Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, note, in a new way, that the question here is not whether all things are good by the goodness of God, but whether all things are good by divine goodness. Thus the sense of the question is not whether all things have it from divine goodness that they are good; rather the sense is whether divine goodness is that by which things are denominated good, just as things are denominated white by whiteness, or situated by place.

II. In the body he does four things: first, he sets out two distinctions, at the same time indicating in what respect philosophers agree and differ; second, he sets out the opinion of Plato¹; third, that of Aristotle²; fourth, he answers the question raised³.

III. The first distinction is: some names signify the absolute, and others signify relation. – The second is: denomination is twofold, one kind is intrinsic, and the other is extrinsic. It is called intrinsic denomination when the form of the denominative term is in that which is denominated, as white, quantified, etc.; but extrinsic denomination when the form of the denominative term is not in the thing denominated, as located, measured, and similar cases. – Now all agree in this, that according to names signifying relation, extrinsic denomination can occur, as is clear from "located" and "measured." But there is a difference between Plato and Aristotle as to whether, according to names signifying the absolute, extrinsic denomination can occur. And this bears on our purpose: because "good" is an absolute name, and God's goodness is extrinsic to other things.

IV. As to the second⁴, there: Plato posits four propositions of Plato. The first is: the species of things are separate. The second is, that particulars are denominated from them. The third is, that the idea of being (ens), of the one, and of the good is found, such that it is God. The fourth: all things are denominated good from it. And thus, according to Plato, the question is answered affirmatively.

V. As to the third point⁵, there: And although, the position of Aristotle in the first two propositions disagrees; but in the third it agrees; nothing is said about the fourth.

VI. Concerning this part a difficulty arises, as to how it can be true that Aristotle agrees with Plato about the idea of the good, since in Book I of the Ethics⁶ he expressly attacks it.

To this it is briefly answered, with Eustratius and St. Thomas⁷ on I Ethics, that the difference between Aristotle and Plato here is merely verbal. For Aristotle censures this, namely, that the good by essence should be posited in the manner of a separate species, as man is by essence, etc.⁸: but not that there is a first good by essence, which is God, as is clear in XII Metaphysics⁹, at the end.

VII. As to the fourth point¹⁰, there is a single responsive conclusion, having two parts: All things are good by the divine goodness extrinsically and causally; but by their own goodnesses formally and intrinsically. – It is proved. From the good through its essence, each thing can be called good by way of assimilation. Therefore each thing is said to be good by the divine goodness effectively, and exemplarily, and finally: but by the likeness of that goodness, formally. Therefore. – The antecedent follows from what was premised. The consequence, with the terms understood, is clear of itself.

VIII. Three terms, however, must be noted. The first is by way of a certain assimilation. For something is said to be such from something extrinsic in two ways. In one way, so that the account of the denomination is the very relation to the extrinsic; as urine is said to be healthy, solely by reason of its relation as a sign to health. In another way, so that the account of the denomination is not a relation of likeness, or any other relation, but the form which is the foundation of the relation of likeness to that extrinsic thing; as air is said to be luminous by solar light, by that account whereby it participates in it through the form of light. And since where there is denomination in the first way, there is denomination from what is purely extrinsic; but where there is denomination in the second way, there is denomination from what is extrinsic, yet not solely extrinsic, for it is also from what is intrinsic, as is evident; and this is how it stands in our case: therefore in the text it is said that from the first good, good by essence, all things are called good by way of assimilation. For from this it immediately follows both that they can be called good by extrinsic and by intrinsic denomination.

The second is the ly sicut. It is noteworthy that in the text it is not said absolutely that each thing can be called good by the divine goodness through extrinsic denomination; rather, there is added the ly sicut principio effectivo, etc. For, as has already been touched upon, extrinsic denomination is twofold: one kind is pure, and another causal. Pure indeed it is when the denomination comes about solely through a relation to the denominating form; causal, however, when participation in the effect of an extrinsic cause grounds the denomination. Hence, in the case at hand, because each thing is said to be good by the divine goodness extrinsically not in any manner whatever, but causally, therefore it was said sicut principio. – And if you consider this more diligently, you will find that it is impossible for pure extrinsic denomination to occur in absolute beings, although causal denomination can occur.

The third is the exemplar. The exemplary cause is distinguished from the efficient cause, and is ranked among the formal causes, because it is like an extrinsic form of the thing. It is signified, therefore, that God not only produces goodness in others, but exemplifies it from His own: which does not happen in this way when it is said that God makes a cow or a lion, as is evident.