Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title of this first article, ly per se, not through another middle term: ly known, knowledge that is evident. For a proposition is said to be per se nota, which is known with certain and infallible evidence from its own terms alone, as is clear in I Poster.¹ The sense of the title is therefore: Whether this proposition, God is (Deus est), is per se nota.

II. In the body two things are done: first, the proposition that is self-evident is distinguished; second, an answer is given to the question². As to the first, the distinction is this: of a proposition that is self-evident, one kind is so in itself only; another is so both in itself and with respect to us; and this latter, either with respect to all of us, or with respect to the wise alone. And thus three members are made in the text.

The distinction is declared, with its members, from a single root of the self-evident proposition in general. A self-evident proposition is one whose predicate is contained in the notion of the subject. Therefore a proposition is self-evident both in itself and to us when its predicate is in the notion of the subject, and the notions of the subject and predicate are known to us, as that anything either is or is not, etc. But only in itself, when its predicate is in the notion of the subject, yet the notions of the terms are hidden from us. Therefore both in itself and to the wise, when its predicate is in the notion of the subject, and the notions of the terms are clear among the wise, as that incorporeal things are not in place. And this member is confirmed by the authority of Boethius.

III. Concerning this part, note that a proposition is called per se known, that is, not through any other middle term, because it excludes every other middle term by means of ly per se, and consequently any premise whatsoever, for making it known. And since some proposition can be made known a priori and a posteriori, it is necessary that ly per se be distinguished: whether it excludes the middle term a priori only; or both a priori and a posteriori at once. For if every per se known proposition is one having its predicate in the intelligibility of its subject, then ly per se must always exclude the middle term a priori; but since it can happen that between things between which there is no medium in itself there may be a medium as they are known to us, therefore it does not always exclude the medium a posteriori. And for this reason in the text the per se known proposition is distinguished according to the difference between terms that are known and unknown, that is, according to the difference between the extremes of propositions as they are known to us. For those whose extremes are immediate not merely in themselves but also as known to us are per se known to all. But those whose extremes, although immediate in themselves, are nevertheless not immediate as known to us, are per se known in themselves only, not to us. And similarly, those whose extremes are immediate as known to the wise are per se known to them.

IV. Concerning this part, there are many doubts and arguments of Scotus, Aureol, and Gregory; but since these pertain to the book Posterior Analytics, where in chapter III I treated this matter at length, therefore, without repeating them here, the solutions to the arguments should be seen there, together with the whole line of reasoning. – Only this should be noted here: that in the text a self-evident proposition is not defined by saying that it is one whose predicate is contained in the ratio of the subject; rather, the causal formulation is given, namely, that from the fact that the predicate is placed in the ratio of the subject, there results a self-evident proposition—which is convertible with respect to that definition. And I say this because it is indeed true with St. Thomas that every proposition whose predicate falls within the ratio of the subject is self-evident, but not conversely: for when one most general genus is denied of another, and when a first passion is predicated of its first subject, propositions result that are immediate in themselves, and consequently self-evident in themselves. If, however, anywhere³ such a definition is found, let ly esse in ratione subiecti be glossed as "formally, or virtually and proximately." Yet such an expression should not be extended further, since it is less proper.

V. As to the second⁴, the responsive conclusion is: This proposition, "God is," is self-evident in itself, but not to us. – The first part is proved because the predicate is identical with the subject⁵; the second, however, because we do not know what the subject is. – And from this there follows a corollary: Therefore this proposition needs to be made manifest through a medium with respect to us, that is, a posteriori through an effect. The inference is clear: because it is not evident to us, and it lacks an a priori middle.

VI. In response to the second, note that against the second answer given there some press quite insistently, as if strengthening the argument, thus. That which exceeds every thinkable thing does not exist, according to your answer: therefore it is not more excellent than everything thinkable, which is opposed to the quid nominis of God himself. The consequence is proved: because it does not exceed a thinkable being; and if it were such, then something thought would be thought greater than what was not thought.

VII. But this objection is no different from the objection made in the text: and therefore it is resolved by the same response, by distinguishing the consequent, that to exceed everything thinkable happens in two ways: in one way, that it excel in rerum natura; in another way, according to the being of what is thought. And I intend, not that esse in rerum natura or objective esse is the reason of the excess: but we use them here as conditions of things thought. For example, the conditions of a perfect orator, when thought, can exceed every orator in two ways: in one way, that this excess be in rerum natura; in another way, that it be in objective esse. In the first way, one would have to posit that a perfect orator exists; in the second way not, but it suffices for him to have objective esse. Now we say that the reason for exceeding is to be considered according to the nobility of the conditions thought in themselves.

In the proposed argument, therefore, it is said that from that antecedent, that which exceeds every thinkable does not exist, there follows most excellently, therefore it does not exceed in actual existence every thinkable thing: indeed, it is not so exceeding as an ant, or any least existing thing whatsoever. But it does not follow that, therefore it does not exceed in itself, according to objective being, every thinkable thing: indeed, in this way it exceeds every thinkable thing. – And when it is said that a greater thinkable thing would exist, if it existed in actual existence, this is denied. For that reply proceeds either from ignorance of their own term, since these men believe that the response given, accepting the quiddity assigned to God by a definition of the name, intends that when this is signified, namely greater than every thinkable thing, something full of all perfection is signified, abstracting from existence (and therefore they insist: "let what is signified be full of all perfection, including existence in actual being; and thus something greater will be signified"): or from ignorance of the distinction between the signified act and the exercised act. For we agree on the quiddity of the name, and we do not disagree. We make no exception in the account of exceeding, or in the signified act: although one must abstract from existing in the exercised act. Hence it is granted that what is greater than every thinkable thing is signified and thought, with all perfection, even the existence of actual being: but in the signified act. Yet from being signified and thought to being (esse) the argument does not hold. And therefore in the text it is said that this reasoning concludes nothing: because it is not conceded by the opponents that what is greater than every thinkable thing exists in the nature of things; although it is conceded that what is greater than every thinkable thing is signified, and thought to exist in the nature of things. Therefore not what is greater is signified as an existing thing: but even if it existed, it would not be greater, but would be that which exists only in thought.

A similar example in particular may be had, if we imagine that we are concealing from ourselves that the noblest of animals exists, and wish to prove that it is from the terms, namely: the noblest of animals is, because if it is not, therefore it is not the noblest of animals. For here it appears more clearly that the ground of excess is the nobility of the thing signified in itself, while the conditions of what exceeds are objective being and being in the nature of things: and how the argument fails is evident to one who exercises himself in it.

VIII. But against these difficulties of the logicians you will impose silence with a single word, saying that greater than everything thinkable imports existence in the nature of things in two ways, namely in act exercised or signified: and that it is conceded in the second way in the matter at hand, but not in the first. And that if it were taken in the first way, that proposition would without doubt be self-evident, that which is greater than everything thinkable, is, just as this one, that which is, is. – The reason, however, why existing is not included as exercised in act but only as conceived is that things are signified by nouns as conceived, but by verbs as exercised. Hence the statement existence is not does not imply contradictories; but this one, that which exists, is not, implies contradictories.

IX. In response to the third, it must be noted that, while the text, in answering, concedes that truth in general is self-evidently known, it seems to accept the inference made in the argument, namely, there is no truth, therefore it is true that there is no truth. Scotus, however, in the First Book, distinction II, question II, in his response to the third argument, censures this inference, saying that it commits the fallacy of the consequent, from several causes of truth to one of them. First, because, although it is valid to argue, there is no truth, therefore it is not true that any truth exists; it does not follow, therefore it is true that no truth exists, for the former is negative, the latter affirmative. Second, because truth is taken either fundamentally or formally: if there is no truth, it is not true in either way that it exists: not fundamentally, because no grounding thing remains; not formally, because no intellect would be supposed to remain. Therefore the affirmative does not follow, but the negative, as has been said.

X. To this it is briefly said that, since according to good logic, from a true proposition de inesse to its modal counterpart de vero there is the best consequence, and conversely, because the true is not a mode adding something above its underlying subject: I wonder how anyone arguing against this consequence opposed himself to it. For it holds validly, Socrates runs, therefore that Socrates runs is true: and likewise, Socrates does not run, therefore that Socrates does not run is true: and this is evident in all cases. And so in the matter at hand, no truth exists: therefore that no truth exists is true. – And it is confirmed: because this proposition, namely no truth exists, is a certain enunciation: therefore signifying what is true or false, as in Book I of the Perihermeneias⁶ But among them it signifies what is true: therefore it signifies that no truth existing is true.

XI. To the first objection, therefore, ⁷ it is said that there is no fallacy: because each of those conclusions follows determinately from that proposition. And the affirmative one about the mode, therefore it is true that no truth is, follows before the negative one, therefore it is not true that some truth is. For the first follows immediately, while the second follows mediately through it: because the first pertains to the consistency of the proposition itself in itself, while the second pertains to the destruction of its contradictory, namely some truth is. And again, although the destruction of the contradictory would follow from it immediately, in saying no truth is, therefore not some truth is: nevertheless the destruction of the contradictory with the mode of the true does not follow except by virtue of the rule stated⁸, namely that a true proposition de inesse is equivalent to a modal proposition de vero: for it is because of this that it follows, no truth is, therefore it is not true that some truth is, since it is equivalent to the negation of its contradictory, namely not some truth is. And thus Scotus, in denying the consequence, granted it unknowingly, when he granted the other one founded upon its root.

To the second objection, it is said that truth is taken at least fundamentally; and when it is said that no foundation would remain, this is denied. For I say that for the fundamental remaining of negative truths, the remaining of things is not required. Hence the truth of this, nothing is nothing, with every thing and intellect entirely excluded, remains fundamentally: for if there were an intellect, it could adequately match its proposition to it, objectively, by composing this, nothing is nothing: and this remaining suffices. Hence even now this proposition, nothing is nothing, has no foundation on the side of the thing signified, except in the way stated. For when it is said that truth fundamentally is an entity, this is true of positive truth, but not of negative: for the foundation of a negative truth is non-being, and is not being, as is evident.

You have this article treated at length in Questions on Truth, question 10, article 12.

A famous title. – In the body, two things. First, he distinguishes demonstration into that and why, etc. Second, he answers the question affirmatively with a single conclusion: that God is, that is, God's esse, is demonstrable a posteriori, or through an effect.

It is proved. An effect depends on its proper cause; therefore, given an effect, the cause must pre-exist; therefore, from any effect whatsoever—provided it is better known to us—it can be demonstrated that its proper cause exists. Therefore, that God exists is demonstrable through effects better known to us. – All this is clear, on the supposition that God has some effects better known to us, which will be shown below¹.

II. In response to the first, note that the things known of God by natural light are taken in two ways: in one way, in themselves; in another way, as known to us. And likewise the articles of faith are taken in themselves and as believed. If both are taken in themselves, then it is not true that these are preambles to the propositions that are articles of faith: but some precede, such as that God is, that God is one, good, and similar absolute truths; some follow, such as that God is the first cause of things, and the like. Nor does it follow from this that they are propositions prior to the first principles in theology: although it does follow that there are certain ones prior to those principles that are the articles of faith. For the preceding ones, in themselves, are among the principles: for it has already been said in article 2² that the articles of faith, in themselves, are per se principles of theology; as believed, however, per accidens. – But if both are taken as known to us, then all things naturally known in this way are preambles, on account of the reason given in the text: and this is all the text intends. Therefore be careful.

III. In response to the second, note that this doctrine concerning the demonstration of the question whether it is is true with respect to us: for according to such an order, the question what it is follows upon whether it is. In itself, however, the reverse holds, as is taught in II Posterior Analytics³.

In the title, a doubt immediately arises from I Poster.¹ No science proves its own subject: and, as Averroes says in II Physic., comment. XXVI, neither from prior nor from posterior grounds; rather it supposes that being to be either per se known to sense or intellect, or it takes it from elsewhere. But in this science the subject is God, as was said in the first question². Therefore God's existence ought not be proved here. Against the art, then, this article is raised.

To this it is said that no science, speaking per se, proves that its subject exists: per accidens, however, it is not unfitting for some science to prove that its subject exists. And so it is in the case at hand: for a twofold accident occurs here, on account of which this science proves that God exists. The first is our imperfect participation in it. For if we participated fully in the divine light, it would at once be evident that God exists. The second is the condition of the medium, namely, that it is as it were foreign. For although no science proves its subject from what are simply its own proper principles, nevertheless from foreign but appropriated ones it can prove it, if those foreign things are better known to us than the esse of that subject. And so it happens in the case at hand: since theology, not from what is simply proper to it, but from what is proper to it ministerially—that is, from things known by natural light, which are absolutely foreign, as we have said³—proves that God exists; as is clear in the course of this question.

II. In the body there is one conclusion, answering the question in the affirmative, namely: God is. – And it is proposed for proof by five ways, which need not be set out here, since they are found both here, and in Book I of the Contra Gentiles, and in Question de Potentia, and in Question de Veritate, and in Book I of the Sentences⁴.

III. Concerning these arguments in general, it must be carefully noted that they can be brought forward for two purposes. First, to conclude to that incorporeal, immaterial, eternal, supreme, immutable, first, most perfect being, etc., which is what and of what kind we hold God to be. And in this way these arguments are highly disputable: because the first way, as is said in I Contra Gent., chapter XIII, does not lead to a mover more immobile than the intellectual soul; but the second, as Averroes says⁵, leads only to the heavenly body and its mover; nor does any of the rest seem to lead further upward. And it is not for this purpose that these arguments are adduced here, as will now now be evident. – In another way they can be brought forward to conclude that certain predicates are found in the nature of things which in truth are proper to God: without concerning themselves how or in what manner they exist, etc. And it is for this purpose that they are adduced here: and according to philosophy they have scarcely any difficulty.

And so that what we say may be better understood, it is explained point by point: of the first way, from the side of motion, it is enough that there be inferred therefore there is a first unmoved mover, without concerning ourselves whether that be the soul of the heavens or of the world; for this will be inquired into in the following question. Of the second way likewise, from the side of the efficient cause, it is enough that it lead to a first efficient cause, without concerning ourselves whether that be corporeal or incorporeal; for this will be inquired into in the following question. Of the third way indeed, from the side of the necessary being, it is enough that it lead to a first necessary being not from another, without concerning ourselves whether it be one or many; for this will be inquired into in question XI. Of the fourth way likewise, from the degrees of things, it is enough to lead to that which is being in the highest degree, true, good, noble, from which are all participations. And similarly of the fifth way, from governance, it is enough to lead to a first governor acting through intellect, whoever he may be. For all these predicates—namely, unmoved mover, first efficient cause, necessary being not from another, being in the highest degree, and first governor through understanding—are, according to truth, proper to God; and therefore, in concluding that these are found in the nature of things, it is concluded directly, as it were per accidens, that God exists, that is, God, not qua God, but as possessing such a condition, exists; and consequently the very subject itself, namely God qua God, exists.

From these considerations, however, it is clear that neither the arguments of Averroes⁶ against Avicenna, nor those of Aureol⁷ against these arguments, are directed against the intent of this article—except for the objection against the last one, and against the propositions assumed.

IV. Hence it must be known, secondly, that in the first argument, which is taken from Book VII⁸ and Book VIII of the Physics⁹, two propositions are attacked. One of them is that nothing moves itself in the first instance. Against this Scotus indeed argues, in the matter of heavy and light bodies, and of the will, etc.¹⁰ And since this would be to go beyond our limits, there will be a special question on this matter.

The second is, the first is the cause of the middle: for this is assumed both in the first and in the second and third argument, in order to prove that there is no infinite regress. And against it, although it is expressly Aristotle's in Book II of the Metaphysics¹¹ and Book VIII of the Physics¹², the argument runs thus, in substance. The middle cause, or mover, if it necessarily depends on the first cause, or mover, has this either because it is a middle, or because it is a cause, or because it is a middle cause: but it is none of these: therefore the middle cause need not depend on the first. – The assumption is evident from a sufficient distinction. The refutation of each member is proved. And first, that it is not from the notion of a middle. For a middle is said with respect to two things, namely on this side and on that, of which it is the middle: and not necessarily with respect to a first and a last, as is clear in the middle proportional parts of a circle. Second, that it is not from the notion of a cause. For a cause, as cause, is directed to its effect; and not to dependence on a prior or a first, as is clear. Third, that it is not from the composite notion, namely of a middle cause. For a middle cause, as such, requires nothing else than that it mediate in causing: but this, namely to mediate in causing, is sufficiently secured if between some prior cause and the effect there be some mediating causality: therefore the middle cause, from the notion by which it is a middle cause, does not require dependence on the first cause, but on a prior. And it is confirmed: because according to you, that conditional is true, that if causes proceeded to infinity, all causes would be middle causes. Therefore to the notion of a middle cause there is not required dependence on a first, but on a prior, with respect to which and to a posterior it is called a middle.

V. To this it is briefly answered that a mediate cause, precisely because it is a mediate cause, necessarily depends on the first cause. For the clarification of this point, one must recall that efficacy belongs to the very notion of a cause: unless a cause actually produces something, it cannot be called a cause in act, of which we are here speaking. For the efficacy of a cause consists in its actual causality; and therefore, unless that causality is completed, neither is there any cause in act, nor is any efficacy or efficiency preserved. It follows that, for the notion of cause to be preserved, its causality must be completed; and hence whatever is repugnant to the completion of some cause's causality is repugnant to that cause itself. Since, therefore, the mediate cause is truly a cause, it must possess its own complete causality.

Then thus. The complement of the causality of a mediate cause can in no way be without dependence on the first cause: therefore the mediate cause, insofar as it is a mediate cause, depends on the first. Therefore Aristotle says excellently, and it is found in the text, that the first is the cause of the mean. – The consequence is evident. And the antecedent is proved. If the first cause were removed, such that before every cause there were another cause, the causality of these causes essentially dependent would never be completed: therefore the complement of the mediates depends on the first. The conditional is clear: because an infinity of descent or ascent is repugnant to the complement. But the consequence is evident: because it is established that the complement of the mediate cause depends on some antecedent; and not on a prior merely, as is clear from the conditional; therefore on the first.

VI. To the objection on the contrary side, when it is said a mediate cause requires nothing except what it mediates in causing, this is granted; but when it is subjoined that this is preserved with respect to the prior cause, it is denied. For it is impossible that mediate causality be brought to completion unless it is sustained in the first cause: for if it depends upon infinitely many prior causes, it will never be able to be brought to completion.

For confirmation, it is denied that that conditional, namely if essentially ordered causes were infinite, all would be intermediate causes, is Aristotle's or ours simply speaking: rather, it is ad hominem, against those who posit infinity in causes of this kind. For among these it follows very well that, since all are posited as causes, and none is first, therefore they are intermediate. But according to the truth, from that antecedent, one proceeds to infinity in causes, there follows therefore no cause exists, as Aristotle and St. Thomas deduce: because it follows, therefore there is no first; therefore neither an intermediate; for the first is the cause of the intermediate, as has been proven ¹³.

VII. Concerning that proposition assumed in the fourth way, namely that which is most such in any genus is the cause of all the others which are of that genus, since it is attacked by Aureol¹⁴, note three terms. First, that it is one thing to be most such in some genus and another to be the first or most perfect species of a genus. Hence what is assumed here is not that the most perfect species is the cause of the rest: but that which is most such, etc. Second, that being a cause can be taken in the proposition in two ways: namely as properly an efficient cause, or as an exemplary cause. Here being a cause is assumed indeterminately: for it does not matter to the purpose by what causality the greatest being, good, and true is the cause of the esse, goodness, and truth of the others; for to be their cause, whether exemplar or efficient, belongs properly to God. Third, that the other things of that genus can be taken in two ways: namely absolutely, that is, according to the whole of what they are; and they can be taken according to the ratio of that genus. In the proposition they are not taken absolutely, but insofar as they possess that ratio: for we do not say that what is hottest is the cause of the remaining hot things according to their substance and the whole of what they are, but only insofar as they are hot. – So that the sense of the proposition assumed is: That which in the highest degree possesses some formal ratio is the cause, whether exemplary or efficient, of the rest possessing the same formal ratio, as such.

From this it is clear that Aureol's objection concerning whiteness in relation to the colors has no force. First, because whiteness is not color in the highest degree. Second, because even if it were color in the highest degree, it would not on that account be necessary for it to cause the other species of color absolutely, but only with respect to the formal character of color. Third, because to say that whiteness is the exemplary cause of the other colors insofar as they are colors involves no difficulty: since more perfect things are naturally the exemplars of imperfections as such; and all colors, the more they approach whiteness, the more they possess of light, and consequently of perfection according to the character of color.

VIII. Concerning the fifth way, there is also the objection of Aureol¹⁵, which however St. Thomas had already excluded beforehand, in III Contra Gentiles, chapter 64: namely, that the quiddities of natural things are sufficient causes of the effects that appear naturally, in an ordered manner, etc., throughout the universe. See there, and also in the Quaestiones de Veritate, question 5, article 2, and you will find the reason for their insufficiency to be the unity of order, mutual utilities, the connections of contraries, etc.: besides the one given here in the reply to the second objection, namely because nature acts for an end, from II Physics¹⁶; therefore it either has the end conceived by itself, or is directed by another intending it, etc.

IX. Concerning the solution to the first argument, note that the response of the text consists in denying the consequence. Yet since no cause is assigned in general, but only in the particular matter under discussion, therefore, speaking generally, know first that one of two opposites excluding the other can be understood in two ways: namely, formally and effectively. Formally indeed, one of two opposites does not exclude the other except from its own recipient, as is evident. And thus in our case, because the divine good is infinite, it formally excludes every evil from God: but not from a creature, because it is not received in a creature, but in God alone. Effectively, however, one of two opposites excludes the other insofar as it produces something like itself: just as the solar power excludes cold from the air, insofar as it assimilates the air to itself in hot being esse. And according to this opposition the argument proceeds, that if one of two opposites is infinite, the other is excluded by it not only formally but also effectively, wherever it may be found: and this on account of the infinity of its efficacy, which nothing can resist unless the other opposite were also infinite. – Know secondly that Scotus, in I Sent., dist. II, qu. I, ad 1, examining this conditional, says it is true not only formally but also effectively, in opposites acting naturally: but not in agents acting voluntarily. And he solves the argument as applied to our case, because the infinite good acts voluntarily. – In the text, however, the consequence is simply denied: and the reason is assigned, namely that from the infinite goodness of the agent there follows the being esse of certain evils from which some good results.

X. But since, as was said¹⁷, that response mixes in a mode of causing, namely through the will, by attributing the permission of evil to the divine will, to which permission pertains; therefore it is particular. Universally, however, the antecedent seems to need to be distinguished. For the infinite is opposed in two ways. In one way, as communicable to others according to the same ratio, as if fire were infinitely hot: for heat is communicable to others according to the same ratio by which it is in fire. In another way, as incommunicable to others according to the same ratio, though it may be participated by a certain analogy: just as God's esse is infinite, yet not communicable to others according to the same ratio (otherwise there could be several gods), though it is participable by all, more and less.

I say therefore that, if one of two opposites, communicable according to the same ratio, is infinite, the other will be neither in the same subject nor in any other whatsoever. But if one of the opposites, incommunicable according to the same ratio yet participable, is infinite, it follows very well that the other will formally exclude it from itself: but it does not follow, therefore, that the other will effectively exclude it from every subject, even if it is posited to act naturally. And the reason is that an infinite agent, finitely participated, does not totally exclude its opposite from those participating it: but an infinite incommunicable opposite, or an infinite good, is of this kind: therefore. – The major premise is evident by induction. For if the sun were infinitely hot, and heat were not communicable to lower things according to the same ratio, but only according to a certain analogical imitation; then the sun, insofar as hot, would be an infinite agent, yet finitely participated, because not according to the same ratio. And hence it would produce in anything only a finite participation of heat: and consequently it would not exclude all cold from those participating it, since with a finitely impressed heat some degree of cold can stand. – It is also evident by reason. Because an agent, of whatever power, does not effectively exclude the opposite except insofar as it is incompossible with the effect. But with an agent existing as infinite in itself, yet finitely participated, the effect need not be incompossible with any degree whatever of the opposite: for the effect, being finite, has the ratio of one of the opposites. Therefore an infinite agent, only finitely participated, does not totally remove its opposite effectively.

And therefore God, glorious, who is infinite goodness, even if he acted naturally, would not remove all evil from the universe. For only a finite good is participated by any creature whatsoever; and from his goodness there would proceed the whole ensemble of goods constituting diverse grades in the universe, from whose natures it is necessary that evil arise; just as from the nature of the wolf comes the death of the lamb, and from the nature of the elements the corruption of mixtures, etc. And so, elevating the argument to the sense assigned in the text, the consequence is rightly denied: for from God's infinite goodness there arises that evil be (for the good of the universe, however); and not that evil not be. And thus it pertains to God's infinite goodness that evil should be in his effects, not in himself.