Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, note both terms. Ly subiectum stands for the formal subject, and ly Deus is taken formally, that is, inasmuch as God: so that the meaning is: Whether God, inasmuch as he is God, is the formal subject of this science.

And for the goodness of the doctrine, penetrate what it signifies insofar as God is concerned, from Scotus's exposition in this question¹. Just as man can be taken in four ways: first, as rational animal; and thus he is understood quidditatively, insofar as he is man: second, as substance; and thus he is conceived in common: third, as naturally gentle; and thus he is conceived per accidens, because to be gentle is an accident or passion of man: fourth, as the noblest of animals; and thus he is conceived relatively with respect to another — so, in our case, proceeding in reverse order, God can be considered as the highest cause, and universally according to whatever predicate relative to what is outside him; and thus he is considered relatively to what is outside him: he can also be considered as wise, good, just, and universally according to the attributive notions; and thus he is considered quasi per accidens: he can also be considered as a being (ens), as act, etc.; and thus he is considered in common. And to these three modes, which are quasi simple, the composite considerations are reduced, e.g., as pure act, as first being (ens primum), etc.: for God is considered in such cases as standing under a common concept, one that is relative or negative, as is evident. But before all these modes, God can be considered according to his own proper quiddity: for this is the first knowledge of all things by nature, and the foundation of the others: and we designate this quiddity by the name deity. And so, to ask whether God under the notion of deity, as distinguished against the notion of goodness etc., is the subject of this science, is to ask whether God under the notion of his own proper quiddity is the formal subject of this science; such that the quiddity of God would be the formal ratio of this subject as it is a thing, etc.

II. In the body there are two parts: first, the responsive conclusion is set down, answering the question affirmatively; second, the sayings of others are reported². As to the first, the conclusion is: God is the subject of this science.

It is proved in two ways³. First. The object of any power or habit is that under whose aspect all things are referred to the power or habit; therefore the subject of a science is that under whose aspect all things are considered in that science. Therefore the subject of this science is God. The antecedent is made clear by the object of sight. — The first consequence, however, is proved as follows. The subject stands to a science just as the object stands to a power or habit; therefore, if the object, etc. — But the second consequence is proved as follows. All things are considered in sacred doctrine under the aspect of God; therefore, if the subject, etc. The assumption is proved: because all things either are God or are ordered to God, as to their principle or their end, etc.

III. Concerning the proof of the first consequence, note that the proposition assumed, as the object is to the power, so the subject is to the science, need not hold for all things: but it is enough for the purpose at hand that it hold with respect to the proportion of the formal ratio; so that, just as the formal ratio of the object of a power is that by which all things are referred to that power, so the formal ratio of the subject of a science is that by reason of which all things are considered in that science. Whether, however, the likeness holds with respect to other things, for instance with respect to commonness (so that just as the formal object of a power is something common to all the per se objects of that power, so the subject of a science ought to be something common to all its per se subjects), is not the present concern: although it is plainly evident from this that one need not preserve this likeness, since the subject posited for this science is not something common, but God as God, who, as such, is admittedly a certain singular being.

Nor is there any obstacle in the fact that in I Sent., article 4 of the Prologue, St. Thomas said that the subject of a science has this condition, namely, that it is common by predication: for that is true only according to what commonly happens, and not necessarily. For we see that condition commonly found in the subjects commonly assigned to the sciences by the doctors; yet it need not be so, as is clear from IV Metaphys.⁴ in the science of the healthy. - The community of predication could also be saved in every subject, not directly, but directly or obliquely: for thus God too is predicated of all theological things, because they are either God, or of God, or ordered to God, or from God, etc. The first answer, however, is literal.

IV. Concerning the proposition assumed in the proof of the second inference⁵, namely, that all things are considered in this science under the aspect of God, there is doubt, both simply and ad hominem. Simply, indeed, Gregory of Rimini argues⁶: If God under the aspect of deity were the subject of theology, both that of the blessed and ours, then all things knowable through the aspect of deity would fall under theology. But this is impossible: both because all things, simply speaking, would fall under theology; and because infinite truths would fall under the same science. For through the deity all things are knowable, and infinitely so, etc., as is evident in the science which God has of Himself through His essence.

But against the man himself: because St. Thomas himself, in the Prologue to Book I of the Sentences, article 4, expressly says that the subject of this science is divine being (ens divinum), knowable by inspiration; and not God, except as its principal subject. Therefore, etc.

V. To the first of these, the consequence must be denied, for a twofold reason. The first is that theology, whether ours or the blessed, is a science inadequate to its subject, whereas that conditional is true of a science adequate to its subject. For God alone has a theology adequate to its formal subject. — But this reason seems to count for nothing. For the formal ratio of the subject and the science must correspond to each other adequately; otherwise the sciences would not be distinguished by their formal subjects, nor could a reason be assigned why one science considers such a subject rather than another.

Hence another account of the negation is assigned. And it is this: because in the antecedent of that conditional there is no mention of the formal ratio under which; yet upon that depends the adequation or limitation of what is knowable concerning the subject, through the formal ratio of that subject as a thing is. For God, although by reason of the deity He is infinitely knowable, nevertheless God as God, under the participated light of glory, is knowable below a certain limit with respect to individual things. And similarly, under the participation of the light of grace, He is knowable according to certain limits, etc. And therefore, in order to verify that conditional, one must add: if God inasmuch as He is God, under a light adequate to Himself, were the subject of some science, that science would know all things, etc. But then the falsity of the proposition to be subsumed is evident: because only the divine light in itself is such a light; but for our theology and for blessed theology, God, indeed inasmuch as He is God, yet under a diminished light, is the subject. And therefore, according to the capacity of the light is the extension of the science. Science, then, is not to be measured according to the extension of the formal ratio as a thing is absolutely, but as standing under the formal ratio of the object as an object is.

VI. To the second ⁷ it is said that St. Thomas, not asserting but opining, following the conditions of the subject commonly stated by others, said this; as is clear from his manner of speaking, when, in beginning that position, he says: if we wish to posit some subject in which all these conditions are preserved. But here he determined assertively what he had even then begun: for there too he says that all things are considered in this science under the aspect of God. Therefore this is to be held simply; the former, however, is to be heard as a matter of opinion.

VII. The second argument leading to the conclusion⁸ is this. The subject of the principles and of the whole science is the same: God is the subject of the principles of this science; therefore God is the subject of the whole science. — The major premise is proved: because the whole science is contained virtually in its principles. The minor, however, because God is the subject of the articles of faith.

VIII. Concerning the proposition assumed to prove the major premise, namely, the whole of science is contained virtually in the principles, a doubt arises: for it seems contrary to the doctrine of St. Thomas. For it follows: The whole of science is contained virtually in the principles: therefore in the subject of the principles: therefore in the subject of the science. Therefore there cannot be one science according to its most special species of two disparate species, indeed even of genus and species, according to what is proper to each. This is false according to St. Thomas: since the science of the triangle and the square and figure, etc., not only according to their common features but also according to what is proper to each, is of one species; as is clear in Ia IIae⁹, and in I Poster.¹⁰ Therefore.

The first consequence is evident: because principles are formed from the account of the subject. The second is also evident: because the subject of the principles and of the science is the same. The third, however, is evident because the science of one wholly disparate species, with respect to its proper attributes, is not contained virtually in another species, nor in the account of the genus as such: just as neither are the passions of one species contained virtually in another, nor in the account of the genus, as is clear.

IX. To this objection one must respond, not only ad hominem, but simply: since this virtual containment introduces doubt, not only because it is posited here in the text, but simply. Hence Scotus, in the Prologue, question III, holding that the virtual containment of all truths pertaining to some science is the condition constituting the formal notion of the subject in that science, agrees with the aforesaid objection, conceding as true that to which the argument leads, which we consider false.

It must be known, therefore, that there are two opinions concerning this kind of containment. For Scotus holds that the subject of a science must contain, first and virtually, as a sufficient cause, all the truths pertaining to such a science. And he proves this in two ways. First, because it contains the immediate propositions, which are the principles virtually containing the whole science. This is evident, because the predicate of an immediate proposition is contained in its subject; but the subject is the subject of the science; therefore. Second, because the subject is the adequate cause of the habit: therefore it contains the whole of that habit virtually, first; therefore all of its truths. — And according to this opinion, there are as many sciences specifically distinct as there are not only species of things wholly disparate (which I say on account of subordinate species, for instance a subject and a passion), but also as many as there are formal rationes of things, one of which is not contained virtually in another. And thus one science is of animal as such, to which it belongs to consider only the proper passions of animal (since those alone are enclosed virtually within animal); and another is of ox insofar as it is ox, and another of lion insofar as it is lion, etc.

X. But St. Thomas, holding that the sciences are divided not as things are divided absolutely, but as they are knowable, holds that the formal subject of a science requires two conditions, as is gathered from the text. The first is that by reason of it all things are attained by that science. The second, that it contain the whole science virtually: not as a cause sufficient in itself, as Scotus wished; but taken in itself indeed, sufficient as a first cause, that is, in its own order, and not simply. But when it is taken both in itself and in the things participating in it, or in any way attributed to it, it becomes sufficient simply. Now that cause is called simply sufficient which is first, that is, adequate, cause of something; as the subject of its proper passion, whether immediately or through some prior passion: but that cause is sufficient in its own order which, although alone it does not suffice for the effect, is nevertheless in its own order the complete and total cause, as the sun is the cause of Socrates. And in this way the first principles of any science contain virtually all the truths of that science, namely, as first propositions. For not from the first propositions alone immediately, as is evident, nor through only those things which depend totally upon them, are all truths known: but from them as first, and from others as second and proximate causes, many conclusions are known.

And this is clearer still in the very passions that are demonstrated. For in the science of number, it is not necessary that all the passions knowable by that science be contained virtually in number, first—that is, adequately and sufficiently—when speaking of number in itself: for thus neither the passions of two nor those of three would be known there, as is evident. But it is indeed necessary that number in itself contain virtually all passions of this kind, as their first root. As distinct and participated, however, in two and three and so on, the subject of all these passions must be first—that is, adequate. And hence the principles of such a science, which have number for their subject, contain virtually all truths as first causes. Nor is it necessary that they suffice for inferring all conclusions, unless joined with propositions whose subject is two or three and so on, as proximate causes: just as neither is number in itself a sufficient cause of the passions of two, but only their first root—and this insofar as they are knowable, that is, inasmuch as they are in such a species of the knowable; whatever may be the case in esse naturae.

And according to this way, it is manifest that the same science, specifically considered, can be about a genus and about many species, in accordance with the proper characteristics of each.

XI. And if it be asked: What, then, will be the limit of the knowables within a single science? The answer is already clear from what has been said: for sciences are delimited according to the species of knowables as such, and not according to the species of things. And therefore as many species and genera of things can be comprehended under one science as can happen to be comprehended under one species of the knowable. And therefore that formal ratio of things which first grounds that species of the knowable—that is, to which there first belongs that mode of abstraction, or definition, or cognition, which constitutes that species of the knowable—is the formal ratio of the subject in that science; and it is the first root of all that pertains to that science as such.

That, however, such virtual containment as has been explained¹¹ suffices for the subject and principles of a science is evident from the procedures of the sciences, both in mathematics and in natural philosophy. For in both cases the proper attributes of many species are handed down—for instance, of the triangle and the quadrangle—which, as is clear, cannot be contained adequately in the subject of geometry.

XII. To the first Scotist argument, it has already been said¹² that what was stated above¹³ holds. – But to the second, from the same foundation it is said that the subject of a habit containing the whole habit virtually can be understood in two ways: in one way, taking the subject in itself; in another way, as found in others participating in it per se in any manner whatsoever. And likewise containing virtually is twofold: namely, adequately, and as a first cause. The subject in itself contains the whole habit virtually, and not a part; just as the sun contains the whole man virtually, and not a part, yet as first or superior cause. But the subject both in itself and in its participants contains the whole habit virtually and adequately, as total cause. – And thus the doubt is resolved both simply and ad hominem¹⁴.

XIII. As to the second¹⁵, three other assignments are referred to it. The first is that of the Master of the Sentences; the second, that of Hugh of Saint Victor; the third is that of the Lincolnian. But note the modesty of the Author. For first, excusing them, he says that they attended to the matter: as if to say that they did not intend to assign the formal subject. Second, he reduces all the aforementioned to the formal subject assigned by himself, saying that all these things are treated in relation to God.