Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, "utterly simple": in itself, excluding every composition of it from itself, not composibility: for composibility will be treated in the following article, etc.

In the body, one conclusion, the responsive question answered affirmatively: God is altogether simple. – It is proved by five means: first, from a sufficient enumeration of the modes of composition; second, because He is the first being (ens); third, because He is the first cause; fourth, because He is pure act; fifth, because He is ipsum esse (subsistent being itself).

II. In response to the first, note that Scotus, in the First Book, distinction VIII, in the question following the first question, reports this position, that every caused being is composite, and rebukes it: for this reason, because if every caused being is composite, let its components be taken: either they are simple, or again composite; and thus, either one would proceed to infinity, or there will be a stopping point at simple component beings. And since it is evident that the components are caused beings, it follows that not every caused being is composite, as is said here.

To this it is briefly said that the objection proceeds from a poor understanding of the text. For a caused thing, or creature, can be taken in two ways: properly, namely, and broadly. If it is taken properly, then, since to be caused and to be created properly belong both to the caused thing and to the creature, only subsisting things are said to be caused or creatures: the rest, however, are said to be concaused and concreated, such as parts, forms, accidents, etc. Broadly, however, everything other than God existing in any way whatsoever in the nature of things can be called caused. Therefore, in the matter at hand, "caused" is taken properly, so as to be distinguished not only against cause but also against what is concaused. And so the objection, which speaks of things concaused, poses no difficulty. Hence in the text the composition of the caused thing is proved from its consisting of esse and quiddity: for these are properly the components of the caused thing, not of the components. And as is clear in I Sent., dist. VIII, qu. V, art. 1¹, Saint Thomas had made that argument adduced by Scotus.

III. In response to the second, it would need to be seen whether simplicity is a perfection simply speaking. But I have already written about this in my commentary on De Ente et Essentia².