Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

Concerning the order and title of the question, note that perfection does not signify any perfection whatsoever, such as goodness, life, wisdom, etc., nor does it signify all perfections in common (for in asking whether something is perfect, one is not asking whether it has all perfections, whether determinately or indeterminately); rather, it signifies the best mode of being according to whatever formal account; although, since the word has been extended by usage, perfection often stands for a thing or formal account actualizing something, as is clear when we say that wisdom is a perfection, and so on. Strictly speaking, therefore, "perfection," though first derived from total making, among philosophers signifies a mode of being—not any mode whatever, but the best: not of some determinate thing, but of whatever thing it is predicated of, whether substance or accident. For a thing can be understood and be under a manifold mode of being, one of which is better than another: just as the nature of plants and animals has a certain mode of being in the seed, and another mode of being in the generated individuals, and again another in the same when grown, etc.; and it is evident that the first is and is called imperfect, because the specific nature there is only in potency; the second, however, is perfect to some degree; the third, indeed, simply perfect, as is clear in Book IV of the Meteorology¹: for each thing is there said to be perfect when it can produce another such as itself; for then it has its nature in the best way. – Hence, just as to ask whether something is perfect according to this or that account, say science or nature, is not to ask whether it has some other perfection, but whether it has that one in the best way; so too to ask absolutely and without specification, as is done here, whether God is perfect, is not to ask whether God has some perfection, nor whether he has all of them, since this is reserved for the second article; rather, it is to ask whether God, that which is, is in the best way: for this is to be perfect.

II. But he testifies that this is the evident sense of the question by the cause of the response assigned in the body of the article. For it is said that God is perfect because He is not in potency but in act: for it is clear that being in act or in potency pertains to the mode of being. And therefore this question was ordered immediately after the question concerning the simplicity of the divine nature: for once the essence has been established, the question that at once presents itself concerns the intrinsic mode of being of that essence itself, such as the term perfect signifies: for it does not import the mode of being of a thing in respect to something surrounding it, or in any way extrinsic, but in itself. Hence Aristotle also, in I Caeli², treating of the nature of the universe, first determines whether it is perfect: since the questions whether it is, and whether it is simple or composite, which came before, were left as self-evident.

III. In the body there are two parts: first, the opinion of the Pythagoreans is reported; second, a reply is given to the question. – As to the first, there are two points. The opinion: that perfection does not befit a principle. The root: because they understood only material principles. The consequence is proved: because as such it is in potency; therefore.

IV. With respect to the second, likewise two points. The Conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: God is maximally perfect. The Root, opposed to the first: namely, because he is an active principle.

Proof. An agent must be in act; therefore the first agent is most of all in act; therefore it is most perfect. – All of this is evident. And the last inference is made clear from the meaning of the name "perfect," namely that to which nothing of what is required is lacking: for a being in potency lacks what it can be in act, whereas a being in act, as such, lacks nothing.

V. In response to the third, note two things. First, that the reply rests on this distinction: common in two ways, in the manner of act, and in the manner of potency. Commonness in the manner of act consists in being received; commonness in the manner of potency consists in receiving. Now esse is the most common of all in the manner of act: for it is related to all things as the received to the receptive, as is evident. – Second, that from this the defect of Scotus is clear, in Book IV Sent., dist. 1, qu. 1, against this position of St. Thomas, namely that esse, according to its formal ratio, is the most perfect of all perfections, which he argues from its commonness. For it is astonishing that he brings forward this argument in order to conclude it, when St. Thomas had answered it so expressly and so clearly.

In the title, sint does not denote any special mode of being, but is taken absolutely: so that the question is not whether the perfections are in God formally or virtually, but absolutely, in whatever way they may be. The word perfectiones stands universally for all perfections, both those that are perfections simply and those that are not simply, as is clear from the course of the article.

II. In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: In God are the perfections of all things.

It is proven in three ways¹. First, from authority. God is said to be universally perfect, that is, according to the noble qualities of all genera: therefore. – The antecedent is proven by the authority of Averroes, V Metaphysics

III. Second, by an argument taken from Dionysius. God is the first effective cause of things: therefore the perfections of all things preexist in God in a more eminent manner.

The antecedent is supposed. The consequent is proved as to its first part. The effect preexists in virtue in the agent cause: therefore, whatever perfection there is in the effect must be found in the efficient cause. Therefore, if God etc., the perfections of all things are in him. – As to the second part, however, it is proved thus. An agent, insofar as it is an agent, is perfect: therefore, to preexist in the virtue of an agent cause is not to preexist in a more imperfect, but in a more perfect mode. Therefore, whatever perfection there is in the effect preexists in the efficient cause, either according to the same ratio, as in a univocal cause; or according to a more eminent one, as in an equivocal cause. Therefore, if God is the first cause of all things, he must possess the perfections of all things in a more eminent mode. – The assumption is clear from the preceding article. The first consequence is proved from the opposite: namely, because matter is imperfect, to preexist in the potency of a material cause is to be in a more imperfect mode. The rest are left as self-evident.

IV. Concerning that proposition, to pre-exist in the power of an agent cause is not to pre-exist in a more imperfect, but in a more perfect, manner, a doubt immediately arises: for it is both false and contradicts another statement of the text. False indeed: because the effect sometimes pre-exists in the efficient cause in an equally perfect manner, as is evident when Socrates generates Plato. But against the text: because it is expressly stated, and rightly, that in a univocal cause the effect pre-exists according to the same ratio: therefore not in a more perfect manner.

Nor is there any lack of occasion for beginners to doubt: for we see that effects preexist in a more imperfect manner in many causes that are truly efficient causes; as is evident in seeds, from which animals and plants are effectively produced.

V. To this it must be said briefly that in a more perfect way can be expounded in two ways. First, comparatively, as the word signifies by its force. And then it is understood, not necessarily, but permissively: so that the negative particle, not in a less perfect way, is understood necessarily; but the affirmative particle, but in a more perfect way, is understood permissively. And thus the proposition is most true: and it signifies that to preexist in the efficient cause, necessarily, is to preexist not in a less perfect way than the mode of being of the effect; but possibly, it is to preexist in a more perfect way. – Second, it can be expounded by interpreting the comparative as a positive: in a more perfect way, that is, in a perfect way, or of perfection. – Yet the first exposition serves my intention: since I intend to prove that the perfections of the effects are in the equivocal cause, God, in a more eminent way.

To the novices, however, the answer is given, according to the doctrine of Alexander, as Averroes reports in XII Metaphysics, commentary XXIV, that seeds and other things of this kind, to which the forms of their effects are not assimilated univocally or imitatively, are not efficient causes, but instruments of the agent causes; and for this reason Aristotle places them in the genus of effecting causes, V Metaphysics² and II Physics³ The present discussion, however, concerns causes that are active properly speaking, not only as they are distinguished from the other genera of causes, but as they are distinguished from the instruments of causes, which are not causes properly speaking.

VI. Concerning the last consequence⁴, note that it is founded on this, that the first efficient cause of things is an equivocal cause. This has been left as settled: both because it is admitted by all, and because it is clearly evident from the terms. For if it is the efficient cause of things of different rationes, it is univocal with none of them; and if it is univocal with any of them, then it is not the efficient cause of the others; therefore it is not of things of different rationes.

VII. The second argument⁵ was also touched upon by Dionysius. God is esse itself subsisting per se; therefore He contains within Himself the whole perfection of being (essendi); therefore all the perfections of all things.

The antecedent is supposed. The first consequence is proved by destruction of the consequent, in special terms, namely the perfection of heat and of hot, thus. It does not contain the whole perfection of being: therefore it does not have esse according to its perfect ratio: therefore it is not esse itself subsisting per se (which is the opposite of the antecedent); just as "A hot" does not have the whole perfection of heat: therefore it does not have heat according to its perfect ratio: therefore it is not heat subsisting per se. – The second consequence, however, is proved. Things are said to be perfect insofar as they have esse: therefore the perfections of all things pertain to the perfection of being: therefore, if it contains the whole perfection of being, etc.

VIII. In response to the third, note first that the force of the argument rests upon the topic from correlates, when it is said: being is more imperfect than living, therefore esse than life. And the truth of the antecedent consists in this, because being does not include the living, but conversely.

Note second, that in the response he hints at this distinction on the side of the thing: esse can be compared to life in two ways. First, formally and precisely on both sides: so that esse is taken precisely for the act of being, and life precisely for what formally adds above being, namely living as such. And thus they are signified by abstract names, for instance being (esse), life, wisdom, etc.: and in the text they are said to be compared as distinguished by reason. And thus esse is more perfect than living and the other perfections: because it is the actuality of all things, as was said above⁶. – Second, esse can be compared to life without precision: so that life is taken according to what it includes, and not only for what it formally adds above being. And thus they are signified by concrete names in the text, and are called a being (ens), a living thing, a wise one: and it is said that a living thing is more perfect than a being, because it includes a being, and something of perfection beyond. – In the third way esse can be compared, in its pure subsistence, to the others however they may be taken. And thus it is signified in the text by the term "ipsum esse": and it is said that it includes in itself life, wisdom, and every perfection of being, as was proved in the body; and consequently it is the most perfect of all.

From these things, however, which are taken from the letter, we have both that esse, formally considered, is more perfect than the others, formally considered: and that esse itself is simply more perfect, possessing all perfections preeminently in itself. So that from the first we may know that that predicate, which belongs to God alone in its quiddity, is formally nobler than the other perfections: and from the second, that because God is ipsum esse subsistens, He has all perfections.

A response to the argument is also obtained from these considerations. For the consequent must be denied: since in the antecedent the living thing is taken as including being and something beyond it; but in the consequent it is taken only according to that which it adds above being. And thus it is shown that the argument does not proceed from the topic from conjugates: which holds when the concretes are held precisely in a formal manner just as the abstracts are; the opposite of which occurs here.

In the title a doubt arises: what purpose does this article serve in this place. For here the argument concerns the perfection of the divine substance in itself; therefore a question about the creature, such as this one is, ought not to be mixed in.

To this it is said that, although this question is verbally about the creature, according to its sense nevertheless it is about the perfection of the divine nature. For what is asked here is whether the perfection of the divine nature is so great that no creature can be like it in being (esse), or not. This indeed remained to be investigated, after it had been determined both what perfect nature is and what universally perfect nature is. – But note that it is not asked whether the divine perfection is so great that nothing can be like it: but that no creature. For the first pertains to the question concerning the plurality of gods, and will be treated in question XI; the second, however, belongs to this place.

II. In the body there are two points: first, likeness is distinguished; second, the question is answered. – As to the first, likeness is threefold: the first, according to a form of the same ratio and of the same mode; the second, according to a form of the same ratio, but not of the same mode; the third, according to a form, but neither of the same ratio nor of the same mode. – The distinction is proved. Likeness is a conformity in form; therefore it is multiplied according to the manner of communicating in form; therefore threefold, etc. All is evident from the text.

III. As to the second point, the responsive conclusion to the question is: Creatures are like God, not according to the same specific or generic nature, but according to a certain analogy.

This conclusion has four parts: the first affirmative, namely that they are like God; the second negative, namely not according to species; the third negative, namely nor according to genus; and the fourth affirmative, namely but according to some analogy. – And first, the first part is proved. Every agent acts through its own form; therefore there must be in the effect a likeness of the form of the agent. And then you may add: therefore the creature must be like God. The consequence is proved: because every agent acts so as to produce what is like itself insofar as it is an agent, that is, according to that which is for it the reason of acting. – Then, as to the second and third and fourth parts: because God is not an agent contained within a species or a genus, but the universal principle of all being (esse). – All things are clear from the text.

IV. In response to the last point, a doubt arises concerning the authority of Dionysius, since he distinguishes cause and caused against things of one order. For from this it follows either that cause and caused are universally of different orders, which is clearly false in univocal causes; or that it is ambiguous, because it is uncertain of what kind of cause and of what kind of caused he is speaking; or that it is badly done, because things of different orders ought to be distinguished against things of one order whether they are cause and caused or not—for this is incidental.

V. To this it is said that this artificial distinction is certain and formal, if rightly understood. For it is not false, but most true and necessary, that cause and caused are universally and formally of diverse orders. But we use the name cause and caused not for the relations or causalities themselves; rather for the thing which is the ground of causing, and likewise for the thing, or form, which the caused receives from the cause: for these things are the foundations of the likeness between caused and cause, as in all cases. The foundations of likeness between some things can therefore be related in two ways, as is said in the text. In one way, they may be of the same order, as this whiteness and that whiteness, and this animal and that animal, etc.: and thus likeness is a relation of parity, and mutual. In another way, one of them may formally, by its own account, be caused by the other, as the image of Socrates and Socrates (for dependence on Socrates does not accrue to the image of Socrates accidentally): and thus likeness is neither a relation of parity nor mutual, but is reduced to the third genus of relatives, set forth in Book V Metaphysics¹, on the knowing and the knowable, etc. Now it is evident that cause and caused of this kind are of diverse orders. For it is impossible for things of the same order to be so related that dependence on the other belongs to the formal account of one: since whatever belongs to the account of one belongs to the account of the other, and conversely.

VI. Whence the answer to the objection concerning univocal causes is evident². For where there is univocation, there is not cause and caused formally and per se, but only materially and per accidens: since the form of the effect does not formally depend upon the form of the cause. For humanity as it is in Socrates, taken formally, does not depend in its being or in its coming-to-be upon the humanity of Plato his father: but the humanity of Socrates, because it is this, therefore depends on the father. And consequently the humanity which is the foundation of the likeness between father and son is not of the genus of cause or caused, except materially and per accidens: rather it is of the genus of foundations of the same order. Whatever things, therefore, taken formally, are cause and caused are foundations of likeness belonging to different orders, as is subtly brought forward in the text: and consequently between them there is a likeness of imitation, and not of pure likeness: and for this reason it is not mutual.

And note this well, and apply it proportionally to the matter concerning non-mutual relatives.