Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title of the question, a doubt immediately arises concerning its order: why this question is made about the good. For the good neither belongs to being (ens) prior to the one, the true, etc.; nor does goodness belong to the divine nature prior to unity or truth, as is evident; nor is what is to be treated here ordered concerning God according to the aspect of cause, so that on that account the first place would be owed to the good, because it names the aspect of the final cause. Therefore no reason appears why in this place the question about the good has been ordered.

II. To this it is said that the question concerning the good can be ordered in two ways. In one way, in itself: and thus this place is not owed to it, as was deduced by way of objection; rather, the question concerning infinity immediately follows the question concerning perfection, inquiring into the quantity of the divine perfection. In another way, as a part of the treatise on perfection: and thus it must be ordered within the chapter on perfection: and this is how it is ordered in the text. This the text itself indicated, both at the beginning of question IV, where the treatise on perfection begins, and it is said: And because each thing, insofar as it is perfect, is said to be good, first we must treat of the divine perfection, second of its goodness (as if to say that, on account of perfection, goodness must be treated of at the same time); and again at the beginning of question VII, where, revealing that he had treated of the good per accidens, that is, by reason of perfection, he says: After the consideration of the divine perfection, of infinity etc., no mention being made of goodness, concerning which he had made two questions. – But why goodness should be inquired into under the treatise on perfection, the cause assigned in the text makes evident: namely, because to be perfect is the reason why something is said to be good.

III. In the body there is one conclusion, responsive to the question in the affirmative: Good and being (ens) are the same in reality, but differ only according to reason.

IV. Before the conclusion is proved, note, newcomer, the terms of the conclusion. For to differ according to reason alone admits of breadth: for things that differ only in mode of signifying, such as man and humanity, differ by reason alone; and many things that differ by their definitive reasons, such as wood and the carvable, differ by reason alone. Therefore distinguish that to differ by reason is twofold: namely, by the reason signified, or conceived; in another way, by the reason conceiving, or signifying. In the present case the discussion concerns difference according to the reason signified: so that the sense is that good and being (ens) differ according to their formal reasons, as signified by their names.

V. The conclusion is therefore proved. First, with respect to the first part, thus: Good has the character of the appetible; therefore of the perfect; therefore of being in act; therefore of being. Therefore good and being are the same in reality. – The antecedent is proved from Book I of the Ethics. The first consequence is proved: because all things desire their own perfection. But the second is left as known. The third, however, is proved: because esse is the actuality of every thing. And the last is evident.

Next, as to the second part. Good expresses the character of the appetible, which being does not express. Therefore they differ in their intelligibility (ratio).

VI. Concerning the antecedents there is a doubt: since that which is said of something in the second mode of saying per se is not contained in the essence of that subject, but conversely, as is clear from I Posterior Analytics¹ But "desirable" is said of "good" in the second mode of saying per se. Therefore good does not have the character of the desirable, but conversely. – The minor is proved: first, because something is desirable because it is good, and not conversely; second, because good is the formal object of appetite, while "desirable" is an extrinsic denomination taken from appetite, and they are related as color and visible; but it is established that "visible" is said of color in the second mode, from II On the Soul²

VII. To this it can be said in two ways, according to the two modes by which something is taken to have the character of the appetible, namely formally and fundamentally. If the term appetible is taken formally, then good is said to have its character not as intrinsic, but as a passion. But if it is taken fundamentally, then good is said to have the character of the appetible intrinsically: since the proper character of good is the foundation and proper cause of appetibility, just as color is of visibility. – And although both glosses are absolutely true, and the first is taken from the principle of St. Thomas's Commentary on the books of the Ethics³, yet the second is directly intended in the matter at hand: since the question concerns the intrinsic character of good.

VIII. But note here that, although each of the things assumed in the deduction of reason⁴, namely good, perfect, being in act, and being, imports the foundation and cause of the appetible, and for this reason a real identity is concluded among them: nevertheless only the good imports the proximate foundation of the appetible; because only the good signifies that thing which grounds appetibility as grounding and causing it: so that the closer something approaches to the ratio of good, the more it expresses the foundation of the appetible, as is evident to one who runs through what has been said. For between being and good there intervene being in act and the perfect: and it is clear that the ratio of the appetible is expressed more by being in act than by being, since each thing is desired according to some act of esse, present or future; and still more by the perfect, which imports completion, since even esse in act is desired for its completion; and lastly by the good, since not even the completion itself is desired except because it is good, or appears good to the desirer. The good therefore imports the ratio of the appetible, that is, the proximate foundation and reason why something is appetible: which, because it is the same as perfection and esse, is the same as being. But because as such it is not expressed by being, but absolutely in itself, therefore it is distinguished from being by its formal ratio.

In the title, prior according to reason, that is, according to the order of the formal rationes of being itself. For being (ens) and good, since they are distinguished by their rationes, must be ordered according to them—and surely in no other order than that which is by nature apt to exist among formal rationes: which is called the order of reason, and consequently has a prior and a posterior according to reason. And this order consists in this: namely, that the posterior ratio presupposes another in itself, and not conversely. So that the sense is: whether the ratio of good precedes, on its own merit, the ratio of being (entis).

II. In the body, a single responsive conclusion to the question: Being is prior in thought than good. – It is proved. Each thing is knowable insofar as it is in act. Therefore being is the proper object of the intellect. Therefore it is the first intelligible. Therefore it falls first into the conception of the intellect. Therefore it is prior in thought than good.

The antecedent is proved from IX Metaphysics. The first, second, and third consequences are left as self-evident. The fourth, however, is proved: because the ratio signified by the name is that which the intellect conceives of the thing. – All things are clear. For this argument concludes not only that being (ens) is prior in ratio to the good, but to all the others, as is evident.

III. Concerning this argument a doubt arises: for it is either intended to infer that being (ens) is prior in the order of reason in itself, or with respect to us. If in itself, this conflicts with what was said above in question III, article V. For there it was said in the text¹ that nothing is prior to God, neither in reality nor in understanding: but from this sense it follows that being is prior to God in the order of reason. For if being is the first intelligible, just as sound is the first audible, the other things must be posterior intelligibles, as is clear from I Posterior Analytics²: for what first belongs to something, the rest belong by reason of that. -- If with respect to us, then the question posed has not been satisfactorily answered. For the doubt turns on whether the ratio of being in itself is prior to the ratio of the good: and not whether with respect to us it is prior.

IV. To this, a twofold answer can be given. First, that being (ens) can be compared to other things of its own order, that is, to other formal rationes; and it can also be compared to the things themselves subsisting. If the ratio of being is compared to the other rationes, taking the rationes of things as distinguished from the things themselves, then being is the first intelligible in itself, and the others are posterior according to the intellect. But among ly these others is not included the quod quid erat esse of God: for a ratio cannot exist without also being a thing, since it cannot abstract from existence, because it is esse itself. -- But if the ratio of being is compared both to the rationes and to the things, then it is not simply the first intelligible: rather, the deity is the first intelligible. Thus intelligibility belongs to God prior to its belonging to being; indeed, it belongs to being because it belongs to God: for God is not intelligible by participation. -- And thus both texts are preserved. For there God is said absolutely to be first according to the intellect, whereas here being is said to be first among the formal rationes.

Second, it can be said that an amphiboly occurs here in ly with respect to us: for it can determine either the order or the intelligibles. If it determines the order, then it is distinguished from the order considered in itself; and thus the objection proceeds. And the answer must be that the discussion concerns the order considered in itself. For, as is clear from the title, the question here is not about the order of cognition, that is, what is first known by us: but about the order of reason, namely which formal ratio is prior. -- If it determines the intelligibles, then it distinguishes our intelligibles from those not intelligible by us. And according to this sense it must be said that what is inquired into here are the intelligibles with respect to us, that is, our intelligibles, or those intelligible by us: so that the present discourse is about the order considered in itself of our intelligibles. And on this account, being (ens) is the first intelligible considered in itself among the things intelligible by us: whereas God is the first intelligible simply speaking. -- And this sense accords with the surface of the letter, which speaks of the object of our intellect, while "to signify by a word" is mixed in. Although this does not compel us to deny that what follows must be interpreted concerning intellect absolutely, insofar as it is intellect, whose proper object alone is established to be being (ens). For every intellect, taken according to its proper nature, has received its own proper object: the divine indeed the deity, the angelic its own substance, the human what a thing is of material things, etc., as will become clear in their proper places³.

In the body, one conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: Every being, insofar as it is a being, is good. And there is added ly insofar as in the conclusion, to show that to be good does not belong to every being per accidens, but per se. – It is proved thus. Every being, as such, is in act: therefore perfect: therefore desirable and good. – All things are clear. The first consequence is proved: because every act is a certain perfection.

II. In response to the fourth, note that the text says two things. First it verifies, assigning the reason why mathematical things are not good; second, it answers the argument¹. – The first indeed is founded on this, that things are good, as will be clear below², either because they exist (sunt), or because they are such, or because they are ordered to the good. But mathematics, as such, abstract from all of these: from being (esse) indeed, because as such they do not exist; but from being such, for the same reason, since being such presupposes being (esse); and from order to the good, because they abstract from an end. It is proved: the end has the character of a mover, but these abstract from matter and motion.

III. Concerning this part two doubts arise. First concerns that argument, namely that mathematical things are not good by primary goodness because they do not subsist separately. For if this argument holds, it follows that no thing taken universally is good, since no thing taken universally subsists, according to the Peripatetics. The consequent is false: therefore.

According to there is a doubt concerning that argument, namely, that the mathematical sciences abstract from the end because they abstract more from matter and motion, since the end has the character of a mover. For this argument seems to fail in two ways. First, because it would follow that metaphysical things abstract from the end: for they abstract more from matter and motion than the mathematical sciences do. Second, because a equivocation occurs with respect to motion: since the end does not have the character of a mover by motion properly so called, from which the mathematician abstracts; but by motion spoken of metaphorically. Therefore, although the conclusion is true, the argument is nonetheless worthless.

IV. To the first doubt it is said that mathematical things can be taken in two ways. In one way, according to what they are absolutely. And thus the judgment concerning them and natural things is the same with respect to being (esse) and goodness: for a triangle is no more abstracted from being (ens) than whiteness is. And thus there is no question here about them in this way; but it can be said of them that they are good in the manner in which beings (entia) are good, namely according to their individuals existing in the nature of things, etc.

They are considered in another way as mathematical things, insofar as they are subject to that mode of abstraction. And in this way it is denied that the judgment about them is the same as about other things taken universally. – For the clarification of this, know that although all universals agree in this, that they do not subsist in their universality; nevertheless among physical, mathematical, and metaphysical universals there is a great difference with respect to subsisting in their proper abstractions. Metaphysical things indeed, when taken according to their proper abstraction, do subsist: since they have in the nature of things individuals abstracting from all sensible and intelligible matter, as is clear in the case of intelligences. Mathematical things, however, when taken according to their proper abstraction, do not exist: since they have no individual in the nature of things abstracting from sensible matter; for this line is not found except in the termination of a sensible body. Natural things, however, since they have no proper abstraction of their own, but only that which is common to all sensibles, namely by which the universal is abstracted from the particular; it is manifestly clear that they subsist in the nature of things, while they have individuals subsisting with sensible matter and the other conditions known to you universally. – Therefore, since in the text it is said that mathematical things do not subsist, it must not be interpreted to mean that mathematical universals taken universally do not subsist (for it would be ridiculous to bring forward this reason): but that mathematical things as such, taken particularly, do not subsist; or, which is the same thing, that mathematical things as such have no individual existing in the nature of things. And therefore they are neither in the universal nor in the particular: and on this account they cannot be beings. Which cannot be said of other things taken universally. And thus the nullity of the consequence made to the opposite is evident: and why it is said singularly of mathematical things that they do not have being.

V. To the second doubt, however³, it is answered that, since statements must always be interpreted according to the subject matter, therefore, although the inference is not valid, it abstracts from matter and motion, therefore from an end, as is clear in Book XII of the Metaphysics, text 37⁴, where an end is found in immobile things; yet this inference is valid: mathematical entities abstract from matter and motion, therefore from an end: because mathematical entities are not by nature apt to have an end except the end of matter and motion, since in reality they are natural beings (entia naturalia). For if they abstract from matter and motion, they must abstract from the end of matter and motion; and if they abstract from such an end, they abstract entirely from an end, because they are not by nature apt to have an end in any other way.

And by this the response to the second objection is also clear. For when it is said, the end has the character of a mover, ly mover can signify the pure causality of the end: and thus "mover" is said equivocally with respect to motion properly so called. But it is not taken in this way here. – It can also signify both the causality of the end and its effect: and then it is equivalent to what I say, causing motion. And thus it is taken in the matter at hand. Nor is there any equivocation: but motion is taken properly on both sides, and it is specified what sort of end that of the mathematicians is. As if he were saying that, because the end of the mathematicians has the character of a mover, that is, of causing motion properly so called, just as does the end of natural things, it follows that, if mathematics abstracts from matter and motion, it also abstracts from an end. – And thus both objections are resolved from the same root.

VI. Secondly, in the same reply⁵ he satisfies the argument. And the argument is indeed this: Mathematical things are not good; mathematical things are beings; therefore some beings are not good (in the second mode of the third figure). – The reply, however, consists in the denial of the argument: because it is a sophism of figure of speech, or from the qualified to the unqualified. For mathematical things seem indeed to signify beings: and yet they signify beings abstracted in this way. And therefore in the text both the inferred conclusion is denied, namely, that some beings are not good; and the conclusion that ought to be inferred is conceded, namely, that some beings, as they are subject to such abstraction, are not good. Nor is this unfitting, as is said in the text: because the notion of being also abstracts from the notion of the good. Just as, because the notion of man is prior to risibility, man can be taken in some prior aspect (because in the first mode of speaking per se), in which there belongs to him to be a rational animal, and there does not belong to him to be risible: nor nevertheless can it be inferred, therefore some man is not risible; but rather, therefore some man, in some prior aspect, abstracts from risibility, in which he does not abstract from the notion of man.

VII. Concerning this part a doubt arises, how these two stand together: mathematical entities, formally speaking, are neither in act nor in potency, as was said⁶; and, mathematical entities have the character of being: since being is said only of that which is in act or in potency.

To this it may be briefly said that these two propositions, rightly understood, stand together. For the first does not deny being universally: rather, it denies being thus, namely in such a mode of abstraction. For a triangle abstracted from sensible matter neither is, nor can be (namely according to such a mode of being), in the nature of things. And this is what is said at the beginning of this response. – The second, however, affirms confusedly some being. Now it is clear that, with the negation of one mode of being, there stands the affirmation of being in general of the same subject: because it can be verified according to another mode of being. Mathematical things, therefore, both are not beings in such a way, and absolutely are beings.

VIII. And if it is pressed against our position: Therefore the same must be said, that they are not good in such a way, but are absolutely good: and consequently it is badly said that mathematical things are not good — this consequence must be denied. For in order for something to have formally the ratio of being (ens), it suffices that it be of such a nature in itself that existence in the order of real things is not repugnant to it, however this may come about, whether through its own abstraction or not. But for something to have formally the ratio of the good, beyond this it is required that the thing itself be taken in relation to esse, or to an end, etc. Now, a triangle and other mathematical objects, according to their quiddities, possess this, namely that existing is not repugnant to them; and therefore they retain formally the ratio of being. But because they are not considered in relation to esse and to an end in the order of real things, therefore they abstract from the ratio of the good formally, though not fundamentally; and therefore esse is denied of them. – A manifest sign of this is that no conclusion there is demonstrated on account of the good or of better being; no demonstration there proceeds through a final or efficient cause (which look to esse in the order of real things), but only through the formal cause: for that belongs properly to the good, this to being (ens).

In the title, to have the character of a final cause is not taken here univocally, but in two ways: namely, in act as signified and in act as exercised. If having the character of a final cause is understood in the first way, it is taken fundamentally with respect to its proximate foundation. For it is not asked whether the good is the character of a final cause, but whether it is the proper foundation of that character. What the character of a final cause is, however, is clear from Physics II Book II¹ and Metaphysics V Book V²: namely, that for the sake of which something comes to be or exists. Hence the sense of the title is: Does a thing, precisely because it is good, claim for itself this prerogative, that it be that for the sake of which? – But if it is understood in the second way, then having the character of a final cause is taken formally; so that the sense of the title is: Whether the good formally is formally the very character of an end in act as exercised, that is, whether it exercises final causality; for example, if it is said that A comes to be or exists, simply or in such a way, because it is good, whether by this very fact it is made a final cause. And this sense, in my judgment, is the one intended: for it is formal, and worthy of genius in proportion to that; and the response tends toward this.

II. Concerning this determination, note briefly the truth you derive from it regarding that question, whether a thing is a final cause in intention or in execution, etc. For since you have here (as is also held in Book II of the Physics, ³) that good conveys the notion of an end in act exercised (which is also proved inductively, since every account of something for the sake of a good or a better thing implies an end), you must, by the same reasoning, call some thing an end insofar as you assert it to be good. From what was said above, however, ⁴ it is clear that each thing is called and is good formally by reason of its esse: therefore a thing has the notion of an end by reason of its esse. So that, just as form is the account of causing efficiently, while existing is the condition of the efficient form, so esse is the account of causing finally; and esse in intention is the condition of the esse that causes finally; but esse in execution is not an end, but rather the terminus and effect both of the end and of the efficient cause. And this needs induction, not argument: for health, knowledge, a bath, etc., are desired as present, as possessed, etc., not in intention, but according to their natural esse. And thus esse is the reason why a thing is desired, which is the same as to finalize; yet none of these would ever finalize, drawing appetite toward itself, unless it were in intention, as is clear; from this we experience that there follows the execution of the thing which moves as end. And this is what Averroes intended in Book XII of the Metaphysics, commentary XXXVI. And this, once well grasped, resolves all the difficulties for the intellect abstracting the thing from esse outside the soul, from esse in execution, and from esse in intention, in the manner described.

III. In the body there are two parts: first, the question is answered; second, a tacit objection is excluded. The first part is the conclusion answering the question affirmatively: The good has the character of an efficient cause. – Proof. The appetible has the character of an end: the good is appetible: therefore the good has the character of an end.

IV. As to the second, the tacit objection is this. Above⁵ it was already determined that the good does not have the character of a first, but rather of a last. Now, however, it is said that it has the character of a final cause: which is acknowledged to have the character of a first, since the end is the cause of causes. How, then, can these stand together—that the good has the character of both last and first?

In excluding this objection, he first gives the response, and then proves it. The response is that good is last in being (essendo), but first in causing—although in the text only the first part of this response is set forth. – The proof is: what is first in causing is last in being; the end is first in causing; therefore the end is last in being. But good has the character of an end: therefore. The major premise is proved from the testimony of sensible things, in which what is first in causing is last in being, as is clear in fire and heat. Therefore, absolutely speaking, what is first in causing is last in being.

V. Concerning the major premise, note the terms: that ly first and last denote in the proposition the order of generation; and they stand for forms, or formal reasons, which are principles of causing and of being. ly in causing is taken as distinguished against in being. For it is supposed here that a twofold order of generation exists among things: one in causing, another in being. And the former is considered according to prior and posterior in causing, the latter according to prior and posterior in being: so that that thing is prior in causing whose causality does not depend upon the causality of another, but conversely; and likewise that thing is prior in being whose esse does not presuppose the esse of another, but conversely. The sense of the major premise, therefore, is that a thing prior in the order of generation with respect to causality is posterior in the order of generation with respect to esse.

VI. Concerning the proof of the major premise, note that the order of things in being can be considered absolutely; and it is taken thus in the major premise: and it can be considered in a given genus, for instance, of caused things; and it is taken thus in the proof of the major premise. That is, from the order in being found between the foundations of prior and posterior cause—for instance, between heat and the form of fire in the thing caused—he wished to lead us by the hand to the order in being simply. For he did not intend to infer the major premise by force of that proof, but rather to show that the same order need not obtain among things in being as obtains in causing, nor conversely; which is sufficiently established by that proof. And again he intended to raise these intelligibles above sense-experience on the testimony of sensible things; which is sufficiently done here.

VII. Concerning the force of this major premise, and of the whole argument, a doubt arises. For either this is a discourse about order in causing and in being absolutely; or with respect to this, and in this. If absolutely, the major is false. First because the ultimate end of all things, namely God, is first in causing; and yet he is not last, but also first in being. Then also in the example of the letter: the form of fire is not only first in being, but also in causing; for the form of fire causes fire formally, whether as causing or as caused, before heat heats effectively. And it is similar in all cases: for form always precedes both in esse and in formal causality. – But if with respect to this, or in this: therefore the intended point is not obtained. For he intends to assign absolutely the order of the good to other things; and not in this or that.

VIII. To this it is said that this discourse concerns order both in causing and in being absolutely. But the objection errs. First, because it misinterprets the major premise. For we do not intend that what is first in causing be, in numerical identity, the last in being with respect to those things of which it is first in causing (for this universal proposition is impossible, nor did we ever dream of it); rather we intend that that same thing, according to its formal reason—whether it be the same in species, or in genus, or the same by analogy—is last in being, within the order of those things of which it is first in causing. And in this way, the divine goodness is first in causing finally, and it itself, by analogy, is last in being in any given thing; as is clear from article 1, in the reply to the first objection. – Second, because it distorts the testimony drawn from sensible things in the text. For, as has already been said⁶, sensible things are adduced here so that from the order in causing this thing, and in being in this caused thing, we might perceive that the order in causing simply and in being simply is not the same. Hence, although the substantial form of fire is prior in being and in causing simply than heat; nevertheless it is not prior in causing this, that is, in generating this fire. For, in the order of generation, heating precedes the generation of the form of fire: for alteration precedes generation. And yet the first thing which this generated fire receives is the form of fire; and heat follows upon the form, just as universally the proper accidents follow upon the form.

IX. But if you wish to examine the order in sensible things simply, note that formal causality necessarily depends on efficient causality, and the question will be resolved. For although in this sensible thing that which gives esse is first, which pertains to the formal cause; nevertheless no form or quiddity truly has formal causality according to the thing itself, unless it be from some efficient cause, which must act for the sake of an end. Since indeed a form is not the formal cause of itself, but of another, namely the composite; and every composite (as was said in q. III⁷, and as Averroes testifies in XII Metaphys., comment. XXV) is from another; there must be efficient causality before all formal causality, and before this, final causality. In being, however (in essendo), there is found first in the cause the form, and in the effect the likeness of the form: second, in the cause the active power, and in the effect its participation: third, in the cause goodness, and in the effect the complement, which is a participation of goodness. And thus, simply speaking, the order in being and in causing is inverted.

X. Yet, concerning the knowledge of the letter at the end, know, novice, that it recalls a twofold perfection, namely in being and absolutely. And by perfect in being he means perfect substantially; but the perfection absolutely, which he says is founded in a being (ens) through the intelligibility of the good, is the perfection of a thing simply, or totally. For this is considered according to the notion of the good simply, as is clear from what was said above⁸: for then nothing at all is lacking.

In the title, note the terms. the ratio of good: not universally, but of caused being, as is clear in the following article¹; for in God these have no place. And again the ratio of good, not in any way whatever, but of good as that by which. – Mode, species, and order. St. Thomas is found to have used these terms in three ways. Here indeed, in the body, by mode he means the commensuration of the efficient principles, or material ones; by species, form; by order, inclination toward something. But in Ia IIae, qu. LXXXV, art. 4, by species he means form absolutely; by mode, the measure of the form itself (for the species of things are measured like numbers); but by order, a respect toward another. In the question De Veritate, however, qu. XXI², he means by species form; by mode, the commensuration of esse itself to the essence to which it belongs; but by order, a respect with regard to what perfects finally, closed within the ratio of good. – These three expositions, although they may seem to differ greatly with respect to one term, namely "mode"; yet if we examine them more subtly, they converge into one. For the commensuration of principles, the measure of form, and the commensuration of esse to essence mutually imply one another. For from such a harmony of principles there is a form of such perfection; and from so great a form, so much esse, according to the order of generation. But according to the order of perfection or end, if esse of such perfection is to be produced, then a form and essence of such perfection must be supposed; and if this, then such a disposition of the preceding principles.

The reason of the good as consisting in mode, species, and order can be understood in two ways. In one way, as in the essential parts, just as the reason of man consists in animal and rational. In another way, as in the integral parts, not of the reason itself, but of its proper matter, just as the reason of man consists in flesh, bones, and sinews. And it is in this way that I understand in the present case the reason of the good to consist in mode, species, and order. – The sense of the title, therefore, is: Whether the reason of the good as that which, being caused, consists in form, antecedents, and consequents, as in the parts of its proper matter.

II. In the body, a single conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: The ratio of good consists in mode, species, and order. – It is proved. Each thing is what it is through its form, which requires certain antecedents and consequents. Therefore, that to which nothing is lacking according to the mode of its nature has species, mode, and order. Therefore, the perfect being has these. Therefore, good requires these. – The antecedent is evident on both counts. The first consequence is evident from the quiddity of the term of species, mode, and order. The second holds by the argument from definition to the thing defined. The third, however, is proved: because perfection is the ratio of the appetible.

III. Concerning this conclusion a doubt arises: how can the mode in the substantial good of the angels be preserved, when mode, that is, the commensuration of the efficient principles, or of the material ones, is explained as it is said here; since in the angels there are no material principles, and their efficient cause is God alone, whose action is His very substance.

To this it is briefly said that, according to the exposition set forth in this place, the mode of the good angel is saved with respect to substance, as regards the efficient principle, thus. For God as agent can be taken in two ways. In one way, absolutely: and so both He Himself and His action are above every mode. In another way, as acting according to this or that idea: and so God's action is commensurate to this thing, not to another; just as the idea is so properly the idea of this thing, that it is not of another. And in this way the productive action of Gabriel is modified, and modifies the esse and substantial goodness of Gabriel: and this suffices. – The mode can also be saved in angels according to the material principle: since essence is as matter for its esse, and is commensurate to it. But this pertains more to the other expositions³: since here the mode precedes the form, as is clear from the text.

A clear title. – In the body, two conclusions: one according to the common opinion; the other proper to me. The first is: This division is properly said to be of human good. The second is: This division is properly of good insofar as it is good.

Both are proved as follows. The term of bodily motion is fittingly divided into those things that correspond to the honorable, the useful, and the pleasurable. Therefore the term of appetitive motion is well divided into the honorable, the useful, and the pleasurable. Therefore also into the good. – The antecedent is explained from the division of the term of motion into what is so in a qualified sense and simply: and again, of the term simply, into the very thing that terminates, and rest in it. The first consequence is proved: because the term of appetitive motion becomes known from the termination of bodily motion. The second: because the good is that which is desired. – All things are clear.