Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title an ambiguity immediately presents itself, as to what "God" stands for in this question, whether God is the same as his essence. For from the second argument, and from the whole course of the body of the article, it is suggested that it stands for the divine supposit: since nothing else is treated here than whether the supposit of the divine nature and that nature itself are the same. But from the notion of a supposit the opposite is shown. For five conditions are required for the notion of a supposit: namely, that it be substance, complete, individual, subsisting, incommunicably: substance, on account of accidents; complete, on account of parts; individual, on account of species; subsisting, on account of Christ's humanity; incommunicably, on account of the divine essence, which is common to the three supposits. And so, since the divine supposit signifies the same thing as the divine person, and in this article no mention is made of what is constitutive of persons, it follows that "God" does not stand for the divine supposit. – And this is confirmed: because below¹ there will be asked expressly whether person and essence in God are the same. Therefore, etc.

II. To this it must be said that God can be taken in three ways. First, as signifying the concrete, as it were specific, nature of the divine nature, that is, one having deity; just as man signifies one having humanity. Second, as signifying the concrete individual of the divine nature, that is, this one having deity, or this God; just as man can stand for this man. Third, as signifying the supposit of the divine nature, that is, this one having deity incommunicably, that is, this divine person; just as man can stand for Socrates. But there is this difference between God on the one hand, and man and the concretes of other natures on the other: in the others, the individual of the nature taken concretely is not distinguished from the supposit (for this man is not distinguished from a human supposit, nor conversely); but in God, the individual of the nature taken concretely, that is, this God, is distinguished from the divine supposit, that is, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. And the reason is because this God is at once a singular term and common to the three supposits—which cannot befall the individual of any other substance.

It can therefore be taken in three ways, and I say that it is not taken here in the first way. Because, as is clear in the body of the article, that for which ly Deus supposits encloses within its meaning the principles individuating God, insofar as they are individuating: which are not signified as enclosed in ly Deus as suppositing specifically. – Nor is it taken here in the third way. Both because no mention is made here of the personal properties, and because under this sense many things are supposed to be determined beforehand; and therefore below² it will be asked in this sense, in the treatise on the divine persons. – But it is taken in the second way, so that the sense is: Whether God, that is, this God, is the same as deity.

III. But note that this God, signifying the individual of the divine nature in the concrete, has two conditions in reality: one negative, namely that it does not signify a supposit of the divine nature (and this speaking according to truth); the other affirmative, namely that it is equivalent to the supposit with respect to the multitude of identity or distinction from the nature; since it is compared to that nature as having to habit, as what-is to that-by-which-it-is, as subsistent to the nature in which and by which it subsists, etc. And it has a third condition in the opinion of the philosophers—indeed, of all human reason according to the capacity of nature—namely that it is taken by all as a supposit of the divine nature: because no condition of a supposit is lacking to it except incommunicability; that this does not belong to it, because it is common to the three persons, we know not by reason but by revelation of faith. And from this there follows a fourth condition with respect to us: that although this God does not signify the divine supposit simply, nevertheless it signifies the divine supposit so long as one remains within the limits of a treatise on absolutes, such as the present one.

Because of the first condition, the text speaks cautiously, both in asking and in concluding and answering: for whenever it speaks of God in particular, it names God and deity, and never a divine supposit. Because of the other three conditions, however, it uses the names supposit and nature when speaking in general: and from the common rules of the identity or distinction of supposit from nature, it determines the question. For the judgment is the same concerning the distinction of this God from deity as concerning supposit from nature: since that individual is equivalent to the supposit which is this one; for supposit is distinguished from nature as the possessor from what is possessed, and that which is from that by which it is, and the subsisting being from that by which it subsists, etc. Nor would it have been fitting to the order of doctrine that things relative and revealed be mixed into the treatise on absolutes, so remote from those principles, with so many intervening questions needing to be decided.

IV. In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question in the affirmative: God is identical with His essence or nature. – Proof. The reason for the difference between nature and supposit is the distinction of the nature from individual matter; therefore, in simple forms, which are individuated through themselves, the supposit does not differ from the nature; therefore God is His own deity and His own life, etc.

The antecedent is proved from the reason for the distinction between nature and supposit in material things, which are better known to us. Nature comprehends within itself only those things that fall under the definition of the species; therefore it does not comprehend individual matter; therefore it is distinguished on this account from the supposit. – The assumption is evident. And the first consequence just drawn is proved in two ways. First, because individual matter is not contained within the definition of the species, as is clear with regard to this flesh in relation to human nature. Second, because the defining principles stand formally in relation to individuating matter: as a sign of which, humanity is signified as the formal part of man. – But the second consequence is proved as follows: because in the notion of a supposit, were it to be defined, individual matter would be included, as in Socrates.

The first consequence is left as self-evident. – The second, however, is proved: because God is not composed of matter and form, as is clear from the preceding article.

V. Concerning the terms assumed in the antecedent, and consequently in this whole argument, I distinguish first ly nature and ly supposit. For we can speak of them in two ways: one way, according to the thing alone; another way, according to the mode of signifying. Nature and supposit are taken according to the thing alone when they are taken according to the proper accounts of the thing that nature signifies, and of the thing that supposit signifies, abstracting from the modes of signifying: for example, when human nature is taken according to its proper definition, and Socrates according to his proper account, without regard to whether nature is signified in the abstract or in the concrete, etc. – They are taken, however, according to the modes of signifying when they are taken as standing under names of first intention, for instance humanity, man, Socrates, Socrateity, etc.

The present discussion concerns nature and supposit according to the thing itself, and not according to the mode of signifying: for the latter belongs rather to the logician's business, the former to the metaphysician's. And therefore all argumentations and replies fall away which introduce being signified by way of a part, or excluding from signification, or neither excluding nor including, and the like; for these pertain to the difference between these things as arising from modes of signifying, not from things themselves. – Nor does it stand in the way that in the body of this article it is inferred that humanity is signified as the formal part of man, in order to prove that nature does not include individual matter: since this was brought forward as a better-known sign a posteriori, to make manifest also from the mode of signifying the distinction according to the thing itself of nature from individual matter.

VI. Distinguish, secondly,³ to differ, or difference. For it is twofold: according to reason, and according to the thing. And the latter is subdivided into real difference between one thing and another thing, and into real difference between a thing that includes something real and one that does not include it (we say "include" and "not include" here not on the basis of the mode of signifying, but on the basis of the formal reason of the thing signified, taken formally). And this latter is again subdivided into real difference based on the inclusion of something real intrinsically, as man differs from animal because he includes intrinsically the rational; and based on the inclusion of something real extrinsically, as the teachable differs from man (supposing that teachability is the same thing as the nature of man), because it includes extrinsically teaching, as the act by which it is defined, which man does not include in his reason.

VII. Since, therefore, there are four modes of difference: according to reason alone, as between man and humanity; between thing and thing, as between Socrates and Plato; between a thing including something real intrinsically, and one abstracting from it; and between one including something real extrinsically, and one abstracting from it: in the antecedent assumed⁴, and in this whole argument and conclusion, the discussion concerns only difference in the third mode, that is, with respect to intrinsic inclusion.

For this discourse is not about a difference according to reason alone: since supposit and nature are distinguished in this way in all things, even in God. For God and deity, by reason of the mode of signifying, are distinguished only thus: that the proposition deity generates deity is heretical, and the proposition God generates God is catholic, as appears at the beginning of the Decretals ⁵ – Nor is this discourse about a real difference, such as exists between one thing and another thing. For it is evident that substantial nature and supposit cannot be naturally distinguished so as to be two wholly diverse things. – Nor is this discourse about an extrinsic real difference: for then the antecedent would be false; and it would be false that supposit and nature do not differ in immaterial substances. For in separate substances, supposit differs from nature extrinsically: because supposit, as such, includes subsistence (which is being of itself) not intrinsically, but in a way as its proper act, to which it would in some manner have to be defined if it were defined; but nature does not. And therefore St. Thomas, in Quodlibet II, question II, article 2, speaking of such a difference, said that in angels supposit differs from nature.

It remains, therefore, that this discussion concerns the difference with respect to intrinsic inclusion. First, because the reason assumed in the text clearly distinguishes supposit from nature in material things according to such a difference; namely, because supposit includes individual matter, which nature does not include: for it is evident that this is understood of intrinsic inclusion. Second, because in things separate from matter, supposit is not distinguished from nature by such a difference, as is affirmed here, on account of their being individuated through themselves; that is, because that which constitutes the nature and that which constitutes the individual are one and the same; and hence the individual includes nothing intrinsic which nature does not also encompass, and conversely. Third, because the same judgment is held in the text concerning the identity of supposit and nature in separate substances, and of God with the divine essence: for this is not simply true unless we speak of the intrinsic difference; since, as has already been said, in the Quodlibets he put forward a different judgment, speaking of the extrinsic difference.

The sense, therefore, of the foregoing is that the reason for the intrinsic difference between nature and suppositum, taken according to the thing or the formal reasons ⁶, is the distinction of nature from individual matter. And likewise the sense of all the conclusions implicitly contained here—concerning supposit and nature in material things and in things separate from matter, etc.—must be taken with the same understanding.

VIII. And if you have examined the foregoing carefully, you will grasp the disposition of all things with respect to identity and distinction between supposit and nature. For you have, first, that the supposit and the nature not substantially constituting the supposit (whether it be the nature of an accident, as Socrates and his complexion; or whether it be a substance quasi adventitious, as the humanity of the Word of God) are distinguished fourfold: namely, as thing and thing, and intrinsically, and extrinsically, and according to reason. – You have, secondly, that in composite substances the supposit and nature are distinguished intrinsically, extrinsically, and according to reason. – You have, thirdly, that in immaterial substances the supposit and nature are distinguished not intrinsically, but extrinsically according to res, and according to reason. – You have, fourthly, that in God, God and deity are in no way distinguished according to res: but only by reason of the mode of signifying. – You have also the concord of the sayings of St. Thomas, and an understanding of what has been written on this matter in various places.

IX. Concerning the first consequence drawn in the text⁷, note that it was left as established because it rests upon that posterioristic rule sufficiently well known, if affirmation is the cause of affirmation, negation is the cause of negation, and conversely⁸. And since this maxim holds only in the case of proper causes, therefore in the antecedent the term reason, where it is said the reason of the difference etc., stands for the proper reason. Hence the sense is: the proper and precise reason of the intrinsic difference between nature and supposit. And then the force of the consequence is plainly evident: from the negation of such a reason, it infers the negation of its effect.