Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, sint does not denote any special mode of being, but is taken absolutely: so that the question is not whether the perfections are in God formally or virtually, but absolutely, in whatever way they may be. The word perfectiones stands universally for all perfections, both those that are perfections simply and those that are not simply, as is clear from the course of the article.

II. In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: In God are the perfections of all things.

It is proven in three ways¹. First, from authority. God is said to be universally perfect, that is, according to the noble qualities of all genera: therefore. – The antecedent is proven by the authority of Averroes, V Metaphysics

III. Second, by an argument taken from Dionysius. God is the first effective cause of things: therefore the perfections of all things preexist in God in a more eminent manner.

The antecedent is supposed. The consequent is proved as to its first part. The effect preexists in virtue in the agent cause: therefore, whatever perfection there is in the effect must be found in the efficient cause. Therefore, if God etc., the perfections of all things are in him. – As to the second part, however, it is proved thus. An agent, insofar as it is an agent, is perfect: therefore, to preexist in the virtue of an agent cause is not to preexist in a more imperfect, but in a more perfect mode. Therefore, whatever perfection there is in the effect preexists in the efficient cause, either according to the same ratio, as in a univocal cause; or according to a more eminent one, as in an equivocal cause. Therefore, if God is the first cause of all things, he must possess the perfections of all things in a more eminent mode. – The assumption is clear from the preceding article. The first consequence is proved from the opposite: namely, because matter is imperfect, to preexist in the potency of a material cause is to be in a more imperfect mode. The rest are left as self-evident.

IV. Concerning that proposition, to pre-exist in the power of an agent cause is not to pre-exist in a more imperfect, but in a more perfect, manner, a doubt immediately arises: for it is both false and contradicts another statement of the text. False indeed: because the effect sometimes pre-exists in the efficient cause in an equally perfect manner, as is evident when Socrates generates Plato. But against the text: because it is expressly stated, and rightly, that in a univocal cause the effect pre-exists according to the same ratio: therefore not in a more perfect manner.

Nor is there any lack of occasion for beginners to doubt: for we see that effects preexist in a more imperfect manner in many causes that are truly efficient causes; as is evident in seeds, from which animals and plants are effectively produced.

V. To this it must be said briefly that in a more perfect way can be expounded in two ways. First, comparatively, as the word signifies by its force. And then it is understood, not necessarily, but permissively: so that the negative particle, not in a less perfect way, is understood necessarily; but the affirmative particle, but in a more perfect way, is understood permissively. And thus the proposition is most true: and it signifies that to preexist in the efficient cause, necessarily, is to preexist not in a less perfect way than the mode of being of the effect; but possibly, it is to preexist in a more perfect way. – Second, it can be expounded by interpreting the comparative as a positive: in a more perfect way, that is, in a perfect way, or of perfection. – Yet the first exposition serves my intention: since I intend to prove that the perfections of the effects are in the equivocal cause, God, in a more eminent way.

To the novices, however, the answer is given, according to the doctrine of Alexander, as Averroes reports in XII Metaphysics, commentary XXIV, that seeds and other things of this kind, to which the forms of their effects are not assimilated univocally or imitatively, are not efficient causes, but instruments of the agent causes; and for this reason Aristotle places them in the genus of effecting causes, V Metaphysics² and II Physics³ The present discussion, however, concerns causes that are active properly speaking, not only as they are distinguished from the other genera of causes, but as they are distinguished from the instruments of causes, which are not causes properly speaking.

VI. Concerning the last consequence⁴, note that it is founded on this, that the first efficient cause of things is an equivocal cause. This has been left as settled: both because it is admitted by all, and because it is clearly evident from the terms. For if it is the efficient cause of things of different rationes, it is univocal with none of them; and if it is univocal with any of them, then it is not the efficient cause of the others; therefore it is not of things of different rationes.

VII. The second argument⁵ was also touched upon by Dionysius. God is esse itself subsisting per se; therefore He contains within Himself the whole perfection of being (essendi); therefore all the perfections of all things.

The antecedent is supposed. The first consequence is proved by destruction of the consequent, in special terms, namely the perfection of heat and of hot, thus. It does not contain the whole perfection of being: therefore it does not have esse according to its perfect ratio: therefore it is not esse itself subsisting per se (which is the opposite of the antecedent); just as "A hot" does not have the whole perfection of heat: therefore it does not have heat according to its perfect ratio: therefore it is not heat subsisting per se. – The second consequence, however, is proved. Things are said to be perfect insofar as they have esse: therefore the perfections of all things pertain to the perfection of being: therefore, if it contains the whole perfection of being, etc.

VIII. In response to the third, note first that the force of the argument rests upon the topic from correlates, when it is said: being is more imperfect than living, therefore esse than life. And the truth of the antecedent consists in this, because being does not include the living, but conversely.

Note second, that in the response he hints at this distinction on the side of the thing: esse can be compared to life in two ways. First, formally and precisely on both sides: so that esse is taken precisely for the act of being, and life precisely for what formally adds above being, namely living as such. And thus they are signified by abstract names, for instance being (esse), life, wisdom, etc.: and in the text they are said to be compared as distinguished by reason. And thus esse is more perfect than living and the other perfections: because it is the actuality of all things, as was said above⁶. – Second, esse can be compared to life without precision: so that life is taken according to what it includes, and not only for what it formally adds above being. And thus they are signified by concrete names in the text, and are called a being (ens), a living thing, a wise one: and it is said that a living thing is more perfect than a being, because it includes a being, and something of perfection beyond. – In the third way esse can be compared, in its pure subsistence, to the others however they may be taken. And thus it is signified in the text by the term "ipsum esse": and it is said that it includes in itself life, wisdom, and every perfection of being, as was proved in the body; and consequently it is the most perfect of all.

From these things, however, which are taken from the letter, we have both that esse, formally considered, is more perfect than the others, formally considered: and that esse itself is simply more perfect, possessing all perfections preeminently in itself. So that from the first we may know that that predicate, which belongs to God alone in its quiddity, is formally nobler than the other perfections: and from the second, that because God is ipsum esse subsistens, He has all perfections.

A response to the argument is also obtained from these considerations. For the consequent must be denied: since in the antecedent the living thing is taken as including being and something beyond it; but in the consequent it is taken only according to that which it adds above being. And thus it is shown that the argument does not proceed from the topic from conjugates: which holds when the concretes are held precisely in a formal manner just as the abstracts are; the opposite of which occurs here.