Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, note that, from the conditions said to belong to God in the preceding article¹, in proving his esse it is clearly evident that it cannot enter anyone's mind that God's being is an accident; rather he must be a substance. Therefore, once the question whether he is has been settled—by which it is known that God is an ens—and from what is attached to it it plainly stands firm that he is a substance, he now immediately inquires whether he is a body, that is, whether he is a corporeal substance; so that the word "body" here is taken properly for a body that falls under the category of substance; whether that be a simple thing, as Averroes believes² concerning the heavenly body, or whether it is not found to be simple, is of no concern. Now this kind of substance, according to all, has threefold dimension annexed to it, whether that threefold dimension be identical with the substance itself or not. For neither of these alters the point at issue. But corporeal substance taken in this way is distinguished not only against the incorporeal, namely immaterial substance: but also against the non-body, that is, even the form which is the act of the body. For neither of these is a corporeal substance, since the word "corporeal" is the intrinsic difference constituting a body: although natural forms are called corporeal substances denominatively from the bodies whose forms they are. And thus "body" is taken properly, as is clear in II de Anima, at the beginning, where Aristotle asks whether the soul is a body. And it is taken in this way here, as appears with singular force also against the obstinate from the third argument brought forward in the text.

The sense of the title is therefore: whether God is a body, that is, a substance which truly and properly is quantified, or extended; or whether He is not, but rather either wholly inextended, or extended in act, or distinguished from corporeity in any other way whatsoever.

II. On the body, one responsive conclusion, negative with respect to the question: God is not a body. – It is proved in three ways³. First. God is the first unmoved mover: therefore He is not a body. The antecedent is evident from the preceding article. The consequence is proved: because no body is an unmoved mover. Which is proved inductively.

III. Concerning that proposition, no body moves what is not moved, note that it can be understood in two ways. First, by taking ly "not moved" actually or potentially. And thus it is evident, and is truly shown inductively. And thus it accords with the minor premise, namely God is an unmoved mover: and the intended conclusion is obtained. – Second, by taking ly "not moved" actually. And thus the proposition has a difficulty: nor does it appear inductively, but it needs argument and qualification. For induction is opposed by the fact that an unmoved magnet attracts iron, and unmoved snow chills, and color alters sight, etc. Hence, in my judgment, it is taken here in the first way.

Yet it is also true in a second way, when speaking of motion that is purely local. And its reason is assigned in I Contra Gentiles, chapter 20: because the mover must be together with the thing moved. For from this it evidently follows that the body moving cannot remain, while the body moved changes place: since if only the thing moved changes place, it ceases to be together with the moving body, which is supposed to remain in the place contiguous to that place from which the mover moves the thing moved.

And from this the exclusion of the instances is apparent: for they were not about purely local motion. And as for the others, it is evident. But concerning the magnet and similar things, you have from Averroes, VII Physics, commentary 10, that these things do not move, but other things are moved toward them: although not from everywhere, on account of the privation of the disposition, which they acquire from them in a certain place by way of a spiritual alteration. But concerning these things, when there will be discussion of the dependence of the other motions upon the motion of the heavens, more will be said⁴: now these things suffice here, where the argument proceeds from local motion.

IV. Second⁵. God is the first being (ens): therefore He is pure act: therefore He is not a body. – The antecedent is clear from the preceding article. The first inference is proved as follows. Act is simply prior to potency: therefore the first being (ens) is act without potency, which is to be pure act. The assumption is explained by showing the difference of order between act and potency considered absolutely, and act and potency with respect to something to which both belong: namely, that in this respect potency is prior; but absolutely—not in this or in that—act is prior. This is proved because whatever is in potency is not reduced to act except by some being (ens) in act. – But the second inference is proved thus: every body is continuous, in whose definition falls potency to division; for it is divisible into ever-divisible parts, as is said in Book VI of the Physics⁶.

V. Third. God is the noblest of all beings: therefore He is not a body. – The antecedent is evident from the preceding article. The consequence is proved: because it is repugnant to a body to be the noblest of all. Which is proved as follows. A body is either living or non-living: but neither is the noblest: for the living surpasses the non-living, and that by which it lives surpasses the living. That this is something other than a body is proved thus: because a body, insofar as it is a body, does not live; otherwise every body would live. – All things are clear.

VI. Nevertheless, at the insistence of certain people, the proposition a living thing is nobler than a non-living thing does not seem true to some: because it would follow that an ant would be nobler than a heavenly body, which is commonly held not to live.

To this it is said that the heavenly body is perhaps alive, in truth. And yet if it is compared to an ant, not insofar as it lives, but insofar as it is a heavenly body, the answer is easy. For it will be said that the ant, as living, is nobler than the heavenly body considered apart from life. And this is necessary: because this is nothing other than to say that the soul is nobler than any body whatsoever; for the whole order of souls is above the whole order of bodies, as is evident.

But if, according to the truth of the matter, the heaven is not living, then the answer becomes more difficult. For it cannot be said that this comparison is true in a qualified sense, and not simply—that is, that a living thing as such is nobler than a non-living thing as such. First, because this comparison would be puerile: since a stone as such is also nobler than a non-stone as such, and universally every positive thing is nobler than its negation. Second, because the point at issue would not be achieved. For he intends to destroy the claim that God is within the breadth of bodies, because life is nobler than corporeity. Now it is evident that the vital grade in the universe is superior to the grade of nature, insofar as nature is distinguished against soul, and that corporeity, according to its entire breadth, is enclosed within the order of life. Therefore not in a qualified sense, but simply, the whole breadth of body is below the breadth of life. And for this reason, if God is the most noble being, He cannot be a body: because there is given a higher order, namely the vital, in which living things are evidently found to exist.

It must therefore be said that living things are simply nobler than non-living things, as the argument brought forward makes clear, and as is stated in XVI de Animalibus⁷; and that, if heaven is not living, then an ant is a being (ens) simply nobler than heaven. Heaven, however, is a nobler body than an ant: and on account of this nobility in the genus of bodies, many relative nobilities with respect to life belong to it, such as incorruptibility, etc.

Aristotle, however, in VI Ethics ⁸, says that the heavenly bodies are more noble even than man, because he holds them to be living; as he expressly says must be supposed in II On the Heavens ⁹.

In the title, note that, although according to the doctrine of St. Thomas to be a body and to be composed of matter and form are convertible and are the same thing; nevertheless, because they are not the same among others nor convertible (for Averroes holds¹ that there is body in the heavens, and yet not composed of matter and form: but Avicebron holds² that there is composition of matter and form in spiritual substances, and yet not body), therefore, in order that the doctrine may be complete in every way, the present question is raised, whether God is composed of matter and form. And for this reason all the arguments set forth in the text use means that abstract from corporeity and quantity, insofar as they exclude even spiritual matter.

II. In the body, one conclusion, answering the question negatively: It is impossible for there to be matter in God. – This is proven in three ways. First. God is pure act: therefore He has no matter. The inference is proven: because matter is in potency.

Second. God is the first good, and the best good; therefore the good is not by participation but by essence. Therefore He is not composed of matter and form. — The antecedent is evident from what precedes³ The first consequence is proved: that which is good by essence is prior to that which is good by participation; therefore, if God is first, etc. But the second is proved as follows: a composite is good through its form; therefore it is good by participation, namely insofar as matter participates in form; therefore if God is first, etc.

Third. God is the first efficient cause; therefore he is the first and per se agent; therefore he is first and per se form. Therefore he is not composed of matter and form. — The antecedent, together with the first consequence, is left as established. But the second is proved: every agent acts through its form; therefore each thing is related to being an agent just as it is related to being a form, and conversely; therefore, if it is the first and per se agent, it is first and per se form, etc.

III. Concerning the first consequence⁴, note that ly first is taken in a certain way equivocally in the antecedent and in the consequent. For in the antecedent it is taken insofar as it denotes an order of priority with respect to the other efficient causes; but in the consequent it is taken insofar as it signifies according to itself, as in I Poster.⁵ it is distinguished as first against per se and universally. So that from the fact that God is first among efficient causes, it is inferred, therefore God is efficiently per se first, that is, according to itself. And the consequence holds: since it belongs to him to be first among efficient causes, not contingently but necessarily, and according to essential causality over the other efficient causes, as is evident of itself. For these points being established, it is now clear that it belongs to him to be an agent not through another; and that whatever things this belongs to, it belongs through itself. Therefore he is first agent, in accordance with the doctrine of the Analytics.

IV. Concerning the consequence assumed in the proof of the second consequence⁶, namely that, an agent acts through its form etc., note that, if form is the reason of acting (as is assumed in the antecedent, and as Aristotle says many times), it is necessary that each thing be related to the reason of acting just as it is related to form, and consequently to active being, proceeding a priori; and conversely, proceeding a posteriori, as something is related to active being, so must it be related to the reason of acting, and consequently to form. Hence the second consequence holds: if something is first in act, it is first the reason of acting and form, and thus it is not composed of matter and form. The text itself hints at this convertibility when it first says that as something is related to form, so is it related to being an agent; and then, wishing to indicate the convertibility to be understood, adds: therefore what is first an agent through itself is first and through itself form.

V. But concerning these things a doubt arises. For this process seems sophistic: since under this common term, namely being related to form, one descends determinately to this special case, namely being form. For that each thing is so related to form as to be an agent is most true; but from this it is not permissible to infer that each thing is so related to being form as it is to being an agent. First, because it is the fallacy of the consequent. Second, because this is false: for fire is not related to being heat as it is to being heating; since fire is first of all heating, yet it is not first of all heat (indeed, it is not heat, but has it per se first); and yet heat is that form which is the ratio of heating. Therefore, from the fact that something is an agent per se and first, nothing else can be inferred except that it has per se and first the form which is the ratio of acting—and not that it is per se and first form, as happens in the text, etc.

VI. To this it is said that two things must be noted here: first, what ly per se signifies in the first place; second, that statements must always be interpreted according to the subject matter. For from these everything will become clear.

Primary per se such, as it is called in I Poster.⁷, signifies that something is such not through another, and that the rest are such through it. But when it is said not through another, not only extrinsic things are excluded, but also parts, as is said in VII Physic.⁸: so that that which is such by reason of a part is not primarily per se such. And accordingly, that to which it belongs to be an agent by reason of a part, namely, form, is not primarily per se an agent; but neither is it an agent per accidens, but through another, namely, through a part. And therefore no composite of matter and form can be primarily per se active, since all things act not by their whole selves, because not by reason of matter (for it is repugnant to matter to be the principle of acting, since of its very notion there is potency opposed to the act which is the principle of acting). And from this it is clear how, from having of itself the relation to being an agent, one may infer not only that it has the relation to form, but that it has the relation to being form, as was done in the text: and conversely it could be done a priori; nor is there any sophism.

But as for the objection from heat, it is said that if the arguments were weighed according to the subject matter, this objection would not arise. For active being (esse) in general includes no imperfection, and it can belong to some subsisting thing in its nature first and most properly properly speaking, as we speak. But heating being (esse) does include an imperfection: for it signifies active being (esse) thus, that is, materially. And it is impossible that it belong to anything first, simply and absolutely speaking: because it must belong to a composite of matter and form, which cannot act except according to a part. – Yet such material activities, taken according to their proper rationes, are said to belong to something first, in the way in which it is possible to find what is first in the agreement of things of this kind, that is, within the genus of material agents, and not simply. – And therefore the objection is not against our thesis. For although with respect to fire and heat, and other material active rationes, the force of the consequence is not apparent, this is because in them there is not found an agent of this kind nor one that is such an agent first, but rather one that is such an agent first within the genus of material agents: where primacy does not exclude a part. Yet it is evident that a part is excluded by primacy simply.

The force of the consequence, therefore, is this: that if God is the first agent through Himself, then He is also the first form through Himself. For what acts as first agent through itself is an agent not through another—that is, not even through a part—but through its whole self; and for this reason the whole must be form, and consequently it must be incomposite of matter and form.

VII. In response to the third, a doubt arises from Durandus⁹ against the cause of individuation assigned there, namely being received in matter, or the inability to be received in it. An individual is said to be an individual by the negation of division by which something higher is divided into its inferiors: and it is an individual by the negation of being in another as in a subject of inherence, not by the negation of being in another as in a subject of information. But both being received in matter and being unable to be received in it pertain to being or not being in another as in a subject of information. Therefore none of these pertains to individuation: rather an equivocation has been committed concerning "being in another" and "subject." The major premise is evident: otherwise this white thing would not be an individual, since it is in another as in a subject of information, namely in this substance. The minor is self-evident.

And it is confirmed. Matter is not the first subject of predication, that is, the lowest thing capable of being a subject: rather it is the first subject of information. Therefore, from the fact that it is the first subject, it is not individuating. – The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved. Because to matter, even though there belongs of itself the negation of being in another as in a subject of information, there does not nevertheless belong the negation of being in another as in a lower subject: since matter is a kind of universal, and is predicated of this and that matter as a universal and as superior of its inferiors, as is evident; otherwise matter would not be knowable, since science is only of universals. – The text, therefore, seems to have assigned badly the reason for the individual from matter.

VIII. To this it must be answered briefly, by granting that one is the mode of being in another as in a lower subject, and another as in the subject of information; and likewise that to be a subject there and here are different things. But with this it stands that for a nature to be in another as superior in inferior—not in any way whatever, but singularly—and for it to be in another through information, are the same thing, not formally, but causally: so that from a quiddity's being in another through information there naturally follows its being in another as a lower singular; and from a quiddity's being unable to be in another through information there follows its being unable to be in the singular as an inferior, but rather its being of itself singular. And this is what the text says. For it assigns being or not being in another through information as the root of individuation: and not as the formal constituent of the individual, as the objections wrongly interpret it. But to prove that this is the root of individuation exceeds the limits of the present undertaking: below, ¹⁰ where individuation will be treated deliberately, it will be discussed. It is enough here, for understanding the text, to know that, according to us, this mode of being in another through information is not what constitutes formally, but causally, the individual.

IX. Hence, in answer to the objection to the contrary, it is said that from the fact that this white thing is an individual, and is in another by way of information, nothing else follows except that esse¹¹ in another by way of information is not the formal constituent of the individual. But this is compatible with holding that, if the nature of whiteness could not be in another by way of inception, white would never be in this white thing as superior in inferior. And again, this white thing would not be this by the positing of an individual difference above the nature, but by the negation of every individual difference: for it would not be divisible into several individuals, as is said in the text concerning forms not receivable in matter.

For confirmation, the consequent is denied. Because from the fact that matter is the first subject of information, it follows that it is the first root of individuation, positively or negatively. — The antecedent is also denied. Because matter is also the first subicible, that is, lowest, not totally, as a complete individual, but partial. — And when it is objected against this, because it is a kind of universal: it is answered that matter in itself is neither universal nor predicable, as is clear from the fact that in itself it is not intelligible, and consequently not knowable either: but matter, by analogy to form, is understood as universal, and becomes a kind of predicable and knowable thing, etc. And therefore in the text it is said that form, insofar as it is of itself, can be in many things, while matter is the first subject: since therefore all universality comes from form, matter in itself is not universal: and since it is the first subject of all the categories, it is both the lowest subicible (though partial), and the first subject of information; and on this account, on every side, the root of individuation.

But concerning these things enough has been said in the commentaries On Being and Essence¹², and in two questions¹³; and more will be said below¹⁴.

In the title an ambiguity immediately presents itself, as to what "God" stands for in this question, whether God is the same as his essence. For from the second argument, and from the whole course of the body of the article, it is suggested that it stands for the divine supposit: since nothing else is treated here than whether the supposit of the divine nature and that nature itself are the same. But from the notion of a supposit the opposite is shown. For five conditions are required for the notion of a supposit: namely, that it be substance, complete, individual, subsisting, incommunicably: substance, on account of accidents; complete, on account of parts; individual, on account of species; subsisting, on account of Christ's humanity; incommunicably, on account of the divine essence, which is common to the three supposits. And so, since the divine supposit signifies the same thing as the divine person, and in this article no mention is made of what is constitutive of persons, it follows that "God" does not stand for the divine supposit. – And this is confirmed: because below¹ there will be asked expressly whether person and essence in God are the same. Therefore, etc.

II. To this it must be said that God can be taken in three ways. First, as signifying the concrete, as it were specific, nature of the divine nature, that is, one having deity; just as man signifies one having humanity. Second, as signifying the concrete individual of the divine nature, that is, this one having deity, or this God; just as man can stand for this man. Third, as signifying the supposit of the divine nature, that is, this one having deity incommunicably, that is, this divine person; just as man can stand for Socrates. But there is this difference between God on the one hand, and man and the concretes of other natures on the other: in the others, the individual of the nature taken concretely is not distinguished from the supposit (for this man is not distinguished from a human supposit, nor conversely); but in God, the individual of the nature taken concretely, that is, this God, is distinguished from the divine supposit, that is, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. And the reason is because this God is at once a singular term and common to the three supposits—which cannot befall the individual of any other substance.

It can therefore be taken in three ways, and I say that it is not taken here in the first way. Because, as is clear in the body of the article, that for which ly Deus supposits encloses within its meaning the principles individuating God, insofar as they are individuating: which are not signified as enclosed in ly Deus as suppositing specifically. – Nor is it taken here in the third way. Both because no mention is made here of the personal properties, and because under this sense many things are supposed to be determined beforehand; and therefore below² it will be asked in this sense, in the treatise on the divine persons. – But it is taken in the second way, so that the sense is: Whether God, that is, this God, is the same as deity.

III. But note that this God, signifying the individual of the divine nature in the concrete, has two conditions in reality: one negative, namely that it does not signify a supposit of the divine nature (and this speaking according to truth); the other affirmative, namely that it is equivalent to the supposit with respect to the multitude of identity or distinction from the nature; since it is compared to that nature as having to habit, as what-is to that-by-which-it-is, as subsistent to the nature in which and by which it subsists, etc. And it has a third condition in the opinion of the philosophers—indeed, of all human reason according to the capacity of nature—namely that it is taken by all as a supposit of the divine nature: because no condition of a supposit is lacking to it except incommunicability; that this does not belong to it, because it is common to the three persons, we know not by reason but by revelation of faith. And from this there follows a fourth condition with respect to us: that although this God does not signify the divine supposit simply, nevertheless it signifies the divine supposit so long as one remains within the limits of a treatise on absolutes, such as the present one.

Because of the first condition, the text speaks cautiously, both in asking and in concluding and answering: for whenever it speaks of God in particular, it names God and deity, and never a divine supposit. Because of the other three conditions, however, it uses the names supposit and nature when speaking in general: and from the common rules of the identity or distinction of supposit from nature, it determines the question. For the judgment is the same concerning the distinction of this God from deity as concerning supposit from nature: since that individual is equivalent to the supposit which is this one; for supposit is distinguished from nature as the possessor from what is possessed, and that which is from that by which it is, and the subsisting being from that by which it subsists, etc. Nor would it have been fitting to the order of doctrine that things relative and revealed be mixed into the treatise on absolutes, so remote from those principles, with so many intervening questions needing to be decided.

IV. In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question in the affirmative: God is identical with His essence or nature. – Proof. The reason for the difference between nature and supposit is the distinction of the nature from individual matter; therefore, in simple forms, which are individuated through themselves, the supposit does not differ from the nature; therefore God is His own deity and His own life, etc.

The antecedent is proved from the reason for the distinction between nature and supposit in material things, which are better known to us. Nature comprehends within itself only those things that fall under the definition of the species; therefore it does not comprehend individual matter; therefore it is distinguished on this account from the supposit. – The assumption is evident. And the first consequence just drawn is proved in two ways. First, because individual matter is not contained within the definition of the species, as is clear with regard to this flesh in relation to human nature. Second, because the defining principles stand formally in relation to individuating matter: as a sign of which, humanity is signified as the formal part of man. – But the second consequence is proved as follows: because in the notion of a supposit, were it to be defined, individual matter would be included, as in Socrates.

The first consequence is left as self-evident. – The second, however, is proved: because God is not composed of matter and form, as is clear from the preceding article.

V. Concerning the terms assumed in the antecedent, and consequently in this whole argument, I distinguish first ly nature and ly supposit. For we can speak of them in two ways: one way, according to the thing alone; another way, according to the mode of signifying. Nature and supposit are taken according to the thing alone when they are taken according to the proper accounts of the thing that nature signifies, and of the thing that supposit signifies, abstracting from the modes of signifying: for example, when human nature is taken according to its proper definition, and Socrates according to his proper account, without regard to whether nature is signified in the abstract or in the concrete, etc. – They are taken, however, according to the modes of signifying when they are taken as standing under names of first intention, for instance humanity, man, Socrates, Socrateity, etc.

The present discussion concerns nature and supposit according to the thing itself, and not according to the mode of signifying: for the latter belongs rather to the logician's business, the former to the metaphysician's. And therefore all argumentations and replies fall away which introduce being signified by way of a part, or excluding from signification, or neither excluding nor including, and the like; for these pertain to the difference between these things as arising from modes of signifying, not from things themselves. – Nor does it stand in the way that in the body of this article it is inferred that humanity is signified as the formal part of man, in order to prove that nature does not include individual matter: since this was brought forward as a better-known sign a posteriori, to make manifest also from the mode of signifying the distinction according to the thing itself of nature from individual matter.

VI. Distinguish, secondly,³ to differ, or difference. For it is twofold: according to reason, and according to the thing. And the latter is subdivided into real difference between one thing and another thing, and into real difference between a thing that includes something real and one that does not include it (we say "include" and "not include" here not on the basis of the mode of signifying, but on the basis of the formal reason of the thing signified, taken formally). And this latter is again subdivided into real difference based on the inclusion of something real intrinsically, as man differs from animal because he includes intrinsically the rational; and based on the inclusion of something real extrinsically, as the teachable differs from man (supposing that teachability is the same thing as the nature of man), because it includes extrinsically teaching, as the act by which it is defined, which man does not include in his reason.

VII. Since, therefore, there are four modes of difference: according to reason alone, as between man and humanity; between thing and thing, as between Socrates and Plato; between a thing including something real intrinsically, and one abstracting from it; and between one including something real extrinsically, and one abstracting from it: in the antecedent assumed⁴, and in this whole argument and conclusion, the discussion concerns only difference in the third mode, that is, with respect to intrinsic inclusion.

For this discourse is not about a difference according to reason alone: since supposit and nature are distinguished in this way in all things, even in God. For God and deity, by reason of the mode of signifying, are distinguished only thus: that the proposition deity generates deity is heretical, and the proposition God generates God is catholic, as appears at the beginning of the Decretals ⁵ – Nor is this discourse about a real difference, such as exists between one thing and another thing. For it is evident that substantial nature and supposit cannot be naturally distinguished so as to be two wholly diverse things. – Nor is this discourse about an extrinsic real difference: for then the antecedent would be false; and it would be false that supposit and nature do not differ in immaterial substances. For in separate substances, supposit differs from nature extrinsically: because supposit, as such, includes subsistence (which is being of itself) not intrinsically, but in a way as its proper act, to which it would in some manner have to be defined if it were defined; but nature does not. And therefore St. Thomas, in Quodlibet II, question II, article 2, speaking of such a difference, said that in angels supposit differs from nature.

It remains, therefore, that this discussion concerns the difference with respect to intrinsic inclusion. First, because the reason assumed in the text clearly distinguishes supposit from nature in material things according to such a difference; namely, because supposit includes individual matter, which nature does not include: for it is evident that this is understood of intrinsic inclusion. Second, because in things separate from matter, supposit is not distinguished from nature by such a difference, as is affirmed here, on account of their being individuated through themselves; that is, because that which constitutes the nature and that which constitutes the individual are one and the same; and hence the individual includes nothing intrinsic which nature does not also encompass, and conversely. Third, because the same judgment is held in the text concerning the identity of supposit and nature in separate substances, and of God with the divine essence: for this is not simply true unless we speak of the intrinsic difference; since, as has already been said, in the Quodlibets he put forward a different judgment, speaking of the extrinsic difference.

The sense, therefore, of the foregoing is that the reason for the intrinsic difference between nature and suppositum, taken according to the thing or the formal reasons ⁶, is the distinction of nature from individual matter. And likewise the sense of all the conclusions implicitly contained here—concerning supposit and nature in material things and in things separate from matter, etc.—must be taken with the same understanding.

VIII. And if you have examined the foregoing carefully, you will grasp the disposition of all things with respect to identity and distinction between supposit and nature. For you have, first, that the supposit and the nature not substantially constituting the supposit (whether it be the nature of an accident, as Socrates and his complexion; or whether it be a substance quasi adventitious, as the humanity of the Word of God) are distinguished fourfold: namely, as thing and thing, and intrinsically, and extrinsically, and according to reason. – You have, secondly, that in composite substances the supposit and nature are distinguished intrinsically, extrinsically, and according to reason. – You have, thirdly, that in immaterial substances the supposit and nature are distinguished not intrinsically, but extrinsically according to res, and according to reason. – You have, fourthly, that in God, God and deity are in no way distinguished according to res: but only by reason of the mode of signifying. – You have also the concord of the sayings of St. Thomas, and an understanding of what has been written on this matter in various places.

IX. Concerning the first consequence drawn in the text⁷, note that it was left as established because it rests upon that posterioristic rule sufficiently well known, if affirmation is the cause of affirmation, negation is the cause of negation, and conversely⁸. And since this maxim holds only in the case of proper causes, therefore in the antecedent the term reason, where it is said the reason of the difference etc., stands for the proper reason. Hence the sense is: the proper and precise reason of the intrinsic difference between nature and supposit. And then the force of the consequence is plainly evident: from the negation of such a reason, it infers the negation of its effect.

In the title, ly essence signifies the deity, which would be imported by a definition of God, if God were defined: ly being imports the signification of ly is as the second term of the proposition, as when we say “God is,” and likewise “a human being is,” and so on: ly the same imports real identity. So that the sense is: Whether the thing signified by ly God is the thing signified by ly is, when it is said God is.

And know that this question is most subtle, and proper to the ancient metaphysicians: but very foreign to the moderns, because they hold not only in God, but in every thing, that essence is identified with that thing's existence. Let this, then, be our question: for others it will be a special question, concerning the distinction of esse from essence universally¹.

II. In a single body, one conclusion: God is His own esse. – It is proved in three ways. First. God is the first efficient cause: therefore He has esse not caused by anything extrinsic: therefore He is His own esse.

The antecedent is clear from what has been said². – The first consequence is clear from the terms. – But the second is proved. Everything fitting to a thing that is distinct from its essence is either caused by the essence alone or by something extrinsic: therefore, if esse is distinguished, it is caused either from within or from without. But that it be caused from within alone is impossible, because nothing is a sufficient cause of itself so as to be. Therefore, if it is not caused by something extrinsic, it is identical with the essence. This is the consequence to be proved.

III. Second. God is pure act: therefore his essence does not stand to esse as potency to act: therefore he is his own esse. – The antecedent is evident. And the first consequence is known from the terms. The second is proved. Esse is the actuality of every form or nature: therefore every nature distinct from esse is compared to it as potency to act: therefore, if it is not compared as potency, it is esse itself. The assumption is proved: because nothing is signified in act unless it is signified as it is.

Note here that this argument is founded on the fact that whatever quiddity or nature, however actual it may be according to its quidditative character, when related to esse has the character of potency: for wisdom and goodness, etc., are actuated by that which I say is; and likewise humanity and equinity, etc. And therefore it is also said that esse is the actuality of every form; and that no nature is signified in ultimate act except insofar as it is signified as esse in exercised act.

IV. Third. God is the first being: therefore He is a being by essence: therefore He is His own esse. – The antecedent, together with the first inference, is evident. The second, however, is proved by the destruction of the consequent, in two ways. First, from the quiddity of the name being by essence, thus. It is not its own esse: therefore it has esse and is not esse itself: therefore it is a being by participation: therefore it is not a being by essence; just as if it has fire and is not fire, etc. Second, God is not His own esse, and He is His own essence: therefore He is not a being by essence, but by something added. – All things are clear.

V. In response to the second objection, a difficulty arises: for the reply seems to imply two contradictories. For if we know that this proposition is true, God is, then we know that it is so in reality, namely that God is; but this is to know the esse that is in God Himself; therefore.

To this doubt (which we treated at length in II Poster., chapter I, and which Scotus, in I Sent., distinction III, question I, at the beginning, adduces while censuring this response), it is briefly said that this response is the best one, and unique to God. For in this the esse of God differs from the esse of other beings: that the esse of God is the quod quid est of God himself, as is determined here; so that the proposition Deus est holds in the first mode of saying per se. But the esse of the others does not stand thus, but is distinct from their quiddities. And from this it arises that the esse of God, in itself and absolutely, is the proper terminus of the question quid est: and it is the terminus of the question an est, secundum quid, that is, as grounding the truth of the proposition. But the esse of others does not pertain to the question quid est, because it is not a predicate of the first mode, as appears inductively, homo est, caelum est, etc.: but in itself and simply it pertains to the question an est. And therefore, when concerning other things we know the question an est, we are said to know the esse that signifies the truth of the proposition, and the esse of the thing itself: because it is known according to its proper mode in which it is knowable. But when concerning God we know an est, we are said to know the esse that signifies the truth of the proposition, and not to know the esse of God: not because the ultimate terminus of our cognition is the esse of the proposition, as the objection understood (since the terminus is the esse of God, not absolutely, but as answering to the truth of the proposition); but because through this cognition the esse of God is not known by the proper question by which it is knowable in itself, since it is not known per quid.

In the title, genus is taken properly, for a logical genus, insofar as the ten genera of things are distinguished.

The body is twofold: first, the distinction; second, the response to the question, in two conclusions, according to the two members of the distinction, with one corollary added to the first conclusion¹.

As to the first, the distinction is: Esse is in a genus in two ways: directly, and reductively, as is evident. — As to the second, the first conclusion, answering the question in the negative, is: God is not directly in a genus.

It is proved in three ways. First. God is pure act: therefore He is not directly in a genus. – The consequence is proved as follows. Genus is taken from potency with respect to that from which the difference is taken: therefore everything existing in a genus has act mixed with potency: therefore, if it is pure act, etc. The antecedent is made clear in animal and rational. All things are clear.

II. Second. If God were in a genus, some genus would be predicated in quid of that of which it is the genus; therefore being would be a genus. But this is impossible. Therefore. – The first consequence is proved. The essence of God is His very act of being (esse), and a genus is predicated in quid of that of which it is the genus; therefore, if God were in a genus, etc. – The second consequence is left as established, because being either signifies only, or above all, formally being (esse). – The destruction of the last consequent is proved from III Metaphysics: Every genus has differences outside itself; being has no differences outside itself; therefore. The minor is proved: because outside being there remains only non-being; but non-beings cannot possibly be differences of being, as is evident.

III. Concerning this argument, one might first doubt about the signification of being; second, about its predication—namely, whether it is predicated in the quid, as in this argument the adversary must be held to say who claims that God is in a genus; third, about its community with all real formal rationes—namely, whether it is intrinsically contained in all of them, as is assumed here from III Metaphysics. But on all these matters we have written in our commentaries on Being and Essence², nor do I think it needs repeating here—especially because, whether because of the reason adduced here or for another, the destruction of the consequent³ is accepted by everyone. Now the sense of the argument adduced here is that differences must be outside the genus in such a way that neither is the genus posited intrinsically in the formal signification of the difference, nor conversely—although the genus is posited in the ratio of the difference extrinsically, or as something added, just as the subject is in the ratio of a passion. But no real rationes distinguishing being are found whose formal significations do not contain being intrinsically. Therefore.

And know that Scotus, in book I, distinction III, question III, holds the opposite of this minor premise. For he thinks there are certain differences, namely ultimate ones, which do not formally and intrinsically include being. And again, he holds that the passions of being do not formally and intrinsically include being. – But concerning the passions, something will be said in question V. As for the differences, although something would have to be said here, since it is nevertheless necessary to introduce new terms (because Scotus speaks of differences taken not from forms but from ultimate realities), it is better to make a special and extensive question on this matter; besides what has been touched upon regarding this in the commentaries On Being and Essence⁴.

IV. Third it is proved. All things directly in a genus share in essence and differ in esse; therefore they have an essence distinct from their esse. God is not of this kind. Therefore. – The antecedent is proved: because they agree in the quiddity of the genus, and are distinguished by one esse or another, as is clear in man and horse. – The consequence, however, is left as established. – That the consequent, when applied to God, is destroyed, is clear from the preceding article. Therefore, etc.

V. Concerning this argument there is a doubt. First, because ly esse is taken equivocally. For in the antecedent the discourse is about specific being (esse specificum), to which the differentia distinguishing the genus leads; in the consequent, however, the discourse is about the act of existing (esse actualis existentiae), which is inferred to be distinct from my essence. – Second, because from the distinction between the principle of agreement and the principle of difference, assumed in the antecedent, no greater distinction than a formal one can be inferred: for the essence of the genus, in which species agree, and specific being (esse specificum), by which each species differs from another, differ not really but only formally. And yet a real distinction between essence and being (esse) is inferred in the text. Therefore this procedure seems bad.

VI. To this objection it was said at great length in chapter VI On Being and Essence, where St. Thomas makes this argument. And therefore it is now said briefly that in the antecedent esse is taken both for specific being and for actual existence, since both are verified of it. Indeed, the verification of one entails the verification of the other: for the difference is said to conduce to esse precisely because it constitutes the proper receptive subject of esse as actual existence, as was declared there, and above on Porphyry ⁵ There is therefore no equivocation. – And although from the fact that two formal rationes are thus distinguished, one being the formal principle of agreement and the other the formal principle of difference, a real distinction between them cannot simply be inferred (otherwise every genus would have to be really distinguished from its differences), nevertheless, for the sake of the matter under discussion, namely essence and esse, the real distinction of esse from essence can very well be inferred from the absolute distinction between genus and esse, in which species are distinguished. And the reason is that these two mutually entail each other: existence is formally distinguished from quiddity, and existence is really distinguished from quiddity, as we declared there ⁶ Therefore see there, etc.

VII. The corollary attached to the first conclusion⁷ is: God has neither genus, nor difference, nor definition, nor demonstration except through His effects. – The inference is evident: because of the definition, etc.

VIII. The second conclusion⁸ is also negative: God is not in any genus reductively. – It is proved. God is the principle, not of some one genus only, but of all being (esse): therefore He is not contained reductively in any genus. – The antecedent is assumed. The consequence is proved. Everything that is in a genus reductively is the principle of that genus alone, as is clear from XII Metaphysics⁹ on the principles of the Categories.

IX. Concerning this conclusion a difficulty arises on the part of an opponent: for in Book I of the Sentences, distinction VIII, question IV, article 2, reply to the third objection, and in the Questions on the Power of God, question VII, article 3, reply to the last objection, St. Thomas grants that God is in the genus of substance reductively. How is the opposite determined here?

To this it is briefly said that, as is clearly apparent from I Sent., there is no contradiction between what is said here and elsewhere. For there a distinction is made that to be in a genus as principle can be understood in two ways. In the first way, as a principle contained within that genus: and thus it is denied that God is in a genus as principle. In the other way, as the principle containing the genus itself: and in this way God is in a certain manner in all genera; and by proper appropriation in the genus of substance, as being more closely related to it. And this is conceded in the passages cited above; with the note that what was left unsaid in the Qu. de Potentia he supplied in I Sent.. Hence it may fittingly be said that God is in a genus as principle, not because he is reduced to the genus, but because to him the genus itself is reduced. And that this is the mind of St. Thomas you can infer from the fact that in the text, in concluding, he says of God: whence he is not contained in a genus as principle; for by saying is not contained, he guarded himself against being in a genus as a principle containing, to which every genus is reduced by a certain order. The same thing is intimated by the preceding words, namely: a principle that is reduced into some genus does not extend beyond it, etc.

X. In response to the second, a difficulty arises: because the reply does not satisfy the objection. The reply indeed says three things: first, that the major premise is true of a homogeneous measure; second, that the minor premise is false, God is a homogeneous measure; third, as it were glossing Averroes, it is said how God is called the measure of all things, because each thing has being (esse) in the measure in which it approaches him. But by these things Averroes's authority, which was adduced and which wills that God, who is the first substance, be the measure of substances, just as the first number is of other numbers, etc., is not satisfied: and this deliberately, in that very place where there is talk of homogeneous measures, namely Metaphysics X, comment. VII.

To this it may briefly be said that St. Thomas, attending to the matter rather than the words, satisfies excellently even according to the mind of Averroes. For genus can be taken in two ways. In one way, properly, as we speak here: and thus it is most excellently denied that God is a homogeneous measure of the genus of substance (indeed, Averroes posits no intelligence that is thus homogeneous with substance): and this is said in this text. In another way, broadly, for coordination: and in this way God is the homogeneous measure of the coordination of substances, more than of accidents, because He Himself is substance, and is not an accident: and this is what Averroes willed there. Yet this is to be a measure outside the genus of predicamental substance; and it is to be a measure of all genera properly outside them, as is evident. And therefore it is said in the text that God is called the measure of all things.

XI. In the argument brought forward to the contrary in this article, there is a word worth noting, and doubting: namely, that nothing is prior to God, neither in reality nor in the intellect; and therefore He has no genus. For this seems to be false, since the predicates common to God and other things are prior, according to the intellect, to God Himself, as is evident from the fact that the consequence does not convert.

But this is quickly made clear by first distinguishing according to the intellect in two ways: on the side of the thing, or of the formal rationes; or with respect to us. For no thing, or formal ratio, is prior to God according to the intellect on the side of itself: in sign of which, no predicate is given that is, in itself, more abstract, simpler, or prior than He. With respect to us, however, wisdom is prior than the divine wisdom, according to the intellect. And therefore the consequence is not converted with respect to us. In the text, however, the Author intends the first mode: for thus the genus is prior to that which is placed in the genus.

In the title, it is clear that the question concerns formal inherence: namely, whether any accidents are formally in God. And the discussion is about real accidents, and not about accidents, that is, predicates taken accidentally, insofar as "accident" is a name of second intention and is posited as the fifth Predicable.

II. In the body, a single conclusion, answering the question in the negative: In God there cannot be an accident. – It is proved in three ways. First. God is pure act: therefore no accident. Second. God is subsistent being itself (ipsum esse): therefore no accident. Third. Because an accident would be either accidental per accidens or essential per se: not the first, since God is the first being (primum ens); nor the second, since God is the first cause.

III. Concerning the second argument, note that, just as between the abstract and the concrete according to the understanding there is this difference: that the abstract as such admits nothing alongside itself according to the understanding, whereas the concrete is permitted to be mixed with many things (for it is not unfitting to understand whiteness to be sweet, etc.; but whiteness as such excludes from itself everything other than itself: for nothing else is that by which something is white than whiteness; but what is white is sometimes also something other than white, say a sweet apple, etc.); so too between the abstract in reality and the composite in reality there is this difference: that a thing abstracted in reality is itself alone; but a composite thing admits something alongside itself which is not itself. And therefore this perfection which esse signifies, if it is posited as abstracted in reality from everything in which esse is receivable, that is, from every generic nature, is hard esse: and it admits nothing besides itself within itself: and consequently it can have no accident. But the composite of esse and nature, which is called that which is, is permitted to have something besides itself within itself. And this is what the text says: that esse itself, because it is abstract and that-by-which, has nothing joined to itself, like heat; but that which is, because concrete and that-which, can have something extraneous, as what is hot is also white.

IV. Concerning the third argument, note that each member proceeds from its own proper principle. For the root of the first is that an accident per accidens naturally presupposes an accident per se: since universally, under whatever order of things, that which is per se is prior to that which is per accidens, as is said in Book II and Book VIII of the Physics¹ – But the root of the second is that universally the first altering thing is altogether unalterable: and the first mover locally is altogether immobile locally: and consequently the first cause is altogether uncaused. It would not, however, be altogether uncaused if it had anything caused within itself, as is evident, etc.

V. In response to the first, you have an excellent gloss of that saying, "what truly is, is predicated of nothing as accidental": — taken univocally; but taken analogically, something is substance in one and accident in another, as is clear in the case of wisdom.

In the title, "utterly simple": in itself, excluding every composition of it from itself, not composibility: for composibility will be treated in the following article, etc.

In the body, one conclusion, the responsive question answered affirmatively: God is altogether simple. – It is proved by five means: first, from a sufficient enumeration of the modes of composition; second, because He is the first being (ens); third, because He is the first cause; fourth, because He is pure act; fifth, because He is ipsum esse (subsistent being itself).

II. In response to the first, note that Scotus, in the First Book, distinction VIII, in the question following the first question, reports this position, that every caused being is composite, and rebukes it: for this reason, because if every caused being is composite, let its components be taken: either they are simple, or again composite; and thus, either one would proceed to infinity, or there will be a stopping point at simple component beings. And since it is evident that the components are caused beings, it follows that not every caused being is composite, as is said here.

To this it is briefly said that the objection proceeds from a poor understanding of the text. For a caused thing, or creature, can be taken in two ways: properly, namely, and broadly. If it is taken properly, then, since to be caused and to be created properly belong both to the caused thing and to the creature, only subsisting things are said to be caused or creatures: the rest, however, are said to be concaused and concreated, such as parts, forms, accidents, etc. Broadly, however, everything other than God existing in any way whatsoever in the nature of things can be called caused. Therefore, in the matter at hand, "caused" is taken properly, so as to be distinguished not only against cause but also against what is concaused. And so the objection, which speaks of things concaused, poses no difficulty. Hence in the text the composition of the caused thing is proved from its consisting of esse and quiddity: for these are properly the components of the caused thing, not of the components. And as is clear in I Sent., dist. VIII, qu. V, art. 1¹, Saint Thomas had made that argument adduced by Scotus.

III. In response to the second, it would need to be seen whether simplicity is a perfection simply speaking. But I have already written about this in my commentary on De Ente et Essentia².

In the title: to come into the composition of another requires four conditions. The first is real distinction from that other: for there is no composition of a thing with itself. The second is real conjunction with it: for composition does not arise from conjunction according to reason alone. The third is that the conjunction be according to its esse: for composition does not arise from merely real conjunction according to position, or any other extrinsic respect. The fourth is that one be the act of the other: or of some third thing actualized by both, if the composition is accidental, as between white and sweet. For if two things are joined even according to esse, yet not in the relation of act and potency, then, as we have said, there is never composition: as is evident both in the case of the divine persons and of the divine Word incarnate (for in such cases the ratio of act and potency is absent). – To ask, therefore, whether God comes into the composition of other things is to ask whether he can be conjoined with another thing according to esse, in the relation of act or potency.

II. In the body there are two points: first, the errors are set forth; second, the question is answered. – As to the first, there are three errors: the first is that of the Sabaeans, from Book XII of the Metaphysics, in Averroes's forty-first commentary ¹; the second is that of the Almaricians; the third is that of David of Dinant. And this is evident.

III. As to the second point, the responsive conclusion to the question, and the destructive one against these errors, is negative: God cannot enter into the composition of anything.

It is proved in three ways. First. God is the first efficient cause; therefore he cannot be the form or matter of any composite. – The antecedent is evident. The consequence is proved with respect to form: an agent and the form of its effect do not coincide in one and the same thing numerically; therefore if, etc. With respect to matter, however: agent and matter do not coincide in one and the same species, because the former is in act, the latter in potency; therefore if, etc.

IV. Concerning this argument a doubt arises. For the proof of the consequence does not seem to the point: from the fact that the efficient cause does not coincide with the form or matter of its effect, nothing else follows except that God, because he is the efficient cause, is not the form or matter of his own effect; but it does not follow that he is absolutely not the form of any composite. To this it is briefly answered that, since the being of a composite entails being an effect (because every composite is made, as is clear in the preceding article); and being an effect entails being the effect of the first efficient cause, as is evident: therefore, from first to last, the being of a composite is the being of an effect of the first efficient cause. And for this reason, supposing this as established, the argument of the text most fittingly draws the consequence: if God is the first efficient cause, he is not the form or matter of any composite: since he would be the form or matter of his own effect, which is impossible, because the agent does not coincide, etc.

V. Second argument. God is the first agent through himself; therefore he is not a part of anything. – The inference is proved. No component is an agent first and of itself; therefore if, etc.

Note here that this text must be interpreted cautiously. For it does not affirm that the composite acts per se first, which was denied above, in article 2; rather it affirms a comparative claim, namely that to act per se first belongs more to the composite than to the component, because the former is that which acts, while the latter is that by which. Yet alongside this it stands that, absolutely speaking, neither the component nor the composite can be the per se first agent, as has been said.

VI. The third argument is: God is the first being (ens); therefore He cannot be a part, not even a primary one, such as matter or form. – The consequence is proved: as regards matter, indeed, because potency is posterior to act; as regards form, however, because participated act is posterior to act by essence, etc.