing matter. A form of this kind is perfected by its union with matter; but not form insofar as it is form. And since the discussion here concerns form absolutely, according to its full breadth—whose inferior part is admittedly that which is limited by matter, while the other part remains free and cannot be confined by any limits of matter—the proposed inference must be denied.

To the second, it is said that, although negation or separation does not signify formally a perfection, it nevertheless signifies it fundamentally: for the foundation of the negation of unibility with matter signifies a great perfection of the form. And this suffices.

VII. As to the third point⁸, there is one conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: God is infinite. — Proof. God is his own subsistent act of being (esse): therefore his act of being is not received in anything: therefore he is infinite and perfect, that is, of infinite perfection, namely an infinity holding itself on the side of form. — The antecedent is clear from the third question⁹. Now the first consequence is self-evident. The second, however, is proved from the fact that being (esse) is the most formal of all things.

VIII. Concerning this procedure, a doubt arises from Scotus, in Book I of the Sentences, distinction II, in answering the first question: for he censures both the roots and the procedure. He says, first, that our procedure is as follows: Form is limited by matter; therefore a form which is not by nature meant to exist in matter is infinite. — He argues against the antecedent. Every form, prior by nature to its reception in matter, is in itself at such a grade of being: therefore finite or infinite. It is not, therefore, first limited by a relation to the negation of something extrinsic, say matter, or anything else. — But against the procedure itself. First, because it would follow that the essence of an angel would be infinite, since it is a form not receptive of existence in matter. Nor does it avail, he says, to claim that the nature of an angel is limited by its esse: for in our case, esse is posterior to essence, and thus the nature, in the first sign, abstracting from esse, since it is infinite, is therefore in the second sign not limitable by esse. — Second, because it commits the fallacy of the consequent, as in Book III of the Physics¹⁰: a body is limited by another body: therefore a body not limited by anything else is infinite.

IX. Concerning the same argument a doubt arises: for, once the whole is granted, it will not seem to novices that the question has been answered. For one ought to conclude that God is of such greatness of perfection that He would exceed every limit of perfection; but what has been proved is that God is not restricted by any receptive principle, which seems very far removed from the first.

X. To make these difficulties evident, it must be noted that the text covertly subdistinguishes infinity formal into the infinity of form and the infinity of being (esse) or act, which is more common than form. For just as act is twofold—namely being (esse) and form—so receptive potency is twofold, namely essence and matter. And thus reception and non-reception are twofold; and likewise finitude and infinitude are twofold—always speaking on the side of act. And just as being (esse) is an act of another kind than form, and essence a potency of another order than matter (as the difference between composition from esse and essence, and from matter and form, shows), so too the reception of esse in essence is of another kind than that of form in matter; and likewise the finitude of esse by essence differs from that of form by matter; and conversely, the finitude of essence by esse, and of matter by form.

And to speak of it point by point: esse in itself signifies a certain perfection; but one cannot imagine how great a perfection it signifies unless it is understood as applied to some nature, say to wisdom, or to Gabriel, and so on. And therefore esse, by the very fact that it is received into some essence, acquires the limits of perfection according to the mode of the receiving nature: and hence, if it is posited as joined to no quiddity at all, but as subsisting naturally in itself, it will have no essential term. Form, however, although it signifies a perfection in itself, can nevertheless be understood as limited to such a perfection even if it is not unifiable with any matter, as is evident in the case of the separate intelligences.

Hence it is clearly gathered how different is the determination of esse by essence, or conversely; and the termination of form by matter, or conversely. For in respect of the former is considered what is finite or infinite simply; but in respect of the latter, finite and infinite only in a qualified sense. Yet because esse and form agree in the character of act and of being receptive in another, therefore from the finitude and infinitude of form one can proceed to the infinitude and finitude of esse. And for this reason the text, in order to intimate the proportional identity between the finitude and infinitude of each, ascends from form to esse: but in order to intimate their diverse character, it subjoined, not that esse is the first form, but that esse is the most formal of all things.

XI. And from these the response to Scotus's objections is easily clear¹¹. For I say first that that antecedent, form is limited by matter, does not speak of limitation simply, but of such, namely in respect of material terms: and therefore the objection poses no obstacle. - And likewise the instances collapse against the argument: for it is true that the nature of an angel is infinite secundum quid. And if one presses: how then from that foundation does the text prove the infinity simply of God himself? the response is clear from what has been said. For the text leads us by hand from the infinity of form, which is secundum quid, to the infinity of the most formal of all things, namely esse, which is simply: and from that it infers God as infinite simply.

XII. And since, in the same way, one could argue about esse, following Scotus, as he argues about form; therefore I say secondly¹² that infinite, like immaterial, is a negative predicate, yet fundamentally positive. And just as the positive contained in the term immaterial is best proved from the natural negation of matter, both in act and in potency; so the positive contained in the signification of infinite simply is best demonstrated to befit God, from the negation of essential terms, as is done in the text. Hence I concede that esse, prior by nature in itself, is of such perfection—say finite or infinite—as it is receptible or irreceptible in this or that: though I say with this that these two mutually follow upon one another; such that if esse is altogether irreceptible, it is infinite simply, and conversely; and likewise, if it is finite, it is receptible, and conversely. And on this account one can argue from the destruction of the antecedent to the destruction of the consequent, without sophism, as happens in convertible terms. – And thus the response to Scotus is clear.

XIII. To the objection raised by the novices¹³, the answer can now be evident from what has been said. For it has already been shown¹⁴ that the total negation of the reception of esse itself is grounded upon an infinite perfection simply speaking.

And note how formal and drawn from its own principles the doctrine of St. Thomas is. For, treating of the infinity of essence, he considered only the essential terms; nor did he digress to the concomitants by which the infinity of power or intellect or will is attended upon, as others less perspicacious do.