Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title: argumentative, that is, demonstrative of what it teaches: whether it does not, but perhaps simply proposes, as Scotus said against article 2¹.

II. In the body, three conclusions. The first is: Sacred doctrine does not argue to principles, but to conclusions from principles. The second is: Sacred doctrine disputes by arguing against those who deny its principles, if they concede something of it. The third: Sacred doctrine disputes only by resolving, against those who deny its principles and concede nothing of it at all. – And the discussion here is always about complex principles of cognition in this science, that is, the articles of faith: whatever may be said of incomplex principles concerns either their being alone or their esse itself.

III. The first conclusion is proved. No science proves its own principles, but draws conclusions from them: therefore. – And the second part of the conclusion is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle, I Corinthians XV.

The second and third, however, are proved together at once. The supreme science among the physical sciences disputes against those who deny the principles; and it defends them by resolving—at least, if they concede nothing. Therefore this doctrine also has both. – The antecedent is explained from the difference between the inferior sciences and the supreme one. The consequence, however, is proved: because this is the supreme science.

Then they are made manifest one by one. The second, indeed, when against the heretics we prove one article from another, etc. The third, however, because no demonstrative argument can exist against infallible truth: therefore all arguments against those things that belong to this science are solvable arguments. The inference holds: because this doctrine rests upon infallible truth.

IV. Concerning the third conclusion, note that the theologian's ability to resolve the philosophers' arguments against the truths of faith occurs in two ways. In one way, from the things believed: for instance, if someone says that everything which is one in number is one hypostatically, he responds: "I deny it, because God is three." And thus the theological solution resolves only by believing. – In another way, from propositions known, either simply or in this respect: for instance, if he were to respond: "I deny it in the case of an infinite being": not because he knows its contradictory, namely that an infinite being exists in several hypostases; but because he knows negatively that no effective middle term can be had for proving it (and one is said to know negatively when the intellect is compelled by no middle term). And thus the theologian resolves from what is known in this respect. Sometimes, however, from what is known simply: as if he should resolve the argument against the accidents in the Sacrament of the Altar, on the grounds that the esse of an accident is not to exist actually, but aptitudinally.

In the matter at hand, I understand this text as referring to theological solution in the second way. And if it is insisted that such a solution is not that of the theologian qua theologian, because it does not proceed from the principles of theology: let the assumption be denied. For theology not only rejoices in what is its own, but also makes what belongs to others its own, when for our sake it employs the propositions of other sciences in its own defense, as was touched upon in article 5, ad 2. And although purely theological matters must flow from theological principles, yet ministerially theological matters need not do so; rather, it is enough that they serve them. Now solutions of this kind are theological in this way.

Hence those seem to think less well who assign to theology the power of solving objections only from some proposition believed. And they are deceived because they have not distinguished between the natures of solution and proof. For proof proceeds from what is evident; but solution also proceeds from things that do not appear to be false, even granted that they are not known to be true. And therefore the theologian can always solve an objection, without his intellect ever being compelled by any proposition contrary to the things that belong to faith, even though he does not see their falsity.

V. Concerning the proof of the third conclusion ², know that it is one thing to know that all the arguments against the faith are solvable, and another to know how to solve them. The first is proved in the text: and the proof assumes one proposition held on faith, namely, that this doctrine rests upon infallible truth: and therefore this conclusion is not evident to us here. The second, however, consists in actual exercise: and the book Contra Gentiles is full of it. And since the solution, as was said ³ and as we experience, does not require evidence, but only that the intellect not be compelled; and this is demonstrated in the very exercise of the solution, so long as no compelling reason is present: therefore, to know how to solve, or to solve the objections against this doctrine, is not to believe, or to believe from belief, except occasionally; for from the fact that we believe, we apply the intellect to discovering the defects of the opposing arguments and propositions. And mark this distinction well: because inattention to it has perhaps allowed some to err in this passage.

VI. In response to the second, note the four enumerated items, namely: the authorities of sacred Scripture, the authorities of the holy Doctors, human reasonings, and the authorities of the philosophers. From the first, indeed, this doctrine is said to proceed as from proper and necessary sources; from the second, however, as from proper but probable ones; from the fourth, truly, as probable but extraneous. And thus no place is assigned to the third. And therefore it must be known that human reasoning, of which we are speaking here, is nothing other than some argumentation having its force from the natural light alone. And it is twofold: one kind concludes necessarily, which is called demonstration; and another kind probabilistically, which has great breadth. But each is contained within some certain physical science, and consequently is extraneous to the genus of theological knowability: and by this very fact, theology proceeds from human reasoning as such as from something extraneous. And since no physical demonstration can be brought forward concerning theological matters as such (since theological matters, as such, must be resolved into principles evident not by natural light, but divine), therefore, speaking absolutely, theology proceeds from natural reason as from something extraneous and probable; just as from the authorities of the philosophers. And therefore the place assigned to the authorities of the philosophers must be understood as assigned also to the natural reason which they knew: a sign of this is that he was treating both at once. And thus all the enumerated items have been given their place.

VII. But a doubt arises here that must not be passed over in silence. If theology proceeds from natural reasons as from extrinsic and merely probable ones, why have speculative doctors undertaken such great labor? What is the purpose of the book Contra Gentiles, so full of natural reasons? etc. For either these authors do not hand down theology, or they have dwelt too long on extrinsic matters.

VIII. To this it is briefly answered that the metaphysical and natural demonstrations brought forward in sacred doctrine are, in themselves, extraneous; but as handmaids of theology—whether for destroying positions opposed to conclusions or principles that are theological, or for resolving arguments made against theological matters, or for establishing those things about which theology is secondarily concerned, such as that God is, and is one, and immortal, etc.—they are not extraneous. Rather, theology proceeds from them as from its own principles, and at times necessary ones; yet ministerially, and not by reason of themselves, but on account of the weakness of our intellect, as was said in article 5, reply to objection 2. And therefore the holy Doctors, who were endowed with a speculative genius and desiring to come to the aid of the defect of human understanding, attempted to bring forward very many philosophical reasons toward some one of these three ends: so that learned men, finding that the things which are of faith are not contrary to reason, might more easily adhere to the things that are of faith, or at least not despise or ridicule them.

It is further suggested that such reasons, as handmaids, become proper to this science for our sake, from the text in the third conclusion, and from its exposition. For objections opposed with a sufficient solution cannot otherwise be resolved except by philosophical reasons: for if the objections of the philosophers were to be resolved from matters of faith, the theologians would be ridiculous to the philosophers, etc.

IX. Concerning these matters, note carefully that it is one thing to speak of human reason, and another to speak of propositions known by human reason. In the text, as we explained ⁴, it is intimated that this doctrine proceeds from human reason, speaking absolutely, as from things extraneous: since propositions known by natural light, not by divine light as such, are extraneous. Yet nevertheless many propositions known by natural light and demonstration, taken in themselves, are truly and properly theological, though under a different light, as is clear in article 1, in the reply to objection 2; as is evident of these: God exists, God is one, God is good, etc. Hence, when the theologian argues from these, he argues from what is proper to him; although not known in a manner proper only to him, insofar as they are not only revealed but also known by natural reason.