Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

A clear title. – In the body, a single conclusion, responsive to the question in the affirmative: God is good.

It is proved by reason, confirmed by the authority of Dionysius, namely: God is the first efficient cause of all things; therefore He is desirable; therefore He is good. – The antecedent is assumed. The first consequence, however, is proved. Each thing desires its own proper perfection; therefore it desires a likeness of its efficient cause. Therefore a fortiori the very efficient cause itself is desirable. Therefore, if it is the first cause, etc. – The antecedent assumed, together with all its consequences, is known from itself. The first indeed: because the proper perfection of a thing is the very likeness of its agent. The second: because every agent acts in likeness to itself; and hence, if its likeness is desirable, much more will the agent itself be desirable. – The rest are clear.

In the title there is nothing difficult. Highest adds the relation of supreme excess: so that it is the same whether it is the highest good, or whether it is a good exceeding all other goods, both in act and in potency.

II. In the body of the article there is a single conclusion, answering the question in the affirmative: God is the highest good simply speaking.

This conclusion is first explained, then proven. It is explained by distinguishing, implicitly, between the highest good simply speaking and the highest good in a genus. The highest good in a genus is that which surpasses the others in that order of things: as human happiness is the highest human good, surpassing all other human goods; and so with the rest. The highest good simply speaking, however, is that which holds the supreme place throughout the whole breadth of beings (entia). And therefore the term simply is added in the conclusion.

It is proved, however, thus. Goodness belongs to God as the first effective cause of all things, not univocally: therefore it belongs to him most excellently: therefore he is the highest good simply speaking. – The antecedent, in both its parts, is clear from what has been said. But the first consequence is proved from the difference in the mode of being of the effect in a univocal cause and in an equivocal or analogous cause: for in a univocal cause it exists in the same mode, but in an equivocal cause in a more excellent one.

III. Note, however, that the effect's being in an equivocal cause in a more excellent manner occurs in two ways: one way, formally and virtually at once; another way, virtually only. An example of the first: light and diaphaneity in the heavenly bodies, with respect to inferior bodies. An example of the second: heat in the sun and in inferior bodies. In our case, we are speaking of an effect preexisting in its cause not only virtually but also formally: hence God is good both formally and virtually. The force of this argument rests on this, that each effect of an equivocal cause is in that cause itself in a more excellent manner than it is in the effect. And therefore the text speaks indistinctly of the mode of being of the effect in the equivocal cause, since this sufficed for the intended point, namely, that goodness belongs to God in the most excellent manner. For already in the preceding article it had been established that goodness belongs to him formally.

IV. In response to the second, note that the reply consists in the conversion of the proposition: good is that which all things desire, that is, that which all things desire is good.

V. In response to the third, note that things of different genera are said to be in no way comparable when they are taken as such, that is, insofar as they are in different genera. For if they were taken according to some predicate in which they would agree, they could be compared.

In the title, ly distinguishes the proper against the common. – Ly by essence can determine the subject, and can determine the predicate. And if it indeed determines the subject, then ly by essence is distinguished against everything that is outside the essence of the subject. And the sense is: Whether God alone, by essence—that is, not by something outside His essence—is sufficiently good formally. But if ly by essence determines the predicate, then it is distinguished against being such by participation. And the sense is: Whether God alone is good by essence, that is, is good not participatively. – Now such participatively is called whatever has some formal ratio, yet does not belong to such a formal ratio according to the whole fullness of possible perfection. For it is necessary that a thing of this kind have only a part of that fullness: and therefore it is called such participatively. And conversely, such by essence is called that which, from its very mode of being, encloses within itself all the fullness naturally possible to that formal ratio; as heat would, if it subsisted of itself.

II. In the matter at hand, however, although for the sake of the material these two modes coincide, following the doctrine of St. Thomas (since what is good per essentiam in the first mode is also good per essentiam in the second mode, and conversely); yet because formally and universally these two modes do not coincide (since Socrates is a man by his essence, and yet is not man per essentiam, but participatively: for only the Platonic man, if it existed, would be man per essentiam), and the present question was raised concerning being itself good per essentiam, and not directly concerning the divine essence itself (since in the third question its simplicity has already been established, and that nothing belongs to it by something added to its essence): therefore the per essentiam is taken on the side of the predicate, and is distinguished from per participationem; and the sense is as we said above¹.

And this as far as the affirmative exponent is concerned: for on the side of the negative, the term "by essence" belongs to the side of the subject, and the sense is as we said above². And all the arguments of the text favor this sense, as does the reason assigned in the body. Hence here the dispute is principally concerned exclusively with the negative exponent, since the affirmative one was treated in the third question.

III. In the body, a single conclusion, responsive to the question in the affirmative: God alone is good by essence. – This exclusive proposition is proved with respect to both exponents at once, thus. The threefold perfection, namely insofar as a thing is constituted in its esse, etc., belongs to God alone through His essence: therefore to be perfect: therefore to be good. Therefore He alone is good by essence.

The antecedent is explained by distinguishing a threefold degree of a thing's perfection, and by showing one by one that each belongs to God alone quidditatively: because in the first is contained esse, in the second accidents, in the third the ultimate end. – The first consequence is left as self-evident from the sufficient division. The second is proved: because each thing is good insofar as it is perfect. The third is left as self-evident.

IV. Concerning the antecedent, the first doubt is that esse in all things short of God is other than essence. But this is to be treated elsewhere³ — The second doubt would be, how no essence is a principle of operation: but this will be asked below.⁴ — As to what is proposed, however, know that it suffices that esse and the principles of operation are formally outside the essences of all substances: but in God's substance all things are contained formally. The intention of the text, nevertheless, concerns real inclusion and exclusion, and not merely formal.

V. Concerning the first consequence⁵ a doubt arises: for it does not seem valid. First, because each thing is perfect quidditatively through its essence, as is evident; nor does the opposite of this follow from that antecedent. Second, because this consequence presupposes that esse belongs to the integrity of the first perfection of a thing, as is evident; but this does not seem true, since esse lies outside the substantial integrity of every thing short of God; in sign of which, no definition states esse, as is said in I Poster.⁶

VI. To this it is briefly said that a thing can be called perfect in two ways, namely simply and in a qualified sense: and that as long as the thing does not exist in the nature of things, whatever being it may have—whether objective, or quidditative, or in a cause—it is not said to be perfect simply, but in a qualified sense, that is, in such a being. But according to existence in the nature of things, it is said to be perfect simply, with respect to its substantial perfection. And therefore esse belongs to the integrity of the first perfection of each thing, not as a part of its quiddity, but as the actuality of that same thing. – And by these points the answer to the objections is clear.

VII. And if it be urged against this, on the ground that things, considered according to their essences, are graded simply by their essential perfections (so that water is essentially more perfect than earth, and air than water, and fire than air, etc.); therefore perfect esse simply belongs to a thing from its essence: – to this it must be said that when it is said, no thing other than God is through its essence simply perfect, it is understood that the word through signifies the formal cause, and not just any formal cause, but one that is sufficient, with every other cause set aside. For although the essence of fire is that by which fire formally has its substantial perfection; yet it is not the sufficient reason why fire is in its substantial perfection; rather it must be actualized by its very esse. Hence, in answer to the objection, it is said that things are graded by their essences in simple perfection not completively but radically. – Or it is said (and it makes little difference) that things are graded by their essences in simple perfection not by abstracting from their esse, but rather by including their ordination to it: since, as we showed at length in our commentaries on Being and Essence⁷, substantial difference is taken from ordination to esse; as Porphyry also intimated⁸, saying in the ultimate and most intimate definition of difference that it contributes to being, as we stated there.

VIII. Concerning the last consequence⁹, note that, as we said in the title¹⁰, because on account of the matter these two mutually imply one another, A is good by its essence, and, A is good by essence; therefore the text did not distinguish between these; and having concluded that God alone is good by essence, it intended to conclude that God alone is good by essence.

IX. In response to the first, note, you Thomist, that here you expressly have it that "one" does not state the ratio of perfection: and consequently neither unity, nor its species, state perfection simply speaking, formally speaking; but they abstract from both perfection and imperfection.

In the title, note, in a new way, that the question here is not whether all things are good by the goodness of God, but whether all things are good by divine goodness. Thus the sense of the question is not whether all things have it from divine goodness that they are good; rather the sense is whether divine goodness is that by which things are denominated good, just as things are denominated white by whiteness, or situated by place.

II. In the body he does four things: first, he sets out two distinctions, at the same time indicating in what respect philosophers agree and differ; second, he sets out the opinion of Plato¹; third, that of Aristotle²; fourth, he answers the question raised³.

III. The first distinction is: some names signify the absolute, and others signify relation. – The second is: denomination is twofold, one kind is intrinsic, and the other is extrinsic. It is called intrinsic denomination when the form of the denominative term is in that which is denominated, as white, quantified, etc.; but extrinsic denomination when the form of the denominative term is not in the thing denominated, as located, measured, and similar cases. – Now all agree in this, that according to names signifying relation, extrinsic denomination can occur, as is clear from "located" and "measured." But there is a difference between Plato and Aristotle as to whether, according to names signifying the absolute, extrinsic denomination can occur. And this bears on our purpose: because "good" is an absolute name, and God's goodness is extrinsic to other things.

IV. As to the second⁴, there: Plato posits four propositions of Plato. The first is: the species of things are separate. The second is, that particulars are denominated from them. The third is, that the idea of being (ens), of the one, and of the good is found, such that it is God. The fourth: all things are denominated good from it. And thus, according to Plato, the question is answered affirmatively.

V. As to the third point⁵, there: And although, the position of Aristotle in the first two propositions disagrees; but in the third it agrees; nothing is said about the fourth.

VI. Concerning this part a difficulty arises, as to how it can be true that Aristotle agrees with Plato about the idea of the good, since in Book I of the Ethics⁶ he expressly attacks it.

To this it is briefly answered, with Eustratius and St. Thomas⁷ on I Ethics, that the difference between Aristotle and Plato here is merely verbal. For Aristotle censures this, namely, that the good by essence should be posited in the manner of a separate species, as man is by essence, etc.⁸: but not that there is a first good by essence, which is God, as is clear in XII Metaphysics⁹, at the end.

VII. As to the fourth point¹⁰, there is a single responsive conclusion, having two parts: All things are good by the divine goodness extrinsically and causally; but by their own goodnesses formally and intrinsically. – It is proved. From the good through its essence, each thing can be called good by way of assimilation. Therefore each thing is said to be good by the divine goodness effectively, and exemplarily, and finally: but by the likeness of that goodness, formally. Therefore. – The antecedent follows from what was premised. The consequence, with the terms understood, is clear of itself.

VIII. Three terms, however, must be noted. The first is by way of a certain assimilation. For something is said to be such from something extrinsic in two ways. In one way, so that the account of the denomination is the very relation to the extrinsic; as urine is said to be healthy, solely by reason of its relation as a sign to health. In another way, so that the account of the denomination is not a relation of likeness, or any other relation, but the form which is the foundation of the relation of likeness to that extrinsic thing; as air is said to be luminous by solar light, by that account whereby it participates in it through the form of light. And since where there is denomination in the first way, there is denomination from what is purely extrinsic; but where there is denomination in the second way, there is denomination from what is extrinsic, yet not solely extrinsic, for it is also from what is intrinsic, as is evident; and this is how it stands in our case: therefore in the text it is said that from the first good, good by essence, all things are called good by way of assimilation. For from this it immediately follows both that they can be called good by extrinsic and by intrinsic denomination.

The second is the ly sicut. It is noteworthy that in the text it is not said absolutely that each thing can be called good by the divine goodness through extrinsic denomination; rather, there is added the ly sicut principio effectivo, etc. For, as has already been touched upon, extrinsic denomination is twofold: one kind is pure, and another causal. Pure indeed it is when the denomination comes about solely through a relation to the denominating form; causal, however, when participation in the effect of an extrinsic cause grounds the denomination. Hence, in the case at hand, because each thing is said to be good by the divine goodness extrinsically not in any manner whatever, but causally, therefore it was said sicut principio. – And if you consider this more diligently, you will find that it is impossible for pure extrinsic denomination to occur in absolute beings, although causal denomination can occur.

The third is the exemplar. The exemplary cause is distinguished from the efficient cause, and is ranked among the formal causes, because it is like an extrinsic form of the thing. It is signified, therefore, that God not only produces goodness in others, but exemplifies it from His own: which does not happen in this way when it is said that God makes a cow or a lion, as is evident.