Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, ly distinguishes the proper against the common. – Ly by essence can determine the subject, and can determine the predicate. And if it indeed determines the subject, then ly by essence is distinguished against everything that is outside the essence of the subject. And the sense is: Whether God alone, by essence—that is, not by something outside His essence—is sufficiently good formally. But if ly by essence determines the predicate, then it is distinguished against being such by participation. And the sense is: Whether God alone is good by essence, that is, is good not participatively. – Now such participatively is called whatever has some formal ratio, yet does not belong to such a formal ratio according to the whole fullness of possible perfection. For it is necessary that a thing of this kind have only a part of that fullness: and therefore it is called such participatively. And conversely, such by essence is called that which, from its very mode of being, encloses within itself all the fullness naturally possible to that formal ratio; as heat would, if it subsisted of itself.

II. In the matter at hand, however, although for the sake of the material these two modes coincide, following the doctrine of St. Thomas (since what is good per essentiam in the first mode is also good per essentiam in the second mode, and conversely); yet because formally and universally these two modes do not coincide (since Socrates is a man by his essence, and yet is not man per essentiam, but participatively: for only the Platonic man, if it existed, would be man per essentiam), and the present question was raised concerning being itself good per essentiam, and not directly concerning the divine essence itself (since in the third question its simplicity has already been established, and that nothing belongs to it by something added to its essence): therefore the per essentiam is taken on the side of the predicate, and is distinguished from per participationem; and the sense is as we said above¹.

And this as far as the affirmative exponent is concerned: for on the side of the negative, the term "by essence" belongs to the side of the subject, and the sense is as we said above². And all the arguments of the text favor this sense, as does the reason assigned in the body. Hence here the dispute is principally concerned exclusively with the negative exponent, since the affirmative one was treated in the third question.

III. In the body, a single conclusion, responsive to the question in the affirmative: God alone is good by essence. – This exclusive proposition is proved with respect to both exponents at once, thus. The threefold perfection, namely insofar as a thing is constituted in its esse, etc., belongs to God alone through His essence: therefore to be perfect: therefore to be good. Therefore He alone is good by essence.

The antecedent is explained by distinguishing a threefold degree of a thing's perfection, and by showing one by one that each belongs to God alone quidditatively: because in the first is contained esse, in the second accidents, in the third the ultimate end. – The first consequence is left as self-evident from the sufficient division. The second is proved: because each thing is good insofar as it is perfect. The third is left as self-evident.

IV. Concerning the antecedent, the first doubt is that esse in all things short of God is other than essence. But this is to be treated elsewhere³ — The second doubt would be, how no essence is a principle of operation: but this will be asked below.⁴ — As to what is proposed, however, know that it suffices that esse and the principles of operation are formally outside the essences of all substances: but in God's substance all things are contained formally. The intention of the text, nevertheless, concerns real inclusion and exclusion, and not merely formal.

V. Concerning the first consequence⁵ a doubt arises: for it does not seem valid. First, because each thing is perfect quidditatively through its essence, as is evident; nor does the opposite of this follow from that antecedent. Second, because this consequence presupposes that esse belongs to the integrity of the first perfection of a thing, as is evident; but this does not seem true, since esse lies outside the substantial integrity of every thing short of God; in sign of which, no definition states esse, as is said in I Poster.⁶

VI. To this it is briefly said that a thing can be called perfect in two ways, namely simply and in a qualified sense: and that as long as the thing does not exist in the nature of things, whatever being it may have—whether objective, or quidditative, or in a cause—it is not said to be perfect simply, but in a qualified sense, that is, in such a being. But according to existence in the nature of things, it is said to be perfect simply, with respect to its substantial perfection. And therefore esse belongs to the integrity of the first perfection of each thing, not as a part of its quiddity, but as the actuality of that same thing. – And by these points the answer to the objections is clear.

VII. And if it be urged against this, on the ground that things, considered according to their essences, are graded simply by their essential perfections (so that water is essentially more perfect than earth, and air than water, and fire than air, etc.); therefore perfect esse simply belongs to a thing from its essence: – to this it must be said that when it is said, no thing other than God is through its essence simply perfect, it is understood that the word through signifies the formal cause, and not just any formal cause, but one that is sufficient, with every other cause set aside. For although the essence of fire is that by which fire formally has its substantial perfection; yet it is not the sufficient reason why fire is in its substantial perfection; rather it must be actualized by its very esse. Hence, in answer to the objection, it is said that things are graded by their essences in simple perfection not completively but radically. – Or it is said (and it makes little difference) that things are graded by their essences in simple perfection not by abstracting from their esse, but rather by including their ordination to it: since, as we showed at length in our commentaries on Being and Essence⁷, substantial difference is taken from ordination to esse; as Porphyry also intimated⁸, saying in the ultimate and most intimate definition of difference that it contributes to being, as we stated there.

VIII. Concerning the last consequence⁹, note that, as we said in the title¹⁰, because on account of the matter these two mutually imply one another, A is good by its essence, and, A is good by essence; therefore the text did not distinguish between these; and having concluded that God alone is good by essence, it intended to conclude that God alone is good by essence.

IX. In response to the first, note, you Thomist, that here you expressly have it that "one" does not state the ratio of perfection: and consequently neither unity, nor its species, state perfection simply speaking, formally speaking; but they abstract from both perfection and imperfection.