Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, to use metaphors is to use expressions that are not verified of the things of which they are said according to their proper signification, but rather according to some likeness to what is properly signified: as when it is said that our God is a consuming fire¹, we use a metaphor; because God is not truly fire, but is related in the manner of a consuming fire. And so with other cases. This question takes its occasion from II Posterior Analytics², where metaphors are forbidden in the sciences.

II. In the body, one conclusion, responsive to the question in the affirmative: Sacred doctrine fittingly uses metaphors drawn from bodily things for divine and spiritual realities.

It is proved in two ways. First. God provides for all things according to what befits their nature. Therefore it is fitting that in sacred doctrine spiritual things are handed on to man under the similitudes of bodily things. — The antecedent is evident. The consequence, however, is proved: because it is natural for man to be led to intelligible things through sensible things. This is proved: because all our knowledge arises from the senses. And this argument is confirmed by the authority of Dionysius, etc.

Second. Sacred doctrine is set before all human beings in common. Therefore it is fitting that spiritual things be handed down under the likenesses of bodily things. The antecedent is proved at Romans 1. But the consequence is proved: because many are not suited to grasp intelligibles in themselves, who can nevertheless apprehend them in this way.

III. In response to the first, a doubt arises as to how it is verified that this doctrine uses metaphors out of necessity and utility, as was said. For there is no necessity, nor is any shown in the body of the text. The second reason indeed infers only utility, as is clear; the first, however, infers fittingness, as the text itself attests, and this can be proven from the fact that our connaturality with sensible things does not infer a necessity for such sensible things, namely metaphors. — And the doubt is increased: because nothing is handed down metaphorically in Scripture that cannot be taught properly. Therefore there is no necessity of using metaphors in this doctrine, although they are used fittingly and usefully.

IV. To this it seems to me that I must answer that the use of metaphors in this doctrine is in a certain way necessary, and in a certain way not: and this with respect not to these or those, say the less capable, but with respect to man as a wayfarer. For it is indeed necessary on account of better attaining the end, namely the knowledge of God. And this necessity is shown by the first argument of the text. For from the fact that it is connatural to man to know intelligibles only through sensibles, it follows that, if he ought to know spiritual things easily and in their own manner, he must know them through metaphors: since metaphors supply the place of the spiritual species, which would have to be had of spiritual things in themselves. — It is not, however, simply necessary: because although not without phantasms, yet without metaphors man could grasp even in this state what is said, though not so easily.

And by this the solution to the objections is clear³ For the first argument shows not only fittingness, but, in showing fittingness, by that very fact shows necessity—not simply, but on account of the better. — And if one presses against this the authority of Dionysius in the text cited, that it is impossible: it may be said that "impossible" is distinguished just as "necessary" is: since the impossible and the necessary are not equivalent; and it is as if it were said, it is necessary that it not shine otherwise for us, etc.