Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, note that, although according to the doctrine of St. Thomas to be a body and to be composed of matter and form are convertible and are the same thing; nevertheless, because they are not the same among others nor convertible (for Averroes holds¹ that there is body in the heavens, and yet not composed of matter and form: but Avicebron holds² that there is composition of matter and form in spiritual substances, and yet not body), therefore, in order that the doctrine may be complete in every way, the present question is raised, whether God is composed of matter and form. And for this reason all the arguments set forth in the text use means that abstract from corporeity and quantity, insofar as they exclude even spiritual matter.

II. In the body, one conclusion, answering the question negatively: It is impossible for there to be matter in God. – This is proven in three ways. First. God is pure act: therefore He has no matter. The inference is proven: because matter is in potency.

Second. God is the first good, and the best good; therefore the good is not by participation but by essence. Therefore He is not composed of matter and form. — The antecedent is evident from what precedes³ The first consequence is proved: that which is good by essence is prior to that which is good by participation; therefore, if God is first, etc. But the second is proved as follows: a composite is good through its form; therefore it is good by participation, namely insofar as matter participates in form; therefore if God is first, etc.

Third. God is the first efficient cause; therefore he is the first and per se agent; therefore he is first and per se form. Therefore he is not composed of matter and form. — The antecedent, together with the first consequence, is left as established. But the second is proved: every agent acts through its form; therefore each thing is related to being an agent just as it is related to being a form, and conversely; therefore, if it is the first and per se agent, it is first and per se form, etc.

III. Concerning the first consequence⁴, note that ly first is taken in a certain way equivocally in the antecedent and in the consequent. For in the antecedent it is taken insofar as it denotes an order of priority with respect to the other efficient causes; but in the consequent it is taken insofar as it signifies according to itself, as in I Poster.⁵ it is distinguished as first against per se and universally. So that from the fact that God is first among efficient causes, it is inferred, therefore God is efficiently per se first, that is, according to itself. And the consequence holds: since it belongs to him to be first among efficient causes, not contingently but necessarily, and according to essential causality over the other efficient causes, as is evident of itself. For these points being established, it is now clear that it belongs to him to be an agent not through another; and that whatever things this belongs to, it belongs through itself. Therefore he is first agent, in accordance with the doctrine of the Analytics.

IV. Concerning the consequence assumed in the proof of the second consequence⁶, namely that, an agent acts through its form etc., note that, if form is the reason of acting (as is assumed in the antecedent, and as Aristotle says many times), it is necessary that each thing be related to the reason of acting just as it is related to form, and consequently to active being, proceeding a priori; and conversely, proceeding a posteriori, as something is related to active being, so must it be related to the reason of acting, and consequently to form. Hence the second consequence holds: if something is first in act, it is first the reason of acting and form, and thus it is not composed of matter and form. The text itself hints at this convertibility when it first says that as something is related to form, so is it related to being an agent; and then, wishing to indicate the convertibility to be understood, adds: therefore what is first an agent through itself is first and through itself form.

V. But concerning these things a doubt arises. For this process seems sophistic: since under this common term, namely being related to form, one descends determinately to this special case, namely being form. For that each thing is so related to form as to be an agent is most true; but from this it is not permissible to infer that each thing is so related to being form as it is to being an agent. First, because it is the fallacy of the consequent. Second, because this is false: for fire is not related to being heat as it is to being heating; since fire is first of all heating, yet it is not first of all heat (indeed, it is not heat, but has it per se first); and yet heat is that form which is the ratio of heating. Therefore, from the fact that something is an agent per se and first, nothing else can be inferred except that it has per se and first the form which is the ratio of acting—and not that it is per se and first form, as happens in the text, etc.

VI. To this it is said that two things must be noted here: first, what ly per se signifies in the first place; second, that statements must always be interpreted according to the subject matter. For from these everything will become clear.

Primary per se such, as it is called in I Poster.⁷, signifies that something is such not through another, and that the rest are such through it. But when it is said not through another, not only extrinsic things are excluded, but also parts, as is said in VII Physic.⁸: so that that which is such by reason of a part is not primarily per se such. And accordingly, that to which it belongs to be an agent by reason of a part, namely, form, is not primarily per se an agent; but neither is it an agent per accidens, but through another, namely, through a part. And therefore no composite of matter and form can be primarily per se active, since all things act not by their whole selves, because not by reason of matter (for it is repugnant to matter to be the principle of acting, since of its very notion there is potency opposed to the act which is the principle of acting). And from this it is clear how, from having of itself the relation to being an agent, one may infer not only that it has the relation to form, but that it has the relation to being form, as was done in the text: and conversely it could be done a priori; nor is there any sophism.

But as for the objection from heat, it is said that if the arguments were weighed according to the subject matter, this objection would not arise. For active being (esse) in general includes no imperfection, and it can belong to some subsisting thing in its nature first and most properly properly speaking, as we speak. But heating being (esse) does include an imperfection: for it signifies active being (esse) thus, that is, materially. And it is impossible that it belong to anything first, simply and absolutely speaking: because it must belong to a composite of matter and form, which cannot act except according to a part. – Yet such material activities, taken according to their proper rationes, are said to belong to something first, in the way in which it is possible to find what is first in the agreement of things of this kind, that is, within the genus of material agents, and not simply. – And therefore the objection is not against our thesis. For although with respect to fire and heat, and other material active rationes, the force of the consequence is not apparent, this is because in them there is not found an agent of this kind nor one that is such an agent first, but rather one that is such an agent first within the genus of material agents: where primacy does not exclude a part. Yet it is evident that a part is excluded by primacy simply.

The force of the consequence, therefore, is this: that if God is the first agent through Himself, then He is also the first form through Himself. For what acts as first agent through itself is an agent not through another—that is, not even through a part—but through its whole self; and for this reason the whole must be form, and consequently it must be incomposite of matter and form.

VII. In response to the third, a doubt arises from Durandus⁹ against the cause of individuation assigned there, namely being received in matter, or the inability to be received in it. An individual is said to be an individual by the negation of division by which something higher is divided into its inferiors: and it is an individual by the negation of being in another as in a subject of inherence, not by the negation of being in another as in a subject of information. But both being received in matter and being unable to be received in it pertain to being or not being in another as in a subject of information. Therefore none of these pertains to individuation: rather an equivocation has been committed concerning "being in another" and "subject." The major premise is evident: otherwise this white thing would not be an individual, since it is in another as in a subject of information, namely in this substance. The minor is self-evident.

And it is confirmed. Matter is not the first subject of predication, that is, the lowest thing capable of being a subject: rather it is the first subject of information. Therefore, from the fact that it is the first subject, it is not individuating. – The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved. Because to matter, even though there belongs of itself the negation of being in another as in a subject of information, there does not nevertheless belong the negation of being in another as in a lower subject: since matter is a kind of universal, and is predicated of this and that matter as a universal and as superior of its inferiors, as is evident; otherwise matter would not be knowable, since science is only of universals. – The text, therefore, seems to have assigned badly the reason for the individual from matter.

VIII. To this it must be answered briefly, by granting that one is the mode of being in another as in a lower subject, and another as in the subject of information; and likewise that to be a subject there and here are different things. But with this it stands that for a nature to be in another as superior in inferior—not in any way whatever, but singularly—and for it to be in another through information, are the same thing, not formally, but causally: so that from a quiddity's being in another through information there naturally follows its being in another as a lower singular; and from a quiddity's being unable to be in another through information there follows its being unable to be in the singular as an inferior, but rather its being of itself singular. And this is what the text says. For it assigns being or not being in another through information as the root of individuation: and not as the formal constituent of the individual, as the objections wrongly interpret it. But to prove that this is the root of individuation exceeds the limits of the present undertaking: below, ¹⁰ where individuation will be treated deliberately, it will be discussed. It is enough here, for understanding the text, to know that, according to us, this mode of being in another through information is not what constitutes formally, but causally, the individual.

IX. Hence, in answer to the objection to the contrary, it is said that from the fact that this white thing is an individual, and is in another by way of information, nothing else follows except that esse¹¹ in another by way of information is not the formal constituent of the individual. But this is compatible with holding that, if the nature of whiteness could not be in another by way of inception, white would never be in this white thing as superior in inferior. And again, this white thing would not be this by the positing of an individual difference above the nature, but by the negation of every individual difference: for it would not be divisible into several individuals, as is said in the text concerning forms not receivable in matter.

For confirmation, the consequent is denied. Because from the fact that matter is the first subject of information, it follows that it is the first root of individuation, positively or negatively. — The antecedent is also denied. Because matter is also the first subicible, that is, lowest, not totally, as a complete individual, but partial. — And when it is objected against this, because it is a kind of universal: it is answered that matter in itself is neither universal nor predicable, as is clear from the fact that in itself it is not intelligible, and consequently not knowable either: but matter, by analogy to form, is understood as universal, and becomes a kind of predicable and knowable thing, etc. And therefore in the text it is said that form, insofar as it is of itself, can be in many things, while matter is the first subject: since therefore all universality comes from form, matter in itself is not universal: and since it is the first subject of all the categories, it is both the lowest subicible (though partial), and the first subject of information; and on this account, on every side, the root of individuation.

But concerning these things enough has been said in the commentaries On Being and Essence¹², and in two questions¹³; and more will be said below¹⁴.