Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, genus is taken properly, for a logical genus, insofar as the ten genera of things are distinguished.

The body is twofold: first, the distinction; second, the response to the question, in two conclusions, according to the two members of the distinction, with one corollary added to the first conclusion¹.

As to the first, the distinction is: Esse is in a genus in two ways: directly, and reductively, as is evident. — As to the second, the first conclusion, answering the question in the negative, is: God is not directly in a genus.

It is proved in three ways. First. God is pure act: therefore He is not directly in a genus. – The consequence is proved as follows. Genus is taken from potency with respect to that from which the difference is taken: therefore everything existing in a genus has act mixed with potency: therefore, if it is pure act, etc. The antecedent is made clear in animal and rational. All things are clear.

II. Second. If God were in a genus, some genus would be predicated in quid of that of which it is the genus; therefore being would be a genus. But this is impossible. Therefore. – The first consequence is proved. The essence of God is His very act of being (esse), and a genus is predicated in quid of that of which it is the genus; therefore, if God were in a genus, etc. – The second consequence is left as established, because being either signifies only, or above all, formally being (esse). – The destruction of the last consequent is proved from III Metaphysics: Every genus has differences outside itself; being has no differences outside itself; therefore. The minor is proved: because outside being there remains only non-being; but non-beings cannot possibly be differences of being, as is evident.

III. Concerning this argument, one might first doubt about the signification of being; second, about its predication—namely, whether it is predicated in the quid, as in this argument the adversary must be held to say who claims that God is in a genus; third, about its community with all real formal rationes—namely, whether it is intrinsically contained in all of them, as is assumed here from III Metaphysics. But on all these matters we have written in our commentaries on Being and Essence², nor do I think it needs repeating here—especially because, whether because of the reason adduced here or for another, the destruction of the consequent³ is accepted by everyone. Now the sense of the argument adduced here is that differences must be outside the genus in such a way that neither is the genus posited intrinsically in the formal signification of the difference, nor conversely—although the genus is posited in the ratio of the difference extrinsically, or as something added, just as the subject is in the ratio of a passion. But no real rationes distinguishing being are found whose formal significations do not contain being intrinsically. Therefore.

And know that Scotus, in book I, distinction III, question III, holds the opposite of this minor premise. For he thinks there are certain differences, namely ultimate ones, which do not formally and intrinsically include being. And again, he holds that the passions of being do not formally and intrinsically include being. – But concerning the passions, something will be said in question V. As for the differences, although something would have to be said here, since it is nevertheless necessary to introduce new terms (because Scotus speaks of differences taken not from forms but from ultimate realities), it is better to make a special and extensive question on this matter; besides what has been touched upon regarding this in the commentaries On Being and Essence⁴.

IV. Third it is proved. All things directly in a genus share in essence and differ in esse; therefore they have an essence distinct from their esse. God is not of this kind. Therefore. – The antecedent is proved: because they agree in the quiddity of the genus, and are distinguished by one esse or another, as is clear in man and horse. – The consequence, however, is left as established. – That the consequent, when applied to God, is destroyed, is clear from the preceding article. Therefore, etc.

V. Concerning this argument there is a doubt. First, because ly esse is taken equivocally. For in the antecedent the discourse is about specific being (esse specificum), to which the differentia distinguishing the genus leads; in the consequent, however, the discourse is about the act of existing (esse actualis existentiae), which is inferred to be distinct from my essence. – Second, because from the distinction between the principle of agreement and the principle of difference, assumed in the antecedent, no greater distinction than a formal one can be inferred: for the essence of the genus, in which species agree, and specific being (esse specificum), by which each species differs from another, differ not really but only formally. And yet a real distinction between essence and being (esse) is inferred in the text. Therefore this procedure seems bad.

VI. To this objection it was said at great length in chapter VI On Being and Essence, where St. Thomas makes this argument. And therefore it is now said briefly that in the antecedent esse is taken both for specific being and for actual existence, since both are verified of it. Indeed, the verification of one entails the verification of the other: for the difference is said to conduce to esse precisely because it constitutes the proper receptive subject of esse as actual existence, as was declared there, and above on Porphyry ⁵ There is therefore no equivocation. – And although from the fact that two formal rationes are thus distinguished, one being the formal principle of agreement and the other the formal principle of difference, a real distinction between them cannot simply be inferred (otherwise every genus would have to be really distinguished from its differences), nevertheless, for the sake of the matter under discussion, namely essence and esse, the real distinction of esse from essence can very well be inferred from the absolute distinction between genus and esse, in which species are distinguished. And the reason is that these two mutually entail each other: existence is formally distinguished from quiddity, and existence is really distinguished from quiddity, as we declared there ⁶ Therefore see there, etc.

VII. The corollary attached to the first conclusion⁷ is: God has neither genus, nor difference, nor definition, nor demonstration except through His effects. – The inference is evident: because of the definition, etc.

VIII. The second conclusion⁸ is also negative: God is not in any genus reductively. – It is proved. God is the principle, not of some one genus only, but of all being (esse): therefore He is not contained reductively in any genus. – The antecedent is assumed. The consequence is proved. Everything that is in a genus reductively is the principle of that genus alone, as is clear from XII Metaphysics⁹ on the principles of the Categories.

IX. Concerning this conclusion a difficulty arises on the part of an opponent: for in Book I of the Sentences, distinction VIII, question IV, article 2, reply to the third objection, and in the Questions on the Power of God, question VII, article 3, reply to the last objection, St. Thomas grants that God is in the genus of substance reductively. How is the opposite determined here?

To this it is briefly said that, as is clearly apparent from I Sent., there is no contradiction between what is said here and elsewhere. For there a distinction is made that to be in a genus as principle can be understood in two ways. In the first way, as a principle contained within that genus: and thus it is denied that God is in a genus as principle. In the other way, as the principle containing the genus itself: and in this way God is in a certain manner in all genera; and by proper appropriation in the genus of substance, as being more closely related to it. And this is conceded in the passages cited above; with the note that what was left unsaid in the Qu. de Potentia he supplied in I Sent.. Hence it may fittingly be said that God is in a genus as principle, not because he is reduced to the genus, but because to him the genus itself is reduced. And that this is the mind of St. Thomas you can infer from the fact that in the text, in concluding, he says of God: whence he is not contained in a genus as principle; for by saying is not contained, he guarded himself against being in a genus as a principle containing, to which every genus is reduced by a certain order. The same thing is intimated by the preceding words, namely: a principle that is reduced into some genus does not extend beyond it, etc.

X. In response to the second, a difficulty arises: because the reply does not satisfy the objection. The reply indeed says three things: first, that the major premise is true of a homogeneous measure; second, that the minor premise is false, God is a homogeneous measure; third, as it were glossing Averroes, it is said how God is called the measure of all things, because each thing has being (esse) in the measure in which it approaches him. But by these things Averroes's authority, which was adduced and which wills that God, who is the first substance, be the measure of substances, just as the first number is of other numbers, etc., is not satisfied: and this deliberately, in that very place where there is talk of homogeneous measures, namely Metaphysics X, comment. VII.

To this it may briefly be said that St. Thomas, attending to the matter rather than the words, satisfies excellently even according to the mind of Averroes. For genus can be taken in two ways. In one way, properly, as we speak here: and thus it is most excellently denied that God is a homogeneous measure of the genus of substance (indeed, Averroes posits no intelligence that is thus homogeneous with substance): and this is said in this text. In another way, broadly, for coordination: and in this way God is the homogeneous measure of the coordination of substances, more than of accidents, because He Himself is substance, and is not an accident: and this is what Averroes willed there. Yet this is to be a measure outside the genus of predicamental substance; and it is to be a measure of all genera properly outside them, as is evident. And therefore it is said in the text that God is called the measure of all things.

XI. In the argument brought forward to the contrary in this article, there is a word worth noting, and doubting: namely, that nothing is prior to God, neither in reality nor in the intellect; and therefore He has no genus. For this seems to be false, since the predicates common to God and other things are prior, according to the intellect, to God Himself, as is evident from the fact that the consequence does not convert.

But this is quickly made clear by first distinguishing according to the intellect in two ways: on the side of the thing, or of the formal rationes; or with respect to us. For no thing, or formal ratio, is prior to God according to the intellect on the side of itself: in sign of which, no predicate is given that is, in itself, more abstract, simpler, or prior than He. With respect to us, however, wisdom is prior than the divine wisdom, according to the intellect. And therefore the consequence is not converted with respect to us. In the text, however, the Author intends the first mode: for thus the genus is prior to that which is placed in the genus.