Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title of this first article, ly per se, not through another middle term: ly known, knowledge that is evident. For a proposition is said to be per se nota, which is known with certain and infallible evidence from its own terms alone, as is clear in I Poster.¹ The sense of the title is therefore: Whether this proposition, God is (Deus est), is per se nota.

II. In the body two things are done: first, the proposition that is self-evident is distinguished; second, an answer is given to the question². As to the first, the distinction is this: of a proposition that is self-evident, one kind is so in itself only; another is so both in itself and with respect to us; and this latter, either with respect to all of us, or with respect to the wise alone. And thus three members are made in the text.

The distinction is declared, with its members, from a single root of the self-evident proposition in general. A self-evident proposition is one whose predicate is contained in the notion of the subject. Therefore a proposition is self-evident both in itself and to us when its predicate is in the notion of the subject, and the notions of the subject and predicate are known to us, as that anything either is or is not, etc. But only in itself, when its predicate is in the notion of the subject, yet the notions of the terms are hidden from us. Therefore both in itself and to the wise, when its predicate is in the notion of the subject, and the notions of the terms are clear among the wise, as that incorporeal things are not in place. And this member is confirmed by the authority of Boethius.

III. Concerning this part, note that a proposition is called per se known, that is, not through any other middle term, because it excludes every other middle term by means of ly per se, and consequently any premise whatsoever, for making it known. And since some proposition can be made known a priori and a posteriori, it is necessary that ly per se be distinguished: whether it excludes the middle term a priori only; or both a priori and a posteriori at once. For if every per se known proposition is one having its predicate in the intelligibility of its subject, then ly per se must always exclude the middle term a priori; but since it can happen that between things between which there is no medium in itself there may be a medium as they are known to us, therefore it does not always exclude the medium a posteriori. And for this reason in the text the per se known proposition is distinguished according to the difference between terms that are known and unknown, that is, according to the difference between the extremes of propositions as they are known to us. For those whose extremes are immediate not merely in themselves but also as known to us are per se known to all. But those whose extremes, although immediate in themselves, are nevertheless not immediate as known to us, are per se known in themselves only, not to us. And similarly, those whose extremes are immediate as known to the wise are per se known to them.

IV. Concerning this part, there are many doubts and arguments of Scotus, Aureol, and Gregory; but since these pertain to the book Posterior Analytics, where in chapter III I treated this matter at length, therefore, without repeating them here, the solutions to the arguments should be seen there, together with the whole line of reasoning. – Only this should be noted here: that in the text a self-evident proposition is not defined by saying that it is one whose predicate is contained in the ratio of the subject; rather, the causal formulation is given, namely, that from the fact that the predicate is placed in the ratio of the subject, there results a self-evident proposition—which is convertible with respect to that definition. And I say this because it is indeed true with St. Thomas that every proposition whose predicate falls within the ratio of the subject is self-evident, but not conversely: for when one most general genus is denied of another, and when a first passion is predicated of its first subject, propositions result that are immediate in themselves, and consequently self-evident in themselves. If, however, anywhere³ such a definition is found, let ly esse in ratione subiecti be glossed as "formally, or virtually and proximately." Yet such an expression should not be extended further, since it is less proper.

V. As to the second⁴, the responsive conclusion is: This proposition, "God is," is self-evident in itself, but not to us. – The first part is proved because the predicate is identical with the subject⁵; the second, however, because we do not know what the subject is. – And from this there follows a corollary: Therefore this proposition needs to be made manifest through a medium with respect to us, that is, a posteriori through an effect. The inference is clear: because it is not evident to us, and it lacks an a priori middle.

VI. In response to the second, note that against the second answer given there some press quite insistently, as if strengthening the argument, thus. That which exceeds every thinkable thing does not exist, according to your answer: therefore it is not more excellent than everything thinkable, which is opposed to the quid nominis of God himself. The consequence is proved: because it does not exceed a thinkable being; and if it were such, then something thought would be thought greater than what was not thought.

VII. But this objection is no different from the objection made in the text: and therefore it is resolved by the same response, by distinguishing the consequent, that to exceed everything thinkable happens in two ways: in one way, that it excel in rerum natura; in another way, according to the being of what is thought. And I intend, not that esse in rerum natura or objective esse is the reason of the excess: but we use them here as conditions of things thought. For example, the conditions of a perfect orator, when thought, can exceed every orator in two ways: in one way, that this excess be in rerum natura; in another way, that it be in objective esse. In the first way, one would have to posit that a perfect orator exists; in the second way not, but it suffices for him to have objective esse. Now we say that the reason for exceeding is to be considered according to the nobility of the conditions thought in themselves.

In the proposed argument, therefore, it is said that from that antecedent, that which exceeds every thinkable does not exist, there follows most excellently, therefore it does not exceed in actual existence every thinkable thing: indeed, it is not so exceeding as an ant, or any least existing thing whatsoever. But it does not follow that, therefore it does not exceed in itself, according to objective being, every thinkable thing: indeed, in this way it exceeds every thinkable thing. – And when it is said that a greater thinkable thing would exist, if it existed in actual existence, this is denied. For that reply proceeds either from ignorance of their own term, since these men believe that the response given, accepting the quiddity assigned to God by a definition of the name, intends that when this is signified, namely greater than every thinkable thing, something full of all perfection is signified, abstracting from existence (and therefore they insist: "let what is signified be full of all perfection, including existence in actual being; and thus something greater will be signified"): or from ignorance of the distinction between the signified act and the exercised act. For we agree on the quiddity of the name, and we do not disagree. We make no exception in the account of exceeding, or in the signified act: although one must abstract from existing in the exercised act. Hence it is granted that what is greater than every thinkable thing is signified and thought, with all perfection, even the existence of actual being: but in the signified act. Yet from being signified and thought to being (esse) the argument does not hold. And therefore in the text it is said that this reasoning concludes nothing: because it is not conceded by the opponents that what is greater than every thinkable thing exists in the nature of things; although it is conceded that what is greater than every thinkable thing is signified, and thought to exist in the nature of things. Therefore not what is greater is signified as an existing thing: but even if it existed, it would not be greater, but would be that which exists only in thought.

A similar example in particular may be had, if we imagine that we are concealing from ourselves that the noblest of animals exists, and wish to prove that it is from the terms, namely: the noblest of animals is, because if it is not, therefore it is not the noblest of animals. For here it appears more clearly that the ground of excess is the nobility of the thing signified in itself, while the conditions of what exceeds are objective being and being in the nature of things: and how the argument fails is evident to one who exercises himself in it.

VIII. But against these difficulties of the logicians you will impose silence with a single word, saying that greater than everything thinkable imports existence in the nature of things in two ways, namely in act exercised or signified: and that it is conceded in the second way in the matter at hand, but not in the first. And that if it were taken in the first way, that proposition would without doubt be self-evident, that which is greater than everything thinkable, is, just as this one, that which is, is. – The reason, however, why existing is not included as exercised in act but only as conceived is that things are signified by nouns as conceived, but by verbs as exercised. Hence the statement existence is not does not imply contradictories; but this one, that which exists, is not, implies contradictories.

IX. In response to the third, it must be noted that, while the text, in answering, concedes that truth in general is self-evidently known, it seems to accept the inference made in the argument, namely, there is no truth, therefore it is true that there is no truth. Scotus, however, in the First Book, distinction II, question II, in his response to the third argument, censures this inference, saying that it commits the fallacy of the consequent, from several causes of truth to one of them. First, because, although it is valid to argue, there is no truth, therefore it is not true that any truth exists; it does not follow, therefore it is true that no truth exists, for the former is negative, the latter affirmative. Second, because truth is taken either fundamentally or formally: if there is no truth, it is not true in either way that it exists: not fundamentally, because no grounding thing remains; not formally, because no intellect would be supposed to remain. Therefore the affirmative does not follow, but the negative, as has been said.

X. To this it is briefly said that, since according to good logic, from a true proposition de inesse to its modal counterpart de vero there is the best consequence, and conversely, because the true is not a mode adding something above its underlying subject: I wonder how anyone arguing against this consequence opposed himself to it. For it holds validly, Socrates runs, therefore that Socrates runs is true: and likewise, Socrates does not run, therefore that Socrates does not run is true: and this is evident in all cases. And so in the matter at hand, no truth exists: therefore that no truth exists is true. – And it is confirmed: because this proposition, namely no truth exists, is a certain enunciation: therefore signifying what is true or false, as in Book I of the Perihermeneias⁶ But among them it signifies what is true: therefore it signifies that no truth existing is true.

XI. To the first objection, therefore, ⁷ it is said that there is no fallacy: because each of those conclusions follows determinately from that proposition. And the affirmative one about the mode, therefore it is true that no truth is, follows before the negative one, therefore it is not true that some truth is. For the first follows immediately, while the second follows mediately through it: because the first pertains to the consistency of the proposition itself in itself, while the second pertains to the destruction of its contradictory, namely some truth is. And again, although the destruction of the contradictory would follow from it immediately, in saying no truth is, therefore not some truth is: nevertheless the destruction of the contradictory with the mode of the true does not follow except by virtue of the rule stated⁸, namely that a true proposition de inesse is equivalent to a modal proposition de vero: for it is because of this that it follows, no truth is, therefore it is not true that some truth is, since it is equivalent to the negation of its contradictory, namely not some truth is. And thus Scotus, in denying the consequence, granted it unknowingly, when he granted the other one founded upon its root.

To the second objection, it is said that truth is taken at least fundamentally; and when it is said that no foundation would remain, this is denied. For I say that for the fundamental remaining of negative truths, the remaining of things is not required. Hence the truth of this, nothing is nothing, with every thing and intellect entirely excluded, remains fundamentally: for if there were an intellect, it could adequately match its proposition to it, objectively, by composing this, nothing is nothing: and this remaining suffices. Hence even now this proposition, nothing is nothing, has no foundation on the side of the thing signified, except in the way stated. For when it is said that truth fundamentally is an entity, this is true of positive truth, but not of negative: for the foundation of a negative truth is non-being, and is not being, as is evident.

You have this article treated at length in Questions on Truth, question 10, article 12.