Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title of the question, a doubt immediately arises concerning its order: why this question is made about the good. For the good neither belongs to being (ens) prior to the one, the true, etc.; nor does goodness belong to the divine nature prior to unity or truth, as is evident; nor is what is to be treated here ordered concerning God according to the aspect of cause, so that on that account the first place would be owed to the good, because it names the aspect of the final cause. Therefore no reason appears why in this place the question about the good has been ordered.

II. To this it is said that the question concerning the good can be ordered in two ways. In one way, in itself: and thus this place is not owed to it, as was deduced by way of objection; rather, the question concerning infinity immediately follows the question concerning perfection, inquiring into the quantity of the divine perfection. In another way, as a part of the treatise on perfection: and thus it must be ordered within the chapter on perfection: and this is how it is ordered in the text. This the text itself indicated, both at the beginning of question IV, where the treatise on perfection begins, and it is said: And because each thing, insofar as it is perfect, is said to be good, first we must treat of the divine perfection, second of its goodness (as if to say that, on account of perfection, goodness must be treated of at the same time); and again at the beginning of question VII, where, revealing that he had treated of the good per accidens, that is, by reason of perfection, he says: After the consideration of the divine perfection, of infinity etc., no mention being made of goodness, concerning which he had made two questions. – But why goodness should be inquired into under the treatise on perfection, the cause assigned in the text makes evident: namely, because to be perfect is the reason why something is said to be good.

III. In the body there is one conclusion, responsive to the question in the affirmative: Good and being (ens) are the same in reality, but differ only according to reason.

IV. Before the conclusion is proved, note, newcomer, the terms of the conclusion. For to differ according to reason alone admits of breadth: for things that differ only in mode of signifying, such as man and humanity, differ by reason alone; and many things that differ by their definitive reasons, such as wood and the carvable, differ by reason alone. Therefore distinguish that to differ by reason is twofold: namely, by the reason signified, or conceived; in another way, by the reason conceiving, or signifying. In the present case the discussion concerns difference according to the reason signified: so that the sense is that good and being (ens) differ according to their formal reasons, as signified by their names.

V. The conclusion is therefore proved. First, with respect to the first part, thus: Good has the character of the appetible; therefore of the perfect; therefore of being in act; therefore of being. Therefore good and being are the same in reality. – The antecedent is proved from Book I of the Ethics. The first consequence is proved: because all things desire their own perfection. But the second is left as known. The third, however, is proved: because esse is the actuality of every thing. And the last is evident.

Next, as to the second part. Good expresses the character of the appetible, which being does not express. Therefore they differ in their intelligibility (ratio).

VI. Concerning the antecedents there is a doubt: since that which is said of something in the second mode of saying per se is not contained in the essence of that subject, but conversely, as is clear from I Posterior Analytics¹ But "desirable" is said of "good" in the second mode of saying per se. Therefore good does not have the character of the desirable, but conversely. – The minor is proved: first, because something is desirable because it is good, and not conversely; second, because good is the formal object of appetite, while "desirable" is an extrinsic denomination taken from appetite, and they are related as color and visible; but it is established that "visible" is said of color in the second mode, from II On the Soul²

VII. To this it can be said in two ways, according to the two modes by which something is taken to have the character of the appetible, namely formally and fundamentally. If the term appetible is taken formally, then good is said to have its character not as intrinsic, but as a passion. But if it is taken fundamentally, then good is said to have the character of the appetible intrinsically: since the proper character of good is the foundation and proper cause of appetibility, just as color is of visibility. – And although both glosses are absolutely true, and the first is taken from the principle of St. Thomas's Commentary on the books of the Ethics³, yet the second is directly intended in the matter at hand: since the question concerns the intrinsic character of good.

VIII. But note here that, although each of the things assumed in the deduction of reason⁴, namely good, perfect, being in act, and being, imports the foundation and cause of the appetible, and for this reason a real identity is concluded among them: nevertheless only the good imports the proximate foundation of the appetible; because only the good signifies that thing which grounds appetibility as grounding and causing it: so that the closer something approaches to the ratio of good, the more it expresses the foundation of the appetible, as is evident to one who runs through what has been said. For between being and good there intervene being in act and the perfect: and it is clear that the ratio of the appetible is expressed more by being in act than by being, since each thing is desired according to some act of esse, present or future; and still more by the perfect, which imports completion, since even esse in act is desired for its completion; and lastly by the good, since not even the completion itself is desired except because it is good, or appears good to the desirer. The good therefore imports the ratio of the appetible, that is, the proximate foundation and reason why something is appetible: which, because it is the same as perfection and esse, is the same as being. But because as such it is not expressed by being, but absolutely in itself, therefore it is distinguished from being by its formal ratio.